CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993709
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 3, 1961

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3 January 1961
Copy No. C ;
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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3 JANUARY 1961
I. SPECIAL ITEM
Situation in Laos.
II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ithrushchev states willingness to drop UN
debate on U-2 incident.
III. ASIA-AFRICA
Chinese Nationalist commander on Chin-
men orders artillery to fire warning shots
at British ships entering Amoy, and at
ships themselves if they ignore warning. 0
Indonesia may stage military incident in
Netherlands New Guinea area as means of,..�
bringing New Guinea issue to UN. 'QV
Mali reportedly receiving Soviet bloc
small arms and ammunition by way of
Guinea.
Situation in the Congo.
Algeria--Further rightist and Moslem
demonstrations likely as referendum ap-
proaches.
IV. THE WEST
�West Germans reportedly won conces-
sions from East Germans in recently
concluded interzonal trade talks.
�Provisional government in El Salvador
apparently moving to reduce US economic
and military assistance.
6Cuba--Castro demands reduction in
number of US Embassy personnel.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
L SPECIAL ITEM
L;The Situation in Laos (as of 0400 EST): Following the
loss of the Plaine des jarres airfield and Xieng Khouang town
on 1 January, the government garrison from Xieng Khouang
regrouped at a point about 30 miles to the south, Aerial
observers report that the 300 men of the government's First
Parachute Battalion who were dropped a few miles east of
Xieng Khouang town on 1 January have formed a defense
perimeter there. On 2 January a radio unit was reportedly
dropped. to this group which had been out of contact. The
paratroops, carrying light arms and a minimum of ammuni-
tion. will need constant resupply
CGeneral Phoumi has ordered five companies to move
southward from Luang Prabang and secure a key road junc-
tion about 25 miles south of the city in an effort to seal off
the route from Xieng Khouang which forks north and south
at this point toward Luang Prabang and Vientiane, respec-
tively. The two columns of government troops which had
been moving slowly north from Vientiane in pursuit of Kong
Le's forces reportedly will be ordered 0 Dress the attack
on the rebel stronghold at yang Vieng3
[Government reinforcements have also been ordered
to several towns in southern Laos, where loca ers
had reported the threat of Communist attacks_3
[American military observers in Vientiane report
that operations of the Laotian Ministry of Defense and army_3
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(-headquarters "continue most confused, inefficient
and to a large degree ineffective." The command
structure, assignments, and communications are in
a "chaotic state of change" as a result of a major
reorganization of the military establishment which
Phoumi had begun just prior to the Communist of-
fensive-3
On the political front, the Boun Oum govern-
ment has summoned all National Assembly depu-
ties to Vientiane for a special session to be con-
voked on 3 January by King Savang to invest the
government. Khampan Panya, former Foreign
Minister and confidant of the King, is being sent
to the United Nations to support the Laotian repre-
sentative there. The Laotian UN representative
has been instructed to protest to the Security Coun-
cil against Soviet intervention in Laos.
�Hanoi radio reports
that Prince Souphannouvong, head of the Communist-
front Neo Lao Hak Sat party, has issued another in-
vitation for "Premier" Souvanna Phouma, now in
Cambodia to return to Laos.
Khrushchev, speaking at a Cuban embassy re-
ception on 2 January, repeated the call for a new meeting
3 Jan 61
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of the countries which took part in the 1954 Geneva
conference and for reactivation of the International
Control Commission in Laos. The Soviet premier
warned that "the dangerous hotbed of fire which has
started" must be "extinguished in time."
Soviet IL-14 transports flew at least 11, but
probably 15 sorties to the Vientiane/Vang Vieng
area and one to Sam Neua on 2 January. On the
same day one North Vietnamese 1L-14 flew two
sorties from Hanoi: one to a point near the South
Vietnamese border and the other to Dien Bien Phu
According to an unconfirmed report
here was "heavy Soviet air activity" in
the Meng Khouvang area on 2 January
On 1 January, Soviet and North Vietna-
mese transports flew a total of 11 confirmed sorties
to yang Vieng--instead of 21 as previously re-
ported--10 by Soviet IL-14's and one by a North
Vietnamese transport. Ten; Soviet and four North
Vietnamese transports are scheduled to fly into
Laos on 3 January. Between 3 December and 1
January, Soviet IL-14's have flown 166 sorties
from Hanoi to the Vientiane/Vang Vieng area.
The five Soviet MI-4 helicopters pr
route to Laos remain at Changsha.
3 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF ill
TO?-SEGRE
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II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: Khrushchev used a New Year's eve reception at
the Kremlin to end any speculation that a US apology for the
U-2 incident remained a precondition to top-level negotia-
tions with the new US administration by stating his willing-
ness to drop UN debate on the matter. Although he avoided
any specific reference to the RB-47 incident, other Soviet
officials, who had indicated privately that the U-2 item would
be withdrawn, have also hinted that the two RB-47 crew mem-
bers might be released. The USSR's New Year's greetings to
Western leaders were� cordial in tone and stressed the.pros-
pects for settling international issues--disarmament and the
German question�during 1961. Among other recipients of
greetings from Khrushchev were Souvanna Phouma of Laos
tk..addressed as "premier."
III. ASIA-AFRICA
*Nationalist China:elle commanding general on Chinmen
issued orders on 30 December for Nationalist artillery to fire
warning shots across the bows of all British ships entering
Amoy and to fire at the ships themselves if they fail to heed
the warning. The Nationalists� reportedly decided on this ac-
tion because the British have not been giving prior notice of
recent ship sailings for Amoy--now averaging one per week.
Taipei has not attempted to enforce the port closure in the last
three years, except for one occasion--on 25 September 1959,
when an artillery battery fired and hit the British ship Tai-
chungshan as it was entering Amoy harboi.)
*Indonesia:CThe government reportedly plans to create,
sometime after 3 January, a military incident in the Nether-
lands New Guinea area of sufficient gravity to bring the New
Guinea issue before the United Nations. Although this report
lacks confirmation, there are other indications that Indonesia-j
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Gaill step up its para.militarir and diplomatic efforts toward
acquisition of the are& I An air force
directive of 30 DecembeiorderS increased "fighting-endur-
t ance training to meet Ne Guinea preparations"; a note is
being prepared for UN S, cretary General Hammarskjold
warning of a possible clash between Netherlands and Indo-
nesian forces in the New Guinea area;
(Page 1.)
1
*MaThOmall arms and ammunition are reliably reported
to have been transshipped by truck from Guinea to Mali at
regular intervals last month. The arms, which probably are
from stocks given Guinea in 1959 by Czechoslovakia, are be-
lieved intended for distribution to internal security forces and
for stockpiling. Acquisition of bloc arms in this way, report-
edly arranged during the early December meeting between top
Malian and Guinean leaders, reflects the growing influence of
the pro-Guinea extremist faction in Mali's single-party regirng
(Page 2)
*Congo: Mobutu's unsuccessful attempt to move his troops K into ivu Province on 1 January may influence him to defer any
further such efforts for the present. On 30 December, similar
moves had been reported about to be undertaken from points in
Equateur Province into neighboring Orientale Province, now
controlled by Lumumba's deputy Gizenga. Reports
indicate a general breakdown of the government there, wih
European settlers terrorized by undisciplined troops. These
troops were convinced by agitators from Stanleyville that the
Congo will return to colonial status if Lumumba is not released.
Meanwhile, Hammarskjold's sharp rebuke of Belgium on 2 Jan-
uary for allowing Mobutu's Kivu-bound troops to land in the UN
trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi will probably encourage Lu=
mumba's supporters abroad to press for additional curbs on the
Mobutu regime.
Reports that clearance has been requested for seven IL-14
aircraft to land at Khartoum en route to Stanleyville suggest a
3 Jan 61
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possible early attempt by Soviet bloc or other pro-Lumumba
elements to buttress Gizenga's regime. Sudan's foreign min-
ister repeated on 31 December, however, earlier Sudanese
assurances that no such clearances would be granted.
,d-u.eria-France:CRightist opponents of De Gaulle in
Algeria reportedly have definite plans for street demonstra-
tions beginning 4 January. Moslem violence continues nightly
in Oran, with Moslems reported ready to mount counterdem-,
onstrations if the rightists go into the stree, Possibly reflect-
ing government fear of widespread abstentions in the referen-
dum, De Gaulle appealed in his New Year's Eve message for
"vast approval" of his policy and implied he would resign if
thiarira warn a 1 a ran number of negative votes or abstentions.
(Page 3)
IV, THE WEST
*East Germany - West Germany: West Berlin Mayor Brandt
has indicated that in the recently concluded interzonal trade
talks, the East Germans acceded to all of Bonn's demands and
agreed not to implement the restrictions on West German travel
to East Berlin which last September had led Bonn to cancel the
trade pact. West Germany has not yet informed its allies of the
detailed formulation of the new agreement,
West
Germany accepted weaker wording than it originally, desired on
several points in order to reach agreement. The East Germans
were successful in insisting that their concessions would remain
in effect only if the strictest secrecy were maintained:1
(Page 4)
d)/
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*El Salvador: The provisional government appears moving to
reduce US economic and military assistance. The defense minister
told a group of US officials on 28 December that his government
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intends to replace US .t.dvisers tO the National Police with
Chileans or Italians Cr both, terming all US assistance pro-
grams "void of beneficLi results for El Salvador." These
statements, which completely reverse expressions of sup-
port for US assistance made by the defense minister within
the past three weeks, apparently reflect the influence of the
pro-Communists and Castro sympathizers in the government.
.One US-supported project was abruptly closed by the govern-
ment on 24 December, and the embassy understands that a
second is shortly to be closed. (Page 6)
*Cuba: Fidel Castro's demand that the number of
US Embassy personnel in Havana be reduced to eleven with-
in 48 hours climaxed his address before a mass rally on 2
January commemeorating the second anniversary of his
revolutionary victory. The Cuban Embassy in Washington
has eleven members. Foreign delegations, including repreW
sentatives of most Sino-Soviet bloc and Latin American /
countries were present at the ceremonies, which featured a
parade including military equipment recently purchased from
the bloc. The observances took place amid strident charges
of imminent US aggression. Soviet,
Chinese Communist, Czech, and Polish embassy and trade
mission personnel now in Cuba .number over 100 and, in ad- .
dition, more than 200 bloc economic and military technicians
are in Cuba. Seven other bloc embassies areexpected shortly
to be opened in Havana.
DAILY � vii
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Indonesia RApproved.for Release: 2020/08/11 CO29937091�w Guinea
*110' . Nor
,
The Indonesian Government reportedly plans to create,
rcsho ly after 3 January, a military incident in the Nether-
lands New Guinea area of sufficient gravity to bring Indo-
nesia's claim to the area before the United Nations. Although
this report is unconfirmed, there are numerous indications
that Indonesia will expand its paramilitary and diplomatic ef-
forts during 1961 with regard to New Guinea. Djakarta's strat-
egy seems to be to incite local rebellions, believing this would
increase international pressures on the Dutch to cede the area.
An Indonesian Air Force directive of 30 December ordered
"increased fighting-endurance training to meet New Guinea prep-
arations." Indonesia's delegation at the UN has been ordered to
prepare a note for submission to UN Secretary General Hammar-
skjold which will state that in view of augmented Netherlands
forces in New Guinea, it will be difficult to prevent an encount-
er between Netherlands and New Guinea forces in the area.
At least half of a 23-man armed Indonesian force which landed
in southuTst New Guinea about 15 November_is believed to be still
at large. 3fforts to communi-
cate with these infiltrators and have directed that other forces re-
main in readiness for a further mission.
nfiltration attempts must be discon-
tinued, pending a change_An the situation, and that "those within"
must take the initiative. Olie Dutch administration in New Guinea
has reported that there have been at least 13 infiltration attempts
since 1952, five of them in 1960; the infiltrating groups apparent-
ly are charged with intelligence collection and psychological war=
fareD
Djakarta is using the New Guinea claim to cloak other issues.
The alleged need to arm against meager Dutch reinforcements is
being cited to justify a high-level mission recently sent to Moscow
to request accelerated deliveries of contracted naval equipment
and possibly to negotiate new purchases for all services. Pres=
ident Sukarno may try to overcome army opposition to his ap-
pointment of Communists to the cabinet by rallying the country
behind him in a New Guinea campaign; under cover of such a move-
ment he may press for a cabinet reorganization, claiming there is
need for a government which will unite all significant political ele-
ments.
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Mali Reported Receiving Soviet Bloc Arms From Guinea
[Mali reportedly received a number of truck shipments of
small arms and ammunition at regular intervals last month
from Guinea, which has only Soviet bloc materiel at its dis-
posal. Since Guinea apparently concluded an arms agreement
with the USSR last year, under which major deliveries have
already been made, it presumably has available for export the
older arms received in 1959 as a gift from Czechoslovakia.y
the most recent
such shipment, consisting of 20 truckloads, arrived at Bamako,
Mali's capital, on 26 December from the Guinean town of Kan-
kan, the training headquarters for Guinea's Army and police
forces. The arms transferred to Mali are believed intended
for distribution to local internal security forces--especially
the new paramilitary units now being formed under Mali's left-
ist Minister of Interior and Defense Madeira Keita�and for
stockpiling, largely ruled out the possi-
bility that the arms might be destined for the Algerian rebels
because of the great logistical problems which would be involvep
Mali's acquisition of bloc arms in this way, reportedly ar-
ranged during the early December meeting between top Guinean
and Malian leaders including Madeira Keita, reflects the grow-
ing influence of the pro-Guinea extremist faction in Mali's single
party regime. It also will heighten the concern of President
Senghor's government in neighboring Senegal, toward which the
Bamako regime has displayed intense hostility since Senegal
seceded from its former federation with Mali last August. Early
Senegalese requests to the US and France for additional arms
can probably be anticipated.]
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Demonstratio)ftiby Both Rightists and Moslemmin Algeria
Likely During Referendum Period
CEuropean rightists opposed to President de Gaulle's Al-
gerian policy reportedly plan demonstrations in Algeria begin-
ning on 4 January. Although the exact nature of the disturb-
ances has not been decided, they are to begin with the move-
ment of crowds into the streets. Similar outbreaks by Euro=
peans during De Gaulle's 9-13 December tour of Algeria touched
off counterdemonstrations in the Moslem quarter which forced
the government to call in army units from the field and resulted
In the death of over 120 Moslems. Violence by Moslems against
Europeans has continued nightly over, the past week in Oran, and
three military vehicles were burned in the Algiers casbah on 30
December. Moslem groups are reported ready to counter any
further European demonstrations. /
In his New Year's eve message to the French people, De
Gaulle called for "vast approval" of his Algerian policy in the
referendum scheduled for 6, 7, and 8 January in Algeria and
8 January in metropolitan France. Possibly reflecting growing
government fear of a large number of abstentions, De Gaulle
stressed the impetus a large favorable vote would give his pol-
icy and implied that if he did not get that "frank and massive"
vote, he would withdraw from the scene.
Reaction to the campaign in France has been characterized
by apparent widespread disinterest probably reinforced by the
holiday season. Trade unions and political parties, except for
some extreme rightists, have expended limited effort to influence
their memb erships. However, two leading French Army gener-
als, Jean Valluy, former commander of NATO forces in Central
Europe, and Jean Touset du Vigier, president of St. Cyr military
school, joined retired Marshal Alphonse Juin in openly opposing
De Gaulle. Valluy said the French Army has passed from aston-
ishment to bitterness and "is on the brink of despair, perhaps of
revolt." Juin was recently removed from his last official position
by a government order abolishing the right of marshals to sit on
the Higher Armed Forces Councq
Tunis, meanwhile, the Algerian rebel government has again
called on Moslems in Algeria to boycott the referendumg
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West Germany's Reinstated Interzonal Trade Agreement
With East Germany
[-West Berlin's Mayor Brandt has indicated that in the re-
cently concluded negotiations reinstating the trade agreement
between East and West Germany as of 1 January, the East
Germans made concessions which put Bonn in a strong enough
position in West Berlin to allow continuance of trade. The East
Germans .reportedly agreed not to implement the restrictions
on West German travel to East Berlin which led.Bonn last Sep-
tember to cancel the trade pact. Existing East German controls
over traffic between West Berlin and West Germany are appar-
ently also to be eased somewhat,
[in return, Bonn has withdrawn its restrictions on West
German firms participating in East Germany's annual Leipzig
industrial fair next spring. The Western allies will probably
also, although such is not part of the agreement, lift their re-
strictions--imposed as. a result of Pankow's harassments of
West Berlin--on East German officials traveling to the West.
In the course of the talks East Germany gained no added degree
of diplomatic recognition and did not seriously try to prevent in-
clusion of West Berlin in the West German side of the agreement]
(In both this agreement and the Soviet - West German trade
pact, signed on 31 December, the Soviet bloc has avoided inflam-
ing the Berlin situation for the time being, probably to impress
the new US administration with its "reasonableness" and to pre-
vent any slowdown in trade with West Germany which might in-
convenience Soviet and East German economic plans..D
(Bonn has not yet informed its allies of the detailed formu-
lation of the new agreement, although its chief negotiator has
i ed a US official in Berlin on its various provisions.
West Germany accepted we er wor mg an orig-
inally desired on several points. Although not to be implemented,
the East German decree of 8 September restricting West German
travel to East Berlin apparently has not been formally abrogated.
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Lit is not known whether the guard houses erected on the Berlin
sector borders to enforce this law are to be d1smantled3
In view of the highly legalistic bases which both East and
West use to justify their present positions in Berlin, the ac-
tual scope of the reported concessions may be less than Bonn
claims. In addition, the East Germans were apparently suc-
cessful in insisting that their concessions would remain in ef-
fect only if the strictest secrecy were maintained. This pro-
vision will enable East Germany to renege on the agreement
almost at will, since some publicity is probably unavoidable-1
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J. _Ut.J.,116 1-1001oLa.i.�..c
El Salvador's provisional government, which contains a
considerable number of pro-Communists and Castro sym-
pathizers, is now apparently moving to reduce US economic
and military assistance programs. One such project--the
National School of Public Administration--was closed by the
government on 24 December, and the US Embassy has learned
that a second project is scheduled to be shut down shortly.
Defense Minister Col. Castillo Navarrete told a group of
�
US officials on 28 December that the government intends to re-
place US advisers to the National Police with Chileans or Ital-
ians or both. He termed all US assistance programs "void of
beneficial results for El Salvador," and maintained that the US'
primary interest in Latin America is to ensure a pro-US voting
bloc--presumably in the OAS and UN. He added that North
Americans are not "attuned" to the Latin American mentality
and do not make good advisers, and that aid should be sought
from "developed" European countries and, in some instances,
other Latin American countries.
These statements, which completely reverse expressions
of support Castillo had made within the past three weeks for US
assistance programs, may reflect a high-level policy decision
by the government.
These developments coincide with several Communist moves
to organize rural workers into a peasant militia, to gain control
over the country's electoral machinery, and to place the govern-
ment's internal security functions under the control of the attor-
ney general--a suspected Communist who has been spearheading
a drive to "demilitarize" the National Police, Roberto Carias
Delgado, leader of the active Communist front, the April and
May Revolutionary party, reportedly said on 21 December before
leaving for Cuba that plans are under way to seize the government
by exploiting the assistance given his party by the junta.
This increasing Communist activity, under cover of a "dem-
ocratic" front party, appears to stem from confidence resulting
from the confusion and lack of coordination among anti-Commu-
nists, both civilian and military.
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%II; CONFIDENTIAL *qpi
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
� The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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