O/NE CONSULTANTS' CONFERENCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02996264
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: December 11, 1956

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
11 December 1956
STAFF MEMRANDUM NO. 94-f;46
SUBJECT: 0/NE Consu1tants2 Conference
1. Attachment A is a surrary of the salient points and major
suggestions made by the consultnnts during their meeting at Princeton
on November 29-30, 1956. Attachment B is a record of the discussions.
2. The following consultants and members of 0/NE participated in
the conference.
Participants:
James Cooley, Chairman
Cyril Black
Klaus Knorr
William L. Irnger
Harold F. Linder
Philip E, NbselY
0/NE Members present:
DeForest VnnSlyck, Board
Maurice Williams
Joseph R. Strayer
T. Cuyler Young
3. On Thursday morning SNIE 12-6.561 Probable Developments in Soviet-
Satellite Relations, was discussed. Thursday afternoon was devoted to
SNIE 11-10-56, Probable Soviet Actions in the Middle East, and other
Middle Eastern problems. Friday was devoted to examination of the draft
estimate on the World Situation.
419,1442.
DOCUMENT NO.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO; TS 8 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE: J In
AUTH: KR TO-2
DATE: 311.51 30
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ATTACHMENT A: Summary of Major Reconmendetions and Ideas
1. 2.012i4atallitaatalaaA, The consultants thought that the recent
SNIE posed the Soviet dilonme properly and described post and present policy
accurately. LANG ER criticized its failure to treat two topics : anti-German
sentiments in some Satollitos as a factor encouraging close relations with
the USSR, and the necessary reappraisal of Bloc military capabilities fx
various types of cmpaig-s. There was general agreement that the treatment
of Yugoslavia was insufficiently deteailed.
2. On the estimate of probable future developmentsl, BLACK gained some
support for his dissent frcel the estimate that the present Soviet policy
of an alternation between concessions and repressions "could continuo
indefinitely." Ho thought rather that it would soon ho replaced by a more
consistent policy in one direction or the other and that this policy was
likely to fall outside the alternatives regarded as � ost likely in the
estimate. LINDER and ethers were in closer agreement with the estimate
on this point. All the consultants stressed differences in geography,
history, national ch-eacter� and national parties in discussing future
Satellite prospects and expected considerable variations on those grounds.
3, Discussing the intelligence program, the consultants agreed that,
in addition to n fuller treatment of Yugoslavia in Bloc papers, a separate
estimate on Yugoslavia was desirable. A paper on Comunist parties was
sugeosted, with emphasis upon international and natienal factions. KNORR
urged further work on analysis of the Huzgarian revolt with respect to
Soviet Army reliability and offictendy and the motivations for revolt.
A need was also expressed for a better annreciati(n of Eastern European
economic prospects under various political aesumntinns.
4. Dallillilljaaat. The group had no majer objections to the SNIE
on possible Soviet actions in this area. Opinion was unanimous that the
Anglo-French-Israeli attack was calaniteus for the Western position. In
discussing the consequences of. US accession to the Baghdad Pact, STRAYER
received partial support from LINDER in his assessment that such a move
would be, on balance, advantageous to the US. The other consultants appeared
to feel that the possible advantages were outweighed by probable disadvantages.
5. Kluld_aluatlua. The draft paper was discussed first in general
and than paragraph by paragraph. The general discussien is summarized in
ATTACHMENT B.
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ATTACHMENT 13: Minutes of the Discussion
I. THURSDAY MORNING SESSION
STRAYER began the Satellite discussion by sugoesting that wo had underrated
the influence of Tito, exorcised partly deliberately and partly through examplo.
pointing out Yugoslavia's continued efforts to stey in the socialist family
he posed Tito's control problem as choosing between holding things together
in that family or having his �own way.
BLACK thought Tito was concerned by the possible domestic reaction
to Hungarian events, saying that the same causos of discontont existed in
both countries.
LANGER demurred, printing out the factor of Soviet oppression in Hungary.
Ho wont on to cont that SNIE 12-3-56 did not distinguish sufficiently
botwoon Hungrry, whore anti-Communism became overwhelming, and Poland, whore
the Communists were able to control a rapidly developing situation.,
BLACK said that the Hungarian revolt casts doult on Soviot control of
Satollito armios. KNORR picked up this line of thought to identify as a
major conclusion of the Hungarian experience the general failuro of Communist
youth indoctrination which it revealed. LINDXR dissontod from tho general
agroomont to t' is point, saying that its failure in the USSR, whore a longer
period was available, has not yet boon demonstrated. In the ensuing discussion
KNORR argued strongly for thorough investigations among rofugoo sources to
determine a) the behavior of Soviet troops in th, an fighting and
b) Hungarian motivations for active resistance, noted effective
mass indoctrination requires the foreclosing of alternatives and that,
when now alternatives arise, the situotion changes radically. SELY added
that, under foreign occupation, it is extremely difficult to foreclose other
alternatives in countries which have nn oral tr dition of history and strong
nationalism, such as Poland, Hungary, and to a loss extent Rumania.
COOLEY asked whether the croup regarded the present Polish situation
as stable or touch-and-go, drawing brief responses from LANGER (internally
unstable) and KNORR (also unstable from the Soviet standpoint). STRAYER
returned the discussion to indoctrination, asking whether Communism was not
loping its zip as a system and breaking down in careerism. This needlaot
impair economic growth, he thought) but might impair national toughness and
willingness to fight,
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VANSLYCK suggested that the USSR must pay increased attention to con-
sumption, and LANGER. added that industrialization and education necessarily
load to critical thought. .110SELY repli)d on the basis of his observations
in the USSR, that everyone, and especially the youth, wanted more consumer
goods. Some students, especially politically active ones, exhAited sone
of the traditional Russian disdain for "materialism." All a:porrod to we;
to make the system work bettors and they sought freer expr000loa iLiic
purpose, not in order to propagandize a different system
thought that the regime's various problems regording the pop-
ulation should be regarded as -a constant multiplicetien of little strains
and adjustments thereto, rather than a buildup of pressures loading to
radical or explosive changes,
STRAYER approved of the paper's statement of the Soviet dilemma and
� though that its exclusion of oxtromo solutiens was oroper,
BLACK took the opposite view. He saw little difference among the
three alternatives on which the -aver concentrated. He particulArly doubted
whether a middle course alternating between repression and relaxation
"could continue indef!nitel," as the raper suggested, and wondered whether
Poland could continuo to oxist between Titoism and Stalinism. Ho felt that
the use of Soviet armies, particularly to occupy Hungary, Rumania, and
Bulgaria, was a distinct possibility.
STRAYER sup 13ed Finland as an example of the opposite solution falling
beyond the other end of the paper's alternatives. He felt that A string of
Finlands in Eastern Europe would be just as lefective as Satellites from a
military viewpoint and would support Soviet cultivation of nationalism outside
the Bloc. BLACK agreed, stating that military occupation or a Finnish solution
appeared to be more real alternatives than those adduced in the paper. Ho
returned to this argument on several occasions, arguing that the paper's three
moderate courses might not be objectively possible and that any intermediate
)olic always tends to one extreme or the other, a point supported by
He inclined to the repressive soluticn, including militarycccupation
of the southern satellites, partly to ccunter Titols influence, but thought
that fear of Germany in Poland and Czechoslovakia might make actual occupation
loss necessary there. The opposite soluti n he envisaged as one with many
national variations and the retention of some Soviet military bases but
characterized by more freedom t' an in -resent-day Poland. Ho suggested that
the domestic implications of such a Soviet policy might ho quite dangerous.
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LINDER thought the paper's Course Cp alternating relaxation and repression,
a good prospect for the near term,'He opened a new line of discussion by arguing
that, from the Soviet viewpoint, a consistent policy of relaxing controls
ireEastern Europe probably involved a deal with the US for mutual military
withdrawal. Such an arrangement would permit the USSR to save face and
to salvage a great deal from a bad situation.
MOSELY thought that this had situation would increase their desire
to hang on to their military assets.
In response to LANGER% question whether US negotiations on this
point would not upset its NATO allies, LINDER thought they too would be
tempted by the idea, seeing in it a favorable political shift in Eastern
Europe and believing that rocket war has depreciated the importance of
US Continental forces in protecting them from the USSR. A soft line in
Soviet foreign policy, he thought, would further decrease NATO objections.
LANGER thought the paper should hove discussed the threat of Germany
as a factor in Polish and Czech foreign policy and that it should'ave revised
Bloc military capabilities in the light of recent events. Particularly the
conclusions of earlier estimates regarding the capabilities of Satellite
forces in a campaign against 'Yugoslavia require revision
MOSELY stressed the great Soviet advantage represetted by the Oder-
Neisse line, which ties Poland to the USSR. He termed it a great mistake
to have let this boundary as an open international question in which
only the USSR is committed to Polish interests.. Instead, he argued, we
should have drawn a more easterly border, even a poorer one from the geo-
graphic standpoint, and settled it definitively imiediately after the war.
BLACK disputed the paper's view that party factions were loss sharply
divided in other Satellites than in Hungary and Poland. He cited the existence
of bitter divisions among the Bulgarian leadership in which personal feuds,
attitudes to Tito, and disillusion With the USSR play a part. He thought
that the problem of personal survival was the most important consideration
in working out such conflicts. BLACK later added that he had no information
on the state of Bulgarian party unity below the top level.
MOSELY estimated that, as the Poles become disillusioned by the absence
of rapid improvement, Gomulka and the Polish party will be forced to rely
increasingly on the USSR. He termed this a form of re-Stalinization.
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SUMER w:rned that Hungary is atypical in many respects: the Gorman
threat is not operative, among the southern Satellites Bulgaria and Rumania
are easier to control, Hungary is more open to the west, the Hungarian
party was historically weak and arrived rather late on the scene. LANGER
added that Hutgary is non-Slavic.
MOSELY noted that Tito 's internal oroblems grow in a period of relaxation
of Soviet pros-ures on Yugoslavia. Among these he mentioned the need to bog
food from abroad each year, peasant unwillingnees to invest or expaad their
acreage, high urban prices and the workers' feeling that their status is
not improving, indifference among the youth, an intellectual life which
is freer than in the average Satellite but still not very dynamic, and
some apathy in the Tarty. Ho thought that workers' corncils wore not taken
seriously by the workers and wore mostly for foreign crnsula tion. For
those reasons he questioned the extent to which Tito can really push for
greater Satellite independence. Ho added that Tito probably feared far the
stability of his awn 'arty in view of the Hungarian example of disintegration.
KNORR asked whether Yugoslavia would be economically viable without
US aid and whether other Satellites could succood economically under con-
ditions of political independence.
LINDER'S response strossed Yugoslav dependence on US aid, pointing
out the need for high defense expenditures, the extreme industrialization
effort typical of Communists, and the inadequacies of the resource base,
In more ooneral terms, ho thought that Satellites producing exportable raw
materials enjoyed much better economic prospects than those without this
asset�
pointed out a contradiction - that tho achievement cf the
status of national Communism raises economic expectations which can
probably be satisfied only within a bloc, that is, at some cast to political
independence.
Discussing economic prospects, MOSELY rated Poland's higher than
Yugoslavia's pointing out the more efficient Polish peasantry, the bigger
farmsteads, a bettor balance between light and heavy industry, a bettor
export potential, and the presence of good economists, several of whom
have recently returned from the West to take top jobs, He said that .
Bulgaria h as made fewer economic mistakes than Hungary, concentrating
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investment for domestic purposes, e.g. fertilizer plants, rather than a
general buildup. Bulgaria also is patiently awaiting Soviet support for
a slice of Turkey or Greece, so it exhibits loss economic strain and more
identification with the USSR than its neighbors.
The group agreed with COOLEY's remark that, in acrition to greater
stress on Yugoslavia in Soviet Bloc papersva separate Yugoslav paper would
be valuable. KNORR suggested work on the economic prospects of -Eastern
Europe under various 'llaitical conditions. La= proposed a paper on
Connunist parties, both within and outside the Bloc, emphasizing national
and Bloc-wide factions. STRAYER agreed, but was most concerned with the
Satellite parties. Ho stressed the importance of able loaders, saying that
they improved the prospects for national Communism and that popular hostility
would insure their dependence upon the USSR,
MOSELY decried the voluminous speculations in the press about factions
within the OPSU Presidtum. Ho regarded only Molotov as holding a fixed
position and thought that the others probably tended to swing with events.
In the final donnont, LANCER questioned whether we should automatically
offer aid to countries in trouble with the USSR or whether en occasion it
might not be bettor to withhold it and allow a crisis to develop,
THURSDAY AFTERNOON SESSION
LINDER asked whether Middle Eastern countries were complaining about
revenue losses. YOUNG . .
explained that they aro not; Syria's largely agrarian economy is not immediately
affected by such losses, as Iran's was not. KNORR pointed out that Iraq has
plentiful unspent development funds. CLARK explained that Egypt's losses
were largely of potottiai, not actual revenue'. It was agreed that Bloc
economies felt only a slight effect from the canal closure. STRAYER and
YOUNG felt that India was willing to withstand economic losses for the sake
of political interests in the area.
The group ans,.7ered COOLEY's ,uostion of whether the USSR will seek to
obstruct a political settlement in the affirmative.
VANSLYCK 4aked about the effect of economic sanctions against Egypt.
CLARK noted that the USga. is su7plying POL and wheat, and YOUNG pointed out
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that the the barring of other goods hurt mostly the upper classes, on when
Nasser does not depend. Ho added that Nasser can explain Egypt's poor.
military in the Sinai showing by cit77ng the British-Fi-onch throat in tho
roar, and indicated disbolief of Israeli reports of huge equipment captures.
CLARK posed the problem of limitations on Smviet actions arising from
local governments concern for independence. YOUNG deprecated those limitations,
saying that feelings against the British, French, and Israelis will ovorrido
those anxieties. He believed that anti-west actions would bring Syria,
for example, very close to the USSR. Nor did he believe that the USSR
would be inhibited by fear of involvement in local quarrels if pay dirt
Wore near. The USSR, in fact, was quite milling to be involved in anti-
Israeli quarrels,
stated that the US position is the key to the problem of the (b)(3)
limits of Soviet action.
CLARK asked whether the msn would refrain from sending volunteers to
the area while the UN holds the, initiative. LANGER thought not, if the
UN were to delay beyond 10-14 days, and YOUNG agreed, STuAYER asked why
the USSR should send volunteers when the game was going so well without
them and thcir arrival Aight provoke the ua into a strong policy. LANGER
replied that otherwise a settlement might be mode without their partiot...
potion.
LINDER and LANGER disputed about innedia'o Soviet policy, the former
suggesting that the ussn may want to acquire general power to be used in
the future in this area. He doubted that the USSR was willing at the present
time to assume heavy obligati, ns in the Near East, but sought rather to get
into a position to destroy Western interests later. LANGER thought the
Soviets sought to accomplish this inrodiately*
Discussing the results f US accession to the Baghdad Pact, YOUNG stated
that this would acool;rato a showdown, speed up the subversion of the flyrian
government, and please only the Pact members.
STRAYER pointed out that the USSR will continuo its disruptive activities
in the area (arms shipments, dispatcbh ,f p,rsonnel, economic offers) in any
event and that US accession therefore would not significantly worsen tho
situation*
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VANSLYOK, UNGER, and YOUNG all stressed the negative effocts of
splitting the Near Est, raising the level of crisis, intensifying our
friends' friendship and our enemies' hatred, and alienating South Asia.
YOUNG felt that the only way to .void those ill effects was simultaneously
to got tough with Israel, which seemed impossiblo for domestic reasons*
NOSELY said US accession could be justified if it led to a vigorous
policy such as arming Turkey and Iraq, taking over Syria and Jordan,
working on ibn Saud, and isolating Nasser, but not if it was followed by
continued neutrality.
YOUNG pointed cut that if Turkish or Iraqi action wore to take place in
Syria; pfter US adherence to the Pact, this might have mnre enbarassing
repercussions for tho US than if it wore not a pact member.
Discussing the prospects if the US does not join the pact and remains
neutral, YOUNG judged that they depend upon our policy on Israel. If the
US overcomes demotic inhibitions and settles the Arab-Israeli conflict
in a:noir which doesn't completely alienate the Arabs, the prospects are
not so glomy.
LNG ER felt such a sdiloment was extremely Cilfficult because of mutual
fears but not impossible.
YOUNG believed that many Arabs are against peace with Israel, whatever
the gains of the settlement, because they fear that Israel's long-run
advantages in economics, technology, organizational ability, otc, will
eventually enable her to organize tho Near East and reduce then to the
status of economic satellites*
COOLY asked whether, since the outlook in the event of US inaction
was for further deterioration, should we not ignore these Arab attitudes
and devise a settlenent Which would have India's backing. Inns agreed'
that Indian support would greatly enhance the stability of a settlements.
but STRAYER doubted that Pehru would approve. any arrangements which fell
too far short of mooting Arab demands,
11t0,4 LANGER asked whether Israel could be held to an unfavorable settlement,
LINDER rePlied that, in contrast to 3-5 years ago, Israel now realizes that
her economy is viable and that she can accept continued imml -titian Into her
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present territory. Coupled with her dependence upon private US support,
this makes it possible for the US government to exert pressure for a sottle-
mont which would not totally alienate the Arabs. Failing this, LINDER
argued, the US should join the pact and thereby choose one Arab side against
the ether. STRAYER again supported the latter, feeling that all US interests
could not be maintained and that we should therefore keep at least a part
of the area on our side*
YOUNG called this an oversimplification, pointing to pro-Western
regimes in Turkey and Iran. The choice is rather, he maintained, between
Iraq on the one hand and Egypt and its supporters on the other*
NOSELY argued for individual dealings with the Arab nations rather
than accession to one side, which would consolidate the Soviet-Egyptian-
Saudi alliance, stop up tho arms racel and load to an attack on Israel
which would detach Iraq from the Baghdad Pact. As to timing, he argued
that, while our present popularity is relatively high, this would probably
ho dissipated by the tine ratification was accomplished. LANGER and YOUNG
thought that the announcement of an intention to join would immediately
destroy all Egyptian confidence in the US.
Tho group agreed with VANSLYCK that Soviet volunteers probably could
not prevent a Syrian defeat, but COOLEY, YOUNG, and STRAYER did not regard
the possible protocat140:0 nn Israeli attack as an inhibition on sending
volunteers, since the USSR would estimate that it could go to the General
Assembly and win its case. MOSELYts suggestion that the arrival of volun-
teers night provoke an anti-Soviet coup in Syria was not thought persuasive,
There was general arreement� however, to his point that if the US wanted
Iraq to conquer Syria, it should rennin outside the Pact,
BLACK burrarized that the Soviets can always offer enough- so that
the Arabs will be under no pressure to settle the Israeli conflict, There-
fore, he concluded, probably we must deal with and support all the Arab
countries, But this, STRAYER ob,lected, woulaload to progressive blackmail;
the US cannot got commitments from Arab friends so long an the USSR pro-
vides alternatives, argued that announcement of US accession would
confront us with many unpostponable choices and destroy our maneuverability,
but STRAYER feared that continued maneuverability night mean a continued
absence of policy.
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COOLEY asked whether a settlement worked out and endorsed by the
Goneral Assembly night not gain Arab acceptance and leave pipelines intact.
YOUNG was not sure, saying that Asian and Soviet endorsement would also
be required. A solution backed by strong US and Asian .pressure and not
vigorously opposed by the USSR night work. COOLEY suggested that such an
effort nicht have the value of splitting India and the USSR.
NESELY thought thnt US accession would be incompatible with present
USpolicys which apparently aim at getting the French and British out of
Egypt, leaving Nrsser untouched, and working for a settlement through the
UN.
LANGER stressed the asset of potential US aid in dealing with Egypt,
although STRAYER objected that this would merely replace Soviet aid with-
out. forcing Nasser to change his policies. ILNGEP replied that we have
to deal with an existing, not an ideal situation.
CLARK asked whether some dramatic Soviet riposte night be expected
if the US joined the Pact. KNoan admitted that there wasn't much addi-
tional harassment they could add but felt that this action would increase
Arab receptivity to Soviet influence. DICK agreed, saying that Soviet
gains have been duo to Western errors and weuld decline if those errors-
were reduced. The group in general thought there was some possibility
of a strong Soviet counteracticas
111. FRIDAY SESSION
COOLEY solicited comments on the overall nature of the paper, what
was in it, what was missing, organization, etc..
- LANGER remarked that the crucial question in the paper seemed to him
to be the concluding paragraphs on the dancer of wart and ho thought those
should be moved up to the front of the estimate. Ho than said he would
settle for giving then prominent space in the conclusions.
KNORR contended that the Question of war was not really the neat of
the paper, since the estimate on this matter was not really news to anyone.
Ho would bring up to the front those questions that are really news -- e.g.
Soviet actions and capabilities in situations short of war.
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KNORR also thought that the paper had too little emphasis on trends
and strains in the Western alliance system, and proposed that this be
beefed up even if it wore at the exrenee of cutting the discusston of
trends in the Bloc.
STRLYER also thought that the paper need not discuss so nuch the
risks of general war as the risks that the Bloc nay attain many of its
objectives without war. Ho noted that the Vest is at something of a
disadvantage in the UN, since most' of the problors coning before the UN
involve colonialism or inporialism, which the Bloc can exploit,
There was general agreement that the paper needed more consideration
of the outlook for and imrlicat-l_ons of the crowing role of the UN in crisis
situations; how and to what extent, for exam' le. will this advance or hinder
Western objectives; how will it affect the froodam of action of the West,
added that the sane questions should ho explored with roforonco
N's effect on Soviet capabilities and notions.
LANGEit expressed his concern over the absence of any discussion of
the future status of US military bases and any real evaluation of the
future development of the German and Japanese rositions1 particularly the
German reunification problem and the queotion of Soviet-Japanese relations
in light of the now Soviet-Japanese agreement. The outlooks for European
integration needed further emphasis.
LANGER thought the paper needed to more boldly answer the question
as to whether the overall Soviet position ha s boon weakened or strengthened
in the postai% months; for exarplo, have developments in Hungary boon offset
by Soviet gains in the Middle East; Are the forces that have emerged likely
to continuo operating in tho same way? Ho thought there was too much
schenatizatieu of possible Soviet policy in the future. Degree of repression
and concossioh.will prbbolay depend. eh Sottet readin,of its requirements
and opportunities at any one time.
Most of the consultants agreed that the key issue of Soviet strengths
versus weaknesses tended to to buried in too much descriptive detail.
There was also some general misgiving over the tine-span of the paper, or
rather the absence of an explicit definition of the period covered. COOLY
noted the difficulties of 'oing too precise in this respect, observing that
he and WILLIAMS thought the span should le more than six months and loss
than five years. LANGER thought five years too long for try but the vaguest
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estimates, thouoh VANSLYCK pointed out that it was possible to make some
useful long range rrojections of trends and particularly to define long-
range :roblems likely to continuo or to arise. COOLY and VANSLYCK
both noted the difficulties of imposing a year limit on the oa-,:er because
this night load to nisguiding impressions regarding long-range trends.
DLACKIs chief criticism Was that more emphasis should be given to the
trend in Asia for industrialization and modernization. The popular appoal
of modernizttion in those areas, he felt, was as important as that of
nationalism, and the USSR had shown itself successful in hopping on the
bandwagon in respect to modernization as well as in respect to nationeist
movementsi
LINDER observed that the Soviet a 7roach to modernization requiros,:a
political revolution, and this limits the aoTeal of the Soviet approach
to non-Communist Asians (Nehru who want to avoid that kind of a
political revolution. . On the other hand, ho noted that the Westts ability
to associate itself with this trend in Asia was limited by the relative
immobility of freeecononios net (as in the Soviet caso) under thorough
political direction.
BLACK agreed with LINDER objectively on the quostion of the limits
of. the Soviot appeal to Asians, but subjectively he insisted that oven
anti-Oonrunist Asians are very impressed by the Soviet oxamlle and approach
towards industrialization.
stressed the need to study the conparative capacity of the
West an t o Bloc to operate in relation to the nationalist and modern-
ization trends in the underdeveloped areas.
STRAYER agreed, remarking that ho thought a 15 year view of this
question night roach hapoior conclusions than a 5 year ostimato since
the underdeveloped states, though they may in the next few years try half-
baked Soviet methods, may also subsequently get disillusioned with them
a return to other ways.
On the question of liberalization of Soviet controls, aNGER and
NOSELY took different views as to whether trends toward liberalization constitute
a one-way street. MOSELY believed that it was not a one-way street, that a
reversion to tight control night succeed. LINGER thought such a reversal
would be extromoly difficult onco populace cot accustomed to loss repressive
methods.
The reminder of the day vas devoted to a parasraph by paragraph
discussion of the World situation rapers
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