CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/12/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02998394
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: December 3, 1958

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3.5(c)
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3 December 1958
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
CLASS. CHANCED To:
NEXT RETEW OA I E: 4.
ALITH:
DATE.
.4_ le_ REVIEWER
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3 DECEMBER 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - Available evidence suggests
launching attempt, poscao�, rvf
vehicle in near future.
KhrlIshchev to confer with Polish and
East German leaders on Berlin tac-
tics.
Latest Soviet proposals at Geneva
talks leave Communist position un-
changed.
Four Soviet sub chasers being de-
livered to Indonesia.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Sudan - Abboud rebuffing politicians'
advice; regime pursuing independent
foreign policy tactics.
Cambodia presents its case against
Thailand to Communist China and
USSR.
III, THE WEST
De Gaulle's policy on Algeria may be
hampered by overwhelming parlia-
mentary sentiment for integration.
French dragging feet in NATO as
tactic to advance De Gaulle's tri-
umvirate proposals.
Bolivia - President Siles says USSR
has offered aid to oil industry.
Uruguay. - Colorado party defeated
by protest vote; change in orienta-
tion under National party considered
unlikely.
0 Colombia - Government expects coup
attempt by supporters of ex-dictator
Rojas.
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3 December 1958
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet missile activity:
involving the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range indi-
cate that a launching attempt may take place in the near
future. Available evidence suggests that the next Soviet
attempt will involve some tvne of space vehicle rather than
an ICBM. I
USSR.- Berlin: Khrushchev is scheduled to meet soon
with Polish and East German leaders to discuss further
tactics on Berlin. A Czech broadcast says Khrushchev,
Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, and Ulbricht will "coordinate a
political and diplomatic initiative for the solution of the
Berlin problem and for relaxation in central Europe."
(Page 1)
USSR--Geneva talks: Soviet-bloc delegates in both
Geneva conferences have introduced "declarations" sum-
marizing bloc proposals and criticizing Western positions.
These declarations, apparently designed for early publica-
tion, represent further efforts to place the bloc in the strong-
est possible position prior to proposals to end the talks or
raise them to a higher level. The USSR's ostensible conces-
sion in agreeing to include "basic provisions" on controls
in a treaty on ending nuclear tests does not alter its basic
position that the West must agree to a permanent and uncon-
ditional cessation of testing before the details of a control
system can be discussed. (Page 2)
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USSR-Indonesia: Four Soviet sub chasers being towed
by a merchant ship and three tugs cleared the Turkish Straits
on 24 November and transited the Suez Canal on 30 November,
apparently for delivery to Indonesia under its arms deal with
the bloc. Under an $85,000,000 credit from Poland, Indonesia
is scheduled to receive by the end of this year eight sub chas-
ers from the bloc, the first four of which were delivered in
mid-October. This credit also provides for Indonesia to re-
ceive four destroyers and two submarines from the bloc
Sudan:1 Recent decisions by the Abboud regime in itireign
and domestic affairs reflect his independence from the influ-
ence of old-line politicians. The regime has accepted the
American aid program; recognized Communist China; stated
Its intention to abide by the "neutralist" Bandung principles;
and is considering a long-standing Soviet offer of assistance.
The government has moved to curb pro-Communist and pro-
TJAR publications. (Page 3)
Cambodia: The Cambodian ambassador in Peiping has
presented his government's version of the dispute with Thailand
to the Chinese Communist government. Sihanouk's account has
also been passed-to all diplomatic missions in Peiping, and has
been transmitted to Moscow. This action may be a preparatory
step by Premier Sihanouk in case he feels the need to reauest
Peiping's support against Thailand.
(Page 4)
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: De Gaulle's maneuverability on Algeria
may be severely circumscribed by the election of over 400
parliamentary deputies�out of a total of 546--who generally
favor integration with France. With his prestige at a new high
and his power to govern by decree extending for some time, he
may, however, try to move rapidly toward a comparatively
liberal solution. He may announce the long-rumored replacement
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of Generals Salan and Massu and the re-establishment of
civilian administration during his scheduled 3 - 7 December
visit to Algeria. (Page 5)
0 1 C
France-NATO: France's footdragging on key NATO mil-
itary programs is apparently motivated by a determination
to impress the United States and Britain with the seriousness
of De Gaulle's proposals for tripartite global policy coordina-
tion. Growing French nationalism, as shown in the 30 No-
vember election results, will encourage De Gaulle to persist
in this attitude even at the risk of further delay in NATO mil-
itary projects and of political tension within the alliance.
(Page 6)
Bolivia: President Siles says that the USSR has offered
large7"-g-'E)F., e assistance to Bolivia's national oil company. For-
eign Minister Andrade, referring to a Rumanian UN proposal
on oil development, has said that Bolivian public opinion is
highly vulnerable to Soviet-bloc maneuvers because of the
national oil eomnams failure to obtain loans from free-world
sources (Page 7)
Uruguay: The National party defeated the Colorado party
in the 30 November elections on the basis of protest votes,
largely on economic issues, rather than on a positive plat-
form. Alter 93 years of Colorado party rule, considerable
transitional confusion is likely, but Uruguay's foreign policy
probably will not be basically altered.
(Page 8)
Colombia: The Lleras government expects the supporters
of former dictator Rojas to attempt a coup, possibly within
the next few days. Leaders of the plot recently claimed that
the plans were in too advanced a stage to halt and indicated
\ that the action would be timed for about mid-December. Rojas
apparently has some support in the army, which is reported
to be restive. (Page 9)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Conference May Be Held Warsaw Warsaw to Discuss Berlin
Problem '
Khrushchev, Ulbricht, Gomulka� and Cyrankiewicz are
to meet soon in Poland, according to a Czechoslovak station
broadcasting to Italian Communists, to "coordinate a polit-
ical and diplomatic initiative for the solution of the Berlin
problem and for a relaxation of tension in central Europe."
IChrushchev said on 10 November that he would soon return
the visit of Polish leaders to the USSR, and an East German
delegation headed by party boss Ulbricht is scheduled to
visit Poland later this month.
While Polish leaders have publicly supported Khrushchev's
proposals on Berlin, many Poles are reported uneasy. Ithru-
shchev may consider it necessary to reassure Poland that any
changes in Berlin's status will not have an adverse effect on
Poland's western borders.
The conference probably will again call for a settlement
of the German problem through the creation of a confedera-
tion of the two German states, as recently suggested by East
Germany. Moscow has said that it would be better to reach
an over-all settlement on Germany rather than just the Berlin
aspect, but that this is impossible so long as the West insists
on free all-German elections.
The Communist governments may take this opportunity to
reaffirm previous bloc proposals to reduce tensions in Europe,
such as the Rapacki Plan, and a nonaggression pact between
the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO.
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Bloc Delegates at Geneva Issue Declarations
On Basic Proposals
Soviet bloc delegates in both Geneva conferences have in-
troduced formal "declarations" which apparently are designed
for early publication and may foreshadow Soviet initiatives to
end the talks or raise them to the foreign-minister level,
On 29 November, the Soviet delegate to the nuclear test
talks introduced a declaration which stressed the "merits" of the
Soviet position and accused the West of evading an agreement
by insisting on detailed discussion of a control system. After
listing four major points in the Western position which "cast
doubt on the successful completion" of the talks, the Soviet
declaration stated that the USSR would not object to the inclu-
sion of "basic provisions on control" in a treaty on the cessa-
tion of tests. This ostensible concession was intended to re-
move a weak point in the Soviet position--the vague relationship
between the Soviet-proposed treaty and a protocol on controls.
This latest proposal, however, does not alter the basic Soviet
position that the drafting of a treaty, with only the briefest ref-
erence to controls, must be completed before provisions for a
control system can be discussed.
In the conference on surprise attack, the Soviet delegate
introduced a declaration on 28 November which spelled out bloc
proposals linking "concrete measures" to reduce the danger of
surprise attack with specific disarmament measures. The
declaration repeated, with minor variations, long-standing So-
viet proposals for ground control posts and aerial photography.
These inspection measures, according to the declaration,
would be valueless unless accompanied by "concrete" disarm-
ament measures which would include reduction by one third of
foreign forces in Europe and a ban on nuclear weapons and mis-
siles in both parts of Germany.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Sudanese Situation
Domestic and foreign policy decisions of the Sudan's new
military regime under General Ibrahim Abboud reflect inde-
pendence from the influence of old-line politicians and suggest
the possible emergence of Abboud as a genuine "strong man."
There is no indication of any organized opposition to the regime,
although former Prime Minister Khalil and his Umma party
are reported to be disturbed by Abboud's ignoring their advice.
There may also be a group of disgruntled junior army officers.
Abboud's cabinet has accepted the controversial American
aid program and is likely to seek additional US assistance. A
Soviet offer of assistance is also under consideration. On 29
November Foreign Minister Ahmad Khayr proclaimed the gov-
ernment's intention to abide by the neutralist "principles of
Bandung." At the same time, he announced its recognition of
Communist China, a subject of contention between conserva-
tive and radical elements in the now-dissolved Parliament. On
1 December Communist China responded favorably, announc-
ing its decision to establish diplomatic relations.
On the major problem of the division of the Nile waters,
Abboud is quoted as saying that negotiations will be conducted
between the Sudan and the UAR--excluding the United Kingdom.
Abboud has indicated, however, he will accept the British arms
gift prof erred to the previous government.
The regime is maintaining close surveillance over press
and political activities. It has closed the pro-Communist news-
paper Al Midan and confiscated copies of the radical Cairo
weekly Rose al-Yussif. On 29 November it arrested a number
of leaders of Communist-front and labor organizations.
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Cambodia Enlisting Bloc Support in Dispute With Thailand
The Sihanouk government has broadened the implications
of the continuing Thai-Cambodian dispute by a prompt ap-
proach to the Sino-Soviet bloc. Cambodian Ambassador
Leng Ngeth in Peiping notified Phnom Penh on 28 November
that he had submitted Cambodia's case to the Chinese Commu-
nist Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to diplomatic missions
in Peiping, and had met sympathetic response. On 29 No-
vember, the Chinese Communist foreign minister stated
that his country "is ready to help in every way to combat
this injustice." Cambodia's ambassador to Moscow has also
been supplied with an official version of the breakdown in
relations with Bangkok.
Cambodia's action provides a convenient means for the
Sino-Soviet bloc to strengthen its identification with Cambodia's
national interests at the expense of Western influence.
Sihanouk, apparently surprised by the furore created by
his precipitate decision to suspend relations with Thailand,
now seems desirous of patching up the quarrel. However,
the growing harshness of Thailand's.' terms�apparently
stiffened by Marshal Sarit personally--is making such back-
tracking increasingly difficult. Sihanouk's diplomatic action
may well be a precautionary move against the possibility that
relations with Thailand will deteriorate to a point where he
feels compelled to seek more direct support from the bloc,
ossibjv even ry equipment from Communist China.
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle's Algerian Policy Complicated by French Election
Results
The election on 30 November of some 400 French deputies
who generally favor integration of Algeria with France may
have severely circumscribed De Gaulle's ability to solve the
crucial Algerian problem, according to the American Embassy
in Paris. The embassy considers that the result is a strong
popular mandate for integration, and that the critical point
is the extent to which De Gaulle will feel he can disregard it.
There are indications that De Gaulle still intends to try
to move rapidly toward a liberal solution. He retains power
to rule by decree for some weeks, and the embassy doubts
that Parliament, even if it were in session during this period,
would or could block implementation of a given policy deter-
mined by De Gaulle.
be Gaulle
plans following the elections to release the five Algerian
rebel leaders imprisoned since 1956 suggests one way in
which he may attempt to regain the initiative for contacts
with the rebels. A civilian replacement is to take over
the civil functions of General Salan, the French delegate
general in Algeria. This may be announced, along with
a general replacement by civilians, of army officers acting
as prefects, in connection with the premier's 3-7 December
visit. The transfer of General Massu is also likely to be
announced.
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French Delaying NATO Programs
French noncooperation on several key NATO military
projects is admittedly motivated by a spirit of nationalism
and by a determination to win acceptance of Premier de
Gaulle's recent proposals that the Western Big Three coor-
dinate their global policy and strategy. French staff officers
at SHAPE have intimated to Norstad that it would be "useful"
for him to see De Gaulle personally and he has requested an
appointment before the NAC ministerial meeting scheduled
later this month.
France has lodged a reservation concerning plans for
integrated NATO air defense, has refused approval of new
projects required to implement the NATO new-weapons and
atomic-stockpile program, and is holding up implementation
of the "forward scatter" communications system. It has also
long insisted on a special relationship with the US--equivalent
to the US-UK arrangements--concerning joint control of IRBM's
and of any NATO nuclear weapons stockpiled in France.
French public opinion has allegedly been a major factor
underlying De Gaulle's decision to request tripartite policy
coordination. The American Embassy in Paris believes the
impressive showing of the nationalistic New Republic Union
party in the parliamentary elections will assure parliamentary
support for the premier's efforts to enhance France's interna-
tional prestige. De Gaulle is therefore likely to persist in
obstructionism in NATO, despite the resulting political tension
within the alliance.
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Bolivia May Be Receptive to Soviet-bloc Gestures on
Petroleum Financing
Bolivian President Sues informed the American
Embassy on 30 November that the Soviet Embassy in
Argentina had offered large-scale assistance to YPFB,
Bolivia's national oil company. Foreign Minister Andrade
stated on 29 November that Bolivian public opinion was
highly receptive to such proposals as the one made by
Albania and Rumania in the UN for international coopera-
tion in developing of ,the oil industry in underdeveloped
countries. Andrade referred particularly to the failure of
YPFB to obtain loans from private and public sources
in the free world.
Ambassador Bonsai comments that certain elements in
the Bolivian situation favor Soviet-bloc efforts: 1) the
gross value of mineral exports has decreased almost 70
percent in the past two years; 2) serious cuts in employment
are in prospect; and 3) exploration by private foreign com-
panies apparently has not produced results.
All Bolivia's oil production comes from YPFB, which
has made Bolivia a net exporter of petroleum in the past
several years despite its small daily production, now
running at about 102000, barrels. YPFB's general manager
believes, on the basis of available information concerning
promising geological structures, that the company's present
production could be increased to 35,000 barrels per day in
three years by an investment of $100,000,000.
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Uruguayan Elections
The victory of the conservative National party in Uruguay's
30 November elections, after almost a century of supremacy
by the liberal Colorado party, stems mainly from widespread
disillusionment over economic conditions. The Socialists and
Communists made only small gains; the Communists polled
some 3 percent of the vote.
Within the National party, the faction led by 86-year-old
Alberto Herrera has a clear lead in the nearly complete re-
turns over the generally respected leaders of the Blanco Demo-
cratic Union (UBD) faction and will control the nine-man execu-
tive council which heads the government. Two referendums
to change from the council system to a single president failed.
A difficult transition period is in prospect since the Na-
tional party has no specific program and little experience in
governing. The American Embassy in Montevideo comments
that the Herrera faction tends to be more demagogic and has
fewer leaders of proven ability than the UBD.
Martin Etchegoyen is expected to be the first president of
the governing council. He is regarded as a front man for Herrera,
who is sometimes unfriendly to the United States, However,
Uruguay's foreign policy probably will not be basically altered.
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Coup Attempt Expected in Colombia
The Colombian Government expects the supporters of
former dictator Rojas to attempt a coup within the next few
days. Rojas has been the cause of considerable tension and
government concern since he returned to Colombia on 11 Oc-
tober, allegedly to clear his honor of charges of misconduct
during his 1953-57 presidential term. Rojista leaders re-
cently claimed that their plans for action against the Liberal-
Conservative regime of popular President Lleras were too
advanced to halt and implied the coup would take place in mid-
December, when the Senate plans to begin prosecution of Rojas.
Rojas, who placed the military in a privileged position
during his presidency, is believed to have some support within
the armed forces and possibly among the dissident Conserva-
tive elements who oppose the incumbent National Front regime.
The Colombian Intelligence Service, an army-controlled agency
originally established by Rojas, may also be cooperating with
the movement. Top-ranking officers, however, have thus far
appeared to support Lleras, although the loyalty of air force
commander General Pauwels and armed forces commander Gen-
eral Gomez has been questioned.
A Rojista coup attempt, designed to unseat Lleras but not
necessarily to restore Rojas to power, would probably be ac-
companied by considerable violence. Anti-Rojas sentiment
among civilian groups probably continues strong.
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(-1) t IAL
'1/4.01
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Inte,,rior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIIVNTIA I.
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