CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/09/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000957
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: September 23, 1955

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Copy No. 9,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. _./.9
NO-CHANGE IN CLASS.
C ! DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE;., r.:PO
AUTH: HR 7
DATE REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1. SOVIET ARMS OFFERS REPORTEDLY ACCEPTED BY
EGYPT (page 3).
2. TOKYO DROPS PREREQUISITE FOR RECOGNITION OF
USSR (page 5).
3. COMMENT ON CRISIS IN GREEK-AMERICAN RELATIONS
(page 6).
4. YUGOSLAVS PLEDGE CONTINUED CO-OPERATION
WITH GREECE (page 7).
5. ICELANDIC OPINION RELATES PORKKALA TO NATO
BASE AT ICEFLAVIK (page 1).
23 Sept 55
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1. SOVIET ARMS OFFERS REPORTEDLY ACCEPTED BY
EGYPT
On 21 September Egypt signed a five-year
"open agreement" with the USSR under
which the Soviet Union is committed to sell
certain categories of military equipment
to Egypt,
The initial Egyptian order consisted of
200 jet aircraft
six jet training planes, 100 heavy
tanks, six torpedo patrol boats and two submarines. One
hundred of the aircraft are to be delivered by December 1955.
The total cost of this equipment is 30 million Egyptian pounds
(about 85 million dollars) and is payable in Egyptian exports.
The first shipment of Soviet equipment has
been inspected and accepted by Egyptian officers at Odessa
and either has been or is about to be shipped. Soviet tech-
nicians are to go to Egypt to assist in assembling the aircraft,
but will stay only three months.
the Egyptian government has decided not to make a public
announcement, but rather to publish a series of editorials
arguing that Egypt should no longer wait for the West. but
accept the Soviet offer.
editorials began to appear on 21 September.
Comment This detailed report is in line with other
recent reports, even though the quantities
involved seem high in terms of Egypt's capacities. Aside
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from assemblage of the aircraft, Egyptian personnel would
require much more than three months for learning to main-
tain and fly the planes.
Supplying arms to Egypt would break a
long-standing Soviet practice of shipping arms only to
countries in the Sino-Soviet bloc, and may presage a series
of similar offers which would allow arms to flow into troubled
areas. The USSR has recently offered Saudi Arabia arms and
economic assistance, and has shown special interest in Syria.
Should Egypt receive a substantial quan-
tity of modern arms from the USSR, the first and most
vigorous reaction would come from Israel. The Israeli govern-
ment would step up its campaign to obtain a specific security
guarantee from the United States.
/Shipment of Soviet arms to
Egypt would increase the influence of elements in Israel who
argue that a preventive war against Egypt is the only real
solution to the Arab-Israeli problem.
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2. TOKYO DROPS PREREQUISITE FOR RECOGNITION OF
USSR
Tokyo has apparently retreated from
its previous position that the imme-
diate and unconditional repatriation of
Japanese detainees is a prerequisite
for normalizing relations with the
USSR.
apan was willing to establish diplomatic relations
with Moscow prior to the return of Soviet-held Japanese
and rely on an exchange of notes outlining the Soviet re-
patriation plan at the time a treaty was signed.
The speedy negotiation of a settle-
ment with Moscow by Chancellor Adenauer may have in-
fluenced the Japanese to shift their position.
Statements by Soviet leaders, such as
that of Khrushchev on 21 September to a visiting Japanese
parliamentary delegation citing the quick German agree-
ment and charging Japan with deliberate stalling, probably
will strengthen pressure in Tokyo for acceptance of some
of Moscow's other terms.
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3. COMMENT ON CRISIS IN GREEK-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The Greek press is launching a bitter
attack on the United States as a result
of the American vote on 21 September
against inscription of the Cyprus issue
on the agenda of the UN General Assem-
bly.
Both Greek foreign minister Stephanopou-
los in New York and Deputy premier Kanellopoulos in Athens
reacted strongly to the American decision and predicted
dire developments when given advance information of it. Re-
ports from Athens, including a statement by Ambassador
Cannon, suggest, however, that local Greek security forces
are probably capable and desirous of handling any demon-
strations. British forces on Cyprus are likewise adequate
for maintaining local order.
Aside from the possibility of isolated
acts of terrorism, the more serious longer-range threat
would appear to be the rising trend toward neutralism in
Greece, which will be given strong encouragement by the
sense of frustration and abandonment now rife in Greek
political circles.
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4. YUGOSLAVS PLEDGE CONTINUED CO-OPERATION
WITH GREECE
The Yugoslav government has in-
formed Athens that if Greek-Turkish
co-operation should cease, the Yugo-
slays would strengthen their co-
operation with Greece but would not
take comparable action with Turkey,
according to the Greek chief of staff,
General Dovas, The Yugoslav mili-
tary attache, in telling this to General
Dovas, exp ed that the identical_notes sent to Greece
and Turkey arlier this month stating Belgrade's intention
to terminate the intelligence exchange program on the
USSR and the Satellites were written with Turkey prima-
rily ikmind. He said Yugoslavia wanted to continue its
program with Greece.
the Yugoslav move regarding the exchange
program could be part of an attempt to influence Greece
toward Yugoslavia and its "neutralism." Greek public
sentiment has received strong impetus in this direction
following the disorders in Turkey.
Comment Should the Balkan alliance break up
over Turkish-creek differences, Yugo-
slavia would gain more by maintaining close relations
with Greece than with Turkey.
to Greek security.
23 Sept 55
Friendly ties with Yugoslavia are vital
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5. ICELANDIC OPINION RELATES PORKKALA TO NATO
BASE AT KEFLAVIK
In connection with the Soviet return
of Porkkala to Finland, which has
created a greater stir in Iceland than
any other recent Soviet move, nation-
a s and left-wing elements are drawing an analogy be-
tween Porkkala and the US-manned NATO air base at
Keflavik. According to the American legation in Reykjavik,
even the Conservative and Progressive press fails to point
to the fact that Iceland is a member of NATO and Keflavik
a NATO base.
Comment Despite the economic advantages accru-
ing from the Keflavik base, the pres-
ence of American troops in Iceland has never been popular
among the Icelanders. Even Icelandic leaders favorable
to NATO are reluctant for domestic political reasons to
defend the presence of Americans.
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