LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS: STAFF NOTES FEBRUARY 19, 1975 [SANITIZED] - 1975/02/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02991589
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: February 19, 1975

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Latin American Trends
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February 19, 1975
No. 0497/75
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
February 19, 1975
Argentina: Industrial
Absenteeism
3
ANNEX
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Dependence on Aide Hurts Argentine President 10
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Argentina: Industrial Absenteeism
Top government officials are worried about soar-
ing absenteeism among workers. Since the return of
Peronism, workers have responded to higher wages,
increased leave benefits, and full employment by
staying off the job in droves. According to Secre-
tary of Commerce Jose Alloatti, the absentee rate
has jumped from around seven percent in 1973 to ap-
proximately 30 percent at present.
While inflation has caused industrial produc-
tion costs to double, absenteeism has resulted in a
70-percent decline in productivity at several fac-
tories. Alloatti recently warned that such a trend
could "ruin the republic."
Government leaders themselves, however, must
shoulder much of the blame for the present situation.
The labor law enacted last September protects workers
from dismissal and gives them extensive legal advan-
tages over management. For example, workers who take
unauthorized leave are entitled to "sick pay" if they
submit a medical certificate upon return to work.
Since many unions have their own doctors and clinics,
such certificates can be obtained easily.
Official favoritism is further reflected in the
2.4 percent jobless rate announced last month. This
more than fulfills the requirements of full employ-
ment, which is defined at 97 percent. It also means
that a number of "marginal" individuals hold jobs
whose productive usefulness is in question.
High absenteeism is a common phenomenon in many
industrialized societies where job fatigue and work
boredom have become important disincentives once a
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satisfactory wage wage level has been attained. In Italy,
for example, absenteeism increasingly became a prob-
lem after extensive benefits were granted workers by
national legislation in 1969.
High absenteeism and low productivity will be
one of the major roadblocks to current efforts to
stabilize the Arsentine economy. A sudden recession
could force Mrs. Peron to choose between backing her
economic advisers and retaining the support of labor
leaders who are the backbone of Peronism. There al-
ready are signs of pressure within the government to
take a tougher line with the unions. Economy Minister
Gomez Morales has publicly expressed the desire to
"trim the fat" from the public enterprises that employ
thousands of workers. Alloatti went even further when
he recently accused some labor leaders of fomenting
absenteeism against the national interest and specifi-
cally attacked automotive workers in one plant for
"industrial sabotage."
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sEeirrr
ANNEX
Dependence on Aide Hurts Argentine President
The dependence of Argentine President Maria
Estela Peron on the shadowy Jose Lopez Rega as her
principal political mentor has become a major vul-
nerability. In the six months since Juan Peron's
death, Lopez Rega has emerged as the de facto
strongman of the regime, and his personality and
power have alienated the Argentine military and the
country's other power brokers.
As minister of social welfare since Juan Peron
returned to the presidency in October 1973, Lopez
Rega has controlled over 20 percent of the national
budget.
As secretary to the presidency, Lopez Rega has
the authority to coordinate all of the President's
official activities and has access to all the infor-
mation she gets from any public official. He formal-
ly assumed this job only last month, but the appoint-
ment merely legitimized a role he was already filling.
As the government's unofficial coordinator for
the fight against leftist terrorists, Lopez Rega is
widely believed to be the mastermind behind the
"death squads" that are trying to terrorize the ter-
rorists.
It is Lopez Rega's strong personal influence
over the inexperienced and insecure President, how-
ever, that gives him his greatest source of power.
Mrs. Peron relies on Lopez Rega as a political strat-
egist, personal confidant, and for psychological sup-
port. She seems swayed by his mysticism; he claims
to be in communication with the spirit of Juan Peron
and makes no attempt to hide his involvement in the
occult.
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ET
Lopez Rega serves as a kind of political light-
ning rod, drawing criticism to himself for adminis-
trative failures that might otherwise be blamed on
the President.
Path to Power
Jose Lopez had a checkered career before he met
Juan Peron. He was a police corporal, a nightclub
bouncer and singer, a small-time publisher. He wrote
several books on astrology. He ingratiated himself
with Juan Peron in Madrid in the mid-1960s and became
the exiled leader's private secretary and bodyguard.
It is unlikely that Juan Peron, during this
period, ever turned to his secretary for advice on
important matters, but Lopez Rega did manage some of
Peron's business interests and was the leg man on
some of Peron's political and financial dealings.
On Peron's return to power in October 1973, the loyal
servant was rewarded with a cabinet job.
Mrs. Peron and Lopez Rega have been close friends
for more than a decade and partners in a wide variety
of business ventures. They are reported to be joint
inheritors of Juan Peron's sizable estate.
Now 58, Lopez Rega is not a particularly adept
administrator. Indeed, his performance as minister
of social welfare has been mediocre. He is, however,
adept at blackmail and at intimidating his opponents;
he has steadily strengthened his position by arranging
the appointment of sycophants and allies to high gov-
ernment positions.
He publicly scorns popular references to him as
El Brujo (the sorcerer), but probably finds his
reputation as a mystic useful in intimidating and
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.speRET
confusing his enemies. Whether he takes his pseudo-
scientific interests seriously, they give him a
sinister air and inspire widespread fear.
Murky Atmosphere
It may be that no one person governs Argentina
today. The inner workings of Mrs. Peron's administra-
tion are cloaked from view. From somewhere within,
executive decrees and ministerial pronouncements
emerge, and an inert Peronist-controlled legislature
promptly ratifies them. The return of Peronism by
popular mandate in 1973 has proved to be little more
than the replacement of a military cabal by bureau-
cratic authoritarianism.
This murky, unstructured atmosphere is made to
order for Lopez Rega. He has appealed to ultra-
nationalistic, anti-Marxist, and anti-Semitic forces
within Argentina. He has encouraged Mrs. Peron to
take a political stance to the right of her late
husband--a shift that has cut off communication with
the moderate Peronist left and seriously damaged any
chances for unifying the movement.
In the process, he has made many powerful enemies.
In Argentina's hidebound, highly stratified society,
he is regarded as an interloper by the leaders of all
major pressure groups. Instead of attempting to mol-
lify these critics, Lopez Rega antagonizes them, for
example, by appearing at Mrs. Peron's side whenever
she makes a formal appearance.
One of those Lopez Rega has alienated is Ricardo
Balbin, the leader of the moderate opposition Radical
Party. Juan Peron had started a dialogue with Balbin,
but Mrs. Peron has let it languish. Believing that
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Lopez Rega is chiefly responsible, Balbin has de-
nounced recent government actions and criticized the
extent of Lopez Rega's power.
Protests have come from military commanders, who
distrust the ties Lopez Rega is said to have made with
the minister of defense and the chief of the federal
police. Although the commanders share with Lopez Rega
a fear of the left and a goal of defeating leftist
terrorists, the commanders think that he seeks to ag-
grandize his power at their expense.
Lopez Rega's earlier alliances with a number of
other cabinet ministers and a key Peronist labor
leader have cooled. He even has enemies in extreme
right-wing circles.
An Unwanted Problem
Despite the wide range of this opposition, it is
unlikely that any group or coalition will move deci-
sively to depose him. They will try to contain and
undercut him, but none seems willing to force the issue
with the highly emotional President, who might resign
and leave them all with an unwanted succession problem.
This reluctance will probably last until the tide is
turned in the struggle against terrorism.
Once terrorism ceases to be the major preoccupa-
tion, the armed forces could find ready support among
political and labor groups to present Mrs. Peron with
an ultimatum on Lopez Rega. Even if they did, it is
doubtful that she would give him up.
Lopez Rega's role as a major actor probably will
have a short run in Argentine politics, but he could
be the catalyst that will bring the military back into
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politics. Army generals have already begun to take
independent policy actions in internal security.
U.S. observers on the scene admit the possi-
bility that a military-labor alliance will eventual-
ly take power and impose a neo-fascist dictatorship.
Evidence of growing political frustration and col-
lusion between these groups supports this prediction.
While effective counter-insurgency operations have
prevented a dramatic upsurge in leftist violence, be-
hind the scenes maneuvering among those opposed to
Lopez Rega has increased. This restlessness will
almost certainly intensify between now and the na-
tional elections scheduled for 1977. 3.5(c)
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