CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/09/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02989924
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: September 10, 1959

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10 September 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
CLi 0-4ANiGED TO: TS S C
Niix-1 REVIEW DATE:
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10 SEPTEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet official in Paris discusses
Khrushchev visit to US; economic
agreements would facilitate Soviet
"political concessions."
Eiirushchev sees Gaitskell and Bevan;
maintains firm line on Berlin but gives
Impression some arrangement possible. 0
In 8 September letter to Nehru, Chou
En-lai takes firm position on border
Issue, but indicates willingness to
talk.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos�Indications of North Vietnamese
airdrops may forecast new Communist
activity in central Laos.
Chinese Nationalists preparing to air-
drop arms to irregulars in Burma.
Singapore--Expected release of jailed
leftist leaders to add to Communist
strength.
0 Rhee continues negative approach toward
South Korean - Japanese negotiations.
0 Ethiopia reportedly preparing to com-
plete the annexation of Eritrea.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev visit:
at the Eisenhower-Khrushchev discussions "agree-
ment" probably could be reached on cultural and economic ex-
changes, and "progress" could be made on disarmament and
the control of nuclear weapons.
Khrushchev wants to be remembered as the man who was
able to raise the USSR's standard of living and bring about peace
and prosperity. He stated that an agreement on economic ex-
changes and credit in an early stage of Ehrushchev's visit would
facilitate "political concessions" later. In referring to Peiping
as "definitely unhappy" about the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meet-
ings, provided a further indication that the Chinese
are concerned over the effect which the visits might have on
Communist China's international objectives)
(Page 1)
USSR: CIn his interview on 4 September with British Labor
party-WaTiers Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan' Khrushchev
maintained his tough line on Berlin and repeated his threat to
conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany at some u
defined future date. Bevan gained the impression that, despite
this firm stand, there is some possibility of an acceptable ar-
rangement on these issues. In an apparent effort to encourage
the Labor party leaders to press their proposals for disengage-
ment in Europe, Khrushchev said that in exchange for a total
American withdrawal from Europe, the USSR would withdraw
from Central and Eastern Europe. He ruled out a mutual with-
drawal from Germany alone, however, as unaccentahlp on
grounds of prestige.)
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z
Communist China - India: In an 8 September letter to
Nehru, Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai made a dis-
play of willingness to discuss Sino-Indian border questions
but stanchly reasserted Chinese claims to disputed territory.
Stating Peiping "has consistently held" that both sides should
seek a permanent settlement, Chou suggested, as a "provi-
sional measure," that the "status quo" existing before the
Tibetan revolt be maintained. He denied, however, the valid-
ity of Indian territorial claims and charged that Indian troops
were guilty of "armed attacks" on Chinese frontier outposts.
In urging that Indian troops be pulled back from areas on the
McMahon line where they were sent last spring, Chou appar-
ently was trying to shift to Nehru the responsibility for easing
the current situation. Nehru--firmly committed to the McMahon
line--will refuse to accept Peiping's territorial claims and to
withdraw troops from established Indian posts, but probably will
agree to diplomatic discussions.
*In a move to soft-pedal the dispute, Moscow issued a TASS
statement on 9 September stressing the USSR's friendly relations
with both India and Communist China and carefully refraining
from assigning blame to either party. The statement said
"Soviet leading quarters" are confident that the two governments
will reach a peaceful settlement based on mutual interests and
"traditional friendship.' (Page 2)
Watch Committee conclusion-- Taiwan Strait: Available in-
formation on air, ground and naval activities does not indicate
that a major military undertaking by the Communists is in prep-
aration for the immediate future. However, the Chinese Commu-
nists retain the capability
with little or no warning.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: Despite minor gains claimed by government forces
in Sam Neua Province, the town of Sam Neua apparently remains
under threat of attack. (Meanwhile, there are indications of re-
_
cent North Vietnamese airdrop activity in the vicinity of the de-
marcation line between North and South Vietnam which suggest)
10 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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preparation for new activity in Laos at its narrow wai& ComLL
-
cn
unist China and North Vietnam have given official support to
the Soviet statement in the United Nations that the Security Coun-
cil decision on Laos is an "illegal measure."
(Page 4) (Map)
Watch Committee conclusion�Laosz(The dissidents' wit
probable North Vietnamese assistance, continue to have the
objective of establishing themselves in a strong position, par
ticularly in the northern provinces, which they could use as
the basis for political negotiation or for the expansion of mil-
itary operations to include the greater portion, if not all, of
the country, should government resistance weaken)
Nationalist China:(The Chinese Nationalists are believed
planning to airdrop a large quantity of arms to the Kuomintang
irregulars in Burma near the border with Thailand and Laos,
within the next two or three months. The arms reportedly in-
clude 5,600 rifles, and a substantial number of machine guns,
mortars, recoilless rifles and rocket launchers. There has
also been a reliable report that Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-
shek's son, would like to use these irregulars for operations
against the Pathet Lao) (Page 6)
Singapore: CBritish members of the Singapore Internal
Security Council, who feel they have no alternative without sus-
pending the constitution, have tentatively agreed to vote with the
Sngapore delegation at the councirs 17 September meeting in
or of releasing from jail about forty left-wing extremists of
e ruling People's Action party of Singapore. The Malayan Gov-
2 ernment fears their release but reportedly will go along with a
British decision. The release would enhance the prestige of the
extremists pro-Communist leader, Lim Chin Siong, and add a
well-trained group of leaders to the steadily growing strength of
the Communists ?age 7)
South Korea - Japan: President Ethee appears unwilling to
agree to a program for the repatriation of Koreans in Japan
to South Korea, which American officials have been urging to
diminish the impact of repatriation from Japan to North Korea,
10 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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scheduled to commence in November. Rhee has apparently
been persuaded by his foreign minister's insistence that repa-
triation to the north must first be stopped. In view of South
Korea's continued negative approach toward its problems with
Japan, the current Japan - South Korea talks hold little promise
of settling any of the major issues between the two countries.
(Page 8)
Ethiopia: Ethiopia is planning to complete the annexation
of Eritrea, according to the Italian consul general in Asmara,
thus ending the federation arrangement sponsored by the United
Nations in 1952. Ethiopian-arranged public demonstrations
are reportedly scheduled for 12 September in Asmara, capital
of Eritrea, in a move to pressure the Eritrean Assembly into
voting for annexation. The American consul indicates Asmara
is quiet, and although some annexation rumors are circulating,
he has been unable to confirm them. While most of the Eritrean
people probably would not willingly forfeit their last vestige of
autonomy, they lack leaders and organization for mounting a
significant protest, especiall Addis Ababa's effec-
tive control of the territory. (Page 9)
Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: (Situations sus
ceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which
would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particu-
; J larly in Iraq and Iran. The initiation of significant hostilities i
unlikely in this area in the immediate future;)
10 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Diplomat Comments on Khrushchev Visit
President Eisenhower
and Premier Khrushchev should discuss "all issues" in or-
der to achieve a "change in the atmosphere" between the two
countries, but should not undertake detailed negotiations. He
said "agreement" probably could be reached on cultural and
economic exchanges and "progress" could be made on dis-
armament and the control of nuclear weapons,)
in agreement on trade
and US credits for Soviet purchases at an early stage in Khru-
shchev's visit would facilitate "political concessions" later.
He commented that the "aging" Khrushchev wants to be remembered
as the man who, after 40 years of revolutionary struggle, was able
to raise the USSR's standard of living and bring about peace and
prosperity. He said Vice Minister of Foreign Trade P. N.
Kumykin will head the economic staff accompanying Khrushchev)
He stated that the Chinese Communists definitely are un-
happy about Khrushchev's visit to the United States, especially be-
cause they feel the US has no intention of recognizing the Peiping
government. Khrushchev's visit to China following his trip to
the US, is to "appease" the Chi-
nese Communists. Communist China's propaganda on the visits
appears to reflect concern over the effect the talks in Washington
might have on Peiping's international position; Peiping has formal-
ly endorsed the exchange, but is emphasizing to a greater extent
than other bloc commentators the charge that there is a lack of
sincerity on the part of the United States)
SECRET
10 Sept 59
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CONFIDENTIAL
Chou En-lai's Letter on Sino-Indian Border Dispute
In an 8 September letter to Nehru, Chou En-lai expressed
Peiping's willingness to join in "friendly negotiations" for set-
tlement of Sino-Indian border problems. While this display
of reasonableness seems intended to repair some of Peiping's
damaged prestige, Chou made even "provisional" settlement
contingent on withdrawal of Indian troops from posts activated
along the McMahon line last spring. This apparently is intended
to shift to Nehru responsibility for easing the current situation.
Chou's letter, which is Peiping's first direct comment on
the border situation, detailed Communist China's claims to dis-
puted areas all along the border. Chou characterized India's
claims as a legacy of British "imperialism." But, while he re-
affirmed Communist China's right to the disputed areas, Chou
said his government "consistently" advocated negotiated settle-
ment and he suggested return of troop dispositions along the
Sino-Indian border to the "status quo" which existed before the
Tibetan revolt. In this situation, "provisional agreements" could
be reached "concerning isolated places."
Chou was clearly seeking to counter India's charges and to
warn against further public criticism. He accused the Indians
of "repeated incursions" into Ladakh and of "armed attacks" on
Chinese frontier troops north of the McMahon line. He indicated
annoyance over India's "bringing pressure to bear on China mili-
tarily, diplomatically, and through public opinion" and warned
that continued Indian criticism can only "impair" relations.
Nehru will be irritated by Chou's unyielding attitude on
territorial claims and by his placing full blame for the recent
clashes on "trespassing" Indian forces. Chou's claims to ex-
tensive border areas long regarded as Indian will be unacceptable
to New Delhi, which has repeatedly declared its "internationally
recognized" frontier is not subject to negotiation--except for
minor modifications. In view of Nehru's public pledges to
--ee-NP-IDENTrAr
10 Sent 59
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repel incursions south of the McMahon line, he is not likely
to agree to pull his troops back from the outposts established
near the line last spring, although he will be agreeable to dip-
lomatic discussions.
In preliminary comment on 9 September, Indian officials
adamantly denied Chou's charges, adding that New Delhi would
welcome negotiations over minor disputes but woul�stand firm
on the "present" frontier.
CONFIDENTIAL
10 Sept 59
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BURMA
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Now'
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos
Communist partisan forces continue to maintain pressure
on government troops ih Sam Neua Province. Om the night of
7 September, partisans are reported to have attacked a Laotian
Army patrol on the edge of the airfield near the town of Sam
Neua,D Skirmishing is also reported at Muong Poua, about 15
miles northeast of Sam Neua town. The government claims the
recapture of Muong Son, in the western part of the province, an
area heavily infested by Communist partisans. Its ability to
retain the post is problematical.
Recent information indicates that the North Vietnamese
con ucted airdrop operations from TIoncr TTni in 1-1-tro QtIllthearn
part of North Vietnam.
two AN-2 aircraft f w x to eignt trips daily Irom Dong
Hoi between 20 and 29 August. The planes flew with doors re-
moved and in one instance a roller ramp of the type used for
airdrop operations was observed in one of the aircraff.`i
This airlift may have been in support of the North Vietnam-
ese lementg, whieh, entered the Tchepone border area of
southern Laos last January or of elements of the 325th Divi-
sion which more recently were reported to have moved from
the Dong Hoi area toward the Laotian frontier, where they may
be conducting or preparing paramilitary operations similar to
those believed to be under the direction of the 335th Division in
Sam Neua Province:1
The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry on 9 September
issued a statement protesting the UN Security Council decision
to appoint a subcommittee to investigate the Laos situation.
The statement charged that the decision was intended to elim-
inate the ICC and denied that the United Nations had the right
to intervene in Laos. In a speech on the same day, Communist
China's foreign minister strongly supported Hanoi's protest and
SECRET
10 Sept 59
rckiTo A I IkITGI I LnEkle`E DI II I Evik�
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claimed that UN action would "only aggravate the tension" in
the area. Both Peiping and
revival of the ICC in Laos.
Chinese or
vietnamese personnel were not necessarily included in the group.
The implication remains, however, that North Vietnam is pro-
viding facilities for medical evacuation and treatment of soldiers,
wounded in the Laos fighting.
SECRET
10 Sept 59 CMITDAI IkITCI I inckurc DI II I CTIAI
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Chinese Nationalists Planning Additional Support
For Kuomintang Irregulars
&he Chinese Nationalists are planning to airdrop a large
quantity of arms to the Kuomintang irregulars in the Burmese-
Thai border area within the next two or three months..
arms to be
dropped in an operation called "Black Flag"--probably the same
one--will include 2.36- and 3.5-inch rocket launchers, 81-mm.
and 60-mm. mortars, and 75-mm, recoilless rifles,. Orders also
have been given for the packaging of 400 machine guns and 5,600
rifles for airdrop. The drops are to be made by P4Y aircraft op-
erating from airfields on Taiwan)
the Kuomintang irregulars are short of heavy arms needed
for use against Burmese Army strong points. However, Chiang
Ching-kuo, the chief of the Chinese Nationalist security services,
he would like to use some of the irregulars to as-
sist Laos in the fl ht against Communist invaders in the Laos
border area. about 3,000 of them were available
for this use, u n ica e that the views of the United States
would be sought before any decision on action was taken. In ad-
dition. Li Mi. the former commander of the irregulars,
about 1,000 irregular
troops are based along the Mekong River within the borders of
Laos, and that these troops are the poorest armed of all the ir-
regular contingents. It is therefore possible that some of the
arms listed above may be for the use of these units
CThe decision to supply additional arms to the irregulars ev-
idently was made after the return of a high-ranking intelligence
official from a visit to the areaN
10 Sept 59
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Eatly Release of Jailed Singapore Extremists Expected
(A tentative agreement for the release from jail of the re-
maining left-wing extremists of the ruling People's Action
party (PAP) of Singapore apparently was reached at the first
meeting of the Singapore Internal Security Council on 28 August,
Despite British and Malayan
apprehensions, the council, which consists of one member from
the Federation of Malaya, three from the United Kingdom, and three
from Singapore, will probably vote unanimously for release at its
next meeting, on 17 September. This would enhance the prestige
of Communist leader Lim Chin Siong and add approximately 40 well-
trained leaders to the steadily growing strength of the extremist
wing of the PAP)
(Britain's anticipated vote in favor of the release of the ex-
tremists would be in line with its policy of supporting Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew on internal security matters in the be-
lief that he is the best judge of how to control the extremist
wing of his own party)
(If Prime Minister Lee and the PAP "moderates" genuinely
desire to control the pro-Communists, the move to release the
detainees may be a tactical retreat to facilitate the extension of
Singapore's stringent antisubversive laws, which expire next
month. Presumably it will be easier for the PAP-dominated
legislative assembly to vote for extension of the laws if no mem-
bers of the party are in jail. Lee may also feel that the exten-
sion of the public security laws and the popularity he will achieve
by releasing the second-echelon extremists will strengthen his
hand if he rearrests Lim Chin Siong, unquestionably the primar
threat to Lee's domination of the party and government
SECRET
10 Sept 59
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Rhee Refuses to Approve Repatriation of Koreans in japan
To South Korea
*uth Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Tong-cho on 7
September informed Ambassador Dowling that he had failed to
persuade President Rhee to agree to a plan for repatriating
Koreans in Japan to South Korea. Such a plan has been encouraged
by US officials to diminish the impact of the proposed repatriation
to North Korea, scheduled to begin in November.
Rhee also has stated recently that he
will not relax the ban on trade with Japan and that a settlement
of differences is out of the question unless Japan accepts all
South Korean demands. He continues to express his intention
to use force to block the repatriation to North Korea)
(Although some South Korean officials recognize the futility
of further opposition to the Japanese - North Korean repatriation
agreement, Rhee apparently has been persuaded by Foreign Min-
ister Cho Chong-hwan and Ambassador in Japan Yu Tae-ha that
repatriation to North Korea must be blocked before Seoul agrees
to accept repatriates. The negative policy of South Korea toward
the Koreans in Japan has already resulted in considerable dis-
content among non-Communist Korean groups in Japan who feel
that Seoul is neglecting their interests.)
(In view of Rhee's attitude, the current Japanese - South Korean
talks in Tokyo hold little promise of settling any of the major is-
sues between the two countries. Although the two sides have ten-
tatively agreed to an exchange of Koreans detained in Japan and
Japanese fishermen seized by South Korea, Seoul may temporarily
continue to hold the fishermen as hostages in the hope of extracting
concessions from the Japanese. Even should they be released, how-
ever, Seoul could seize more fishermen for violation of the "Rhee
fishing line"--as it did early last year after a mutual release of
prisoners. There has been no indication of progress on any of the
other issues under discussion)
SECRET
10 Sept 59
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Ethiopia Reported Planning Annexation of Eritrea
Ethiopia is planning to complete czie annexation of the for-
mer Italian colony of Eritrea, according to the Italian consul
general in Asmara, thus ending the federation agreement spon-
sored by the United Nations in 1952. This agreement provides
for federal (Ethiopian) government control over national de-
fense, foreign affairs, finance, and interstate commerce, while
reserving matters such as health, education, police, and jus-
tice to a semi-autonomous Eritrea.
Public demonstrations�presumably Ethiopian-inspired--
reportedly are scheduled for 12 September in Asmara, the
capital, in a move to exert pressure on the Eritrean Assembly to
vote for annexation. However, the American consul indicates
the capital is quiet; some annexation rumors are circulating,
but he has been unable to confirm them. While the Eritreans
would not willingly forfeit their last vestige of autonomy, they
lack leaders and organization for mounting a significant protest.
Addis Ababa has gradually increased its control over in-
ternal Eritrean affairs since 1952. The extent of Ethiopia's in-
fluence over political affairs was shown last December when the
Eritrean Assembly�effectively controlled by Addis Ababa through
threats and bribery--voted to adopt the Ethiopian flag.
SECRET
10 Sept 59
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LUNltL'L4L I aril.,
Nime
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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