CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/09/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02989927
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: September 14, 1959

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14 September 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
CHAN011 IN CLASS.
DEr7:.L
NI_ X. REVIEW DATc,:
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REVIEWER:
TOP SECRET
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160
14 SEPTEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR indicates embarrassment
over events both in Laos and on
the Sino-Indian border.
Chinese Communist propaganda
now giving full publicity to Sino-
Indian border dispute; New Delhi
charged with exaggerating incidents.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Communist propaganda attempt-
ing to place onus on Phoui govern-
ment for continued fighting in Laos.
Sudanese Army command declares
nrpraiitinnary rnmmunications alert.
Arab-Israeli tensions heightened by
new incidents on eve of UN General
Assembly meeting.
III. THE WEST
British- UAR relations continue to
improve.
LATE ITEM
0 Comment on Soviet lunar shot.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: remarks by Soviet spokesmen
provide further evidence of the USSR's embar-
rassment over events both in Laos and on the Sino-Indian bor-
der. A TASS correspondent in London stressed the USSR's
desire to prevent any aggravation of the Laos situation and
said Moscow would "do everything possible" to avoid jeopard-
izing the chances for a detente with the United States.
Peiping's actions in the border dispute were "in-
comprehensible" and could gain nothing valuable enough to
justify the bad impression being create&
'Page 1)
Communist China - India: In contrast to their silence up to
last week on the Sino-Indian border dispute, Chinese Commu-
nist propaganda media now are giving full publicity to the issue.
The resolution passed by the standing committee of the National
People's Congress, press editorials, and statements at public
rallies held throughout the country profess a sense of injury that
New Delhi should "blow up" the matter and thereby give comfort
to elements who want to drive a wedge between India and China.
In this connection, strong exception is also being voiced to the
"unfriendly" activities of the Dalai Lama countenanced by New
Delhi. The Chinese are highlighting their firm opposition to the
McMahon line. Their statements do not go so far, however, as
to insist that the line presently shown on Chinese maps is beyond
discussion. (Page 3)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: Communist bloc propaganda continues to emphasize
the "willingness" of the Laotian dissidents to negotiate a settle-
ment with the Laotian Government on the basis of "respect for
the 1954 Geneva and 1957 Vientiane agreements." By placing
the onus for continued fighting on the Phoui government, the
Communists probably hope not' only to exploit existing differ-
ences within Laos, but also to divide free world attitudes on the
situation. Laotian officials, while admitting the possibility of
some unintentional exaggeration in communiqu�on the fighting
r to date, express confidence that the four-nation UN fact-finding
team about to arrive on the scene will bear out Laos' charges of
North Vietnamese involvement in the rebel activity. Laotian
Army sources report small-scale military action continues in
the northern provinces. ((Page 4)
Sudan: The Sudanese Army command declared a communica-
tions715Tt on 11 September. This is a precautionary measure by
the Abboud military government,which is aware of coup plotting
by a new group of dissident junior officers. The government an-
ticipates a strong popular reaction to its announcement in the
near future of courts-martial verdicts and sentences against the
officers imnlicatpci in the abortive coup attempts of 22 May.
(Page 6)
Israel - Arab States: With Arab-Israeli differences likely
to be aired early in the United Nations General Assembly session
beginning 15 September, tensions between Israe), and the Arab
States have been heightened by new incidents. C_On 10 September
the Jordanian defense minister protested to local UN officials
against Israeli military patrolling activities in the Mount Scopus
area and warned that if such patrols do not cease immediately,
the Jordanian Army will take "direct action" beginning 18 Septem-
ber. He implied that by "direct action" he meant firing on the
Israeli patrols:) During the past few days, the Israeli Govern-
ment has made a special point of publicizing recent violent border
14 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Incidents allegedly perpetrated by its Arab neighbors.
On 13 September Israeli military aircraft intercepted a
UAR commercial aircraft in the vicinity of the Israeli port of
Eilat. The intercepted aircraft, on a flight from Kuwait to
rairo was nursued over the Simi_Peninsula.
THE WEST
Britain-UAR: (The present visit to the United Kingdom of
UAR Economics Minister Qaysuni--the first such visit of any
member of a Nasir government since the 1956 Suez interven-
tion--points up the continuing improvement in relations betwee
the two countries. London has responded favorably to a series
of overtures from the UAR hoping they will lead to a resumption
of diplomatic relations. Such a step still seems unlikely for sev-
eral months, however, and any sharp clash with Nasir over spe-
cial British positions or interests in the Arab world could re-
verse this trend. (Page 7)
LATE ITEM
USSR: For the statement of the US Guided Missile and
Astronautics Intelligence Committee concerning the successful
lunar shot, see Page 8.
14 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Sotet Embarrassnient Over Events in Far East Indicated
remarks by Soviet spokesmen
provide further evidence of the USSR's embarrassment
over events in Laos and on the Sino-Indian border.
the Chinese Commu-
nists' actions in the border dispute were "incomprehensible"
and could gain them nothing valuable enough to justify the bad
impression being created)
TASS correspondent in London denied any Soviet respon-
sibility for recent Chinese Communist actions in the Far East,
saying it was "hardly logical" to assume that the USSR would
"apply pressure" against non-Communist Asian countries on
the eve of Khrushchev's visit. He asked why the Soviet Union
should be blamed for "everything that happens" in bloc coun-
tries and stressed that the USSR wished to prevent any aggrava-
tion of the situation and would "do everything possible" to avoid
jeopardizing the chances for a detente with the United States)
The correspondent's remarks bore also on the relationship
between the USSR and the Communist Chinese. "We can urge
them to do things," he commented, "but we cannot push buttons
and watch them jump to conform." He remarked that if the Chi-
nese Communists are not happy at the prospect of Khrushehev
exchanging visits with President Eisenhower�and he said he
had no information that this is the case--the USSR would still
go through with the visits. This would not mean that a break
was imminent between the USSR and China which, he added, the
Soviet Union would do everything possible to prevent)
(The TASS representative expressed his conviction that some-
thing tangible must result from the Khrushehev-Eisenhower ex-
change of visits, and he mentioned the possibility of agreements
on the cessation of nuclear testing and on trade. He stressed the
importance of disarmament and urged that the United States sign
a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Touching also
14 Sept 59
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6he Berlin issue, he said the USSR will try to work out
"something like a series of status quos." He dented any
Soviet intention of taking "dangerous" action on this ques-
tion and remarked, "We can keep talking about Berlin for
some time to come.)
SECRET-
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Napo Nue
Communist China's Propaganda Campaign on Sino-Indian
Border Dispute
Chinese Communist measures to publicize Peiping's side of
the Sino-Indian border issue are assuming the proportions of a
major propaganda campaign, with all the trappings of long press
editorials and public rallies. Speakers in the standing committee
of the National People's Congress have echoed Premier Chou
En-lai's condemnation of Indian activities along the border, re-
iterated his readiness to negotiate a solution, and urged his pro-
posal to preserve the "status quo" pending a final settlement.
Embarrassed by their bad press in India and probably irri-
tated as well by the failure of the USSR to voice unqualified sup-
port for the Chinese position on the border issue, the Chinese
are voicing a sense of outrage that New Delhi by its charges should
give encouragement to elements hostile to Sino-Indian friendship.
Chinese stiffness toward New Delhi is based further on apparent
confidence that Communist China's legal position in the border issue
is every bit as strong as India's. Peiping cites British maps to
support its position, and the American Consul General in Hong
Kong points out that the Chinese could also draw on American maps
for this purpose, including military maps that were widely avail-
able during World War II which give the Chinese version of the
Tibet-Assam boundary.
The Chinese are adamant in their insistence that the McMahon
line is "illegal" and unacceptable. They have not indicated, how-
ever, their minimum demands in the border area. None of their
statements so far insists that the line presently shown on their
maps is beyond discussion. New Delhi's position is that the McMahon
line is not subject to negotiation except for minor modifications.
Some Indian Parliament members and newspapers in recent
days have queried why Nehru hid from the Indian public the news
of early Sino-Indian border clashes. They are now beginning to
question the validity of the moderate stand Nehru is taking in Par-
liament on the border issue and are pressing him to take firm ac-
tion against the Chinese Communists,
CONFIDENTIAL
14 Sept 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Nape
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: Communist bloc propaganda is giving increased prom-
inence to the declared readiness of the Laotian dissidents to ne-
gotiate a peaceful settlement with the government. Both Peiping
and Hanoi have publicized the recent offer attributed to General
ICayson, ranking Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) leader at large. Con-
ditions set for a settlement include withdrawal of United States
military personnel and weapons, cessation of Laotian Army op-
erations against the rebels, release of imprisoned NLHZ lead-
ers, and resumption of International Control Commission (ICC)
activities in Laos. Kayson is quoted as warning that should the
Phoui government "continue to use American weapons to further
the civil war, ... the Laotian people will fight resolutely to the end."
The Communists probably feel that the degree of success
achieved by the rebellion places them in an advantageous posi-
tion from which to bargain. By dangling the bait of a peaceful so-
lution, they apparently hope to bring domestic pressure on the
government and international pressure on the United States to ac-
cept a negotiated settlement along the lines of the November 1957
agreement guaranteeing Communist participation in a coalition
government.
The Laotian Government has spurned the NLHZ overtures,
and American Ambassador Smith feels this position will not change
so long as the Phoui regime stays in power. The military and young
reformist group championed by influential Crown Prince Savang,
recently named regent, are also strongly opposed to any conces-
sion.
Probably anxious to head off UN or other external interven-
tion in Laos, the Communists are at some pains to deny "slander-
ous" charges of North Vietnamese participation in the conflict.
Some fighting reportedly continues in northern Laos; a complete
cessation of activity coincidental with the arrival of the UN mission
would tend to refute the Communist portrayal of a "popular upris-
ing."
Laotian officials admit the possibility of some unintentional
exaggeration in communiques on the fighting to date, but express
SECRET
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New' vim"
confidence that the investigation by the United Nations fact-finding
team will bear out Laos' charges that North Vietnam is actively
supporting the dissidents. The Laotian Government is amassing
available evidence, including captured arms and equipment and
eyewitnesses to enemy attacks. Arrangements are also being
made to fly the investigators by light plane and helicopter to the
remote fighting areas. The hit-and-run tactics of the enemy and
the rugged terrain, however, virtually preclude effective obser-
vation.
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Sudanese Army Alert
The Abboud military government, aware of plotting by a
new group of dissident junior officers and concerned over the
activities of a number of influential political leaders, took the
precaution on 11 September of ordering a military communica-
tions alert. Since his assumption of power last November,
Abboud, who is army commander in chief as well as prime
minister, has faced one crisis after another as the result of
widespread dissension within the army officer corps. Popular
sentiment for a return to civilian government is growing and
several important political and religious figures have urged
Abboud to take steps in that direction. On 10 September a group
of 40 students from Khartoum University petitioned for the re-
turn of the army to its barracks and the restoration of political
freedoms.
A crisis may be precipitated by the government's announce-
ment before the end of this month of courts-martial verdicts
and sentences against the army officers implicated in the abor-
tive coup attempt of 22 May. The prosecution's failure to pre-
sent a really convincing case has caused many Sudanese to be-
lieve that the government had rigged these trials from their
outset. The new conspiring group of junior officers is hoping
to take advantage of a sharp popular reaction to the sentencing
to make its move against the government.
Abboud and Army Deputy Commander in Chief Hagan Bashir
Nasir have already delayed announcement of the sentences while
they attempt to strengthen their control of the army by reassign-
ing key officers. They are likely to issue orders soon that the
Khartoum garrison be augmented with loyal troops from one of
the regional commands.
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IIL THE WEST
Anglo-Arab Relations Improving
(Et_ elations between London and Cairo continue to show gradual
improvement. Political considerations bar any precipitate move
by either government, and resumption of formal diplomatic ties
does not seem to be in prospect for many months, certainly not
until after the British elections on 8 October, The British response
to the growing number of overtures from Cairo in the past two
months has been designed to point up the desirability of full dip-
lomatic relations)
(The UARes mid-July invitation to participate in the Damascus
trade fair from 21 August to 20 September, and then to send a
member of the Macmillan government to take part in the "British
day," was met by sending representatives of a semiofficial advisory
committee on Middle East trade. Several members of the govern-
ment-supported British Council are going to Cairo this week to
discuss the UAR desire to place students in British universities.
Greatest public evidence of the new cordiality is the present "pri-
vate" visit to the United Kingdom of UAR Economics Minister
Qaysuni�the first member of Nasir's government to visit there
since the 1956 Suez intervention. His informal discussions with
Foreign Secretary Lloyd may shed some light on Nasiris intentions
to further the rapprochement.)
(Differences over the Suez Canal, while potentially trouble-
some, do not seem a present threat to this trend. Britain's ef-
forts to delay an IBRD loan for Suez Canal improvements have not
discouraged these overtures from Cairo. In any UN General As-
sembly discussions of the canal transit problem, London plans only
to support the general principle of freedom of transit rather than
specific Israeli claims. A reversal of the trend could nevertheless
result from any clash with Nasir over Britain's remaining special
positions elsewhere in the Arab world
14 Sept 59
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LATE ITEM
GMAIC Statement on Lunar Shot
The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
on 13 September sent the following conclusions to USIB:
1. At about 0240 EDT, 12 September 1959 the
Soviets launched a space probe which impacted on the
moon at about 1700 EDT, Sunday, 13 September. The
announced payload and empty last stage weights were
slightly higher than those announced for Lunik I. Con-
trary to US press articles, the launching on an unfavor-
able day was not originally planned, since the launch
had been attempted three times on more favorable days,
6, 8 and 9 September. This is the second generally
successful Lunik.in six launchings.
3. The announced sodium cloud was allegedly sighted
visually by various unofficial observers, but there is no
confirmation of this event.
4. Over-all we believe with a high degree of confi-
dence that Lunik II made a hard impact on the moon, and
that this was the primary intent of the Soviets.
5. Although generally successful, Lunik I is not
considered to have performed as planned; Lunik II ap-
parently did.
6. Analysis
win probably provide information
within the next several months that may confirm or cipnv
announced experiments and their success.
14 Sept 59
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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