CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/17

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02993701
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
18
Document Creation Date: 
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 17, 1960
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15798865].pdf950.31 KB
Body: 
'/ZZ IZZ/Z/ZZ/Zi VZ/ZZZZA ri W./7i rZ/ZrZZI WZ/ZZ/Z/Z/Z/i Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 Nre �I1-1G I 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 17 December 1960 Copy No. C - 75 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO rAWV.KG.F. IN CLASS. yvit, " CLASS, C:il..-4t,g41 TO: IS S C faXT Ret MAN: hi: DAP JUN,1980 REyiEwER -11LOP-SEC-R-E-T- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO29937017 r A Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 k �TiMi�-seeRET- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 17 DECEMBER 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR tests another supersonic aerody- namic vehicle. Vietnamese Communists to announce on 20 December united front throughout South Vietnam. II. ASIA-AFRICA Somali Republic to recognize Communist China. Shah says he plans parliamentary elec- tions will choose candidates himself. Situation in the Congo. Ethiopia--Coup attempt has collapsed. III. THE WEST Italy--Political tension rising. Ecuador to establish relations with USSR. :OP SECRET 0 LATE ITEM 0 Situation in Laos. r Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 AV Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 coi ur N1ticL 1 k.vid CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 17 December 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COM1VIUNIST BLOC � USSR: On 16 December. the USSR launched what is be lievia7-5.'-be a large supersonic aerodynamic vehicle called Hotcross in the intelligence community. The last test of such a vehicle took place on 23 March. The latest vehicle was launched from Vladimirovka and was apparently pro- gramed to fly to the Kamchatka impact area of the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range. In the three previous transcon- tinental tests, the Hotcross vehicles were also scheduled to fly to Kamchatka: two are known to have crashed en route; the third possibly completed its flight. According to preliminary analysis the vehicle traveled 2,800 nautical miles and may have reached its apparent destination near Klyuchi, a dis- tance of about 4,000 nautical miles. The vehicle flew at an altitude of approximately 65,000 feet and at speeds of 1,600 to 1,800 knots, conforming to performance characteristics of Hotcross observed to date. The role of the Hotcross vehicle is not known, but it is estimated that such a vehicle could be employed for weapon delivery, reconnaissance, or for investigation of problem areas related to high-speed , flight. North Vietnam - South Vietnam: The Vietnamese Com- munists have designated 20 December as the date for pub- licizing the establishment of a united front throughout South Vietnam, This move will be a dramatic advance in Hanoi's two-pronged campaign to topple the Diem regime, combining stepped-up guerrilla ac- tivity with political agitation among elements opposed to VA AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 A 1.0L�66Z00 �1./�0/0Z0Z :aseaia JOI penaidd\of MOSCOW Vladimirovka LAUNCHED 0030 GMT STATUTE MILES 10?0 30991 01216 .TYURA TAM Vorkuta. 180 75 rj hokurdak if 021 1111(.11 Ukraina PROBABLE PLANNED FLIGHT ROUTE FOR AERODYNAMIC VEHICLE LAUNCHED 16 DEC 60 ver A � Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 President Diem, The Communists in the South, acting on or- ders from North Vietnam, appear to be trying to exploit the widespread non-Communist dissatisfaction with the government evidenced by the abortive coup of 11 November. (Page 1) I I. ASIA-AFRICA Somali Republic - Communist China: Prime Minister Abdirascid announced in the Somali parliament on 14 Decem- ber that his government had decided to recognize Communist China and exchange diplomatic representatives. The decision, the result of an assiduous campaign by Peiping in competition with Nationalist Chinapeportedly was made following a recent conversation between Abdirascid and the Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo. An official Chinese delegation reportedl Mincrarliarin in 1-ha many fiitivrA Iran: LThe Shah of Iran hopes to (' begin parliamentary elections within the next ten days. He plans to allow voters a choice between at least two contenders for each seat and he will personally select the candidates. The Shah in- tends to order local authorities not to manipulate the voting on behalf of their favorites. It is unlikely that such an order would be followed. Public knowledge of the wholesale rigging of last August's elections forced the Shah to suspend them. A new elec- toral fiasco could cause public disturbances (Page 2) Congo: The pro-Lumumba regime at Stanleyville has not yet taken any action against Europeans there; it is mainly con- cerned with nrpnaratinns In met a nncasihip attaelr y the Congo Army. in adjoin- ing Equateur ,province, -trom i,uuu to 1,300 men have been called to military service in Stanleyville;' presumably in addi- tion to pro-Lumumba militia who have controlled the city. In Leopoldville, Congo Army commanders and key, staff officers down to the battalion level have been called together by Mobutu, 17 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF ii -TOP z� Jkpproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701; _Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 vi 'Jr I1LA1jL INovi possibly to discuss military action against the dissidents. Recent overtures by Ghanaian President Nkrumah con- cerning an African army to restore Lumumba to power in the Congo appear to have stimulated little enthusiasm among neu- tralist Afro-Asian states. Although some form of military consultative arrangement may be agreed upon among Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, and the UAR, the government press in Cairo has emphasized that the UAR has "its own plans" for combat- ing "foreign aggression" in Africa. (Page 3) *Ethiopia,: Troops loyal to the Emperor have regained al- most complete: control of Addis Ababa, and the coup attempt apparently has collapsed. Loyalists have freed the crown prince and other officials who were being held in the palace. Most of the dissidents are at large in the Addis Ababa area. Elle army reportedly has issued orders for the arrest of the ringleaders, including Bodyguard commander General Menghis- tou, Director of Security Workeneh, and Germami Neway, Men- ghistou's brother,who r..ortedly was the behind-the-scenes leader of the dissidents 3 The Emperor, who landed in Asmara on the afternoon of 16 December, can be expected to impose severe nunishment.on 111. TILL Wbb 1 Italy: Political tensions are rising as the Christian Dem- ocrats are negotiating for allies outside the four parties sup- porting the government; only with such alliances will they be able to govern key cities where the four parties do not have a majority following the local elections on 6 and 7 November. The Christian Democrats are playing down the national polit- ical significance of the local collaboration with the Nenni So- cialists which is urged by the government's moderate left sup- porters. Opposition by right-wing Christian Democrats and 17 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF ill C 1. CRET AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 v 44 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 Liberals to such collaboration could build up pressures leading to the fall of Fanfani's government. (Page 5) Ecuador: Ecuador's pro-Castro anti-US minister of government--the principal exponent of pro-bloc policies within the governmen1 formed Ecuadorean Communist leaders on 13 December that the cabinet had secretly decided to establish relations with the USSR. Three days earlier Foreign Minister Chiri- boga had announced that Ecuador and CzechoslovakiaRould soon exchange diplomatic missions of legation rank. (Pres- ident Velasco told Ambassador Bernbaum on 14 December that while Ecuador is willing to establish relations with the USSR, he will neither take the initiative nor yield to domes- tic pressures for close ties with the bloc or withdrawal frrffn the Organization of American States (OASc-f IV. SPECIAL WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS Con the basis of findings of a Special Watch Committee Meeting on 16 December 1960 concerning developments re- lating to Laos, the United States Intelligence Board concludes thati Erhe recent developments in Laos have undoubtedly forced the Communists to review, their tactics and immediate objec- tives,' rSuch evidence as we have to date regarding Communist in- tentions is susceptible of two interpretationg!3 Ca. A decision to rely on the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces with such increased assistance as is required in materiel anki 17 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701r A / Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 %so (..11 a3/Lot�IAL Gelected personnel, to prevent the Phoumi- Boun Oum forces from establishing effective control of Laoga lb. A decision to intervene openly with Democratic Republic of Vietnam or Chinese Communist force. CThe course of action "a" would not only advance Communist interests in Laos but would also allow full opportunity for attempting to isolate and discredit the US. Although the evidence better supports the adoption of course "a," open intervention under course "b" is not precluded even though such a course might involve sub- stantial risks to the bloc-4 LATE ITEM *Laos; The bloc continues its threatening propaganda 0 K. line charging US and Thai "interference" in Laos. The bloc tt) airlift also continued unabated through 16 December; a total of 37 Sino-Soviet transports are now involved in this opera- _tp41 tion. In Vientiane, some Phoumi forces apparently have oc- cupied the airfield, while other elements are continuing their attempts to clear the town of remaining pockets�oferesistance. (Page 6) 17 Dee 60 DAILY BRIEF -TOP SECRErj- AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO29937017 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 *NW Nov TOP SECRET North Vietnam - South Vietnam The Vietnamese Communists have designated 20 De- cember as the date for publicizing the establishment of a united front throughout South Vietnam. widespread circulation of a printed proclamation to be followed by demonstrations, meetings, and dissemination of propaganda leaflets and banners. These activities are directed toward "mobiliz- ing thoroughly" all segments of the South Vietnamese population, including government and army personnel. � Although the Communists are confident that their con- trol in some areas is sufficiently secure to permit open establishment of local front committees, the directive cautions that "the situation is still fraught with many dif- ficulties." Aware that the Diem government is likely to take reprisals against any persons who can be identified with the movement, it warns against identifying the front with "the name of the party" and appears to postpone the selection of members of the front's central committee.. Although apparently caught by surprise when a coup attempt was made against Diem on 11 November, the Communists now appear to be moving rapidly to exploit the widespread non-Communist dissatisfaction evidenced that time. Communists in me soutn to cultivate opposition ele- ments involved in the coup. Hanoi has embarked on a two-pronged campaign to topple the Diem regime, combining stepped-up guerrilla activities with political agitation among non-Communist opposition groups in South Vietnam, In September Le Duan, Ho Chi Minh's top lieutenant in party affairs, called for a broadly based united front south of the 17th parallel and indicated that Hanoi believed dissatisfaction in the South was sufficiently widespread to permit enlarging the "reunification s rilacrIP" hPunrirl thQtho'n of purely guer- rilla warfare. TOP SECRET 17 Dec 60 CEkITD A I IkITCI I le'Cklif^C DI II I CTIkl Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 mu. Iranian Elections Scheduled to Begin Next Week &he Shah hopes to begin parliamentary elections,, minium the next ten days. He plans to allow voters a choice between at least two contenders for each seat, but will personally select the candidates, thus ensuring a parliament respon- sive to his demands. The Shah claims he will not attempt to assure the victory of any particular individual or party, and he intends to order local authorities notto;cinfluence voting on behalf of their favorites. It seems unlikely that many local officials will refrain from manipulating the voting, but the Shah may hope to avoid the obvious involve- ment of central government officials:} Oremier Sharif-Emami and Interior Minister Alavi- Moqadarn are urging the Shah torallow an unrestricted number of independents to stand for election. They be- lieve that if no party wins a clear majority, their chances of retaining office will be increased. Allahyer Saleh, a prominent independent who is distrusted by the Shah for his popularity and past association with former Premier Mossadeq, apparently will be permitted to run. Former Premier Eqbal, who was forced to resign last August over election scandals, is actively leading the Melliyun party in the hope of again becoming premier. SECRET 17 Dec 60 rch, ire%Al lhlI I IoNvik n� II I ITT I h. t `-i-Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 SECRET The Situation in the Congo The pro-Lumumba regime at Stanleyville has not yet taken any action against Europeans there; it is mainly con- cerned with preparations to meet a possible attack by the Congo Army. Although Ethiopian troops of the UN Command have been concentrated in Stanleyville, concern for Euro- peans outside the provincial capital has prompted the UN to maintain units in the towns of Bunia, Buta, and Paulis. in Equateur Province, "from 1,000 to 1,300 men have been called to mil- itary service in Stanleyville," presumably in addition to the pro-Lumumba militia who have controlled the city since late September. Although the dissidents have sought to extend their influence outside Orientale Province, their present disposition appears defensive. Recent overtures by Ghanaian President Nkrumah con- cerning an African army to restore Lumumba to power in the Congo appear to have stimulated little enthusiasm among neu- tralist African states. The government press in Cairo has emphasized that the UAR has "its own plans" for combating "foreign aggression" in Africa, but some form of military.con- sultative arrangement may be agreed upon among Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, and the UAR. Cairo may confine its aid to the dissidents to financial assistance and military equipment, notwithstanding Gizenga's recent appeal for troops. &here are indications, however, that Gizenga's claim to represent the legal Congo government may bear fruit in terms � with Lumumba in prison, Gizenga can be as- sumed to be acting premier.; he USSR appears to be awaiting the outcome of de- velopments affecting the Stanleyville group and the attitude or 17 Dec 60 CB,ITD Al lkiTC1 I 1"Ekle.V hi iiir�rik Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 002993701 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 vnir CAfrican and Asian countries toward Gizenga's "government." Radio Moscow reported that Gizenga had assumed respon- sibility and moved the seat of government to Stanleyville, but the USSR has not yet explicitly recognized his regime. Mos- cow is continuing its efforts to rally opposition by Afro-Asian countries to the UN Congo operation and to Mobutu11 In Leopoldville, Congo Army commanders and key staff officers down to the battalion level gathered on 14 December at Mobutu's call, apparently for a major council of war. The meeting was characterized as one "to establish goals and means," presumably with respect to Stanleyville. Mobutu's deputy chief of staff indicated that units stationed in Orientale Province had not been invited, partly because their loyalty was f suspect and Daftly becausn n the transportation problem in- volved. 17 Dec 60 CEFI'M A I 1k11-01 I le*Gkle40 ni rrak. Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 Political TenE.' Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 � CONFIDENTIAL The Christian Democra s are now negotiating for new local allies because the 6-7 liovember.local elections in many cities, including Rome, Milan, Genoa, Turin, Venice, and Florence, failed to give a majority to either the coalition supporting the national government--Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals--or to the Nenni Socialists and Communists. The Christian Democratic party is pledged not to form municipal governments with the Commu- nists or neo-Fascists, and one or the other of its various fac- tions opposes any nationwide collaboration with the Nenni So- cialists or with the Monarchists, who have too few city coun- cil seats to offer important municipal solutions on a large scale. Christian Democratic party leaders are anxious to play down the significance of local commitments to the Nenni So- cialists because of the implications such commitments would have for the national government. Apprehension on the part of the Liberal party lest the national government rely on Nenni Socialist parliamentary support led to the collapse of the Segni government in February 1960. The extent of Christian Demo- cratic collaboration with the Socialists in municipal councils may therefore determine the life of the Fanfani coalition. Nenni is stressing the significance of local agreements, however, in order to convince his own party's left wing that his policy of independence of the Communists is paying off. Nenni and his supporters fear that failure to achieve alliances with the Christian Democrats in important cities would hurt him vis- a-vis the Socialist left wing at the March party congress. He has been pressing for collaboration in the Sicilian regional gov- ernment with the Christian Democrats, who now participate with the neo-Fascists and Monarchists. Meanwhile the Communists are attempting to draw the So- cialists back into united action by exploiting a series of strikes in the railway and industrial sectors. Additional strikes are threatened by teachers, newsmen, and shopkeepers. The strikes are based on economic issues, and not only the Communist- dominated CGIL but the largely Christian Democratic and Social � unions have participated in most of them. CONFIDENTIAL 17 Dec 60 cENITD A I IkITCI I limckirm DI II I rflkl Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 44impe Situation in Laos The bloc continues its threatening propaganda line charging US and Thai "interference" in Laos. A Moscow Home Service broadcast of 15 December attacked "Amer- ican imperialists" as bearing full responsibility for the Laotian crisis. The broadcast warned that US interference in Laos was "provoking a wide military conflict" and prom- ised a "clean sweep of the transatlantic interventionists." Communist China's People's Daily stated on 16 December that the Laotian people "are not alone," and North Korea is- sued an official statement on 15 December charging the US with "a flagrant violation" of the Geneva agreements on Indo- china and with creating a "grave threat to the peace of the world." North Vietnam continues to describe the Laotian situation in terms of "a direct threat to the DRV." The bloc justifies its actions in Laos by insisting that Souvanna Phouma still heads the legal government. In a move possibly intended to sound out the Burmese position on this subject, called on a Burmese official on 15 December to state Hanoi's view on Souvanna and to inform the Burmese that North Vietnam wanted a political solution in Laos. The North Vietnamese diplomat stated that Souvanna was the only individual qualified to form a coalition government. The North Vietnamese recently withdrew transportation from the ICC inspection teams at Haiphong and Vinh in North Vietnam. The US Embassy in Saigon suggests this move may �be intended to hamper observation of military movements. In view of the supply lift to North Vietnam, the Canadian ICC delegation for Vietnam has requested urgent ICC considera- tion of apparent violation of the Geneva agreements. A spe- cial meeting will take up this question on 20 December. The bloc airlift in support of the Pathet Lao continued un- abated through 16 December. Apart from the five Soviet IL-14s TOP SECRET 17 Dec 60 CENTRAI ltJTrI I inckurc RI II I CTIM Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701Page 6 �Approved for Release:2020/03/13 CO2993701 which were rtittected in flight to Vientiane on WDecem- ber, two AN-2s, one LI-2, and one MI-4 helicopter--all probably North Vietnamese�were scheduled to fly on 15 December, probably to the Sam Neua area. Several addi- tional Chinese Communist transports subordinate to the 3rd Independent Regiment and two of naval subordination have joined the 17 transports of the 13th Air Division in airlift operations to Nanning. There are now a total of 37 Sino-Soviet transports involved in airlift operations. Some of the 3rd Independent Regiment transports have been noted in flight from Peiping to Hanoi. Also, three Chinese Com- munist civil transports flew to Hanoi from Canton, Kunming, and Hankow respectively on 16 December. the planes were carrying "freight." Some of the cargo is probably POL which Moscow asked Peiping on 14 December to send to Hanoi for purposes of refueling the IL-14s engaged in the airlift. Moscow in- formed Peiping that the fuel shipment was necessary be- cause "our fuel is delayed en route," and stated it would compensate Peiping. (Personnel evacuated from Vientiane report that Kong Le's artillery and mortar fire has been very accurate and that the destruction of US installations appeared deliberate. The accuracy of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao artillery and mor- tar fire tends to substantiate earlier reports of the arrival of North Vietnamese gunners in Laos. Phoumi's Radio Sayan- nalchet he claimed the capture of "some" North Vietnamese soldiers. In Vientiane, one of Phoumi's commanders claims that commando elements under Major Siho have occupied the air- field to the northwest of the town. Other Phoumi elements are continuing their efforts to clear the town itself of remaining pockets of resistance. The whereabouts of Captain Kong Le and the bulk of his retreating force is unknown; they may link up with Pathet Lao elements in outlying districts of Vientiane Province, where together the two forces would pose a continu= ing threat to Vientiane. TOP SECRET 17 Dec 60 CesApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 002993701 Pace 7 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 CONFIDENTIAL THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive' Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director -GOGINFIDENTIAL� Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701 TOP SECRET / ? / / / 7 ./ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / '7 V / /- / / 7 / 7/4 / / / / / / / / 4/7 /) / / / / -TOP-SECRET- 47/ AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2993701