CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/07/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02989756
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: July 8, 1956

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Comments and interPretations in this Publication
are based on all sources, including COMINT, and
rePresent the immediate views of the Office of
041-rent Intelligence. The Office of Research
and Reports and the Office of Scientific Intel-
ligence contribute or are consulted on subjects
within their spheres of resPonsibility.
The classification of a comment is noted stPa
rate/y only when it is higher than that of the
report commented on.
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CONTENTS
1. ANTILEFTISTS FORCE RESIGNATION OF SYRIAN CHIEF
OF STAFF (page 3).
2. SOVIET AID AGREEMENT WITH CAMBODIA
(page 4).
3. FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN ADJUSTING TO
DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN (page 5).
4. COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS
(page 6).
5. NORWEGIAN MINISTERS CONCERNED BY IMPACT ON
SCANDINAVIA OF NEW SOVIET LINE page 7).
6. YUGOSLAVS DISCLAIM ANY IMMEDIATE INTENTION TO
RECOGNIZE EAST GERMAN y (page 8).
7. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES GERMAN REUNIFICATION
WITH WEST GERMAN SOCIALISTS (page 9).
8 July 56
* * * *
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 10)
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1. ANTILEFTISTS FORCE RESIGNATION OF SYRIAN CHIEF
OF STAFF
The resignation on 7 July of General
Shawqat Shuqayr, Syrian chief of staff,
appears to be the initial result of a move
by rightist army and civilian elements to
eliminate leftist influence in the Syrian
army. Shuqayr's resignation was forced
by a group of antileftist senior officers,
the minister of defense, and apparently
a faction split off from the "little RCC"
junior officer group. The leaders of the
action, Brigadier General Tawfiq Nizam
7
-al-Din, Shuqayr's deputy, and Colonel Omar
-Kabbani, a high staff officer, have become chief and deputy
chief of staff respectively. Brigadier General Aziz Abd al-Karim,
chief of the Syrian air force, is reported to have been appointed
assistant chief of staff,
Although the antileftist group has assumed at
least temporary control in an action which has been bloodless up
to now, its strength and staying power have not yet been deter-
mined. The group may not continue to retain the support of the
'"little RCC" faction led by Colonel Nufouri, Syrian G-1. More-
over, the antileftists have not yet moved against Colonel Sarraj,
Syrian G-2 and top leader of the "little RCP' but they plan to do
so. The antileftist action may precipitate a countermove by army
supporters of the Communist Party and the leftist Arab Socialist
Resurrection Party (ASRP) before the rightists can consolidate
their position. Moreover, Egypt, which has backed the ASRP and
Shuqayr, and which probably suspects an Iraqi-Turkish maneuver,
may directly encourage an ASRP-led countermove.
Shuqayr, chief of staff since July'1953, had
little personal following and remained in power principally be-
cause of his professional ability and political agility. Since
February 1954, he has associated with and supported the ASRP
and has been marked as a target for removal by both rightists
and "little RCC" elements.
8 July 56
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2. SOVIET ALD AGREEMENT WITH CAMBODIA
The Soviet Union's pledge of economic
and technical assistance to Cambodia
highlights the increasing success of the
Sino-Soviet bloc in exploiting Cambodia's
neutralism and its desire for economic
expansion. The agreement follows closely the conclusion of
negotiations for a $22,400,000 Communist Chinese economic
aid program in Cambodia.
The USSR, according to a joint commu-
niqud, has expressed its readiness to send technicians to
train Cambodian personnel, to provide industrial equipment,
and, as a gift, to build and equip a hospital in Phnom Penh.
Prince Sihanouk, leader of the Cambodian delegation, is said
to be fully satisfied with the results of the Moscow talks--
suggesting that the aid will be on favorable long-range terms
and will dovetail with other Cambodian foreign aid arrange-
ments.
Although Sihanouk's concept of neutralism
in playing both sides' to advance his country's economic devel-
opment has occasioned some criticism in Cambodia, his polit-
ical influence has thus far effectively overcome such objections.
The prospect of increased Soviet and Chinese ties with Cam-
bodia may prove disturbing to India., in view of Nehru's hopes
to expand his own influence there.
8 July 56
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3. FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN ADJUSTING TO
DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN
The American embassy in Paris is in-
clined to believe that the French Com-
munist Party leadership is successfully
orienting the party in the new situation
roug a ou y de-Stalinization. Maurice Thorez is said
to "continue to believe" that the best chance for the future
success of the party lies in close, although better-disguised,
ties with Moscow.
Most reliable observers appear to agree
that major changes in party leadership in the near future are
probably unlikely. Thorez has re-established party disci-
pline among the rank and file.
� Comment The Stalin issue does not seem to have
weakened the Communist party in France.
In a 1 July assembly by-election the Communists ran second
and maintained the same percentage of votes as in the national
elections in January. On 6 July the party's central committee
unanimously approved the 30 June resolution of the Soviet cen-
tral committee which "shows how the cult of the personality of
Stalin has been surmounted in the USSR:'
8 July 56
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4. COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS CONFERENCE
The Commonwealth prime ministers, in
their London conference which ended on
6 July, apparently were unanimous in the
belief that the international situation has
enter aperiod' of transition as a result of significant shifts
in the policy of the Soviet Union. According to the Common-
wealth Relations Office, they were unable, however, to agree
on an assessment of the dimensions or the "sincerity" of the
Soviet shifts and even Indian prime minister Nehru concurred
that the changes should be evaluated cautiously.
With regard to the Chinese UN membership
question, the prime ministers agreed that Peiping at some time
and in some way should be brought in, but showed no willingness
to force the issue.
The problem of British bases on Ceylon
was settled in principle, leaving Britain some communications
and storage facilities and some responsibility for development
of Ceylon's armed forces.
Private talks between Nehru and Prime Min-
ister Mohammad Ali of Pakistan resulted in no progress toward
settlement of the Kashmir problem.
8 July 56
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5. NORWEGIAN MINISTERS CONCERNED BY IMPACT ON
SCANDINAVIA OF NEW SOVIET LINE
On 4 July, Norway proposed that a NATO
ministerial meeting be held in September to discuss "prima-
rily defense problems:'
Comment Both the Norwegian and Danish governments
are certain to face increased parliamentary
pressure for a general reduction in defense spending when the
parliaments reconvene this fall. It appears likely that Denmark
will reduce its defense expenditures by some five percent, and
would follow Norway's lead if Oslo sought a larger reduction.
8 July 56
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11. YUGOSLAVS DISCLAIM ANY IMMEDIATE INTENTION
TO RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY
Yugoslav foreign secretary Popovic on
5 July told the Greek ambassador in
Belgrade that his government had no im-
mediate intention of recognizing East
Germany in view of the attitude of Yugoslavia's "Western
friends!' He said he looked forward to the day when circum-
stances would permit his government to do so.
Comment This is the frankest statement of Yugoslav
intentions toward East Germany since
Tito's Moscow visit, during which he formally acknowledged
the existence of two "sovereign" German states.
Yugoslavia is undoubtedly fearful that to
extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany now would
seriously jeopardize West German ratification of the favor-
able financial settlement recently concluded with Bonn. Also,
Belgrade is probably concerned that the move would be re-
garded by the West as proof that Yugoslavia had in fact solidly
aligned itself with the Soviet bloc.
8 July 56
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SOVIET AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES GERMAN REUNIFICATION
WITH WEST GERMAN SOCIALISTS
Soviet ambassador Zorin reportedly had
a long but largely inconclusive discus-
sion in June with the leaders of the op:
position Social Democratic Party (SPD),
Comment The USSR has been maintaining publicly
that unification is strictly a matter for
discussion between the two German states. Except for a few
left-wingers, the Social Democrats oppose such discussions.
The other views attributed to Zorin seem to echo the SPD's own
line. Since Moscow has never hinted that any of the present
East German leaders might be dropped, it appears that if Zorin
did so, he was attempting to convince the SPD that some prog-
ress toward unification might be made, and thus increase their
criticism of the Bonn government.
8 July 56
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 8 July)
Refuting reports from Arab capitals of
Israeli troops massing on the Jordanian border, the American
embassy in Tel Aviv reported that, while routine maneuvers were
in progress? there was no unusual disposition of Israeli forces on the
borders as of 7 July, and that usual week-end leaves were granted
army personnel. While the borders could be reinforced in a matter
of hours under Israel's system of mobilization, the embassy con-
siders that troops are not deployed in a manner to lustily Jordan's
charges.
Awareness that Jordan's inadequately
suppued torces could not cope with a determined Israeli attack may
have induced Hussain to publicize Israel's threat in the hope of fore-
stalling any Israeli action. A successful Israeli blow against Jordan
could bring a disastrous Popular reaction against both the king and
his young chief of staff.
Prolongation of the alert, despite reassurances
that Israeli troops were not massed, may also reflect uneasiness in
8 July 56
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Jordan over the consequences of current political maneuvering in
Syria. Jordan's principal immediate political question appeared
temporarily settled with the king's proclamation of a date (21 Octo-
ber) for election of a new lower house of the legislature. There
had been reports from Jordan that the king might attempt to use
the "crisis" with Israel to postpone elections and rule by decree.
An Israeli Foreign Ministry official has ex-
pressed the view that allegations of Israeli troop concentrations
may have been intended to disguise the reason for movement of
Iraqi troops to the Jordan border, which he considered to be one
phase of an effort to offset the extension of Egyptian influence in
Jordan.
Israeli maneuvers of unknown size are being
held in the area of the Northern Command, which borders on Syria
and Jordan, according to the American army attache in Tel Aviv.
A "substantial" northward movement of troops and materiel has
taken place�including possibly a battalion of tanks and requisi-
tioned civilian vehicles. These maneuvers are further confirmed
by an invitation to foreign military attaches to view "brigade maneu-
vers in the northern area jon. 9 and la July�'.' ' The attacht believes
that the belated invitation may be intended to reassure foreign em-
bassies in view of Arab charges of Istaeli troop concentrations.
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