CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993697
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: December 9, 1960

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3.5(c)
9 December 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
INGUSINT iL
NO all:t.NOE IN CLASS."
OtCLASSIFIED
CLASS. r.1.1.-NCtr: TO: IS $
R. DATE: �2&10
4.L.TUt
1 0 JUN 1980
DATE: REVIEWER,
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9 DECEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Top Soviet leaders privately imply Com-
munist manifesto attack on US was con-
cession to Chinese but does not change
USSR's desire to improve relations with
US.
USSR--Special party meeting to be held
in Moscow just before 13 December cen-
tral committee olenum on agriculture.
North Korea, with official endorsement
from Moscow, continues campaign for
Korean reunification.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
New Japanese cabinet unites conservative
party and improves chances for keeping
factional rivalries under control.
Turkish interim President Gursers ill-
ness, minimized in official statements,
could have unsettling effect in Turkey. 0
Congo--Tension between UN officials and
Mobutu regime may increase following
Hammarskjold criticism of Congo leader. @
III. THE WEST
�Chilean Government concerned over re-
cent Soviet trade overtures.
LATE ITEM
�Situation in Laos.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
9 December 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The first private comments by top Soviet lead-
ers on Moscow declaration of Communist parties point
up the dilemma Moscow faces in seeking to preserve at
least the facade of bloc unity by making concessions to Chi-
nese Communist demands without jeopardizing the Soviet
goal of arranging new top-level negotiations with the West,
Mikoyan told Ambassador Thompson on 6 December that
the declaration's virulent attack on the US had been a con-
cession to the Chinese but emphasized this does not change
the USSR's desire to improve relations with the US, In ad-
dition, presidium member Kosygin took refuge in the fa-
miliar pretense that this was a Communist party statement
not binding on the Soviet Government and indicated that it
would not affect Soviet policy toward the West. Kosygin
also reaffirmed Moscow's desire to reach agreements and
to establish good relations with the US. Ambassador Thomp-
son reports that other Soviet officials have given the appear-
ance of being both embarrassed and concerned by the anti-
American tone of the declaration. (Page 1)
USSR: A special party meeting will be held in Moscow
shortly before the central committee plenum on agriculture
scheduled for 13 December.
bince a wicie variety of lower level officials will
participate in the plenum, the Soviet leaders probably wish to
brief key party officials in advance on planned agricultural
decisions. Recent attacks in the Soviet press on Agriculture
Minister Matskevich suggest that he may be blamed for the
poor agricultural showing of the past two years and that the
plenum may discuss a reorganization of his ministry as well
as the formation
tration.
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North - South Korea: North Korea's propaganda cam-
paign for North-South reunification continues, with worker
rallies throughout the country acclaiming Pyongyang's of-
fers to aid the South Korean economy. Moscow, in an of-
ficial government statement issued on 7 December, also
endorsed the North Korean position calling for rpiinifica.
tion and economic contacts.
North Korean agents in South
�Korea to back up Pyongyang's propaganda by undertaking ac-
tivities to influence the masses in the South. South Korean
police capabilities suffered in the wake of the April revolu-
tion, but Seoul is now attempting to improve its counterin-
telligence effectiveness.
(Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Japan: Hayato Ikeda, re-elected prime minister on
7 December by the new parliament, has at least temporar-
ily united the conservative party and improved his chances
of keeping factional rivalries under control by including in
his new cabinet representatives of all major party factions.
However, wrangling over selection of a speaker of the lower
house, which delayed Ikeda's election two days, has marred
his image as a skilled political leader and generated intra-
party friction. The press, which previously refrained from
strong criticism of Ikeda, has attacked his cabinet as "sec-
ond rate," ..nd commentators see the new cabinet's tenure en-
dangered by the "rapidly changing economic situation triegered
by the US dollar protection measures.",
(Page 4)
Turkey: )Turkey's interim President, General Gursel,
is more seriolisly ill than reflected in official releases, and
his absence for any extended period could have an unsettling
effect in Turkey. Gursel suffered a circulatory ailment in
late November, and his condition, while improved, remains
9 Dec 60
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Cfritical. The regime is making a special effort to min-
mize domestic apprehension. During Gursel's absence,
Deputy Premier Fahri Ozdilek, former chief of the Army
General Staff, is the acting chief of state, closely sup-
ported by General Madanoglu, apparently thdQrnIn
member of the Committee of National Union
) (Page 5)
Congo: aension between UN officials and the Mobutu
regime may increase following Hammarskjold's criticism
of the Congo leader at the Security Council session on 7
December, when he stated that technical and financial aid
outside the UN framework were responsible for the rehabil-
itation of the Congolese Army and Mobutu's strengthened
pos1tion:1in the Congo, the UN Command has reacted strongly
against Mobutu's order to control the transport of UN mil-
itary supplies which came soon after announcement of the
Impending withdrawal of Ceylonese, UAR, and Yugoslav
forces. The Yugoslav action will deprive the UN Command
of some of its necessary aviation maintenance men; the UAR
withdrawal will strip the hard-pressed UN forces of 500
troops.
Colonel Mobutu has taken measures to attempt to seal
off the Lumumba partisans in Orientale Province, and Pres-
ident Kasavubu has proclaimed a state of emergency in that
rovince rvention.
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Chile-USSR: The conservative Alessandri government
has expressed concern to the US Embassy in Santiago over
Soviet trade overtures, particularly offers to supply petro-
leum at well below world prices and to purchase substantial
quantities of copper. The offers, presumably made by Soviet
representatives now in Chile, are presented as straight com-
mercial transactions and not barter. Leftist politicians are
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probably fully aware of the Soviet trade offers and can be
expected to press for increasing Chilean-Soviet trade, now
less than one percent of the value of Chile's total trade.
o diplomatic relations with the bloc.
(Page 8)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding two weeks)
Communist China: Current situation in industry and agri-
culture; stability and morale of the party; social conditions;
military strength and potential nuclear capabilities; foreign
relations with USSR, Africa, Asia, and attitude toward the US.
Tables. NIE 13-60, 1 December 1960
Outlook for Greece: Political prospects of Karamanlis gov-
ernment; strength of Communist-controlled United Democratic
Left; economic situation; foreign relations, particularly with
US; and status of armed forces. ME 32-60. 1 Dec 1960
Main trends in Soviet capabilitie
NIE 11-4-60. 1 Dec 1960, 0026555.
'cies, 1960-1965.
Situation and short-term outlook in Laos: Strength, weak-
nesses, and intentions of the Souvanna government, Phoumi
and the Revolutionary Committee, the King, Kong Le, and the
Pathet Lao; repercussions in Southeast Asia. SNIE 68-60.
6 Dec 1960.
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*Laos: Captain Kong Lq with elements of his Second Para-
troop-E-fialion and some armed support, has apparently re-
gained control of Vientiane itself. Kong Le is reported to have
arrested Col. Kouprasith, whose early morning coup on 8 Decem-
ber set in motion the struggle for control of the capital. Koupra-
sail's forces remain in control of Camp Chinaimo, a few miles
south of Vientiane; they apparently have been joined by a company
of paratroopers loyal to Phoumi which was dropped on 8 December
some hours after the Kouprasith coup. Phoumi is said to be
moving additional troops by air and overland to reinforce the
elements at Chinaimo. When these reinforcements arrive, a
showdown struggle between the opposing forces is probable,
with Pathet Lao forces possibly: intercedtng,oKong Le's behalf.
Some twenty National Assembly deputies left Vientiane and
went to Camp Chinaimo just before the Kouprasith coup, and are
thus available for an assembly vote of no confidence against Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma. There is a possibility, however, that
Souvanna may seek to eaxorrtiftet mikt;''Sttkii'c plan with ar-
new diversionary initihtive of his own, such as a UN appeal
based on changes of "foreign interference. "
(Page 9)
9 Dec 60
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Soviet Leaders Comment on Moscow Declaration
The first private comments by top Soviet leaders on
the Moscow declaration of Communist parties point up the
problem Moscow faces in seeking to preserve at least the
facade of bloc unity by making concessions to Chinese
Communist demands without jeopardizing the Soviet goal
of arranging new top-level negotiations with the West.
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan told Ambassador Thomp-
son on 6 December that the declaration's virulent attack
on the US had been a concession to the Chinese but empha-
sized that this would not change the USSR's desire to im-
prove relations with the US. He observed to the Swiss
ambassador that the USSR had a "tough negotiating part-
ner."
The concern of Soviet leaders not to allow the militant
-
line of the declaration to nullify recent gestures toward the
US was also evident in First Deputy Premier Kosygin's re-
sort to the familiar pretense that this was. a Communist
party statement not binding on the Soviet Government and
that it would not affect Soviet policy toward the West. He
stated that Moscow was not only prepared but anxious to
reach agreements and establish good relations with the US.)
As the formal meetings were ending and the documents
already completed, Ithrushchev made a point of reassuring
Ambassador Thompson of his desire to improve relations
with the US and quietly explore the question of Germany and
Berlin. At the same time, the Soviet UN delegation embarked
on a series of maneuvers to clear the way for establishing
top-level contacts with the new US administration at a spe-
cial session of the General Assembly on disarmament next
spring. In addition, Moscow and most of the satellites went
to some lengths to indicate, by propaganda comments and
friendly gestures, that the declaration's harsh attack on Yugo-
slav revisionism did not signify a shift in the Soviet policy 3
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Di maintaining correct governmental relations with
el-
grade, despite the ideological disputej
theinain result of the meeting for Soviet policy appears
to be a compromise which grants Khrushchev a period of
grace and a relatively free hand to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of his policy in another round of negotiations.
East German party
officials were informed that the Moscow conference did not
result in any change in Khrushchev's intention to resolve
the Berlin question through an early summit meeting. Khru-
shchev reportedly prevailed in the argument with the Chi-
nese over the advisability of summit d1p1omacy:3
L.Although the declaration's formulations for the most
part are Soviet in tone and reaffirm Soviet primacy in the
bloc, the concessions to Chinese viewpoints could reduce
Khrushchev's over-all freedom of action. The general tone
of attacks on the West, the US in particular, and the advo-
cacy of more aggressive tactics in the underdeveloped areas
appear to commit the USSR to maintain its recent assertive
stand on such issues as Cuba, the Congo, Algeria, and "anti-
colonialism" in general. In particular, the Chinese appear
to have been successful in extracting a more extensive com-
mitment for further bloc consultations and in precluding a
return to the atmosphere which Khrushchev sought to create
following his visit to the US in 1959, typified by "Camp David
spirit" nr7ouncements.1
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VA
North Korea S ,es Reunification Rallies
North Korea's propaganda bombardment on North
South reunification continues, with worker rallies shout-
ing support for Pyongyang's offers to aid the South Korean
economy. In one North Korean city, laborers pledged
themselves to send 400,000 bags of grain, 50,000 suits of
clothes, and "various necessities to the hunger-stricken
peasants" in four nearby South Korean communities. This
gesture is typical of the specific North Korean aid offers
being given unprecedented publicity by Pyongyang in an at-
tempt to stir Southern dissatisfaction, stimulate interest
in North-South contacts, and ultimately focus popular pres-
sure on the South Korean Government,
All the items offered by North Korea are advertised
as a preview of the affluence South Koreans could expect if
they should support reunification under Pyongyang's terms.
These terms include withdrawal of US and UN forces and
general elections without supervision by the United Nations.
The North Koreans are not making the aid offers contingent
on acceptance of their demands.
UN General Assembly discussion of the Korean issue
may provide the bloc with an opportunity to draw Afro-
Asian attention to Pyongyang's campaign. The USSR issued
an official statement on 7 December giving vigorous sup-
port to North Korean proposals to reunify North and South
or, if that is impossible, to form a loose North-South fed-
eration for economic and cultural exchange. The Soviet
statement attacked US refusal to withdraw its troops from
South Korea as "the main obstacle to Korean unification,"
and called on the UN to allow both North and South Koreans
to participate in the discussion.
.gents
in the South to back up the propaganda and "win over the
masses." Activities in this area may not be too rewarding
for the North Koreans, however, for Seoul is attempting to
improve the effectiveness of its counterintelligence services,
which were drastically reorganized after the April revolution.
Despite growing public concern with the problem of a
divided Korea, the majority of South Koreans remain unsym-
pathetic to Pyongyang.
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New Japanese Government
Hayato Ikeda, re-elected prime minister on 7 De-
cember, has at least temporarily united his conserva-
tive Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) and improved
chances for his government's stability by including in
his new cabinet representatives of all major party fac-
tions. However, wrangling over selection of the speaker
of the lower house, which delayed Ikeda's election two
days, has marred his image as a political leader and
generated inte,rparN friction,. Although the distribution
of power in the LDP cannot be finally determined until
powerful party posts have been filled, the core of Ikeda's
support appears to come from the same factions that
dominated the government of former Prime Minister
Kishi.
The press, which refrained from strong criticism
of Ikeda's first cabinet last July on grounds that it was
only a "caretaker" government, immediately attacked
the new cabinet as "second :rate" and accused Ikeda of
surrendering to factional pressures. He has retained
strong incumbents in the important foreign, labor, fi-
nance, and education ministries but has not included any
faction leaders. As a result, some observers are pre-
dicting another cabinet reshuffle after the next regular
session of the Diet ends in the spring. Foreign Ministry
officials believe the current special session of the Diet
will be devoted to a wholesale attack on Ikeda's economic
program--an attack in which his intraparty rivals may
join.
c Ikeda told a press conference on 8 December that his
goa of doubling Japan's income in ten years would not be
affected by decreased US dollar expenditures abroad, but
high government and Bank of Japan officials believe that
Japan will be affected severely and that an economic re-
trenchment will be required. They estimate that US
moves announced thus far will cost Japan between $200,-
000,000 and $300,000,000 annually, sufficient to eliminate
the nation's favorable balance of international payments un-
less offset by an increase in exports. Foreign Minister
Kosaka, reflecting widespread press, business, and even
some government sentiment for restoration of trade with
Communist China, said after his reappointment that some
"economic intercourse" with Communist China is desirable.1
LJET
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Interim President of Turkey Critically Ill
General Gursel's absence from the government for
an extended period could have an unsettling effect in Tur-
key and delay restoration of a civilian regime unless ac-
tive leadership is passed to another member of the Com-
mittee of National Union (CNU). The interim President,
who, re-
mains in critical conaition as a result of a serious circu-
latory ailment which he developed in late November, faces
a long recovery period and may have to withdraw completely
from the affairs of state. Gursel, who has successfully
projected a "father image" to many Turks, had emerged as
a prime contender for the presidency of the "second repub-
lic"�to be established after the ratification of a new consti-
tution and following national elections which have been
promised prior to November 1961.
� Deputy Premier Fahri Ozdilek, former chief of the Army
General Staff, apparently is unofficially the acting chief of
state, with General Madanoglu, apparently the dominating
figure on the Committee of National Union, in close support.
Ozdilek was commanding general of the First Army and mar-
tial law commander in Istanbul at the time of the 27 May coup.
He is credited with having prevented major disturbances and
loss of life in Istanbul during the uneasy pre-coup period)
Ozdilek reportedly knew of the intended coup but was not
a participant, although he is credited with expeditiously de-
livering Turkey's largest city to the insurgents. In early June
he was named minister of defense and on 22 October became
deputy premier and minister of state The 62-year-old gen-
eral is regarded as competent but
not particularly dynamic. His age and army experience
probably make him Gursel's closest associate in the CNU.
Official news releases regarding Gursel's illness have
been designed primarily to minimize popular apprehension
regarding his health. Plans for the early convocation of a
representative constituent assembly will be postponed pend-
ing Gursel's full recovery or abdication:
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Situation in the Congo
Friction between UN officials and the Mobutu regime
appears to be mounting. IAt the 7 December meeting of the
Security Council, Secretary General Hammarskjold crit-
icized Mobutu, claiming that the rehabilitation of the Congo-
lese Army and Mobutu's present position resulted from tech-
nical and financial aid given outside the UN framework. He
reiterated that the UN could not deal with Mobutu because he
was "outside the constitutional framework" of the Congo.]
Colonel Mobutu has aroused considerable international
opposition by his imprisonment and alleged ill treatment of
former Premier Lumumba, On 2 December Ghana, India,
and Morocco protested to Hammarskjold about this treatment,
/and more recently there have been popular protests in Ethio-
pia and Nigeria. Nobutu has now agreed to permit a Swiss
doctor to visit Lumumba, provided he is also permitted to
visit several Congolese officials being detained by Lumumba
supporters in Stanleyville.)
In the Congo, the UN Command quickly rejected Mobutu's
demand of 8 December that surface transportation be restricted
to movement of food and medical supplies of the UN. They
claimed that such a restriction would paralayze UN activities
at a time when the UN's transport problem was becoming acute.
The announced departure of Yugoslav aviation maintenance per-
sonnel will handicap air operations.
Leopoldville officials have recently taken several political
and military measures against Lumumba's supporters in Stan-
leyville. President Kasavubu has proclaimed a state of emer-
gency in Orientale Province, but this proclamation appears to
have little more than psychological value. Mobutu has sent a
small force of paratroopers to the border area of Equateur
Province, where pro-Lumumba groups from Orientale are re-
ported to have attacked several villages. In an 8 December
message, the paratroop commander reported to Mobutu that
the situation was calm.
nn UN orders to intervene
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between pro- and anti-Lumumba elements would be ig-
nored. He indicated that his forces were giving clan-
destine assistance to pro-Lumumba elements there.
Meanwhile,
there is much conflict in Stanleyville between various
factions supporting Lumumba. Deputy Premier Gizenga,
Louis Lumumba, and Bernard Salumu appear to be in-
volved in a struggle for power, with Salumu at present
gaining the upper hand. Reportedly, there is a change of
African officials daily, and some supporters of Louis
Lumumba and Gizenea have been seized and thrown into
the Congo River.
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Chilean Concern Over Soviet Trade Overtures
The conservative Chilean Government has told the
US Embassy in Santiago of recent Soviet trade overtures,
presumably made by two Soviet representatives now in
Chile, to supply petroleum well below world prices and
purchase substantial quantities of copper ingots and semi-
finished copper products. The offer is presented as a
straight commercial transaction, not barter.
Chilean leftist politicians are believed to be fully
aware of the Soviet offers and are expected to publicize
them soon in an effort to press for increasing Chilean-
Soviet trade, now less than one percent of Chile's total
trade. There are already growing leftist demands to es-
tablish commercial and diplomatic relations with the bloc.
Oil, a state monopoly, is a relatively new industry in
Chile, and the country's two refineries produce about 60
percent of its needs. Venezuela has been Chile's only source
of crude oil.
The Chilean Government is not in principle opposed to
trade with the bloc, and it has been liberal in granting visas
to bloc cultural and trade representatives. Previous Sino-
Soviet bloc offers to purchase substantial quantities of copper
have not been accepted, however, largely because about 90
percent of Chile's copper production comes from US-owned
mining companies and because of the bloc's preference for
barter arrangements.
Chile has no diplomatic relations with the bloc.
-GONFIRENTM
9 Dec 60
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The Situation in Laos!'
Captain Kong Le, with elements from the Second Paratroop
Battalion and some armored support, apparently regained con-
trol of the town of Vientiane in the evening of 8 December. Some
hours after Col. Kouprasith's early morning coup, Kong Le is
reliable reported to have fled Vientiane in the company of a
ranking Pathet Lao military leader, which may suggest that
Pathet Lao elements were in his force when he retook the town
that evening. Kong Le is reported to have placed Kouprasith
under arrest; however, the units which supported Kouprasith in
his coup apparently remain at Camp Chinaimo, a Lao army base
a few miles south of Vientiane.
A company of paratroopers taken from the pro-Phoumi
Luang Prabang garrison was dropped near Chinaimo in mid-
afternoon on 8 December; they have presumably joined forces
with the units at Chinaimo. With Kouprasith'sarrest, leader-
ship of these units may have passed to officers more reliably
loyal to General Phoumi and his Savannakhet group. Phoumi
reportedly plans to drop another company of paratroopers and
to bring a battalion of infantry overland from Pak Sane, which was
captured on %8 December by Phoumi elements advancing from
Pak Ca Dinh. When these units arrive, a showdown struggle
between the opposing forces is probable, with the Pathet Lao
possibly interceding on Kong Le's behalf.
Just prior to the Kouprasith coup, some twenty deputies
from the National Assembly gathered at Camp Chinaimo, from
where it would be an easy matter for them to*.slip across the
river into Thailand. Combined with an approximately equal
number already out of Vientiane, more than enough deputies
necessary for an assembly qubrm would now appear to be
available for a session either in Luang Prabang or Savannakhet
for the purpose of registering a no-confidence vote against
Souvanna Phouma.
Throughout the confusion of 8 December, Souvanna
showed no sign of being ready to resign, and with characteristic
adeptness chose to consider both the Kouprasith coup and the
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Kong Le countercoup as affirmations of support for his govern-
ment. He almost certainly is concerned over the fact that the
presence of the deputies at Chinaimo poses a threat of an ,
imminent assembly no-confidence vote against him, however, and
this could. lead him to attempt some new initiative in return,
Soviet Ambassador Abramov is reported to have intimated to
the French counselor on 7 December that "someone" would
be making an appeal in the near future to the UN Security
Council.
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