CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02989931
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: November 19, 1959

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19 November 1959
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CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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19 NOVEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev speech to Soviet journalists
reiterates theme of growing Western rec-
ognition of necessity of peaceful coexist-
ence.
Migration from West to East Germany
has increased; involves mostly return-
ees.
Moscow continuing efforts to extrart r*Ill
__e_asian_s_lfrom Tehran.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Peiping expected to reject Nehru's latest
call for a general withdrawal of Chinese
troops from the disputed border area but
will probably press for immediate "
liminary talks."
Qasim apparently still in hospital though
his departure may be imminent.
Indonesian Foreign Ministry and Chinese
Communist Embassy in Djakarta ex-
change public recriminations.
Philippine election results show strength
of Nacionalista party machine but re-
veal President Garcia'.3 personal unpop-
ularity through defeat of candidates
closely associated with him.
III. THE WEST
0 Worsening economic position makes
Greece more vulnerable to Soviet ef-
forts to reduce Greek ties with the West.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 November 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: In his speech to Soviet journalists at a Kremlin
reception on 14 November, Khrushchev returned to the theme
that has dominated his foreign policy pronouncements since
his visit to the United States--growing Western recognition
of the necessity of peaceful coexistence. He reaffirmed his
satisfaction with the improvement in East-West relations and
expressed confidence that the "present incipient lessening" of
international tension will continue. Perhaps in response to
critics within the bloc, he denied that the USSR has changed
its policies and again invoked Lenin as the author of the peace-
ful coexistence concept. Despite Khrushchev's apparent attempt
to create the impression that 250 ICBMs were produced by a
single Soviet missile plant in one year, available evidence sug-
gests that only the 700-nautical-mile missile has been in pro-
duction long enough to permit achievement of such a production
rate. (Page 1)
,gast-West German3q, Since. 1957 the.; migration from
West to East Germany, involving mostly returnees, has been
growing, possibly reaching 50,000 in 1959. During 1958 the
East German refugee flow to the West, about 204,000, was 22
percent lower than in 1957. The drop in 1959 is expected to
be about 30 percent. Semiskilled labor makes up the bulk of
the increasing eastward movement, and the trend will probably
continue as economic conditions in East Germany further im-
prove. The westward flow is being affected at present not only
by gradually improving security measures but by developments
in the international situation which occasion a "wait-and-see"
attitude. (Page 3)
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*USSR-IRAN: Moscow is continuing its efforts to extract
concessions from Tehran. On 11 November, Acting Foreign
Minister Semenov presented Iranian Ambassador Masud-
Ansari with a draft protocol embodying an exchange of guar-
antees to exclude foreign military bases and forces from the
USSR and Iran. The protocol also would have bound each
country to prohibit any use of its territory which would "en-
danger the security of the other." However,
oscow's proposal
had been shown to the Shah who indicated that it was in con-
flict with what the Iranian Government was willing to give in
writing. The Shah had rejected an oral presentation of a sim-
ilar nature by Ambassador Pegov on 8 November.
(Page 4)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
India - Communist China:(Nehruts counterproposals
for neutralizing the Sib-Indian frontier call for Chinese
withdrawal from Longju outpost in Assam and for both Chi-
nese and Indian withdrawals from disputed territory in
Ladakh.
Nehru expressed his willingness to meet with
Chou after "preliminary" discussions at a lower level, but
stressed that immediate efforts should be concentrated on
reaching an "interim understanding" to ease tension and
make talks possible. Peiping probably will reject Nehru's
latest call for a general withdrawal of Chinese troops as it
has his earlier demands. The Chinese, however, will prob-
ably press for the preliminary talks
(Page 5)
Iraq: The Baghdad radio statement indicating that Prime
Minister Qasim had left the hospital on 17 November appears
to have been premature. However, Qasim's departure may be
imminent, since he has previously said he expected to leave
this week.
19 Nov 59 DAILY BRIEF
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Watch Committee Conclusions: Situations susceptible
of direct exploitation by Sino- Soviet bloc action which would
jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East,
particularly in Iraq.
Laos: Dissident military activity remains at a low level.
However, the insurgents retain a considerable potential for
guerrilla action, and no decrease in their subversive activities
is foreseen at the present time.
Middle East: The situation in Iraq remains unstable, and
the possibility of further assassination attempts or coups re-
mains.
Indonesia - Communist China: A public exchange of re-
criminations between the Chinese Communist Embassy in
Djakarta and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry is further evi-
dence of the growing strain in Sino-Indonesian relations. The
Chinese Embassy has denounced as untrue Indonesian Foreign
Minister Subandrio's claim that the Chinese ambassador had
agreed to cooperate with the Indonesian Government's program
to remove Overseas Chinese from rural areas. Djakarta has
now retorted that if the ambassador persists in his denial, and
in his justification of the obstructive activities of his embassy
Philippines: The administration's victory in securing five
of the eight Senate seats and a majority of the local offices con-
tested in last week's election reflects the strength of the Nacion-
alista party machine. At the same time, the defeat of candi-
dates closely associated with President Garcia points up his
personal unpopularity. Garcia may become increasingly pre-
occupied with a struggle for control of his own party as well as
with a growing challenge from the opposition Liberal party to
the further neglect of administrative reforms. The Liberals
were strengthened by the election of three senators and various
local officials. Garcia may step up emphasis on his policy of
economic nationalism despite the limited campaign appeal of the
Nacionalista "Filipino First" slogan. (Page 7)
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III. THE WEST
Greece-USSR:(yhe worsening economic position of
Greece is increasing its vulnerability to Soviet efforts to
reduce Greek ties with the West, according to Greek For-
eign Minister Averoff. The Soviet campaign, described by
Averoff as alternating between the "smile" and "snarl" tech-
niques, has proceeded since last summer in the political,
economic, and cultural fields and has recently resulted in
attacks on the Greek Government for rejecting bloc proposals
for a Balkan "summit" conference. In view of the developing
economic situation, the American ambassador in Athens re-
gards the Soviek campaign as a serious threat to Greece's po-
sition in NATO.)
(Page 8)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Again Defends Peaceful Coexistence Policy
Khrushchev's somewhat rambling speech to Soviet jour-
nalists at Kremlin reception ron14 November, the text of
which was published on 17 November; underscored the theme
that has dominated the Soviet premier's foreign policy pro-
nouncements since his visit to the United States�growing
Western recognition of the necessity of peaceful coexistence.
As in his major policy address to the Supreme Soviet on 31
October, Khrushchev attributed this shift in Western policies
and attitudes toward the USSR to the deep impact of Soviet mil-
itary and technological achievements.
These statements appear to reflect Khrushchev's confi-
dence that there is an irresistible drift in the West toward
an accommodation which the USSR can exploit to win at least
tacit Western recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe
and East Germany.
Khrushchev expressed satisfaction that East-West rela-
tions "have taken a better turn" and indicated confidence that
the "present incipient lessening of international tension" will
continue. He asserted that a comparison of his talks with
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan this
year with his discussions with British and American leaders
at the Geneva summit meeting in 1955 shows important prog-
ress toward Western "understanding of the necessity of peace-
ful coexistence."
As an example of the "mighty weapons" at the USSR's dis-
posal; Khrushchev stated that "in one year 250 missiles with
hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in the factory
we visited." The context implied he was referring to Soviet
ICBM production. However, available evidence suggests that
only the 700-nautical-mile missile has been in production long
enough to permit achievement of such a production rate.
In this speech, Khrushchev again appeared to be seeking
to justify the correctness of his peaceful coexistence posture.
Perhaps in response to expressions of misgivings within the
19 Nov 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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.*Nro, Niro,
bloc regarding the long-range implications of his present
course, Khrushchev denied that the USSR has changed its pol-
icy. In line with the assurances in his Supreme Soviet speech
that "there cannot be any question of concessions" in matters
of ideology, Khrushchev declared, "We were born Commu-
nists, we live as Communists, and will not die, but continue
to march onward as Communists." He again invoked Lenin
as the author of the peaceful coexistence slogan and said,
"We are proud that we have always acted and are acting as
we were taught by Lenin, who was the first to proclaim this
slogan."
After attacking Chancellor Adenauer in connection with
West German plans to establish a radio station in West Ber-
lin, Khrushchev remarked that "it would be a good thing if no
one tried to exacerbate.. the situation in this or other areas
of the globe.''
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Migration From West to East Germany Increases
Migration from West to East Germany appears to be in-
creasing substantially, while the refugee flow in the opposite di-
rection is decreasing. The East German Foreign Ministry as-
serted on 16 November, according to a Western news report,
that the eastward movement in 1958 was 82.6 percent higher
than in 1957. While this figure is highly suspect and cannot
be checked, it is believed that as many as 50,000 persons
may go to East Germany during 1959.
During 1958, the East German refugee flow to the West,
totaled about 204,000-22 percent less than in 1957; the total
in 1959 will be about 30 percent less than in 1958.
These trends will probably continue. Economic pres-
sures in� East Germany have abated, and if this improvement
continues, dissatisfied West Germans and refugees who have
not been satisfactorily assimilated will be increasingly will-
ing to seek work in East Germany. The bulk of the eastward
movement consists of semiskilled labor.
At the same time certain factors currently inhibiting the
westward flow will probably cause further declines. East
German security measures are becoming increasingly effec-
tive. In addition, many would-be East German refugees have
adopted a wait-and-see attitude during the current interna-
tional detente.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Iran Rejects Sovierqraggigcro
*NO
Moscow is continuing its effort to extract concessions
from Iran as the price for "normalizing" relations and halt-
ing bloc radio propaganda attacks. Acting Foreign Minister
Semenov on 11 November presented Iranian Ambassador
Masud-Ansari with a draft protocol by which Iran and the
USSR would guarantee to exclude foreign military bases and
forces and to prohibit the use of their territories in such a
way as to "endanger the security" of the other party.
The substance of these Soviet proposals, an expansion
of the Shah's offer of a protocol guaranteeing that no foreign
missile bases would be permitted on Iranian soil, had al-
ready been rejected by the Shah as not "subject to proper
definition" when outlined orally by Ambassador Pegov on 8
November. Tehran informed Ansari of the Shah's talks with
Pegov and directed him to tell Khrushchev or the Soviet for-
eign minister that the Shah's offer is "the maximum conces-
sion that the Iranian Government can make."
Ansari recommended that the Iranian Government pre-
sent the USSR with a coun
terms.
the Shah viewed Moscow's proposal as conflicting with
what the Iranian Government was willing to give in writing
and instructed him to present a counterdraft stating Iran's
original position which was termed "definite and final."
The Soviet Government's handling of the current exchange,
particularly its efforts to extract additional concessions and
its postponement of action on the Shah's offer to exclude for-
eign missile base; suggests that Soviet leaders feel Tehran
is weakening in the face of the bloc's sustained propaganda at-
tacks.
anian Foreign Minister Aram, on 16 November, voiced
concern over recent developments. He distrusts Ambassador
Ansari in Moscow andopposes sinine any agreement with the
USSR at this time. Ansari was instructed
on 15 November to tell Soviet officials that Iran "prefers" only
to agree that there will be no haspc for
"short- or lona-range
missiles.0
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru Sends Counterproposals on Border Problem to Peiping
(Prime Minister Nehru's counterproposals for neutralizing
the Sib-Indian frontier make no basic change in New Delhi's
position that Chinese forces must be withdrawn from Indian-
claimed territory both in Assam and Ladakh. Nehru on 16
November sent a firm but friendly reply to Chou En-lai's pro-
posal of 7 November for a mutual troop withdrawal from pres-
ent frontier positions,
Rejecting Chou's proposal as "impracticable" and "unneces-
sary," New Delhi maintained that the best way to avoid further
border clashes in sectors other than Ladakh and the Longju area
in Assam is simply to instruct outposts on either side to refrain
from sending out patrols. New Delhi insisted on Chinese with-
drawal from Longju outpost, but repeated its earlier offer not to
reoccupy the position if the Chinese evacuate. With respect to
Ladakh, the Indians refused to accept the Chinese contention that
they are in occupation of the entire area claimed on their maps,
despite indications that this is the case. However, New Delhi
has offered, to keep its forces
in Ladakh west of the boundary line claimed by Peiping in return
for withdrawal of Chinese forces east of the Indian-claimed bor-
der.
No reference was made to the idea, which,
was under consideration in New Delhi last
week, whereby the Indians would concede Chinese civilian occu-
pation of the northeastern corner of Ladakh where China has built
a road. Nehru may have either vetoed this suggestion or decided
to hold it in reserve.
Nehru expressed his willingness to meet with Chou after
"preliminary" discussions at a lower level, but stressed that an
immediate effort should be made to reach an "interim understand-
ing" to ease tension and make talks possible.
Peiping has rejected previous Indian demands that the Chi- ,
nese withdraw from all Indian-claimed territory before negotiations. )
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CThe Chinese, however, have indicated a strong desire to get
these negotiations started so they can make a display of their
"willingness to settle the border issue." Thus, while the Chi-
nese are likely to refuse to evacuate Ladakh, they may be more
flexible about the McMahon line and might suggest something
could be worked out a,bqut Lon u It tt a-
tions Nehru referred to.)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RUH FTIN
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Philippine Elections
Results of the Philippine senatorial and provincial elec-
tions held on 10 November reflect the basic strength of the
incumbent Nacionalista party machine, but reveal President
Garcia's personal unpopularity. Candidates closely as
with the President were defeated. None of the five
senators elected from the eight-man Nacionalista ticket is
a close Garcia follower, and the Nacionalista mayors elected
in the major cities of Manila and Cebu had openly campaigned
against corruption in the Garcia administration.
Although Garcia may recognize in this setback the need
for administrative reforms, he may become increasingly pre-
occupied with a struggle for dominance of his party in advance
of the 1961 presidential election. His announcement that he
will continue a policy of economic nationalism, despite the
limited campaign appeal of the Nacionalista "Filipino First"
slogan, may lead to further harassment of foreign business
interests for domestic political reasons.
Garcia also faces a growing challenge from the opposition
Liberal party, which has been strengthened by the election of
three senators--giving the opposition bloc a total of six in the
24-man Senate, 19 governors in the 54 provinces, and about
two fifths of the municipal mayors. On the other hand, pros-
pects are poor for the newly formed opposition Grand Alliance
to maintain itself as a third party since it failed to win any
major office. Its eventual absorption into the Liberal party
would significantly enhance the prospects of the anti-adminis-
tration forces. Renewed efforts to forge such unity, however,
may again face obstacles if the desires of Alliance leaders for
some significant role in the opposition are rejected.
-CONFIDENTIAL.
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io THE WEST
Greece Regarded as Vulnerable to Soviet Campaign
The American ambassador in Athens regards the current
Soviet effort to reduce Greek ties with the West as a serious
long-range threat to that nation's position within the NATO de-
fense chain. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff also has ex-
pressed his government's "uneasiness" regarding possible ef-
fects of the recently intensified campaign. Averoff put par-
ticular stress on Greece's increasing vulnerability to bloc
initiatives in the light of worsening economic conditions caused,
in part, by inability to dispose of large agricultural surpluses.
The USSR and several East European countries have made
attractive offers to purchase such surpluses. A protocol on
commodity deliveries, calling for increased trade between
Greece and the USSR, was signed on 31 October.
Moscow's campaign has proceeded on three fronts�polit-
ical, economic, and cultural--and has alternated, according
to Averoff, between "smile" and "snarl" techniques with the
former particularly effective in view of a general desire in
Greece for international peace. A major Soviet-bloc effort
to improve relations, including invitations to the Greek lead-
ers to visit Moscow and proposals that the Balkan states set-
tle their differences at a "summit" conference, has been fol-
lowed in recent days by bloc propaganda criticism of the Greek
Government. Premier Karamanlis has been castigated for
failure to adapt to the "Camp David spirit," refusing to attend
a Balkan conference, declining the invitation to Moscow, and
permitting establishment of "Honest John" missiles in Greece.
Symbolic of the return to the "snarl" technique is the is-
suance by the USSR of a postage stamp honoring Manolis Glezos,
sentenced by a Greek court last July to five years in prison for
assisting Communist spies. ICaramanlis has decided to reply in
kind,, andthe Greek Government has announced its intention to
issue a stamp honoring Imre Nagy, executed by the Hungarian
Government in 1958.
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AVA 1.41. I A Al�
**Pi
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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