CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/09/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03000956
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: September 22, 1955

,Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03000956
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22 September 1955
Copy No. ,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 18
NOCHANGE IN CLASS.
Cl DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: IP-.0 I
HR 70-2 AnAt
DATE: r.� StON _ REVIEWER:
1 11
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
J.. COMMENT ON ARGENTINE SITUATION (page 3).
2. BURMESE COMMUNIST CHIEF ORDERS CONTINUATION
OF INSURRECTION (page 4).
3. COMMENT ON VIET MINH CABINET CHANGES (page 5).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 6)
22 Sept 55
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1. COMMENT ON ARGENTINE SITUATION
The new governing junta established
as a result of truce negotiations be-
tween the victorious forces of the
Argentine revolution and the military
junta of the "loyalist forces" consists
of professional military leaders, none
of whom is known to be unfriendly to
the United States.
Retired army general Eduardo Lonardi
has been announced as the head of the new junta, which
will also include Admiral Rojas and Generals Bengoa and
Bergallo. Lonardi, who has a reputation for integrity,
was implicated in the unsuccessful September 1951 revolt.
Admiral Rojas commanded the rebel fleet during the cur-
rent revolt. General'Bengoa, who is widely respected
throughout the army, was reported in the early stages of
the June 1955 revolt to be the rebel commander but later
claimed to be on Peron's side. He resigned from the
service in August. General Bergallo is believed not to
have been engaged in any political activities.
The new junta will be plagued both by
interservice rivalries and by the ever-present danger of
serious strikes and possible sabotage by the General
Confederation of Labor and those members of the Peron-
ista party who remain fanatically loyal to Peron.
22 Sept 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
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A h./ 1.41, A ILLS A
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2, BURMESE COMMUNIST CHIEF ORDERS CONTINUATION
OF INSURRECTION
hakin Than Tun, the leader of the in-
urgent Burma Communist Party,
ssued a proclamation on 26 August ,
tating that the party would "continua,
o oppose and fightour enemy, the government, with de-
termination and keenness," Members were specifically
instructed to carry on full-scale guerrilla warfare, to
undertake careful intelligence work, and to make every
effort to bring about internal dissension in government
ranks.
Comment The Burmese Communists revolted
against the government in 1948, and
have been a major security problem since that time. Than
Tun's proclamation may have been motivated by a fear that
his party is about to be sacrificed in the interest of friendly
Sino-Burmese relations. There have been reports suggest-
ing that Peiping is not averse to writing off the badly dis-
credited Burma Communist Party. Such an act would not
significantly reduce the Chinese Communists' capabilities
for promoting subversion in Burma because they can util-
ize the overt and pro-Communist Burma Workers and
Peasants Party.
22 Sept 55
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3. COMMENT ON WET MINH CABINET CHANGES
President Ho Chi Minh's relinquish-
ment of the premiership to Foreign
Minister Pham Van Dong, together
with appointmen: of Vo Nguyen Giap and Phan Ke Toai
as vice premiers, formalizes an already existing ar-
rangement. Pham Van Dong has been closely associated
with daily direction of government affairs. There is no
indication that these changes result from factional strug-
gles or policy differences.
Ho's position now more closely re-
sembles that of Mao Tse-tung in Peiping. Ho remains
president of the state and chairman of the Lao Dong
(Communist) Party.
The announcement was made before
a session of the National Assembly hastily called to ap-
prove the government's policies and its campaign for
unification of all Vietnam. Ho's new position allows him
to stand above and apart from the government and thus
may enhance his value as a popular symbol in South
Vietnam as well as in the north.
22 Sept 55
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
TOP SECRET
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1,0�,
BIWEEKLY SUMMARY
(8-21 September 1955)
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
1. Military activity in the area remained at a low level
during the period. Small-scale artillery exchanges occurred
intermittently.
2. Chief, MAAG (Formosa), reported on 18 September
that President Chiang Kai-shek has ordered an additional
artillery battalion and another infantry battalion to reinforce
the Matsu garrison. The apparent basis for this is Chiang's
expectation of a Communist attack against Matsu sometime be-
tween 27 September and 15 October. Chief, MAAG, has pro-
tested and has reiterated his position that no more troops
should be sent to the offshore islands. Of the 21 infantry
divisions in the Nationalist army, 7 1/3 currently are on the
offshore islands and chief, MAAG, considers that this is al-
ready a larger force than can be adequately supported.
The Nationalists will probably proceed with this rein-
forcement, however, just as they did with the recent move-
ment of a division to Quemoy over strenuous MAAG objections.
The claim of an impending attack against Matsu is not con-
firmed by any other sources and is probably a fabrication to
justify this reinforcement. It may be that Chiang believes
that by committing an excessively large portion of his regu-
lar forces to the offshore islands, the US will be c
to support him in the event of a Communist attack.
3. Aerial photography of 7 September showed 78 MIG
fighters at Luchiao, 150 miles northeast of Matsu as com-
pared with 36 in early August.
flew from Shanghai to Luchiao
22 Sept 55
at least 34 jet fighters
. There are
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indications that Chinese Communist air force and naval
air force units are periodically staged into Luchiao for
area-familiarization flights.
4. Peiping's tactics evidence a continuing determina-
tion to get the US to negotiate with Communist China on the
questions now dividing the two countries. Peiping's propa-
ganda and Wang Ping-nan's statements to Ambassador John-
son have hinted that the repatriation agreement would be
jeopardized if the Americans refused to et on with the
second phase of the Geneva talks.
22 Sept 55
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22 SEPTEMBER 1955
FORMOSA STRAITS SITUATION
Prim,ry rcTd
Secondary roods
NAUr/CAL MILfS
50 100
150
1 1 1 1 1 1 Railroad
50 Proposed railroad
51,71J, kilirS
e
� A . OPERATIONAL
� A SERVICEABLE
� A UNKNOWN
UNDER
CONSTRUCT! ON
COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND
USABILITY
MIG.15, MIG.17.TU.4. IL-DR
TU.2, IL-ID. LA.9/11. LI.2. ETC.
UNKNOWN
FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPAOCE OE
SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
AT PRESENT.
NATIONALM AlkFILLO
DESIGNATIONS
PRIVARY: CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA, WITH PREPARED
RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.
SECONDARY: AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES, OR FIELDS OF LESSER
IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.
OPERATIONAL: ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT.
SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE 4SABLE WY JETS.
SERVICEABLE: INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT
UNKNOWN: CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED.
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