CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/09/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02996633
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: September 23, 1958

lee
- Approved for Release. 2020/01/23 U029:33
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
4,6 3.3(h)(2)
23 September 1958
Copy No. t, 59
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLA1%3
I 7 DEC' Ats:33(FIE�:0
TO:
DA7r::
Al:VIEWER
-TOP-SKIM-
/We/Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO29966337 A
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
401%
-TOP-SECRET-
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
TOP SECRET
Niow
23 SEPTEMBER 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait - Peiping issues "tenth
warning" to US; Nationalist pilots
initiate another action over mainland.
Soviet weapons tests in Arctic area
could include air-to-surface missiles.
Joint GMIC-JAEIC statement on ex-
plosion at Kapustin Yar--see page i
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Tension continues in Lebanon; Chris-
tian-Moslem clashes likely if kidnaped
Phalangist editor not released. 0
O Algerian rebels cautious toward UAR
but Cairo not ruled out as possible
seat of government.
0 Nash' moves to strengthen control over
Syria.
O Indonesian elections postponed; Com-
munist reaction probable.
0 Laos - Opposition to monetary reform
places prime minister in precarious
position.
III. THE WEST
0 Bolivian President likely to ignore
legislative call to resume relations
with USSR.
LATE ITEM
O USSR - Probable space vehicle launch-
ing attempt at Tyura Tam missile
range.
1 --,--
-
?Z-
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
14D
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO29966333
/�t, frarr
two
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 September 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Taiwan Strait situation: Peiping on 22 September
ssued its "tenth Warning" against United States "provoca-
ions." Nationalist pilots again took the initiative in an air
lash on 20 September over the mainland near Kinmen.
(Page 1)
Soviet missiles: A Special Purpose Unit of the So-
let Long Range Air Force, trained in the use of the Soviet-
ermed "KS" air-to-surface missile, participated in a re-
ent large-scale exercise by submarines and surface ships
n the Norwegian Sea. The presence of this Special Pur-
ose Unit in the Northern Fleet area suggests that a field
evaluation of this missile may be included in the forthcom-
ing test of "modern weapons" off Novaya Zemlya.
(Page 3)
Joint JAEIC-GMIC statement; At a meeting of the
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and the Guided
Missile Intelligence Committee on 22 September, the fol-
lowing statement was agreed to:
On 19 September 1958, a firing of a missile to an al-
titude of 250 nautical miles occurred on the ICapustin
Yar missile test range.
the crew
of an American aircraft operating at 40,000 feet, ap-
proximately 600 nautical miles from the test range,
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
11.1
observed high in that direction a brilliant explosion,
the light from which was still observed after 10
minutes, indicating a possible nuclear explosion.
Present evidence from the Atomic Energy Detection
System is still inconclusive as to the occurrence of
a nuclear explosion at that time. Until further evi-
dence and analysis are available, it is not possible
to determine whether or not this
nuclear test.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Tension in Beirut remains high and is
spreading into the countryside. Numerous pro- Chamoun
Phalangists have made their way into Beirut, while others
are encamped on the city's outskirts. Should the kidnaped
Phalangist editor not be released by 23 September, clashes
between Christians and Moslems are likely to occur despite
the 24-hour curfew and government efforts
der.
Algeria: Algerian rebel leaders have indicated that
their "free Algerian government" is dealing cautiously with
the United Arab Republic, and denied that Cairo has been
chosen as the seat of their government but did not rule it
out. They claimed the announcement was timed to offset
the effect of the Algerian vote on the French constitutional
referendum. (Page 4)
UAR: Nasir apparently will soon move toward
strengthening his personal control over Syrian affairs by
establishing a more centralized government in Cairo. He
will probably use government reorganization as a means of
placing further curbs on the activities of Syrian politicians
who have been blocking the extension of his authority in
Syria. (Page 6)
23 Sept 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
7
77/
qI
:Approved for Releaselag01/23 c02666633'
TOP SECRET
rfir
�
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
*41.0 '4ft�I
Indonesia: The announced postponement for a year of
national elections previously scheduled for September 1959
apparently is a major victory for the Indonesian Army and
marks another step in its program to check growing Commu-
nist party strength. It may precipitate a strong reaction from
the Communists, whose hopes for national dominance had
risen last year as a result of their sweep of the Javanese
local elections. (Page 7)
Laos: Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone is in a pre-
carious political position as he begins negotiations with the
United States over monetary reform. Strong opposition to
devaluation exists within his cabinet and his parliamentary
backing. (Page 8)
IIL THE WEST
Bolivia: President Siles is unlikely to carry out the
resolution passed by the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies on
19 September calling for resumption of diplomatic relations
with the USSR. The chamber's action is part of a pattern of
pressu relations in various Latin American coun-
tries. (Page 9)
LATE ITEM
*Soviet space vehicle launching attempt
attempted
launching of a space vehicle, probably significantly different
frornAhe Soviet Union's three previous earth satellites. Among
the possibilities would be a lunar probe, launch and recovery
of a satellite, or a limited reconnaissance satellite vehicle.
23 Sept 58
DAILY BRIEF
111
TOP SECRET
%H
AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633v
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
4111%
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
*4.4
I. THE. COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation
In its "tenth serious warning" on 22 September, Com-
munist China's Foreign Ministry claimed that "provocations
by American naval and air forces have recently become in-
creasingly serious," and that "brink of war" actions have
"greatly aggravated" the present situation. Again there is
no threat of counteraction. By attributing tension to Ameri-
can actions, Peiping clearly hopes to win sympathy for its
ostensible restraint and to bring increased international
pressure to bear on the United States to make concessions
at the Sino-American talks in Warsaw.
American military advisers returning from duty on
Kinmen report that the morale of the garrison is "excel-
lent" and that the defenders would put up stiff resistance in
the event of an assault. As of 21 September, however, only
30 days of food remained on an austere-consumption basis.
Work on the Kinmen beaches has provided several dry-ramp
landing slots for LSrs. Tracked vehicles now can use all
beaches, two of which have 18 inches of crushed stone. The
chief problem now appears to be the reluctance of Nation-
alist captkins to bring their ships onto the beaches.
A previously unreported air battle took place between
Nationalist and Communist fighters on 20 September. Four
Nationalist F-86 fighters covering a photo reconnaissance mis-
sion in the Kinmen area attacked four MIG's which were re-
turning to their base.
two Communist aircraft may have been shot down. The the engagement took place over the mainland and that
Na-
tionalist aircraft were under orders not to engage, and there
was confusion and delay in reporting the incident.
several recent air combat
reports have been deliberately obscured by the Nationalists
to conceal the fact that their pilots provoked the engagements,
TOP SECRET
23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 20201/01/23 CO2996633
%FL La....IA 1.1.4
%WI 10.1
contrary to agreements with American officials. One Na-
tionalist air liaison officer believes the initiative was taken
by the pilots themselves and not as the result of official or-
ders, because the pilots are aggressive and confident of their
combat abilities.
TOP SECRET
23 Sept 58 CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
4110 Nktrof
Soviet Air Force Missile Unit Participates in
Naval Exercise
A Soviet Long Range Air Force unit trained in the use
of the Soviet-termed "KS" air-to-surface missile recently
participated in a large-scale exercise of submarines and
surface vessels by the Northern Fleet in the Norwegian Sea.
The exercise involved the defense of the Kola Gulf area
against "hostile" naval forces simulated by a cruiser and
destroyer returning from visits to Norway and Sweden.
In addition to meeting a barrier force of seven groups
of opposing submarines, the "enemy force" was apparently
subjected to simulated KS missile attacks on 18 September
by aircraft of a Special Purpose Unit of the Long Range Air
Force. There was probably some coordination between the
submarines and the aircraft because an attack was apparent-
ly made on the surface force some ten minutes after a sight-
ing report by a submarine.
This second association of the special unit with naval
exercises suggests that the Long Range Air Force will be
responsible for delivery of this weapon until Soviet naval
air units, which are now training with the missile, achieve
complete operational status.
The presence of this Long Range unit in the Northern
Fleet area suggests that it may also participate in the air
and naval exercises scheduled from 20 September to 25 Oc-
tober. These exercises will include the use of "modern
weapons." An operational test of the KS missile equipped
lear warhead may be included.
-TOP SECRET
23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLICENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
711.4%.041,1.4
NOP�
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian Rebel Government
Mohamed Yazicl, minister for information in the pro-
visional "Government of the Algerian Republic," indicated
to American Embassy officials in Cairo on 20 September
that it is dealing cautiously with the United Arab Republic.
He claimed that the National Liberation Front (FIN) had
been embarrassed by a UAR leak to the press some 48 hours
prior to the proclamation of the regime on 19 September, and
that the Algerians had maneuvered with the Iraqi ambassador
In Cairo so that Iraqi recognition would precede that of the
UArt;
Yazid refuted with obvious resentment statements in
the UAR press that Cairo has already been chosen as the
seat of the new government, and also denied that a decision
has been made to apply for Arab League membership. League
affiliation may be one of the questions considered at the initial
"cabinet" meeting on 26 September. All league members, ex-
cept Lebanon, apparently had recognized the new regime as
of 22 September. Tunisia, Morocco, and Kuwait have also
recognized the rebel government, while the Pakistani �cloy-
ernment, whose charg�n Cairo has called on the rebel
�
leaders, has urged American and Commonwealth diplomats
to apply pressure on France to take immediate steps either
toward independence or integration for Algeria, failing which
Pakistan must recognize the FLN "government."
Deputy Premier Krim Belkacem, who with Premier
Abbas and Minister of Armament and Supply Mahmoud Cherif
will establish himself in Tunis, informed Ambassador Jones
in Tunis that the establishment of a provisional government
had been demanded by the Liberation Army and "political
workers" inside Algeria for its psychological impact on the
French constitutional referendum, which in Algeria will be held
from 26 through 28 September. Belkacem expressed astonish-
ment and resentment at Tunisian President Bourguibats dis-
pleasure over the proclamation of the government.
-SEeRE-T-
23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
vary Nerl
Belkacem's statement that the Algerian regime will not allow
itself to come under the influence of any government probably
can be interpreted as applying equally to Tunisia and the UAR:
Belkacem admitted that the Algerians expected some em-
barrassment from the FLN's relations with the Soviet bloc, but
added that in their own interest this door must be left open.
Cherif volunteered that the Algerians would continue their
policy of "accepting only token Soviet bloc offerings as long as
'weapons and ammunition are available through Arab sources."
Communist China on 22 September became the first non-Arab
state to recognize the provisional regime.
Yazid claimed that the Algerian leaders have no desire
to embarrass the United States on the question of recognition,
but believed the most "helpful" American attitude would be to
maintain complete silence on the problem. Nevertheless, the
rebel regime has formally requested recognition.
Although France has warned that recognition of the Al-
gerian regime would be considered an "unfriendly" gesture,
a Foreign Ministry spokesman assured the American ambas-
sador in Paris that there is "no question" of- recalling French
ambassadors from Tunis or Rabat. The French Government,
he said, would make every effort to ensure that recognition
by Morocco and Tunisia would not result in such embarraSsing
"practical consequences" as an exchan e of amb ss do
SECRET
23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
A.111.416.01 %LI
NNW
Centralization of UAR Government
Cairo press reports that President Nasir will soon
centralize in Cairo the "planning, coordination, and execu-
tion" of UAR policies probably presage a move to gain more
effective control over Syrian affairs. Some Damascus news-
papers, approving Nasir's reported plan, state that the cen-
tral government will assume responsibility for all financial,
monetary, industrial, and agricultural affairs for both regions.
Nasir's most serious long-term problem is economic, and ac-
tions taken thus far to coordinate the Egyptian and Syrian econ-
omies have achieved little more than the creation of resentment
in Syrian commercial and industrial circles. Attempts at
tighter control may only intensify that feeling.
Nasir has apparently found that even the limited degree
of autonomy granted the Syrian region following union last
February allowed too much freedom to groups and individuals
resentful of Egyptian domination, both economic and political.
Numerous reports that Nasir is dissatisfied with progress in
the union, and his own overt criticism in his speech of 3 Septem-
ber, suggest that he will act quickly to remove or curtail the
Influence of those blocking the extension of his control.
Syrian Vice President Hawrani, whose Baath party has
thus far evaded compliance with Nasir's order disbanding po-
litical groups, would probably be among the first affected by
any change. Nasir is reportedly contemplating trial of Syrian
politicians and officers for involvement with the Nun i Said re-
gime in plotting against Syria, and might seek to include
Hawrani. Nasir recently ordered the closing of the pro-Hawrani
Damascus newspaper al-Rai al-Amm, and reportedly refused
Hawrani's request that the Bath party be allowed to expand its
propaganda activities to combat Communism in Iraq. Nasir
presumably fears the natural attraction of Iraq for Syria, and
is unlikely to countenance close cooperation between the two
branches of the party even though Iraqi Baathists are now said
to be strongly supporting union with the UAR.
23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
SEC
'11107
Indonesian National Elections Postponed One Year
Prime Minister Djuanda has informed the Indonesian
Parliament that the national parliamentary elections
scheduled for September 1959 are to be postponed for a
year because of the continuing rebellion in Sumatra and
Celebes., The decision appears to be a major victory for
the Indonesian Army in its plans to check growing Com-
munist party strength.
Significant Communist gains, possibly giving the party
a national plurality, had been expected in the 1959 elec-
tions. The Communist party had won a plurality in the
1957 local elections in Java, where over 60 percent of
Indonesia's population lives, and local elections else-
where in Indonesia had also showed Communist gains.
In contrast to the inactivity of the non-Communist parties,
the Communists had already begun vigorous preparations
for the next national elections. They can be expected to
denounce the postponement as an obstruction of "the
people's will," and they will undoubtedly continue pre-
election activity if permitted to do so. They are likely
to attempt to challenge the army's conservative leader-
ship and then increase their efforts to undermine Chief
of Staff Nasution and his supporters.
Army leaders have stated privately that they are
working toward a five-year postponement of elections.
They feel they need this much time to stabilize the
country and undercut Communist influence.
the army intends further action against the Chinese community,
including Communists. ;he present Indonesian
political climate makes it necessary to take action against Na-
tionalist sympathizers before moving against Chinese Commu-
nist elements.
23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
10110 1111,
New Laotian Government Faces Critical Test on Monetary
Reform Issue
� Laotian Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone is in a precar-
ious political position as monetary reform negotiations begin
with the United States on devaluation of the Laotian currency.
Most of the deputies within the conservative Rally of the Lao
People (RLP), which is the principal support of the govern-
ment, profit from the present unrealistic official dollar ex-
change rate and oppose devaluation. Disgruntled leaders
within the RLP are working to overthrow Phoui on this issue
by lining up RLP deputies to vote with the extteme leftist
opposition. They charge that Phoui, prior to his investiture,
misrepresented his position on devaluation to the RLP.
In addition, the Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat's
well-organized propaganda machine has successfully por-
trayed reform as an inflationary measure aimed at the "little
man," and some conservative politicians fear that a vote for
devaluation would damage their prospects in the national
elections in 1959.
23 Sept 58 � CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
%IVA J. 44...la I a
%Pi Noi0
III. THE WEST
Pressure for Closer Latin American Relations With USSR
The resolution of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies
on 19 September calling for the resumption of diplomatic
relations with the USSR is unlikely to be carried out by
moderate President Siles. Siles, in refusing to comply with
the deputies' request, may cite the public accusations which
he, the foreign minister, and the Bolivian lower house it-
self have made in recent months that Soviet tin sales con-
stitute economic aggression against Bolivia. At present,
Czechoslovakia is the only bloc country which maintains a
mission in La Paz.
The request is part of a pattern of pressure for such
relations in Latin American countries, pressure which is
encouraged by a combination of Communists, ultranation-
alists, tuld some economic groups who believe relations with
the bloc will provide markets for surplus raw material pro-
duction. In Brazil, in particular, there is political and
business sentiment for closer relations with the USSR. Al-
though most officials of Brazil's National Security Council
are dubious about the wisdom of restoring diplomatic rela-
tions, a number of prominent politicians continue to insist
that such relations are necessary to Brazil's international
prestige. The government wants closer trade relations with
the bloc in view of the foreign exchange crisis and is sup-
ported in this view by a number of coffee growers.
In Venezuela, President Larrazabal said last July
that the interim government would leave the question of es-
tablishing relations with the USSR to the government
scheduled to be elected in November 1958. Recently, a
high official of the USSR Office of Cultural Exchange is said
to have urged greater cultural exchange during an interview
with Larrazabal, while a TASS representative in another re-
cent interview sought the President's authorization to establish
a permanent TASS office in Venezuela.
23 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
:eV.
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633
-014
0/44
10�//1.!
Of"
ef/
e
orj
orj
"dr
r
rj
11
71
-1-01)-SEC-11-ET-
461 4774,1/Z/Z/Zrjrzyz/Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2996633,zArzzA,A, , A. A,
44',/