CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993695
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: December 6, 1960

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CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
OnWIMENT NO. 3/
PIAIANric iN CLASS. [X
NECIirni PI SO
W ASS. CIL.: NrIE:li TO: IS S
FEU
AliP4 NR 10-2
0 JUN 1980
PATE: iiEVIEWE
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LATE ITEM
*International Communism: Although full analysis depends
upon receipt of the complete text, judging from the 4,000-word
Soviet summary, the 20,000-word statement which was hammered
out in the three-week-long meeting of world Communist leaders
In Moscow in November, seems to represent a tactical accord
to present a facade of unity despite continuing evidence of Sib-
Soviet disagreement. In dealing with the fundamental issues in
dispute between the Soviet and Chinese parties, the summary
suggests that the statement in most cases either contrives awk-
ward formulations which conjoins the Soviet and Chinese positions
on a given issue or relies on ambiguities which blur or evade the
issue.
The summary reaffirms a number of positions which the So-
viet and Chinese parties have long agreed on. It reiterates con-
fidence in the growing strength of the Communist world and the
comparable disintegration of capitalism. It denounces imperialism
in general, with specific emphasis on American imperialism, and
condemns Western policies everywhere as aggressive. In contrast,
the world Communist movement is presented as unified behind the
concept of "peaceful coexistence," but the summary does not indicate
whether the Soviet or Chinese interpretation of this concept is to
prevail. For example, the summary reiterates the long-standing
Sino-Soviet agreement that general war can be averted, but it does
not deal with the disagreement on the important question of whether,
as the Chinese contend,local wars should be expected and even, at
time encouraged. Similarly, the summary blurs the questions of
policy toward the governments of underdeveloped countries and the
"liberation" movements there, The summary is very ambiguous
on the key question of discipline of the world Communist movement--
permitting the Soviet party to continue to condemn "dogmatism and
sectarianism" as a serious danger and the Chinese party to attack
"revisionism" under the guise of denouncing Yugoslavia.
The statement reaffirms the adherence of all parties to the decla-
ration written at the conclusion of a similar meeting in Moscow in 1957,
and even uses that declaration as a framework for the discussion.
The 1957 declaration, however, was in fact relied upon by both
Moscow and Peiping, emphasizing differing formulations in the decla-
ration, in support of their differing positions on both domestic and
foreign policy. Soviet and Chinese editorial interpretation of this
latest statement should soon make clear whether--as seems likely--
Moscow and Peiping will again present their agreempnt diffprpntiv
A
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6 DECEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR attempting to clear way in UN for
top-level contacts with new US adminis-
tration at special General Assembly meet-
ing next spring. 0
Moscow and Cambodia formally announce
accord on number, of foreign policy posi-
tions in joint communique.
Chinese Communists encountering "tre-
mendous difficulties" in industry.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR orders widespread press attack in
Lebanon on policies of Iraqi Prime Min-
ister Qasim; may foreshadow ne
effort to hasten Qasim's decline.
Situation in Laos
0
III. THE WEST
()Brazilian President-elect probably will
institute major foreign policy changes,
especially in colonial matters and Latin
American economic development.
�Guatemala- -Army unrest persists and
new coup may be attempted soon.
Trip Crro r
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*Laos: LGeneral Phoumi has received information that
military elements in Vientiane sympathetic to him plan to
stage a coup in his behalf on the night of 7 December. The
individuals involved are not specified, but plans for the coup
are said to have been closely coordinated with represent-
atives of Phoumi across the river in Thailand. Chances
for a successful coup have probably been enhanced by the
withdrawal of some pro - Souvanna Phouma forces from
the capital and by Captain Kong Le's preoccupation with the
Phoumi offensive in the Ca Dinh River area.
Fighting meanwhile appears to have subsided in the Ca
Dinh area. However, Kong Le and the Pathet Lao are re-
portedly planning to withdraw their forces with the aim of
luring Phoumi forward to a more vulnerable position; Kong
Le then would make a stand somewhere east of Vientiane
and would also attack Phoumi from the rearn
III. THE WEST
Brazil: resident- elect Janio Quadros apparently plans
a more "independent" foreign policy for Brazil following his
inauguration on 31 January. Changes will be especially
marked in policy toward the European colonial powers and -
in the field of Latin American economic development, accord-
ing to Joao Dantas, an anti-US Brazilian publisher who some- -
times acts as an emissary for Quadros. Dantas believes
Quadros will soon make public an exchange of correspond-
ence with Ferhat Abbas in which Abbas calls on Brazil for
help in "completing decolonialization." Quadros, who is now
in Spain, has turned down an informal invitation to meet with
President-elect Kennedy in the US during the nreinaneural
period.
(Page 4,
ef)
Guatemala: Army unrest responsible for the abortive
military revolt of 13 November still persists, and a new coup
6 Dec 60
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may be attempted shortly. Two Guatemalan colonels told an
American Embassy officer on 2 December that the army will
oust President Ydigoras and assured him that their movement
Is not Communist inspired, The replacement of the unpopular
defense minister, who resigned on 23 November with the en-
tire cabinet, would, however, tend to ameliorate army griev-
ances and might forestall a revolt. Meanwhile, leaders of the
three strongest opposition political parties, sensing the re-
gime's weakness, signed a unity pact on 2 December in which
� they agreed to support a new regime in which they would par-
ticipate. They also agreed to reject dealing with "anyone as-
sociated with international Communism." (Page 6)
6 Dec 60
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Moscow Presses for Special UN Session on Disarmament
The Soviet UN delegation is attempting to clear the way
for top-level contacts with the new US administration at a
special session of the General Assembly next Spring. Chief
Soviet delegate Zorin has contended in private talks that
early completion of the debates on such "contentious items"
as Tibet and Hungary before the new US administration takes
office would improve the atmosphere for a US.Soviet rap-
prochement. Zorin has suggested that, after a Christmas
recess, the current assembly ,session reconvene on 3 Jan-
uary to deal with outstanding issues except for disarmament.
According to the current Soviet plan, discussion of disarma-
ment would be carried over into a special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly to be attended by the heads of government.
Moscow apparently feels that a proposal for the heads of
government to consider the issue of disarmament would com-
mand wide support in the UN and be difficult for the West to
reject. The main purpose of such a session from Moscow's
viewpoint probably would be to provide an opportunity for
Khrushchev to meet with the new President and lay the ground-
work for a formal summit conference later in the year. The
Soviet premier probably recognizes that his actions since the
collapse of the Paris meeting have complicated the convening
of another four-power conference this spring. an his recent
talk with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev stated he was
fully aware that an improvement of relations with the US would
be a gradual step-by-step process3 A meeting with Western
leaders at the UN would also provide Khrushchev with a justi-
fication for further delaying unilateral action on the Berlin
question.
Since Afro-Asian opinion favored the abortive five-power
resolution last September calling for renewed contacts between
President Eisenhower and Khrushchev, the USSR probably feels
these states can be brought into line behind a proposal for heads
of government to attend a session on disarmament. During
negotiations on the Soviet-Finnish communique of 24 Novem-
ber, Moscow attempted unsuccessfully to gain Finnish agree-
ment to a statement calling for a special assembly, session on
disarmament. The Soviet-Cambodian communique of 3 Decem-
ber contained the first formal nonbloc endorsement of the pro-
posal for the special session.
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�CONFIDENTIAL�
vamp,
Moscow Secures Cambodian Support on
International Questions
In a joint communique published on 3 December fol-
lowing discussions between Prince Sihanouk and Soviet
officials in the USSR, Moscow succeeded in identifying
long-standing Cambodian positions with Soviet views on
foreign policy. Agreement was expressed on the neces-
sity for universal disarmament, the admission of Commu-
nist China and Mongolia into the United Nations, and the
need to adapt the UN to the "new conditions" which exist.
Only Sihanouk's support for Khrushchey's plan to modify
the UN structure is a new position for Cambodia. The
statement, capitalizing on Sihanouk's apprehensions over
� the critical Laotian situation, also advocated support for
the Souvanna Phouma regime.
While no mention was made of Sihanouk's hopes for a
Cambodian-Laotian neutral zone, the anti-Western flavor
of the communique contained in such expressions as "con-
cern over foreign intervention" in Laos and a call for the
liquidation of military bases on foreign soil appears to bear
out other indications that Cambodia's relations with the West
are again cooling. Sihanouk's position may be partly influ-
enced by his desire for bloc assistance in financing Cambo-
dia's ambitious five-year development plan, for which about
a third of the cost is being sought from foreign sources.
The communique" included a Soviet offer to construct as
a gift a technical school in Cambodia, a project previously
suggested by Sihanouk to the US for US consideration. The
statement indicates that the USSR responded favorably to
Sihanouk's overtures for increased economic assistance and
that it is probably ready to extend credit and technical aid
for specific projects which may be discussed in future talks.
Moscow's only aid project in Cambodia is a gift hospital which
was completed according to schedule last August. Sihanouk
will probably play up domestically the USSR's response to his
overtures and may make similar requests for assistance, in-.
eluding aid for his proposed Phnom Penh - Sihanoukville rail-
road, during his visit to Peiping.
CONFIDENTIAL
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China Has Difficulty With Exports to Bloc
Peiping is
unable to satisfy urgent requests from bloc countries for late
1960 delivery of some industri 1 r
no further iron ore should be expected from the
Chinese this year because of "tremendous difficulties in their
industry," He described the general situation as hopeless and
reported that the Chinese refused to negotiate. Chinese inde-
cision is ascribed to the fact that the 1961 economic plan is be-
ing reworked completely and "they do not know what they have
or what they will be able to release."
Furthermore, shipments of rice and soybeans to the USSR
are considerably below the quantities usually observed at this
time of the year. Other agricultural exports are also expected
to be reduced in volume. Peiping has invoked a force majeure--
an "act of God" clause--blaming situations beyond the control
of either party--to cover its failure to ship agricultural prod-
ucts to Hungary. A further decline in exports will worsen Chi-
na's balance of payments position unless imports can be cut
back.
China's trade problems reflect internal economic difficul-
ties and perhaps stalling tactics pending the outcome of talks
with the USSR. The continuing delay in setting 1961 require-
ments, however, will almost certainly lower the trade level
for the first quarter of next year. Even if negotiations are ini-
tiated in early December, as the Chinese reportedly promised
the Bulgarians, Chinese procrastination will result in delay or
cancellation of bloc delivery of such items as diesel re
gates," machine tools and communic tions e
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eetiffiDENTTA�C Nee
Brazilian Foreign raucy (-flanges Likely
EPresident-elect (Tani� Quadros apparently plans a more
"inapendent" foreign policy for Brazil following his inau-
guration on 31 January. Changes will be especially marked
in policy toward the European colonial powers and in the
field of Latin American economic development, according
to Joao Dantas, an anti-US Brazilian publisher who some
acts as an emissary for Quadros and has been men-
tioned as a possible cabinet member in the new regime.
Dantas, who last week interviewed Algerian rebel leaders
in Tunis at Quadros' request, believes Quadros will soon
make public an exchange of correspondence with Algerian
rebel leader Ferhat Abbas in which Abbas calls on Brazil
for help in "completing decolonialization." Dantas said
Quadros also plans "aggressive and constructive" anti-
colonial action with respect to black Africa, including Por-
tugal's Angola
Quadros, who is now in Europe recuperating from an
eye operation, has turned down an informal invitation to
meet with President-elect Kennedy in the US during the
preinaugural period, possible to call attention to campaign
assertions that his regime would be "strictly independent."
He reportedly plans to seek extensive US economic aid, but
apparently believes that for domestic political reasons and
for reasons of international prestige, he cannot afford to
appear overly friendly toward the United States. In his only
postelection press conference, he asserted several times
that the United States "must become convinced of the indis-
putable fact that Brazil in the very near future is to become
a major power." This theme has been stressed by the in-
cumbent Kubitschek government but never so openly or ex-
plicitly.)
Quadros, previously labeled a "Wall Street lackey"
by the leftist press in Brazil, also promised during the elec-
tion campaign to re-establish diplomatic relations with Mos-
cow and to "recognize" Communist China. He has since)
CONFIDENTIAL
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aiedged on these promises, possibly to maintain freedom
as to conditions and timing. Public pressure for closer
ties with the &no-Soviet bloc has been building up for
the past several years in Brazil despite periodic Foreign
Ministry warnings that this could imperil national secu-
rity:3
EVice President Goulart, a leftist who is sparring with
Quadros for influence in the new government, last week
requested high-level interviews in Washington on 20 De-
cember, but he has accepted invitations from Moscow and
Peiping that may postpone or preclude his visit here. Since
Goulart was re-elected to the vice presidency on an oppos-
ing ticket and is not on good terms with the President-
elect, his travel plans probably were not made at Guadrosi
requesg
CONFIDENTIAL
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� Dissident Guatemalan oificers May Attempt Another Coup
The dissatisfactions which led to the abortive military
revolt of 13 November persist in the Guatemalan Army, and
a new coup may be attempted shortly. A number of officers
who were originally in on the November plot but subsequently
backed out are being pressured to act against the regime now
� or face exposure by the narticin ts in the revolt,
The officers being black-
mailed are said to number over 100 and to include some in
key posts. Two Guatemalan colonels told an American Em-
bassy officer on 2 December that the army will oust the
Ydigoras regime and assured him that their movement is
not Communist inspired. Another officer reportedly said
that the army intends to establish a three-man military junta
and then hold elections "as soon as possible."
The extent of army dissidence is unclear, but if it is as
widespread as claimed by the dissidents, it constitutes a clear
threat to the President. The replacement of the unpopular de-
fense minister, who resigned on 23 November with the entire
cabinet, would, however, tend to ameliorate army grievances and
might forestall a revolt. However, the scheduled trials of officers
involved in the revolt may prove embarrassing to the President,
and his repeated public references to the 13 November revolt as
"Communist inspired" have undoubtedly aroused resentment in
some army circles.
Meanwhile, leaders of the three most important opposition
political parties, sensing the regime's weakness, signed a unity
pact on 2 December agreeing to support a new regime in which
they would participate. These parties�the strong moderate left-
ist Revolutionary party, the dissident wing of the late President
Castillo Armast party, and a church-oriented group--also re-
jected dealing with "anyone associated with international Com-
munism."
Although the Communists are apparently not directly involved
in the current coup plans, they are aware of army unrest and,
-SECRET
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1.11
are "ready to participate in armed insurrection
when action staxts."aro-Communist former Guatemalan
President Arbenz, now in Cuba, emerged from a meeting
with Fidel Castro in mid-November with the assurance
that Castro wants to aid the Guatemalan insurrection, but
"with the greatest discretion,"
-SECRET-
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�etffirrivt-rm-A-L�
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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