CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993691
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 18, 1960

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18 November 1960
Copy No. C 75
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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18 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists and Czechs offer aid
--probably arms and money--to Lumumba
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lumumba planning to "reconquer" the
Congo, using Stanleyville as a base.
Algerian rebels seeking to receive Chi-
nese Communist aid without accompany-
ing Chinese personnel; rebels apparently
preparing increase in military opera-
tions.
Laos--Vientiane announces agreement
with Pathet Lao on initiation of certain
relations with North Vietnam and Com-
munist China.
Burmese military leaders at odds on the
army's political role, with Chief of Staff
Ne Win being pressed to renew army in-
tervention in governmental affairs.
�Japanese political observers predict in-
creased majority for Prime Minister
Ikeda's Liberal-Democratic party in elec-
tions on 20 November but warn against
interpreting this as popular mandate for
security treaty.
III. THE WEST
0 West German government representa-
tive scheduled to begin secret negotia-
tions with East Germans on interzonal
trade; East Germans may try to exploit
this as de facto recognition.
� Argentina�Army commander Toranzo
Montero to renew pressure on Pres-
ident Frondizi for policy changes.
0 Honduras--Government alerted against
possibility of violent outbreaks.
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CENVAL INTELLIGENCE
ltti BULLEILIN
18 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Bloc Congo:
Sino-Soviet bloc is preparing to provide aid to pro-
Lumumba forces in the Congo.
the
the Chinese Commu-
nists had asked if the "decision"--presumably on a Chi-
nese aid offer--had been made.
told the Chinese he would soon meet with
a
Lumumba and then would return to Morocco "to reach a
wyrepmpnt with resnect to ll assistance"
ff
Czech-
oslovakia now is ready "to supply all that material"--ap-
parently arms--which had been discussed earlier.
the UAR and the Sudan will be asked to
assist in transporting bloc aid shipments to the Congo.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Republic of the Congo: Lumumba,
, confirmed the need for his government
to move to Stanleyville," in Orientale Province, wilich he con-
trols, rEach of the
major political parties backing Lumumba reportedly plans to
send a senior official to Stanleyville to inaugurate a new gov-
ernment and to plan the "reconquest" of the Congo. Pro
Lumumba leaders estimate that they will require over $6,000,-
000 per month--which they hope to obtain from bloc sources--
to bribe Mobutu's following in the army and policeT
Lumumba has asked "the Afro-Asian
states" for such an amount. Lumumba may wish to delay any
governmental shift until he has presented his case before the
UN conciliation committee, scheduled to arrive in Leopold-
ville next week.
(Page 1)
L7 Le
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Ge will resign unless a more "realistic stand" is taken.
Brigadier Aung Gyi, third-ranking member of the army
leadership, thus far has taken no position. Growing
pressure from the officer corps may ultimately force
Ne Win to renew intervention in governmental affairsD
(Page 6)
Japan: Leading independent political commentators
in Ja.pan are predicting that in the 20 November election,
Prime Minister Ikeda's conservative Liberal-Democratic
party may slightly increase its strong majority in the
lower, more powerful chamber of parliament. Japanese
observers warn against interpreting a conservative vic-
tory as a strong popular mandate for the US-Japanese
security treaty, however, even though the question of neu-
tralism has become a major issue of campaign debate
among national party leaders. Local issues and person-
alities and domestic economic issues will probably influ-
ence voters more than foreign policy. ) (Page 7)
III. THE WEST
West Germany: All-German Affairs Minister Ernst
Lemmer has told American officials in Berlin that Eco-
nomics Ministry Under Secretary Westrick was scheduled
to meet secretly with East German representatives on 17
November to initiate new interzonal trade negotiations. Al-
though Bonn may claim that Westrick is merely an alternate
for Kurt Leopold, Bonn's low-level representative of the
semiofficial so-called "trustee office" established in West
Berlin to handle trade with East Germany, such a meeting
would be a high-level government contact with the East
Germans, who could exploit it in their drive for recogni-
tion. By this shift in policy, Adenauer may hope to obtain
East German guarantees of civilian access to Berlin.
) (Page 8)
18 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Argentina: army Commander in Chief General Carlos
Toranzo Montero, key figure in the mid-October crisis
prompted by army complaints over President Frondizi's
advisers and policies, intends to renew pressure soon for
specific action on these complaints. Toranzo Montero may
attempt a coup if, as he expects, Frondizi refuses such
demands as the removal of Economy Minister Alsogaray
and imposition of federal control over several provinces.
While most of the military agree to pressure on Frondizi,
they oppose any coup attempt and will try to dissuade the
hot-headed Toranzo Montero from setting back constitutional
governmentj Page 9)
Honduras: The government of Honduras is alert for pos-
sible outbreaks inspired by recent revolutionary activities -e--)v '7/73
In other Central American countries and by Communists and
Castro supporters who plan to intensify their agitation dur-
ing a "pro-Cuba week" to begin on 20 November. An imme-
diate cause for the government's concern is the decision of
the International Court of Justice on the bitter Honduran-Nic-
araguan border dispute, to be announced on 18 November, ,zt;r
which will have especially strong political repercussions in 7.
whichever country considers it has lost the dispute.
(Page 10)
18 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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ur
The Situation in the Congo
Patrice Lumumba,
"has confirmed the need for his government
to move to Stanleyville,"
Stanleyville, in Orientale Province, has
been under the control of pro-Lumumba elements since
mid-October.
Any such move would probably involve only a few key
figures and possibly not Lumumba, who continues under
house arrest in Leopoldville.
each of the major groups backing Lu-
mumba plans to send a senior official to Stanleyville to in-
augurate a new government and to plan the "reconquest" of
the Congo. Pro-Lumumba leaders estimate that they will
require over $6,000,000 per month--which they hope to ob-
tain from "Communist" sources�to bribe Mobutu's follow-
ing in key places such as the army and p01ice:3
Lumumba has asked "the Afro-Asian
states" tor sum an amount. Lumumba sent the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference at Beirut a request on 15 November
for "financial aid" so that "my government. . . will be able
to make necessary propaganda."
Lumumba's plans for turning Orientale Province into a
politico-military stronghold could be jeopardized by Mobutu's
15 November arrest of a Ghanaian diplomat in Leopoldville.
the Ghanaian was carry-
ing sealed letters for Lumumba from his lieutenants in Stan-
leyville. Should the contents of the letters reveal Lumumba's
designs, Mobutu may take vigorous countermeasures, possi-
bly including an attempt to seize Lumumba by force.
In the absence of any clear-cut victory for his rivals in
Leopoldville, Lumumba may be reluctant to give up the pres-
tige which attends his occupancy of the premier's residence
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there. He may, in any case, delay any proclamation of
a new government until after he has presented his case
to the 15-nation UN conciliation commission scheduled to
arrive in Leopoldville next week.
if a
motion to postpone the General Assembly debate on ac-
creditation of the Congolese delegation--scheduled for 18
November can be defeated, Kasavubu and his delegation
will be seated. However, there is strong sentiment, par-
ticularly among the Afro-Asian bloc and even among those
supporting Kasavubu, for postponing the debate until the UN
conciliation commission can make its re ort:
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Provision 1 Algerian Government Discusses
Communist Aid
he Algerian provisional government, during its 4-
10 November plenary session in Tunis, reportedly dis-
cussed ways of accepting Chinese Communist materiel
without the technicians or advisers that usually accom-
pany it. the rebel government be=
Heves acceptance of Chinese Communist materiel might
have a desirable psychological effect on the West, but
that the presence of Communist personnel could hava
a counterproductive reaction.
Press reports that rebel units are already employing
Chinese mortars in attacks on the electrified barriers
along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders are unconfirmed.
no sign of Chinese Communist elements among rebel forces
along the Moroccan frontier:",
The rebels are probably preparing to step up military
operations. The winter months provide favorable weather
for guerrilla activity, and the rebels may wish to demon-
strate their strength prior to the UN debate on Algeria.
the rebels plan to open a
military front in the Sahara-Mali border area to coincide
with the debate.
t_ New units for the rebel army have been formed in
Tunisia, where there are already 10,000 rebel troops, and
a group of about 40
Algerians trained in China has arrived to train these units
in the use of Chinese weapons. The rebels may also be plan-
ning to form and train a volunteer regiment in Guinea. ,
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The Situation in Laos
Radio Vientiane announced on 17 November that the
royal government and the Communist-dominated Pathet
Lao had agreed on the following points: the dispatch of
a government good-will mission to North Vietnam and
Communist China; the commencement of postal service
between Laos and North Vietnam; and the establishment
of "friendly relations" with Communist China. Fulfill-
ment of the agreement would carry Laos further along
the road to closer ties with the bloc than Premier Sou-
vanna Phourna had previously indicated he was prepared
to go, suggesting he now may feel himself unable, due to
erosion of his support from the right, to resist the de-
mands of the Pathet Lao and other extreme leftist ele-
ments.
There is also a possibility that Souvanna himself
took the initiative in bringing about the agreement as a
means of eliciting stronger Sino-Soviet bloc diplomatic
and propaganda support in his struggle, against increas-
ingly difficult odds, to retain office. The swing-over of
northern Laos to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolu-
tionary Committe was a severe blow to Souvanna's posi-
tion, which has been compounded by the defection to
Phoumi of Souvanna's erstwhile armed forces commander,
General Ouane. These developments have left Souvanna
in a bitter mood, as evidenced by his threats to take
military action to recoup his losses and by his public at-
tack on the United States for "illegally" supporting Phoumi.
Whether or not Souvanna retains any real power of
initiative in Vientiane, the odds appear increasingly in
favor of an attack on the Phoumi forces southeast of Pak
Sane by Captain Kong Le's paratroopers, in conjunction
with Pathet Lao elements. Ciouvanna during the past
few weeks has only with difficulty restrained these forces
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brom resuming their offensive; he may .now be either in
no position or no mood to resist further demands for
military action against Phourni. Although Phoumi has
strengthened and reorganized his forces since their hu-
miliating defeat at the hands of the paratroopers in late
September, it is believed that they remain vulnerable to
another debacle
C_The military situation in Vientiane itself remains
obscure. It is reported to be only lightly garrisoned by
regular Laotian Army elements which are divided by con-
flicts of loyalty to Souvanna, Kong Le, or Phoumi. The
capital would thus appear open to occupation by the Pathet
Lao, strong elements of which are reputed to be close to
the town and in a position to advance from several direc-
tions.
Souvanna's continuation in oitice is the only deterrent to
Pathet Lao occupation of the capital.
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Burma's ComMander in Chief and Subordinates Disagree
On Army's Political Role
r,Brigadier Maung Maung, military training director
and close adviser to General Ne Win, is said to be firmly
opposed to Ne Win's current policy of nonintervention in
Burmese politics.
Maung Maung considers that the army's
inaction is in effect installing Communist China as Burma's
"new master." He has threatened to resign from the army
unless Ne Win allows more forceful intervention with the
government.
'General Ne Win is reluctant to intervene, as he fears
the corrupting influence of political power on the officer
corps. He overrode army objections to permit the Febru-
ary national elections and U Nu's return as prime minister.
Although he is reportedly seriously concerned with the de-
terioration of government administration since he left of-
fice, he has permitted Nu free rein in all areas not directly
affecting the army. The flare-up with Maung Maung report=
edly occurred at a 10 November meeting at which Ne Win
insisted that the army should avoid any action which might
be offensive to the Chinese Communists or to Burma's civil-
ian political leaders. Brigadier Aung Gyi, the third member
of the army top command, although present at the discussion,
Is not reported to have taken any position.:3
Burma's officer corps has been generally restive under
the Nu administration and, although no one threatens Ne Win's
leadership, criticism of his policies appears to be rising.
Growing pressures from such figures as Maung Maung may
force the general to renew intervention in government affairs.
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4airr
Japanese Election
Leading independent Japanese political commentators
are predicting that in the election on 20 November, Prime
Minister Hayato Ikeda's conservative Liberal-Democratic
party (LDP) will increase slightly the majority it now holds
in the lower, more powerful house of the parliament. The
LDP, which hopes to win 300 of the 467 seats, now holds
283, and 14 of 19 vacant seats were last occupied by that
party. There has been a steady decline in conservative rep-
resentation sirice -1952:`
A conservative gain would enhance Ikeda's prestige and
strengthen his hand in maintaining Japan's alignment with
the West by discouraging dissident LDP faction leaders
from attacking the prime minister and his program. How-
ever, major faction leaders are attempting in the election
to increase their Diet followings to prepare for the even-
tual struggle to succeed Ikeda as party president and prime
minister. There appe rs to be no serious threat to Ikeda's
position in the immediate postelection period, but the rela-
tive strength of the factions will influence his cabinet ap-
pointments and the length of his tenure.
Although the question of neutralism became a major
subject of campaign debate after the assassination of So-
cialist leader Inejiro Asanuma in mid-October, Japanese
observers warn that a conservative victory should not be
interpreted as a popular mandate for continuing the US-
Japanese security treaty. Ikeda h s defended the treaty
and rejected the Socialists' program of "positive neutral-
ism," but local issues and personalities, plus Ikeda's
program for tax reduction, increased welfare benefits,
and continued prosperity, are expected to influence voters
more than foreign policy.
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Possible Major Shift in Bonn's East German Policy
All-German Affairs Minister Ernst Lemmer has told
American officials in Berlin that Economics Ministry Under
Secretary Westrick was scheduled to meet secretly with
East German representatives on 17 November to initiate new
interzonal trade negotiations. Although Bonn may claim that
Westrick is merely an alternate for Kurt Leopold, Bonn's'
low-level representative of the semiofficial so-called "trus-
tee office," established in West Berlin to handle trade with
the East Germans, such a meeting would be a high-level
government contact with the East Germans, who could ex-
ploit it in their drive for recognition.
Bonn has always taken the view that high-level govern-
mental talks with the East Germans would constitute de
facto recognition of the regime, and it has been careful to
limit all contacts to those between economic and transport
technicians. Adenauer now may hope, in view of recent
improved relations with the USSR, to obtain by this shift in
policy some kind of Soviet - East German guarantee on ac-
cess to West Berlin.
In a press interview on 12 November, Adenauer stated
that Bonn will be flexible in new negotiations with the East
Germans. He expressed his conviction that a new agree-
ment will be reached and added that if negotiations are con-
ducted intelligently, Bonn might achieve some advantage
for Berlin access.
CONFIDENTIAL
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argentine Army Commander in Chief General Carlos Toranzo
Montero, key figure in the mid-October crisis prompted by army
complaints over President Frondizi% advisers and policies, intends
to renew pressure soon for specific action on these complaints.
Toranzo Montero may attempt a coup, if, as he expects, Frondizi
rejects such demands as the removal of Economy Minister Alsogaray
and the imposition of federal control over several provinces. Al-
sogaray told US Ambassador Rubottom a week ago that the general's
attitude "was becoming intolerable and a showdown was expected
within two weeks, barring any blunder that might cause it sooner."
The embassy has later information indicating that the army will re-
new its demands after the departure on 20 November of 27 US gov-
ernors now visiting Argentina."-3
Toranzo Montero% prestige has dropped sharply since the Octo-
ber crisis because the majority of the army wanted merely to pres-
sure Frondizi, not upset constitutional government as was threatened
by Toranzo M ntero's actions.
he no longer has the abWty or support to survive the
cu es which would be certain to follow a coup. While three im-
portant army commanders and the commander of the ocean fleet are
reportedly behind Toranzo Montero, less than 30 percent of the
army supports him fully. The US naval attache reported on 7 No-
vember that a group of admirals has decided that the navy would def-
initely resist any army coup "with all means available," and that
they felt the army would have little spirit to continue a coup when
faced by the navy. Toranzo Montero, who considers himself "des-
tined to save the nation," apparently does not anticipate such a navy
reaction and counts on reluctance within the army to oppose his plans
with force.
Ohirest in the army is, widespread. Many officers are convinced
that the government is permitting graft and even facilitating profit-
eering, especially in the petroleum industry, to obtain funds for the
presidential election in 1964. Even officers who oppose a coup be-
lieve this situation exists and that only army pressure will force
Frondizi to change it. These officers will probably try to dissuade
Toranzo Montero from upsetting constitutional government.
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Name gewe'
Situation in Honduras
The political situation in Honduras is unsettled, re-
flecting recent revolutionary activity in neighboring
Central American countries,Eand President Villeda
Morales is alerted for outbreaks.1 The Honduran armed
forces are often at odds with the President over his tol-
eration of leftists and exile activities in Honduras. The
government believes some army officers are conspiring
against it but does not expect a major revolt.
The situation is aggravated by the agitation of Com-
munists and Castro supporters in Honduras who for more
than a year have been assiduously cultivated by the Cuban
Embassy. These elements now are preparing to intensify
their activities during a "pro-Cuba week" to begin on 20
November. Honduran security forces are prepared to pre-
vent violence, but public sympathy for the Cuban revolution
is substantial, and Villeda probably fears the reaction which
any repression of the demonstrations could generate. The
Honduran foreign minister admitted to a US Embassy officer
on 13 November that pro-Castro groups are showing increased
activity and effectiveness in Honduras.
An immediate cause for the government's concern is the
decision of the International Court of Justice on the emotion-
laden dispute betwen Honduras and Nicaragua over a sparsely
settled, largely undeveloped area on their border. The deci-
sion is expected to be issued on 18 November. Neither coun-
try is politically mature enough to accept an adverse judg-
ment, and the government would be held responsible for a de-
feat.
the Nicaraguan Government believes the decision will favor
Honduras and will result in a move into the disputed area by
Hondurans, which Nicaragua will be under popular pressure
to resist with force.
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Nome
"wee
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
I.
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