CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/06/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993104
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: June 10, 1958

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10 June 1958
3.3(h)(2) Copy No.
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CENTRAL
IXTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1.0 JUNE 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR may have new type of improved
BISON heavy bomber in early phases
of development.
Soviet Union pressing Finland to buy
Soviet military equipment on long-
term credit.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Nasir proposes scheme
whereby Shihab would displace Cha-
moan. Both rebel and government
forces step up pace of military ac-
tion.
Turkish leaders stress enduring ties
with United States, and continue flirt-
ing with USSR on economic aid.
0 Greek - Turkish relations severely
strained by continued communal vio-
lence on Cyprus.
0 Indonesia - Central government ships
- shelling dissident capital of Menado.
0 Cambodian - South Vietnamese relations,
chronically bad, have worsened recently.
Tunisia requests small arms from
Iraq and possibly from UAR.
Tunisia accepts "substantially all"
of French proposal on evacuation
of troops and Bizerte base issue.
III. THE WEST
0 Portugal - Election results reveal
deep dissatisfaction with Salazar
regime, which is not in danger, but
will be less complacent.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
71,0
1,0
10 June 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet aircraft production:
TET-tiriusual movement of five large
trucks carrying newly fabricated portions of some large air-
craft out of the main assembly area at the Fill aircraft plant
in Moscow. Although the aircraft type and configuration can-
not be determined from these partially covered components,
the possibility exists that this shipment consisted of parts
of a new type bomber or portions of an improved BISON-
type aircraft. In this connection, Khrushchev stated in
April that the USSR would soon unveil "a new and very in-
teresting bomber." (Page 1)
USSR-Finland: During Finnish President Kekkonen's
recent visit to Moscow, the USSR again pressed the Finns
to purchase Soviet jet aircraft, tanks, radar and communi-
cations equipment, and naval vessels under a long-term So-
viet loan. Negotiations on some of these items are scheduled
to begin later this year. (Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
*Lebanon: Nasir has urged that the United States either
join him or act alone in forcing a "compromise" which would
make Lebanese army commander General Shihab prime min-
ister and then president by succeeding Chamoun. Nasiris sug-
gestion may be aimed at blunting UN action against him, and
he is probably fully aware that Shihab is willing to accept some
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type of accommodation with the UAR. The Lebanese Army
expects a rebel attack on Tripoli soon, and is withdrawing
units from the north and using air attacks to disrupt the
rebel planning. Page 3) (Map)
Turkey-USSR: While Prime Minister Menderes is em-
phasizing the "enduring strength of US-Turkish ties," and
in all probability Turkey does not desire to change its basic
strategic policy, President Bayar and Foreign Minister Zorlu
are pressing the current economic "flirtation" with the USSR.
Turkish leaders may be overconfident of their ability to con-
trol their relations with the Soviet Union.
(Page 5)
Cyprus: Greek-Turkish relations have been severely
strained y the communal rioting on Cyprus which continued
for the third day on 9 June. Archbishop Makarios has in-
structed the Greek Cypriots to organize their own defenses
against Turkish-Cypriot attacks. (Page 6)
*Indonesia: Menado was under attack by three central
government corvettes on 8 June,
The
same warships had shelled two towns on the North Celebes
coast opposite Gorontalo the previous day.
the shelling of Menado would be the prel-
ude to an amphibious landing there.
South Vietnam - Cambodia: Relations between these two
countries, chronically bad, have worsened in recent weeks
as a result of border disputes and numerous economic and
political problems. This impedes efforts to develon co-
operation against Communism. �
(Page 7) (Map)
Tunisia-Iraq-UAR: Tunisia has officially asked Iraq
for small arms "no matter what kind or in what quantity,"
10 June 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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according to the Iraqi charg�n Tunis, who believes the
Bourguiba government_ha.ade a similar request
to the UAR.
*Tunisia - France: Tunisia has accepted "substantial-
ly all" of France's proposals of 8 June to evacuate all troops
except those in Bizerte if Tunis will agree "in principle" to
negotiate the retention by France of its Bizerte base. The
Tunisians have balked, however, at giving formal assurances
that they will leave the base at the disposal of French forces.
Their counterproposal is to open negotiations for a provisional
agreement on Bizerte before 1 October--when virtually all
French forces outside the base would have been evacuated.
(Page .8)
III. THE WEST
Portugal: Unprecedented opposition to the Salazar re-
gime is indicated by the fact that about 20 percent of the
voters in the urban areas supported opposition candidate
General Delgado. Portuguese authorities have expressed
surprise at the strength of the Communist party as re-
vealed during the campaign. As a result of the campaign,
the regime will probably be less complacent about its po-
litical future, but its stability is by no means threatened.
(Page 9)
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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iL I
No, Nue
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Possible New Soviet Aircraft Observed
a con-
voy of five trucks carrying newly fabricated portions of some
unidentifiable large aircraft out of the Fili aircraft plant in
Moscow. Components on the first two trucks were uncovered
and appeared to consist of landing-gear doors and control
surfaces; those on the remaining three trucks were covered,
making identification impossible. One component, possibly
a wing-tip assembly, had a "long spike or tube affixed at
the small end," of an appearance generally characteristic
of the air-speed indicator instrument system of high-per-
formance aircraft.
BISON sightings at Fili and test flights of what may be
an improved BISON-type aircraft from Moscow/Ramenskoye
raise the possibility that these aircraft parts are for an improved
BISON. Some aspects, however, of this
sighting suggest the possibility that these were portions of
a new aircraft. The long "spike" is not believed to be a
BISON part, and BISONS normally are flown rather than
trucked away from Fili. This suggests that rather than at-
tempting operation from the runway at Fili, which is less
than 5,000 feet long, the Russians were transporting the
observed parts to some more adequate facility for final
assembly, as was done with the first BISON prototype.
the USSR soon
would unveil "a new and very interesting bomber."
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USSR Presses Finland to Purchase Soviet Arms
During President Keldgments recent visit to Moscow,
the USSR again pressed the Finns to purchase Soviet jets,
tanks, radar and communication equipment, and naval
_vessals_Aincler_aterm loan,
Kekkonen excluded the possibility
of a long-term arms agreement, stating that each arms
purchase must be approved by the Finnish cabinet and
Parliament.
The Soviet ambassador in Finland has in the past told
Finnish officials that the USSR deplores Finland's buying
arms from the West and not from the East. President
Kekkonen now feels that a purchase of 12 1VIIG-19's or
MIG-21's is necessary to balance the contract signed in
late 1956 for 12 British Gnat jets, and has agreed to
negotiate later this year for the purchase of Soviet jets
as well as taiiks. He may have hoped that in return for
arms purchases the USSR would agree to changes in the
1947 Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty limiting the size of
Finnish armed forces. The USSR, however, adamantly
opposed any revision in the treaty.
Khrushchev declared in
response to a Finnish query that "not one period can be
changed."
Soviet attempts to include in the joint communiqu�
statements that both Finland and the USSR consider the
NATO membership of Norway and Denmark a constant
danger to peace in northern Europe were emphatically
rejected by the Finns. Khrushchev's approval was nec-
-_essary for revised Soviet text omitting this reference.
:2-
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MEDITERRANEAN
Beirut
805114 80607 2
Baniyas
Tripoli
31-inch pipeline.
TO JORDAN &
\SAUDI ARABIA
Selected Roads
-30-inch pipeline
Horns
ascus
0
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iuricnti
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
President Nasir, through intermediaries as well as
by personal contact with the American ambassador in
Cairo, is increasing pressure for prompt joint US-UAR
sponsorship of the settlement he proposes for the Leb-
anese situation. Leading from what he believes to be
a position of strength, Nasir apparently feels a "com-
promise" settlement at this time would ensure eventual
UAR domination of Lebanon.
Nasies suggested terms include permitting President
Chamoun to finish his term, replacement of Prime Min-
ister Sulh by army commander General Shihab, and an
amnesty for opposition leaders. In return, Nasir claims
that all he wants is a "government that will not be hostile"
to the UAR. Shihab, he believes, is "the logical man for
the presideney." Although professing that his contacts
with the Lebanese opposition are not close, Nasir prom-
ised to "do his best" to induce them to accept the pro-
posed compromise.
Some idea of Na,sies intentions toward Lebanon can
be derived from a statement attributed to him a short time
ago when he said an independent Lebanon. constituted an
"open door to my fortress."
While.Nasi ' se contact witn tne Lebanese
opposition, orders went from Cairo to Leb-
anon ordering attacks by the rebels on a front ranging
from northern to southern Lebanon.
rp
ne of Nasies closest advisers has denouncednainoun over Cairo radio and promised support for
the "glorious Lebanese people" against their "oppressors."
Lebanon has been relatively quiet during the past
day, except for some bombs in Beirut. Tripoli is the
focal point of military action, and Lebanese Army au-
thorities expect a major attack there by the rebels in
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LL.ItL I
the near future. Air action is being taken to keep rebel
forces disorganized and to forestall the attack. Troops
north of Tripoli have been isolated by the rebels and
attempts will be made to withdraw these units to Tripoli,
thus yielding control of the northern area to the rebels.
Extremist Moslem leader Adnan Hakim openly
boasted to an American reporter that he favors union
with the UAR and exhibited antitank grenades procured
from the UAR. Hakim also bragged of full responsibility
for terrorist activities being carried on in Lebanon,
and claimed his group included Communists and Baathists.
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I .6,1 J L.4 La a
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Turkish-Soviet Economic Negotiations
Despite Ankara's basic pro-Western orientation and
confidence in its ability to keep economic negotiations
with the USSR within bounds,, Turkey could become over-
involved with the USSR despite centuries of experience
with the Russians. If Turkey should fall victim to entic-
ing Soviet economic blandishments, it could start a chain
reaction of accommodations with the USSR affecting the
entire area.
Turkish Government leaders have become desperate
over Turkey's long-standing economic crisis. Lack of
foreign exchange has created shortages of consumer
goods, raw materials, spare parts, and other essential
imports. Turkey has requested large-scale interim
economic assistance from the United States and West
Germany to tide it over until the OEEC and IMF can
conclude their present survey and propose a long-term
solution of Turkey's economic-problems. The USSR is
reportedly offering nearly $300,000,000 in credit. If
no other aid is in sight, Ankara will probably accept as
long as no special demands are imposed by Moscow.
Turkish leaders, however, probably do not appreciate
the security implications involved in acceptance of
significant amounts of capital equipment from the So-
vie loc.
CY<
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I Jr, 1.411 1.4
Nor,
*sof
Cyprus Situation
Clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots con-
tinued on 9 June for the third straight day, and the gov-
ernment imposed new curfews on many cities and towns
throughout the island. At least six persons have been
killed and more than 100 injured since the explosion of a
bomb near the Turkish Information Center in Nicosia on
7 June. the bomb
may have been thrown by Turks in full knowledge that vio-
lence would follow.
Attempts by the British to reimpose order on Cyprus
are complicated by the fact that the police are composed
largely of Turkish Cypriots, previously unreliable for
quelling Turkish-Cypriot mobs. In addition, Governor
Foot may hesitate to act vigorously against demonstrators
on the eve of the announcement of a new British proposal
for settling the Cyprus issue. Fear and uncertainty re-
garding these proposals may have been prime causes for
the violence by Turkish Cypriots. The present situation
on the island may cause London to alter its previous plans
to make the anticipated announcement by 17 June.
Continued communal violence on Cyprus could easily
lead to incidents against the minorities in Turkey or Greece,
with a probable subsequent break in diplomatic relations
between the two nations. In Athens, the government has
asked for a meeting of the NATO Council, has protested
Turkish-Cypriot action to London and Washington, is not
permitting the Greek ambassador to return to Ankara, and
has indicated anxiety over rumored Turkish troop move-
m9,tfts on the Anatolian coast opposite Cyprus
-GONRDENTIA-L--
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IL' J- 'tit I I ArM Li �
Nor' Nee
Relations Between Cambodia and South Vietnam Deteriorating
The chronic poor relations between Cambodia and South
Vietnam have deteriorated seriously in recent weeks as a re-
sult of cumulative grievances over border disputes and over
political and economic issues. The growing ill will between
the two countries was sharpened on 29 May by a South Viet-
namese notification that Cambodian naval shipping would
thereafter not be permitted to transit the lower Mekong
River without prior authorization. Since the temporary
Vietnamese embargo on Cambodian goods in early 1956,
Cambodia has smarted over its dependence on Vietnamese
waters as a shipping outlet to the sea.
Ultranationalism, aggravated by personality clashes
between Vietnamese President Diem and Cambodian Crown
Prince Sihanouk, has frustrated sporadic attempts to set-
tle mutual differences despite the fact that both govern-
ments recognize this would be in their best interests.
Communist propaganda, moreover, has encouraged Cambo-
dia's inclination to attribute its troubles with South Viet-
nam to Western-directed pressure to abandon neutrality
and Join SEATO.
Continuing tensions between Cambodia and South Viet-
nam are hampering efforts in both countries to combat
Communist subversion, and also undermine a regional
posture against Communism. In addition, the Communist
bloc stands to benefit psychologically if Cambodia carries
out its threat to air its grievances against South Vietnam
in the United Nations.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Neal
Tunisia Accepts Most of French Evacuation Proposals
Tunisia has accepted "substantially all" of France's pro-
posals of 8 June, according to French charg�enard. The
new proposals included an offer to withdraw from Tunisia
within four months the 9,000 French troops outside Bizerte,
if Tunis will agree "in principle" to negotiate French reten-
tion of the Bizerte base and to allow the 13,000 French troops
in the base area to circulate freely. Benard states that the
Tunisian Government is willing to grant immediate freedom
of movement between various French installations in the
Bizerte area once evacuation begins. The Tunisians, how-
ever, have balked at giving written assurances that Bizerte
will remain at the disposal of French forces, and have made
a counterproposal to enter into negotiations for a provisional
agreement regarding Bizerte before 1 October--when virtual-
ly all French forces outside the base would have been evacu-
ated.
French officials in Paris informed the American Embassy
on 7 June that they were prepared to agree to all essential
elements of the Anglo-American "good offices" proposals of
15 March. The good offices recommendations proposed re-
establishment in two phases of French-Tunisian negotiations
disrupted by the Sakiet Sidi Youssef bombing on 8 February.
The first phase provided, among other things, for the evacua-
tion of all French forces outside Bizerte and stationing of neu-
tral observers who would report to the American and British
ambassadors, at evacuated airfields in southern Tunisia.. The
second phase provided that a provisional regime for the Bizerte
base would be defined by mutual agreement in conversations
which might be conducted simultaneously with the evacuation of
troops stationed elsewhere in Tunisia.
While the new French proposal appears in large measure
to meet Bourguiba's objections to French demarches of late
May, he will continue to be under heavy popular pressure for
total evacuation. He probably will again ask the United States
and Britain to indicate their willingness to continue their good
offic should there be new difficulties with France.
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Yr,
Nue Nue
III. THE WEST
Extent of Unrest in Portugal Causing Concern in Lisbon
The intensity of popular dissatisfaction shown during
Portugal's 8 June presidential election campaign has
caused general surprise in Lisbon. Premier Salazar
himself, whom the American Embassy in Lisbon describes
as "unquestionably greatly shaken" by popular manifesta-
tions against the regime, admitted at a public rally of
his party at the end of the campaign that reforms may be
necessary to meet this discontent. Many persons are
said to feel that opposition candidate General Humberto
Delgado would have won a free election.
The small, illegal Portuguese Communist party
Is reportedly exploiting the unrest to the fullest. Offi-
cials of the state security police are reported surprised
at the party's strength and organization. Mass demon-
strations which the Communists hoped to stage on elec-
tion night did not materialize. Nevertheless, the party
has reportedly issued instructions to have arms avail-
able to support any popular violence against the govern-
ment.
The regime's expressed determination to use all
available means to re-establish pre-electoral tranquility
is likely to intensify friction among top government fac-
tions. This may come to the surface during the next
few weeks when anticipated cabinet changes are made.
Nevertheless, the government will almost certainly be
able to control any disorders.
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