CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02989930
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: November 14, 1959

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14 November 1959
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14 NOVEMBER 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Arms for ammunition-short Algerian
rebels pile up in Libya after Bourguiba
forbids shipment through Tunisia.
Friction intensifies between African lead-
ers Nkrumah of Ghana and Mboya of
Kenya,
Political differences between factions in
Laotian Government nearing crucial
stage.
Indonesia�Rebel attacks curtail shell oil
production in Sumatra.
South Korea--Offer to negotiate Rhee Line
with Japan may be only maneuver to block
repatriation to North Korea,
III. THE WEST
�Cuba�Castro allegedly advocates state
ownership of the economy.
�Another Panamanian "march" on the
Canal Zone planned for 28 November,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 November 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria-Tunisia:Gresident Bourguiba's refusal to per
the passage of arms across Tunisia from Libya to the
Algerian rebels has intensified the rebel army's chronic am-
munition shortage. 13ourguiba's decision was prompted by
his fear that the rebels might stockpile further supplies in
Tunisia near the Algerian border and increase the likelihood
of border clashes with the French. It has seriously strained
his relations with the rebels and has reportedly 1pri tn an over-
burdening of rebel supply depots in Libya.
A large shipment of Iraqi military aid to the rebels--flown
from Iraq to Libya in mid-October�is among the -
erial awaiting transshinment to Algeria\
African Nationalists: Friction between Ghana's Nkrumah
and East African nationalist leader 1Vlboya of Kenya, the dom-
inant personalities associated with last year's All-African
Peoples' Conference in Accra, is intensifying and becoming
increasingly open. Mboya recently criticized Nkrumah pri-
vately, and on 10 November a Nkrumah spokesman in Accra
publicly blasted Mboya's participation in the ICFTU-sponsored
African labor conference now in progress in Lagos, Nigeria,
which he characterized as a "gathering of imperialist stooges."
(Page 1)
Laos:6;ifferences between Prime Minister Phoui and his
majority party on the one hand and young reformist elements in
the government on the other appear to be nearing a crucial stage
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voplo
(with the approach of the scheduled termination of the Assem-
ly's mandate next month. Premier Phoui accuses the young
reformists of maneuvering for an extraconstitutional govern-
ment under their control which would be appointed by the king
with the military's support. The reformists, on the other hand,
who have no seats in the present parliament, claim that the
government's anti-Communist program is proceeding too slowly
and advocate c nstitutional modifications strengthening the ex-
ecutive branch.
(Page 2)
Indonesia: Shell Oil Company facilities in South Sumatra
in recent weeks have suffered a series of rebel attacks result-
ing in losses of crude oil totaling one fifth to one sixth of nor-
mal production. The oil industry, as a whole, however, although
frequently threatened by the rebels, has not been seriously af-
fected by the dissidents' campaign of economic warfare aimed at
obstructing export production and denying revenues to the govern-
ment; rubber estates in North Sumatra have borne the brunt of
rebel attacks. In 1958, oil and rubber, Indonesia's major products.
accounted together for 72 percent of the nation's exports.
Japan-Korea: alresident Rhee has told the press that Seoul
is ready to negotiate on the arbitrary Rhee fishing line as part
of a general agreement with Japan, but that the prospects for
such an agreement would be dim if Koreans in Japan are repa-
triated to North Korea. Only once before, apparently, has
Rhee suggested publicly the, possibility of a compromise on
this line, which unilaterally prohibits Japanese fishing on the
high seas off the coast of South Korea. Rhee's warning on re-
patriation, however, suggests this may only be a maneuver to
block the repatriation to Communist North Korea which is sched-
uled to begin in mid-December
(Page 4) (Map)
14 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF
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III. THE WEST
CubaOidel Castro evidently plans to subordinate the '
Cuban Government as well as the entire Cuban economy to
the control of the leftist-led National Agrarian RefOrm Insti-
tute (INRA). He is alleged to have said in a closed meeting
of INRA officials that his government could obtain all the
money necessary for its plans and that no private investment
would be needed since the state would own everything. Am-
bassador Bonsai in Havana believes that, although this re-
port of Castro's statements may be exaggerated, it is rbasic
-
ally accurate and merits most careful consideration)
(Page 5)
Panama: Cme eruption of violent new anti-US disorders,
marked by larger demonstrations and more severe repercus-
sions than those of 3 November, is threatened in plans for
another Panamanian march on the Canal Zone on 28 Novem-
ber. The weak Panamanian Government, seeking strength
from an association with a popular cause, appears unwilling
to control the growth of anti-US feeling which the US Embassy
fears may now be beyond control. Some leading Panamanians
have intimated that only some dramatic US concession regard-
ing Panama's sovereignty claims over the Canal Zone can pre-
vent "disastrous consequences) (Page 6)
14 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
ASIA-AFRICA
Friction Intensifying Between Two Top African Leaders
Kenyan nationalist leader Tom Mboya's active participa-
tion in the regional labor conference being held this week in
Lagos, Nigeria, under sponsorship of the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)� has for the first
time made public his clash with Ghana's Prime Minister
Nkrumah. Nkrumah recently brought about Ghana's "dis-
affiliation" with the ICFTU and last week staged a rival la-
bor gathering in Accra looking toward the formation of an
independent African trade union federation. A spokesman for
.Nkrumah released a statement on 10 November which called
Mboya "opportunistic" and "reactionary." The Accra meeting
seated a Kenyan without trade union connections who has re-
ferred to Mboya as an "imperialist stooge."
Last December Nkrumah was largely responsible for nam-
ing Mboya chairman of the All-African Peoples, Conference
(AAPC) held in Accra, and the two men cooperated closely to
keep the conference on an essentially moderate course. Dis-
cord between the two leaders develoned at least as early as last
spring, however.
, Mboya complained vehemently to Nkrumah
about Accra's tactics in connection with AAPC activities)
Early this month Mboya acknowledged privately that his re-
lations with Nkrumah were cool. Mboya said he is unwilling to
be "manipulated" by Nkrumah, who wants to achieve undisputed
leadership of the pan-African movement. Mboya also called
recent Nkrumah initiatives affecting Liberia, Togo, and Guinea
"inept and arrogant," and indicated that both he and Tanganyikan
nationalist leader Julius Nyerere strongly disapproved of such
trends in Ghana 2A the subordination of trade unions to the gov-
ernment.
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(�Laotian Government Faces: Increasing Internal Rift
Differences between the conservative and reformist groups
comprising Laos' leadership may be brought to a head by con-
flicting plans for solving the political problems arising from the
lapse of the National Assembly's mandate on 25 December. How
this issue is resolved will have a bearing on the balance of power
between the two groups and will determine possible changes in
the governmental framework. Party lines on this issue are
blurred in several cases.
Premier Phouies old-guard Rally of the Lao People (RLP)--
the majority group in the present government--advocate a con-
stitutional amendment permitting extension of the legislature's
mandate by one year and retention of the present cabinet with
minor changes. The young reformists, organized as the Com-
mittee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI), want the
mandate to expire on schedule, after which the King would ap-
point a provisional government pending elections next spring.
The reformists also feel that constitutional modifications
strengthening the executive branch of the government are re-
quired for a vigorous anti-Communist program in Laos.
Phoui accuses the CDNI, which enjoys military backing,
of maneuvering to take over power by extraconstitutional means.
While he has exercised moderation in the past to bridge both
camps, he now states he feels that the time has come when the
CDNI must be "brought into line," even at the risk of a govern-
ment crisis. A key factor is the attitude of King Savang Vathana,
who as crown prince championed the CDNI, but who may, have mod-
ified his views since succeedina to the thron7 last month.-)
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Indonesian Dissidents Continue Attacks on South Sumatran
Oil Fields
An official of the Shell oil subsidiary in Indonesia (BPM)
has reported rebel attacks over a six-week period in Septem-
ber and October against Shell facilities in South Sumatra. The
company and the rebels reportedly have been in touch with each
other, however, and no dissident strikes have been reported
since early November, possibly indicating that some arrange-
ment has been reached.
Company losses during the period of the attacks totaled
one fifth to one sixth of normal production. Since BPM sup-
plies the major part of refined products for the local market,
renewed attacks could cause serious shortages and further eco-
nomic difficulties for the government. To date, however, BPM
has made no representations to Djakarta concerning the dissi-
dent raids.
Oil companies in Sumatra�Caltex, Stanvac, and BPM--
have been repeatedly warned by the dissidents to provide as-
sistance or face sabotage, bul_the oil industry as a whole has
not been seriously affected. (The attacks on Shell were preceded
by a rebel request for financial assistance last August; Stanvac
reportedly also suffered damage in Septembe
Operations against oil companies, although partially aimed
at providing funds for the rebels, are primarily part of a cam-
paign of economic warfare directed at obstructing production and
denying revenues to the government. Heretofore, rubber estates
in North Sumatra have borne the brunt of dissident harassment.
Oil and rubber are Indonesia's major products, accounting to-
gether in 1958 for 72 percent of the nation's exports.
SECRET
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Ns,
(Rhee Willing to Negotiate Fishing Line With Japan
,
President Rhee on 11 November told the press that Seoul
is ready to negotiate the Rhee fishing line as part of a general
settlement of outstanding differences with Japan. Only once
beforeopparently, has Rhee suggested publicly a willingness
to compromise on the line, which unilaterally prohibits Japanese
fishing on the high seas off the coast of South Korea. Seoul has
consistently refused to negotiate any modification of the line
and continues to seize and hold Japanese fishing boats and crew-
men caught operating inside it.
Rhee in his statement, however, linked the successful con-
clusion of an over-all agreement to the cancellation of plans
to repatriate Koreans from Japan to North Korea. His offer to
compromise on the fishing line may thus be just another maneu-
ver to block the repatriation. In a similar move he had pre-
viously agreed, after the Japanese announced that repatriation
to North Korea would be permitted, to resume talks with Tokyo
on outstanding differences.
Seoul has continued to procrastinate on the mutual exchange
with Tokyo of each other's detained nationals which would clear
the way for the settlement of other issues. Despite Seoul's strata-
gems, Tokyo appears unlikely to cancel the repatriation to North
Korea, which is scheduled to begin in mid-December. Out of about
700,000 Koreans in Japan, slightly more than 5,000 have regis-
tered with the Japanese Red Cross for the repatriation.
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(�Cuban Reform Institute Seen Dominating Nation's Economy
Fidel Castro evidently plans to subordinate the Cuban Gov-
ernment as well as the entire Cuban economy to the control of the
leftist-led National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA.). He is al-
leged to have said in a closed meeting of INRA officials that his
government could obtain all the money necessary for its plans
and that no private investment would be needed since the state
would own everything. Ambassador Bonsal in Havana believes
that although this report of Castro's statements may be exag-
gerated, it is basically accurate and merits most careful con-
sideration.
corroborates some of the details.
-confirms suspicions that much of the land
expropriated by INRA will be worked cooperatively under gov-
ernment ownership in direct contravention of Castro's promise
that the land would belong to those who worked it. This and the
government's limitation of cooperative profits may have caused
the dissatisfaction reported among peasants on cooperatives al-
ready established. Cattle ranchers, sugar mill owner; and
cane growers will not be allowed to operate with reduced hold-
ings as previously believed, but will soon be forced to sell out
to the government. "Peoples' stores" will ultimately control the
food market but their takeover of regular outlets will be gradual,
probably beginning in December with rural stores, including
those run by sugar mills. Alleged plans also include eventual
government takeover of private industry. This will be facilitated
by refusal of loans or credits, state control of all raw materials,
and the creation of state industries with low production costs.
Castro's alleged statement that all the money necessary to
implement these plans will be available to his regime may indi-
cate the government will eventually take over the banks.
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( Severe New Anti-US Demonstration Planned in Panama
Anti-US mob demonstrations of more severe proportions
than the 3 November riots are probable on 28 November, the
138th anniversary of Panama's separation from Spanish rule.
Delegations from the interior reportedly plan to join Panama
City groups on that date in a "reaffirmation of sovereignty"
march into the Canal Zone. The new demonstration is reported
to be backed by presidential contender Aquilino Boyd, author
of the call for the 3 November march, whose political prospects
were enhanced as a result of the riots of that date.
The impending crisis, which could easily be turned against
the weak De la Guardia government, is viewed by several lead-
ing Panamanians as potentially more serious than the 3 Novem-
ber incidents. Powerful Panamanian newspaper publisher Harmo-
dio Arias and his law partner Octavio Fabrega told a qualified
American observer that President,de la Guardia will not order
the National Guard into action against demonstrators, fearing
that the mob would then turn against him and his government.
Minister of Government Hector Valdes says that Guard Com-
mander Bolivar Vallarino also opposes firm action by the Na-
tional Guard to quell the 28 November demonstration,. The US
Embassy fears that the Panamanian Government, which has used
anti-American sentiment as a means of strengthening its own
political position, now may be unable to control it.
Anti-US incidents could also occur in Panama on 18 Novem-
ber, the anniversary of the signing of the original canal treaty
between the United States and Panama in 1903.
Some Panamanian leaders maintain that "disastrous conse-
quences" can be avoided only by some dramatic US concession,
such as permitting Panama to fly its flag in the Canal Zone, The
US ambassador says mob violence on 28 November is "almost
certain" under present condition!)
-SECRET--
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretzry for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL.
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