CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/05/22

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02985833
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
23
Document Creation Date: 
January 27, 2020
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 22, 1958
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Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 �TOP�SEERET� 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 22 May 1958 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. te, NO CHAV3E IN CLASo. l. I i LY,27:2LASSIFIED CIA30. CHANGED TO: -- NEXT REVIEW _ HR 7 -2 A A ---TOP-SECRET-- REVIEWER: Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 � Nor II irm. Moolair Moo Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 22 MAY 1958 Approved for Release: 2019/06/20 CO2985833 0 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Points of Soviet - Egyptian disagree- ment emerging in aftermath of Nasir's trip to the USSR. USSR maneuvering to gain from French crisis whether De Gaulle comes to power or not. New developments on ICapustin Yar missile range. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon - New military threat to government developing with TJAR support; political impasse still unresolved. Iraqi and Jordanian leaders cooling on concept of their Union. Egyptian air strength estimate revised upward. Indonesia - Dissident commander claims recapture of Gorontalo; hints at negotiations with central government. Pakistan - President Mirza planning to replace present government and consideKing dictatorship if first tactic fails. Tunisian concern over possible action by French military and presence of Algerian rebels con- tinues. Algeria - Algerian rebel headquar- ters in Cairo denounces General Massu and Soustelle. III. THE WEST France - Rightists step up pressure to force Pflimlin out. West German defense minister angling for domestic press support with private claim that US forced him to accept nuclear weapons. Icleand has tentatively accepted $3I 000 000 Soviet loan. CI Finnish President expects Soviet offers of loan and concessions on use of Saimaa Canal. Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 MZR\ \ \ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 (Jr OLLIIL 1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 22 May 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet Union - UAR: Nasir's visit to the USSR was ap- parently not an unqualified success despite the public impres- sion of "solidarity" on major international issues. rnidiscus- sions with Nasir, Soviet leaders showed displeasure at recent signs of UAR economic rapprochement with the West and Nasir's "uncommitted" posture on non-Arab issues. Nasir succeeded in persuading the USSR to make some reductions in prices to be paid for Soviet economic assistance, but the USSR refused Nasir's request for MIG-19 aircraft. The dip- lomatic corps noted Nasir-Soviet relations 'were 7.'formal even cold" at the end of the tour. -(Page 1) USSR-France: Moscow is presently trying to avoid un- dercutting French Communist efforts to unite left-wing forces in opposition to De Gaulle, but Soviet officials have hinted in the past that they would welcome certain tendencies of General de Gaulle which have sometimes been interpreted as anti- NATO. Kapustin Yar missile range: the 950-nautical-mile down-range area of the Kapustin Yar ballistic missile test range has been reopened. It has been closed since seven missiles were fired to this area in June- August 1957. There may be a renewal of launching activity to this area or the establishment of increased instrumentation for monitoring launchings from Tyura Tam. (Page 3) (Map) TOP SECRET N� ,t�t�� Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 � Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833' VU? SECIte N\NW Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 ort,ECC, 1 resign and make way for De Gaulle. Although Pflimlin pro- fesses determination to continue in office, he apparently has little information on developments in Algiers, and is in- creasingly worried over contacts between rebellious officers In Algeria and their opposite numbers in France and Germany. Posters in Paris announce formation of a "National Committee of Public Safety." (Page 10) West Germany: In an apparent effort to justify his nu- clear weapons policy in view of widespread public criticism and to create a more favorable press, Defense Minister Strauss has privately told a group of German journalists that American officials "forced" him to accept such weapons during his Washington visit. Strauss also complained that he is not being properly supported by the Christian Democratic party and that Adenauer "lacks comprehension" of defense problems and is reluctant to make timely decisions. (Page 12) Iceland-USSR: The Icelandic ambassador to Moscow tenta- tively agreed on 30 April to accept a $3,000,000, 20-year loan from the USSR to pay for fishing vessels being built in East Ger- many. This would be the first Soviet loan to Iceland and may presage acceptance of further loans which the USSR has offered. (Page 13) Finland-USSR: President Kekkonen apparently expects the USSR to offer a loan and to offer concessions concerning the use of the Saimaa Canal during his state visit to Moscow beginning on 22 May. He is inclined to accept a loan on his own terms, but to reject an offer on the canal issue as jeop- ardizing future claims to territory Finland lost after World War II. (Page 14) (Map) 22 May 58 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET - Wz..\ Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 CI Tan rs 17,T, Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Nise I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Nash-"s Visit to USSR Nasir % 18-day visit to the USSR, studded with affirma- tions of Soviet-UAR friendship and "solidarity" on major in- ternational issues, may have been something less than an unqualified success despite Khrushchev's claim that complete agreement existed on all questions touching upon "mutual interests." The red-carpet treatment given Nasir and the spate of friendship speeches reinforced the public impres- sion of firm Soviet endorsement of Nasirts bid for leadership of the Arab world. Information so far, however, suggests that Nasir remains suspicious of the USSR, as he is of the West. He probably does not take Soviet promises of gen- eral support seriously, although he uses reports of them to try to alarm the West. Nasir was partially successful in his efforts to reduce the UAR's debt burden. Moscow agreed to a 15-percent cut in the cost of economic assistance to be rendered both regions of the UAR, and to a substantial reduction in in- stallment payments on Syrian arms. Nasirts request for M1c7-19 aircraft was turned down on the grounds that Egypt already was "over- equipped" despite Nasirts assertion that MIG-19% were needed to match latest model Western jets now in Israeli hands. The USSR agreed to sell the UAR several TU-104 jet passenger air transports, but refused to cut the asking price of approximately $3,000000, ,well above what the UAR is offering. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the visit reaffirmed the identity of Soviet-UAR views on a wide range of subjects and stated that Ithrushchev and VorosJiilov had accepted Nasir's invitation to visit the UAR at unspecified date. SECRET 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 yew 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 TtID erfriDrir Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Aim auk 950-NAUTICAL-MILE DOWN-RANGE AREA - KAPUSTIN YAR MISSILE RANGE Engel Kapostin Yar oTetslioye Kyshtym� CHEVABINSK Magnitogorsk �Aktyubin k �Ashkhabad Novosibirsk tropaylovsk L�k�AithIOLINSK Toripizri' KARAGANDA DZHANA MIKA RR, SIDING NO. 58 KYZYL-DZHAR Balkhash Aralsk Lake Etaikash URA TAM Ktyl Orda � New instrumentation area 0 950-NM down-range area �Tashkent Stalinallado Tomsk Semipalatinsk Lake Zalpan MI Incoming troop transit points Logistic railheads Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 'Roe New Developments at Kapustin Yar a military base is being established in the 950-nautical-mile impact area of the Kapustin Yar ballistic missile test range. Ac- tivities observed include the receipt of quantities of equip- ment, the installation of new communications and instru- mentation gear, reoccupation of a military post by an in- coming command, and construction and use of an airfield. The purpose of this renewed activity is not known. It may be either in preparation for additional test firing of ballistic missiles in the very near future or establish- ment of additional instrumentation in support of ICBM/ ESV launching operations from Tyura Tam. During the period June through August 1957, seven missiles were launched to the 950-mile impact area. Subsequently facilities in the area were noted engaging in the track- ing of Sputnik I. The reactivated base lies directly astride a line from Tyura Tam to Klyuchi. 22 May 58 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 WI- IL ASIA-AFRICA Lebanese Situation Tribesmen who are rallying at Lebanese border villages where the Syrian Army has delivered weapons pose an increasing threat to the government's position in northeastern Lebanon. Infiltrators from Syria are reported crossing the border to operate antiaircraft guns and mortars being supplied to the insurgents. These groups may be the forces described in other reports as moving toward Tripoli, where the government has re-established precarious au- thority. Former Syrian Chief of Staff Shuqayr, a Druze, is claimed by some sources to be taking part in the operations of Kamal Jumblatt, one of the principal insurgent leaders. Efforts to force President Chamoun to compromise are mount- ing, but moderate "third force" leaders so far have failed to persuade General Shihab to step into the post of prime minister while Chamoun serves out his term as -President, ending in September. Despite this rebuff, the Edde brothers are pushing their efforts to mediate between Chamoun and opposition leaders Rashid Karamah and Saib Salam. The opposition still insists Chamoun must resign. Fears of Moslem-UAR supremacy over Lebanon and of Chris- tian-Moslem strife are n-Lo unting among the Christians. Extent of concern in some Maronite Christian quarters is illustrated by a request from the Phalange, a Maronite paramilitary zealot group, to the French ambassador for arms, demolition experts, and an Israeli diversionary raid against Syria. In answer to a Lebanese Army request, Britain is providing four Vampire jet fighters which should reach Lebanon from Cyprus o,(22 May. (QUO). 22 May 58 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 'kJ I �z-a Inauspicious Outl_ok for Iraqi-Jordanian Union The nature of the appointments to the newly formed Arab Union cabinet and the attitude of Iraqi and Jordanian leaders toward their respective roles constitute an in- auspicious beginning for an organization which was con- ceived essentially as an answer to Nasir's United Arab Republic. The American Embassy in Amman reports that King Husayn and Samir Rifai, head of the new Jordanian government, apparently intend to treat their respective roles as if nothing had actually changed as a consequence of the union with Iraq. The Jordanian disenchantment is attributed to the unwillingness of Iraq's Nun i Said, first Arab Union prime minister, to move rapidly to establish a strong federal government. Nun i is said to have been most reluctant to assume the financial burden of provid- ing essential military and economic support to Jordan, and apparently will seek to evade such obligations if they prove too burdensome. Rifai's decision to remain in Am- man also probably reflects realization that his proposed role as Arab Union deputy prime minister under Nuni would not have given him the authority he desired. The embassy reports that King Husayn apparently feels that his position is weakening, and in keeping Rifai in Amman feels that the chances of the monarchy's survival are enhanced. Earlier, Rifai's retention in Amman had been attributed to fear that the crisis in Lebanon would set off new UAR-sponsored unrest in Jordan. Jordanian security officials are braced for UAR-inspired demonstrations and a possible attempt to assassinate Husayn on 25 May, Jor- danian Army Day. TOP SECRET 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 � Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Q Virt r"r Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 NOW' NNW Situation in Indonesia President Sukarno's speech celebrating "National Re= awakening Day" on 20 May was more favorable to the US than any he has delivered since the rebellion began, accord- ing to Ambassador Jones in Djakarta. Emphasizing that Indonesia has found its own identity, Sukarno quoted Abraham Lincoln as stating that "no nation is good enough to govern another," and said that this applied to the Dutch, the USSR, and the US in relation to Indonesia. Sukarno touched only lightly on the revolts in Sumatra and Celebes and on foreign intervention. Jones observed that the Soviet ambassador was visibly angered by the speech. India's chief UN delegate Lall stated on 20 May in New York that Indonesia could be expected shortly to address a formal letter to the president of the Security Council protest- ing new American arms found in the hands of the dissidents. Djakarta has for some time been considering referring the question of "foreign intervention" to the UN but, in view of the recent improvement of its military position in relation to the North Celebes dissidents, it now may feel less urgency about the matter. Col. Sumual, the dissident commander in North Celebes, has announced that the revolutionary government is prepared to negotiate for a "reasonable" settlement with the central government. The announcement was reportedly timed to coincide with the dissidents' claim to have recap- tured Gorontalo, in North Celebes, on 20 May. Gorontalo had been taken by central government forces the day before. According to a reliable source, Sumual had sent reinforce- ments to retake Gorontalo in an attempt to show that his offer to negotiate did not stem from weakness. The commander of the naval base at Surabaya com- plained to Djakarta on 16 May that Soviet jeep tires were of inferior quality, wearing through in four months compared with the "nsnal"nnALvear life of American tires SECRET 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 rir; n Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Mirza Intends to Replace Present Pakistani Government President Mirza has indicated he plans to seize the opportunity presented by Prime Minister Noon's involve- ment in a defamation-of-character case to replace the pres- ent government shortly with a new coalition which he hopes to control, thus assuring Mirza's own continuance in office. Mirza informed the American ambassador on 19 May that if this effort fails he intends to take over as dictator. The ambassador reports that army commander Ayub told him 'on 19 May that he will support Mirza. Mirza's primary motivation in dismissing Noon's gov- ernment,as it was when he installed a similar short-lived coalition late in 1957, is to eliminate the influence of former Prime Minister Suhrawardy, who is the chief support of the present government. The coalition Mirza envisages will ,be difficult to-form because of the diverse elements in- volved. Should he fail to force formation of such a coali- tion, any move to assume dictatorial powers would be taken in the face of opposition from most Pakistani politicians. --SECRET-- 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 o re, nrr Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Nur, The Situation in Tunisia The Tunisian secretaries of defense and foreign affairs pressed Ambassador Jones on 19 May for an early favorable response to President Bourguiba's 16 May request for "defen- sive" arms. They specified that Tunisia's most urgent need was for ammunition, and added that Tunisia feared not only French military operations, but also possible subversive activities on the part of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) whose forces in Tunisia, they claim, are "four times larger and infinitely better armed" than Tunisian forces. While the Algerians probably have larger supplies of arms, other sources recently estimated FLN strength in Tunisia at some 3,000 armed men. Tunisian security forces now number 6,600. Meanwhile, the possibility of clashes between French and Tunisian military units has increased. Tunisian au- thorities are demanding that French troops, which early on 18 May surrounded a Tunisian roadblock 25 miles north of their base at Remada in remote southern Tunisia, re- turn to their base. Press sources on 21 May claim that a Tunisian Army unit assisted by armed civilian auxiliaries had dug in on a hastily drawn battle line near the Remada base, and the Tunisian press demands the immediate de- parture of the French commandant at Remada "if not energetic sanctions." Tunisian authorities also claim that French positions are being reinforced by helicopter, and Bourguiba publicly warned that an "explosive situation" had been created by the arrival of four French jet aircraft on 20 May at Gafsa in south central Tunisia. The Tunisian foreign secretary also warned the French charge on 18 May that if the Remada forces were not regulated, the provision- ing)of French troops might cease. SECRET 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 CrY14PT Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Nor Moslem Attitude in Algeria The continuing demonstrations of support for the "new Algeria" by considerable numbers of Algerian Moslems ap- Oar to be largely artificial, staged by psychological warfare units of the French ariiiy and in some cases by local em- ployers. In any event, they are in no way indicative of any weakening in the Algerian National Liberation Front's (FLN) determination to continue its fight for an independent, Moslem- controlled Algeria. some 10,000 Moslems who participated in a demonstration on 19 May as "simple peasant types herded about like sheep" by army per- sonnel with portable electric megaphones. The consul general reported that over-organization was obvious. According to an an earlier much-publicized demon- stration in tne Moslem quarter of Algiers resulted from not- so-subtle prodding on the part of the military, and did not re- flect any new or general "rallying" to the French by Moslems. that many Moslems are deliberately trying to create such an illusion in the hope of avoiding reprisals if, as they fear, the European extremists now in control should follow their current gestures of friendliness toward the Moslems-- which have contributed to a noticeable relaxation of interracial tension�with a new and more vigorous "get tough" policy. An FLN spokesman broadcasting over Cairo radio has ex- coriated the "Massu-Soustelle criminal gang" and a top FLN military leader stated in Tunis on 18 May that the rebels have no intention of putting down their arms until the French agree to the principle of independence. Recent claims by French military leaders in Algiers that the Moslem rebels have virtual- ly ceased fighting were apparently made with little regard for reality in order to satisfy the current propaganda line They have been officially contradicted by the Ministry of Information in Paris, which published statistics on 19 May indicating that rebel activity had continued a high level since the 13 May co/4. SECRET 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 17,-, Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 lbw." Noe' THE WEST French Crisis Rightist elements are intensifying their activities in an effort to convince the Pflimlin government that the only Way to avoid bloodshed and possibly civil war is to resign and make way for De Gaulle. In an apparently concerted series of reports, rightist military and political leaders are spreading the warning that unless Pflimlin resigns there will be direct action by the army from within Ftance or from Algiers. Posters appeared in Paris on 20 11:17,7 announcing the formation of a "National Committee of .'ublic Safety." A communique signed by retired Army neral Cherrieres, a former commander of the Algiers military region, and Air Force General Chassin, reported in the press as lead- ing an underground movement, stated that the committee is led by a "very high military person" with five civilian and three other military members. Further pressure came in the form of an offer to the government by Antoine Pinay, leader of the right wing of the Independent party, to act as a go-between to negotiate De Gaulle% acceptance of the - premiership. This announcement underscores Pinay's. persistent refusal to join the Pflimlin government and ends any hope that the government might receive help from this quarter. The government, professing its determination to re- main in office, announced on 21 May that the new French chief of staff, General Lorillot, will go to Algiers in an attempt to reestablish Paris' control. Pflimlin is prob- ably not too hopeful this can be done, and Lorillotts mis- sion may be primarily fact-finding, since the government admittedly has practically no firm information on develop- ments in Algiers. On 20 May the American consul general in Algiers expressed the view that local influences were increasingly weakening whatever ties General Salan still maintained SECRET 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 ort-inrirr Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 with the FrenchGovernment. This view seems borne out by Salan's remark to a cheering crowd on 21 May that "we shall march together up the Champs-Elysees." The Pflimlin government is especially worried over reports that rebellious field-grade officers in Algeria are in communication with their opposite numbers in France and Germany, particularly among armored and air units thyie. A SECRET 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 grrPrT Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 NNW West German Defense Minister Favors European Atomic Weapons Production West German Defense Minister Strauss recently told several German journalists that he was "forced" by US officials to accept American nuclear weapons when he preferred that Europe should produce its own, He also said provision of Europe's weapons by the United States was merely another way of deploying existing American weapons without actually adding to the total European mil- itary potential. Strauss was apparently attempting to justify his policies and create a more favorable press for himself. Strauss was bitterly resentful of having to bear the onus of Germany's unpopular nuclear rearmament pro- gram. He also criticized Chancellor Adenauer for "lack of comprehension" of defense problems and reluctance to make the necessary timely decisions. The journalists present were reported to have been impressed with Straus& growing "megalomania" and preoccupation with personal and national power. Strauss has frequently xpressed his opinion that Bonn must have the most modern weapons and nuclear warheads so that Germany will be strong enough to threaten, as a lever to ensure Western backing, to turn a local conflict into a general war. During the French- Italian-German arms negotiations last November, Strauss is reported to have stated that Europe must acquire its own uclear capability by 1961, because by that time the U will have an ICBM and will lose interest in overseas ses. --SECRET-- 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 cf n rur Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Iceland Negotiates $3,000,000 Loan From the USSR The Icelandic ambassador to Moscow has negotiated a 50,000,000-krona (approximately $3,000,000),20-year, 2.5-percent loan with the USSR to pay for fishing vessels under construction in East Germany for Iceland. If final- ly accepted, this would be the first Soviet loan to Iceland. Iceland gave assurances last November in accepting a $5,000,000 American loan under NATO auspices that it would not accept any Soviet loans and would adopt economic reforms necessary to bring its distorted economy into balance. The Icelanders may argue that since the con- tracts for the vessels were concluded last July, the assur- ances do not apply. The Icelandic Government is also under strong pres- sure from the local Communists to accept further Soviet economic assistance. In June 1957 the USSR offered to make id available up to approximately $25,000,000, in addi �on to financing the construction of the fishing vessels in Iuestion. --SECRET"- 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 13 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 441 605292 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 orrvirsrm Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833 Nue Finnish President Kekkonen's State Visit to the Soviet Union Finnish President Kekkonen apparently expects offers of a Soviet loan and some concessions concerning use of the So- viet-controlled section of the Saimaa Canal during his state visit to the USSR beginning on 22 May. He has reportedly de- cided it would be "too perilous" to accept such a canal offer even if the USSR also permits use of a narrow adjacent cor- ridor of land, presumably because such action would jeop- ardize future Finnish claims to more extensive territorial revisions. The inclusion of the port city of Vyborg (Viipuri) in this territory, however, would make it difficult for the Finns to reject the offer. In any case, Kekkonen would be under heavy pressure from refugee and nationalist groups in Finland to accept, particularly if there were no objection- able strings attached and future Finnish claims to the Karelian territory lost after World War II were not forfeited. The Finns will accept a Soviet loan under certain condi- tions, including satisfactory settlement of the USSR's current trade deficit. Finland wishes to industrialize the northern- most provinces and is seeking loans to develop the transporta- tion network and to tap the mineral resources of the area. SECRET 22 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 14 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 CO2985833