[SANITIZED]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY APRIL 2, 1976 - 1976/04/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02996478
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 2, 1976

3.5(c)
FRIDAY APRIL 2, 1976
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The
National Intelligence
Daily
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 78
Argentine President Videla during
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speech on Tuesday
NENWERSBERIER
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Argentina: The Military Junta
Argentina's military junta has largely
completed the task of consolidating its
position and reorganizing the govern-
ment. The officers are firmly in control
and are making it clear that they do not
soon intend to relinquish power.
Everything the junta has said and done
thus far indicates' careful advance
preparation and an eye for public
relations. Last week, the officers handled
the takeover skillfully. This week, they
are using a period of political calm to
project an image of moderation as they
try to build popular support.
Public relief at the ouster of the chaotic
Peron government is contributing to a
"honeymoon" period.
The officers' public statements
emphasize conciliation and reject
vengeance and totalitarianism. The junta
quickly eased the press censorship it had
imposed, removed roadblocks, and re-
duced the prominence of armed troops.
The interim, all-military cabinet has
been replaced by a permanent one that in-
cludes two civilians. The government has
imposed a token price decrease on certain
consumer staples.
The coup was the culmination of a long
process, implemented with
nearly unanimous support among the
military as well as general public ac-
quiescence. In full view of everyone, the
armed forces for many months planned
the details of the takeover, which the
Peron government was powerless to
check.
By delaying as long as they did, the
armed forces gave the administration
every possible chance either to reform or
to discredit itself completely. The lack of
resistance�and even some laudatory
press comment following the coup�in-
dicates that the strategy worked.
(See Argentina. . .Page 2)
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2 FRIDAY APRIL 2, 1976
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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
Argentina. . .
From Page 1
Collectively, the three-man, intra-
service junta has sweeping powers, but
it has set up a system that seeks to
minimize the influence of any one man,
while striving for consensus. The Pres-
ident is to work closely with a nine-
man legislative council composed of
senior officers of the three services.
The council will communicate the views
of the armed forces to the junta and the
President and is to have a strong voice in
the promulgation of laws.
The junta has replaced virtually all
national and regional civilian officials
with military men. Congress has been dis-
banded, all political activity has been
suspended, and major labor organizations
have been placed under government con-
trol. A few splinter parties have been
banned outright.
A state of siege is in effect. Terrorists
can be shot on sight. Those who try to
cripple public services can be tried by
military courts and given stiff jail terms or
the death penalty.
Frankness in First Speech
In his first speech as President, General
Videla on Tuesday assessed the national
situation, the reasons for the military's in-
tervention, and the officers' expectations.
It was a frank acknowledgment of the
gravity of Argentina's problems laced
with cautious optimism that progress can
be made with the military's firm guidance.
At no time did the President rail
against the ousted Peronists, but he made
it clear that the junta intends to break
with past practices. He said the takeover
was nothing less than the "beginning of a
new historical era" to be characterized by
a national attitude of service. Videla left
no doubt that, while he prefers to avoid
repression, the government will use force
if necessary.
The outlook for Videla and his fellow
officers is not particularly bright. They
now have complete responsibility for the
nation's seemingly intractable problems.
Any one of these problems alone would be
formidable; in combination they may
prove overwhelming, even for an
authoritarian government.
The officers now stand toe to toe with a
politically aware, articulate population.
Unless the regime is prepared to be
harshly repressive, it will be hard put to
muffle criticism from Peronists and
others when its policies threaten the high
living standard Argentines have grown ac-
customed to.
There is great potential for opposition
from organized labor and from the ousted
Peronist movement. Although all their ac-
tivities have been suspended, both
organizations remain largely intact.
Stricter political controls and belt-
tightening economic measures are likely
causes of friction.
In an extreme case, many more
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Peronist militants could go underground
and join the terrorists. A number of dissi-
dent Peronists did so long before the coup,
protesting the capture of the movement by
the ousted president's conservative inner
circle.
Continued attacks by guerrillas, like
the killing of two senior police officers in
recent days, will reinforce the arguments
of those military men who advocate more
stringent measures. Resurgent terrorism
and popular resistance to economic
austerity would provide a pretext for these
officers to demand a greater role for
themselves in the national administration.
In that event, Videla's leadership could be
called into question.
The task facing Videla now�which is
nothing less than to remake the political,
economic, and social attitudes of Argen-
tines�may indeed prove impossible. Now
that he is in charge, however, the
long-hesitant Videla seems disposed to
try.
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