[SANITIZED]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY JUNE 15, 1976 - 1976/06/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02997891
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: June 15, 1976

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 CO2997891 3.5(c)
The
National Intelligence
Daily
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only
Copy No.
2uL:
TUESDAY JUNE 15, 1976
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 140
3.5(c)
CRET
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FR sRT-
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MEMEMBINFISMENTEIBMWEREMEMSTERUMEMSEMEMEISM
Latin America: International Terrorist Group
Recently captured documents support
earlier speculation that Latin American
terrorists are joining forces to engage in
activities outside the hemisphere.
Shortly after the murder last month of
the Bolivian ambassador to France,
General Zenteno, leads developed by
Paris police indicated that some form of
international terrorism was at work.
Ballistics tests reportedly confirm that
the gun used to kill Zenteno was the same
weapon that wounded the Spanish
military attache in Paris last fall.
Moreover, the murder of Zenteno bears a
marked similarity to the assassination of
the Uruguayan military attache in Paris
in December, 1974.
Speculation about the activities of a
South American guerrilla organization
known as the Revolutionary Coordinating
Junta was also fueled by an advertisement
it placed in the May 9 issue of Le Monde
in Paris. Entitled "Latin America Fights
in Argentina," the manifesto is the
organization's first such open attack
abroad.
It focuses attention on the repressive
activities of the new Argentine govern-
ment and calls for a world-wide mobiliza-
tion to free Edgardo Enriquez, the
founder of the Chilean Movement of the
Revolutionary Left and a member of the
Junta's secretariat, who was arrested by
Argentine security forces on April 10.
This may be the beginning of an inter-
national propaganda effort to discredit
the military government�at least it
serves to arouse the sympathies of the
French left on this issue.
Information on the Coordinating Junta
is fragmentary. Some of it comes from
sources of unknown reliability and some
from South American security services
that may exaggerate the importance of
available data for their own purposes.
Nevertheless, documents captured in
raids on guerrilla hideouts and arrests of
extremists in Paraguay, Chile, Argentina,
and Bolivia confirm that such an or-
ganization does exist.
The organization may have originated
during informal contacts between various
South American leftist movements as
early as 1968. Its formal existence was
declared in a joint communique in
February 1974 when representatives of
guerrilla groups in Bolivia, Uruguay,
Chile, and Argentina announced that they
were uniting under the leadership of
Roberto Santucho, the head of the
Peoples' Revolutionary Army in Argen-
tina.
In March 1975 a Paraguayan extremist
organization reportedly joined the group
and later that month a meeting was held
in Lisbon "to unify the Latin American
revolutionary movements."
The Junta is now said to have represen-
tatives in several European countries, in-
cluding Portugal, Sweden, and France,
but available evidence indicates that its
headquarters is still in Argentina and that
most of its funds, and probably its
members, come from the Peoples'
Revolutionary Army.
Until now the Junta has not taken
responsibility for any terrorist operations,
as has been the practice of individual
guerrilla organizations in South America.
This does not mean it has been inactive.
On the contrary, it would appear
from captured documents that the
organization takes its coordinating func-
tion seriously and exists for that purpose
and to provide logistic support to its
member groups. These functions were
strongly emphasized in the documents
captured by the Paraguayan government
late last year, in those uncovered by
Argentine security forces in a raid on one
of Santucho's hideouts this spring, and in
documents discovered in Bolivia in April.
Despite the lack of hard data on assets
or numbers involved, it would appear that
the Junta has already achieved a status
and operational capability that exceeds
past efforts by Latin American
revolutionaries to form an in-
tra-hemisphere terrorist organization.
SeRrT
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if
now estimate at I percent or more an-
nually. They also believe the plan is more
a political than economic document and
that ambitious capital projects in the plan
should have been preceded by the develop-
ment of roads, ports, utilities, and
vocational education.
Defenders of the plan say non-
developmental spending, especially by
the military, is more responsible for the
inflationary spiral. In any case, the debate
Prince Fahd
EC: Puerto Rico Summit
The EC foreign ministers, meeting in
Luxembourg over the weekend, failed to
agree on EC representation at this
month's economic summit in Puerto
Rico. The matter will be taken up by the
political directors tomorrow.
Denmark was a major obstacle to con-
sensus on representation because of its op-
position to having Community matters
discussed at the Puerto Rico summit. A
high-level Danish foreign ministry source,
however, believes that his government will
probably yield in return for certain con-
ditions, as yet unspecified, regarding EC
particiption at Puerto Rico and future
summit meetings.
The Dutch, like the Danes, are also un-
easy about the summit, believing that the
US intends to use the meeting to align in-
dustrial country positions toward the
developing states. At the UNCTAD
meeting in Nairobi, the Netherlands was
far more willing than its EC partners to
accept the demands of the poor countries.
The Hague, however, is unlikely to stand
alone in blocking EC participation at
Puerto Rico.
The Luxembourg discussions cleared
up some of the bad feeling aroused by the
larger members' failure to consult before
agreeing to go to the summit. The French,
Germans, British, and Italians have now
reportedly pledged to consult their
fellow EC members before accepting in-
vitations of this kind in the future.
(C NF/OC)
traditional Saudi values.
� The possibility�dreaded by most
Saudis�that they may be creating
another Kuwait, in which virtually all
the essential work of the country is
performed by expatriate helots, while
the local citizens become an idle rich
minority.
Outlook
Discontent over economic pressures,
corruption, and social change has not yet
grown to a serious level, but many senior
Saudi officials, including some of the
staunchest supporters of government
policy, fear that a popular backlash may
be brewing. In the context of inflation and
shortages, they contend that people are
beginning to question the wisdom of
national priorities at home and abroad.
Oil Minister Yamani, according to one
report, told Fahd earlier this year that the
government's decision to focus on in-
dustrialization at the expense of what he
called welfare programs�housing,
medical care, and the like�was causing
"social dislocation" among Saudis.
Saudi Arabia's small, but growing, ur-
ban middle class probably most feels the
economic squeeze from the rising costs of
food and shelter. Eventually the squeeze
may enhance the sensibilities of many
Saudis to the inequities and malfunc-
tioning in the current system. They will
come increasingly to reject the fatalism
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TUESDAY JUNE 15, 1976 3
and passivity of the past and to put the
blame for their problems on in-
competence, indifference, or corruption of
officials.
To some extent, those members of the
royal family and other officials who have
always believed in a "Saudi-first" policy
are using the debate over domestic
priorities as a club to attack the country's
foreign policies�especially Fahd's efforts
to open up relations with governments
such as those in Baghdad and Aden and
his willingness to spend money in pursuit
of Saudi foreign interests.
The Saudis' Egyptian aid program is a
focal point for critics of national planning
priorities; they point to Saudi Arabia's
own housing shortage and the
government's simultaneous funding of
Egyptian housing programs.
Crown Prince Fahd and other
politicians are not insensitive to these
complaints. In recent weeks the council of
ministers has announced a series of steps
to reduce and control prices of food and
building materials, made plans for rent
control, expedited public housing
programs, and announced that an "iron
fist" would be used on profiteers and
hoarders.
These steps will probably not prove
very effective, however, unless inflation
can be controlled�and the government
lacks some of the classic institutional
tools such as discount rates, interest rates,
or meaningful customs duties.
On the other hand, pressures on the
government to get things done have re-
quired it to speed up the recruitment of
foreign workers�against the wishes of
many Saudis. US longshoremen have
even been hired in an effort to reduce the
congestion in the port of Jidda.
Saudi Arabia is in the early stages of a
quiet revolution. By the end of the current
development plan in 1980�even if it is
only partially successful�economic
patterns and priorities will be reordered
and dramatic changes in social values will
almost certainly have occurred.
The impact of these developments on
politics is more difficult to estimate. The
religious establishment, tribal sheikhs, and
some other traditional power wielders are
likely to suffer an eclipse. We cannot rule
out that the tensions flowing from the
reordering of society will magnify intra-
royal family conflict.
There is always the possibility that
those members of the royal family who
are anti-Fahdists to begin with, might
become so "turned off" by corruption and
the direction of social change that they
would attempt to move against Fahd and
the modernizers. They could cite as their
precedent, Faysal's ouster of King Saud
and his profligate sons in 1964.
Somewhat more likely, we believe, is
that the country's public and private sec-
tors will become increasingly dependent
on commoners with managerial,
technical, economic, and scientific skills.
It will not be long until this new class
demands a voice in national decision-
making. Thus, in the long run, it may be
the royal modernizers like Fahd�who set
the revolution in motion�who will be the
biggest losers. (S NF/OC)
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