CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/09/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02989926
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: September 12, 1959

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12 September 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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12 SEPTEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chou En-lai again calls for 'friendly
negotiations" on border dispute but
complains India has resorted to force.
Moroccan official says Soviet charge
has been offering arms of "any and all
types."
II. AMA-AFRICA
Laos--French call Laotian military re-
ports exaggerated but view internal sit-
uation as serious.
Soviet-Iranian efforts to improve rela-
tions may be resumed.
Pakistan--President Ayub's trip to East
Pakistan moderately successful; no in-
dications there of efforts to oppose his
regime.
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LATE ITEM
*USSR: At about 0640Z (0240 EDT) today the USSR suc-
cessfully launched a probable lunar probe vehicle from the
Tyura Tam Missile Test Range. The vehicle is believed to
be the same one which the Soviets had tried to launch on three
other occasions since 6 September. If the indications that the
operation is to be a lunar probe are correct and assuming
that the vehicle's flight is successful, it will probably be about
35 hours before the probe reaches the vicinity of the moon.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Communist China - India: The session of the standing
committee of Communist China's National People's Con-
gress which convened on 11 September became a forum
for countering "the anti-China campaign" launched in the
Indian Parliament over the Sino-Indian border dispute. In
his speech to the session, Chou En-lai again called for
"friendly negotiations," but complained that India has "re-
sorted to force to back up its demand." The speakers follow-
ing Chou haVe taken a stronger line and thus set the tone for
a major propaganda effort to justify Peiping's own territorial
claims. Nehru on 11 September welcomed Moscow's "far and
unusual" statement calling for both sides to resolve their dif-
ferences through friendly discussions. The Indian prime min-
ister will be irritated by Chou's most recent remarks.
(Page 1)
USSR-Morocco: CThe Soviet charge in Rabat has been ap-
proaching the defense minister "almost daily" with offers of
Soviet arms of "any and all types," according to a high Moroc-
can official. While Rabat is probably relaying information on
the Soviet offers in order to hasten US consideration of Moroc-
can requests for arms, Ambassador Yost feels that Morocco
is "perfectly capable" of turning to the USSR to obtain arms.
Soviet officials have also recently extended offers of economic
hnical assistance)
(Page 2)
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France-Laos: Cparis feels that internal political difficul-
ties in Laos have provided a favorable climate for Communist
subversion which in turn has caused cries of alarm from the
"inept" Laotian Army. This estimate is backed by French of-
ficials in Vientiane who, while admitting the seriousness of the
situation, tend to obscure this fact by criticizing individual
Laotian military reports as exaggerated. Foreign Ministry
spokesmen approve the UN mission because this will strengthen
Laotian morale and buy time for domestic reform)
(Page 3)
Iran-USSR: Resumption of Iranian-Soviet efforts aimed at
improving relations now appears in the offing.
Soviet Ambas-
sador Pegov intended to leave for Tehran on 11 September, The
Iranian ambassador to- Moscow planned to arrive in Tehran ahead
of Pegov in order to make the "necessary reports," on his alk
with Khrushchey on 2 September.
(Page 4)
Pakistan: President Ayub has made a new effort to sell him-
self and his government to the people of East Pakistan by conduct-
ing a whistle-stop tour through the province between 1 and 7 Sep-
tember. Ayub's effort was only moderately successful, as shown
by the undemonstrative though relatively large crowds which
greeted him during his tour. East Pakistanis apparently still re-
gard Ayubis regime as their best hope for good government, and
there are no indications of efforts to oppose his regime. In both
East and West Pakistan, however, the government is somewhat
less popular than it was earlier,, (Page 6)
12 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chou En-lai Charges Indians with Responsibility for Tension
On Border
The Standing Committee of Communist China's National
Congress on II September became a forum for countering
charges of Chinese aggression hurled in the Indian Parliament
over the Sino-Indian border dispute. Keynoting what is appar-
ently to be a major propaganda campaign on the border issue,
Premier Chou En-lai told the Committee that "differences should
be resolved through friendly negotiation" but that "recent tension
had been entirely and deliberately created by some Indians who,
with ulterior motives, made use of some boundary disputes to
launch a new anti-Chinese campaign." Chou said the Indian Gov-
ernment tried to seize this opportunity to pressure Peiping into
accepting Indian claims.
Taking their cue from Chou, following speakers also called
for negotiations but, in much stronger terms, attempted to jus-
tify the legality of Peiping's own claims and criticized both the
Indian government and Prime Minister Nehru. "Mr. Nehru,"
one speaker said, "slanders China." Another spokesman warned
India to "halt on the brink of the precipice," The tenor of the
statements suggests that Peiping will maintain a rigid attitude in
any negotiations. "We will never accept the so-called McMahon
line," said one speaker�
Nehru on 11 September welcomed Moscow's "fair and unusual"
statement calling for both sides to resolve their differences
through friendly discussions. The Indian Prime Minister, how-
ever, will be irritated by these remarks in the Standing Committee,
Commenting on Chou's 8 September charge that India was following
British "imperialism," Nehru testily asked how Communist China
got so big if it were not for "imperialism" under earlier regimes.
ENT
12 Sept 59
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Soviet Arms Offers to Morocco
(The Soviet charg�n Rabat has been approaching the
Moroccan defense minister "almost daily" with offers of So-
viet arms of "any and all types" to be paid for over a period
of twenty years at no interest, according to Moroccan Security
Director Laghzaoui. Laghzaoui commented that Moscow is
aware of Morocco's negotiations for US military equipment and
hopes to "get its foot in the door," particularly in order to send
military technicians to Morocco.)
(Rabat is probably relaying this information to hasten con-
sideration by Washington of its requests for arms. Nonetheless,
Ambassador Yost feels that Morocco is "perfectly capable" of
turning to the USSR if the United States and France fail to supply
certain equipment, such as tanks, which Rabat especially desires)
(Evidence has been accumulating since early August that
Soviet officials have also offered Morocco technical and economic
assistance ranging from a large-scale credit for goods to small
amounts of aid to meet specific needs in such fields as medicine
and public health. Moscow apparently hopes that its offers will
encourage Rabat to take a stiffer stand in its effort to reach an
understanding with France on economic matters, and to exert
increased pressure for evacuation of Western forces�particularly
US air bases--from its territory)
SECRET
12 Sept 59
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Frahce Minimizes Military Threat to Laos
(The French Government remains skeptical of the seri-
ousness of the military threat facing Laos, and feels that the
problem is an internal political one caused by the failings of
the Laotian Government which have created a favorable climate
for Communist subversion. The Laotian Army, according to
Paris, is unable to cope with the situation and has exaggerated
the scope of outside intervention in a deliberate effort to con-
ceal its own ineptitude)
(while France approves the UN fact-finder mission to Laos
on the ground that this will have a calming effect, strengthen
Laotian morale, and buy time for domestic reforms, it opposes
direct involvement of SEATO in Laos on the ground that this
might precipitate a "Communist military reaction." The French
argue that SEATO should follow events carefully from Bangkok,
but not send a fact-finding team to Laos. Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville is described as being "completely negative" toward
any SEATO involvement at this time)
(Paris' attitude is no doubt influenced by French representa-
tives in Vientiane who, while admitting the general seriousness of
the situation, nevertheless tend to blur its basic dangers by ac-
cusing the Laotian Army of specific instances of fallacious reporting.
During a recent exchange of views between the American ambassador
and army attach�nd their French counterparts, the French mili-
tary attach�n a lengthy presentation sought to refute numerous
details of Laotian army briefings about the fighting and the degree
of North Vietnamese involvement)
(The 10 September Foreign Ministry inquiries as to "what the
US has in mind" in taking standby military precautions suggest an
effort by Paris to exploit the Laotian situation in the context of De
Gaulle's continued insistence on closer US-UK-French policy and
strategy coordination throu hou the world)
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Iran and the USSR Move Toward Possible Rapprochement
A major turning point appears to have been reached in
Iranian-Soviet relations, which have been seriously strained
since the abortive nonaggression talks last winter.
negotiations may soon be resumed. Both countries are mak-
ing moves that could foster a speedy rapprochement.
Iranian Ambassador Masud-Ansari had an interview with
Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Moscow on 2 September that ap-
peared to signal a mutual readiness to resume normal relations.
Soviet Ambassador Pegov
would leave ior Iran on ii september and that he himself would
come on 10 September in order to give the "necessary reports,"
probably regarding his talks with Khrushchev, prior to Pegov's
arrival. Ansari said it
was his opinion Iran should sign a nonaggression pact with the
USSR in order to halt the Soviet propaganda campaign against the
Shah.
Meanwhile, in Tehran, a press report citing "informed
sources" stated that Khrushchev had told Iran that Russia was
willing to improve relations "provided Iran bars 'foreign, anti-
Soviet' bases from its soil." This report appears to be an at-
tempt by Iran to "prove" that talks were resumed only after
Moscow had met its demand that radio propaganda attacks must
cease, and also to prepare its Western and Middle Eastern al-
lies for renewed Soviet-Iranian talks aimed at some type of non-
aggression arrangement, possibly through revision of the 1927
Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality. Any nonag-
gression arrangement between Iran and the USSR, regardless of
how informal, would probably seriously damage Iran's CENTO
relationship and preclude any practical military planning with
Iran.
While Khrushchev hinted that
Soviet propaganda pressure against Iran might be relaxed, Radio
Moscow and the clandestine "National Voice of Iran," broadcast-
ing from the Caucasus, continue to attack the Shah. However,
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Radio Moscow on 9 and 10 September also told its Iranian lis-
teners of the desire for friendly relations with "intelligent
Iranians." These broadcasts may be the basis for the claim
by Iranian sources that Radio Moscow has taken on a "friend-
lier tone."
A relaxation of Soviet pressure on Iran would offer the
Shah a badly needed respite from the subversive propaganda
barrage of the past six months. There are conflicting assess-
ments of the effectiveness of the broadcasts, but they may have
fostered domestic anti-Shah sentiments and forces that will be
difficult to control.
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12 Sept 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RULLETIN
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New- Noe
Pakistani Military Government Still Acceptable
To East Pakistan
East Pakistan, widely expected eventually to present the
military regime in Karachi with its first substantial opposition,
apparently continues to accept President Ayub and his govern-
ment. Large crowds gave Ayub a moderately favorable recep-
tion during his tour of that province from 1 to 7 September.
Ayub's visit was intended to demonstrate his government's
interest in East Pakistan. The people of that province, generally
more politically conscious than those in West Pakistan, since
the creation of Pakistan in 1947 have resented the domination of
the government by powerful groups in West Pakistan, The mil-
itary government; backed by the predominantly West Pakistani
army, therefore considers that it has special problems in East
Pakistan.
Although the military regime's popularity has abated some-
what in both East and West Pakistan since its early days follbw-
ing the army take-over in October 1958, the East Pakistanis ap-
parently still regard the Ayub government as offering the best
hope for honest government and for solutions to such chronic
problems as high food prices and unemployment. Many regret
the withdrawal of Pakistan's highly respected army from the di-
rect administration of the provincial government, since the civil
service remains widely distrusted.
Ayub told an audience in Dacca that in his meeting with India's
Prime Minister Nehru on 1 September he had stressed the need to
solve the disputes between India and Pakistan. This would enable
both countries to reduce their defense forces and their reliance
on others for help. According to Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir,
Ayub also emphasized to Nehru that invaders historically had been
attracted to the subcontinent when it was divided, and that India
and Pakistan must be prepared to join in its defense.
-CONFIDENTIAL
12 Sept 59
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Cperations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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