OPPOSITION DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRAN: LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION, AND TACTICS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02985516
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2021
• Case Number: F-2017-00841
• Publication Date: December 21, 1978

Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
21 December 1978
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
OPPOSITION DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRAN:
LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION, AND TACTICS
The protest marches in Tehran on 10 and 11
December 1978, which brought as many as a million
demonstrators into the streets, were masterfully
organized and controlled. The evidence suggests
that local community leaders called dastehgardan,
whose traditional functions include organizing
religious processions, mobilized small crowds
around local mosques and then moved these groups
to join with others from around the city to form
the massive parade of demonstrators.
The ability of these local community leaders
to bring out large numbers of people in response
to directives from members of the Islamic clergy
gives the religious opposition in Iran an organi-
zational strength which distinguishes it from any
other group within the opposition. National Front
politicians have benefited politically through
cooperation with the leaders of the religious
opposition, but the National Front has neither an
independent mass following nor any significant
ability to mabilizancestrate large demon-
strations.
This memorandum was prepared by the Iran Analytical
Center of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.
Questions and comments may be addressed to
RP M 78-10500C
SC-06303-78
Top Qecrot
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516 (b)(3)
The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has served as
the focal point for the loyalty of the religious
opposition, and has provided guidance and support
for the movement acting in his name in Iran. Re-
sponsive to Khomeini's leadership, though sometimes
acting independently, clerical leaders, shopkeepers
and merchants in the bazaar, labor leaders, students,
and others have mounted a massive campaign against
the Shah's regime.
There is no evidence to substantiate the claim
voiced periodically by moderate opposition leaders
and members of the government that behind the pat-
tern of events lies the guiding hand of "foreign
elements," "leftists." or, more specifically, the
Tudeh Party.
Leadership and Organization at the Grassroots
The massive demonstrations in Tehran on the high holy
days of moharram, when as many as a million protesters
marched peacefully through the capital, were the most impres-
sive display of organizational ability thus far seen in the
recent incidents of civil unrest in Iran. Detailed informa-
tion on the organization and leadership of the protest is
not available, but there are several indications that local
community leaders, called dastehgardan, mobilized and con-
trolled the massive crowd, which was in fact an amalgamation
of small. Shia grassroots organizations called dastehs or
howzes.
Several notable features of the marches on Tasu'a and
Ashura suggest that the dastehgardan, responding to general
instructions from the ayatollahs, provided the tactical
leadership. The protesters assembled in small groups at
mosques throughout the city before proceeding toward the
main line of march. As the tributary groups moved toward
assembly points, they stopped and started and chanted and
sang in response to specific instructions by leaders carrying
megaphones or riding �in mini-buses equipped with loudspeakers.
-2-
-T-op�aecre-t
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
SC-06303778
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Attempts by isolated individuals and groups to stir up trouble
were rebuffed by the marchers themselves. Marshals showed
concern for such matters as providing food and drink, taking
care of lost children, providing change for telephone calls,
and operating a lost-and-found service.
The ayatollahs and political leaders did not join the
demonstration until it was on the main route of march. The
effective organization and control of the component units of
the largers crowd from the outset, the attention to detail
in the activities of the marshals, and the resistance to
apparent outsiders seeking to stir up trouble, all suggest
organization based on local, community structure. The dastehs
would appear to provide the most logical existing organiza-
tion that would serve this function.
Leadership: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Formally Shia Islam has no clergy. However, scholars
of religion, interpreters of the law, and venerable men chosen
on an ad hoc basis from within the community of the faithful
assume the status of religious leadership. Foremost among
Iranian Shiites, and titular head of the religious opposition
to the Shah, is the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini
commands a broad following among the lower classes in urban
centers, shopkeepers and merchants in the bazaars, workers,
and students.
His popular influence heightened by 15 years in exile,
Ayatollah Khomeini has emerged as the focal point for the
loyalty of religious dissidents in Iran. His picture is
prominently displayed during marches and demonstrations and
his name is chanted by the masses of his followers.
-3-
-T-814--igreeret-
SC-06303-78
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
_Top ooret
Leadership: The Islamic Clergy
Second to Ayatollah Khomeini in terms of popular follow-
ing are a number of other ayatollahs in religious centers
around Iran: Shariat-Madari in Qom, Talaghani in Tehran,
Qomi in Mashad, and others. Lesser clerical leaders in each
of the mosques provide a degree of local leadership and a
channel of communication between the upper echelons and the
people.
In late November 1978 Khomeini issued a
message to his followers instructing them to hold demonstra-
tions during the period of Moharram. Khomeini hoped that as
a result of the violent confrontations with the military
which would ensue. the military and the Shah's reaime would
crumble.
-4-
Top Scorct
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
SC-06303-78
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516-
aN,p
(b)(3)
Leadership: The National Front
Leaders of the National Front appear to have played a
role in clearing the way for the peaceful demonstrations in
Tehran on 10-11 December, and they have certainly benefited
politically from those demonstrations. There is no evidence,
however, to suggest that the National Front or any other
political structure has any significant organizational capa-
bility at the grassroots level. The lack of a well-organized
political following and the fear of being swept aside in
another round of widespread violence may in fact have deterred
National Front leaders from promoting unrest during Moharram.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
National Front leaders have interests in common with the
religious opposition, but the relationship between the two
groups appears to be one of only limited cooperation. The
National Front seeks to benefit from the organizational capa-
bility of the religious opposition. But the religious oppo-
sition does not appear to be susceptible to specific direction
by the National Front or any other political leaders.
Tactics: Students
Iranian students have not played a leading role in organ-
izing major opposition demonstrations during the past year of
unrest in Iran. However, in the months preceding Moharram,
in particular during the first week of October 1978 (the week
of university registration and the opening of classes) and
during the first days of November, university and secondary
school students instigated and led widespread incidents of
violence. In the first week of December 1978, the opening
of the month of Moharram, groups of young people--many of them
-5-
Top Sccrc
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
SC-06303-78
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Top Cccrct
(b)(3)
presumably students--engaged in sporadic, hit-and-run con-
frontations with military units in Tehran and other cities.
University campuses in Iran have long been centers of
political dissidence and the scene of opposition demonstra-
tions which have often turned into bloody confrontations be-
tween students and security forces. Additionally, the uni-
versities have provided a recruiting ground for the two
Iranian terrorist groups, the Mujahedin and the Chariks.
Some Iranian students abroad, members of the Iranian Students
Association in the United States and the Confederation of
Iranian Students in Europe, have returned to Iran during the
current period of unrest and have presumably participated in
anti-regime activities.
Tactics: Ad Hoc Groups and Random Violence
The events of 4-5 November 1978, when mobs of demonstra-
tors roamed the streets of Tehran setting fires and destroying
property, served to reveal the extent of frustration and
hostility toward the Shah's regime on the part of the general
public. These incidents appeared to be largely unplanned and
spontaneous. The choice of targets by the protestors, how-
ever, took its cue from the movement against westernization
and modernization in Iran widely articulated in pamphlets
emanating from a number of sources within the religious
opposition.
A similar quality of random violence characterizes the
incidents of harassment and attacks on the American community.
Threatening letters and telephone messages, attempts to set
fire to vehicles belonging to Americans, rock throwing, bomb-
ings, and firebombings were reported in a number of cities
around Iran. Most of this activity took place in Isfahan and
Tehran where there are large concentrations of Americans. The
anti-American incidents do not appear to be the work of any
single group mounting an organized campaign. In the few
cases of bombings, for example, the explosives were crudely
constructed devices made up from materials easily obtained
in the local bazaars, which distinguishes them from the
devices employed by organized terrorist groups in Iran.
-6-
Top Scarct
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
SC-06303-78
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Top Sek..1.e
Tactics: Terrorists
During the months preceding Moharram, there was a sharp
increase in the number of terrorist incidents, involving
domestic as well as foreign targets. The Sazman-e Charikha-ye
Feda'i-ye Khalq (Peoples Sacrifice Guerrillas, or Chariks), a
terrorist group active since 1971 and far to the left of the
main lines of the religious opposition, attacked police and
security officials in Tehran and Tabriz during September,
in Isfahan and Mashad in October, and again in Tehran in
early December. Other incidents, primarily those directed
against Americans, appear to 1ave been the work of ad hoc
groups of Islamic dissidents.
Tactics: The Question of Imported Technology
Techniques and equipment being used by political and
religious opposition groups in Iran afford little evidence
of foreign involvement. Copying machines for pamphlets,
walkie-talkies, bullhorns, and other loudspeakers, are in
common use in Iranian cities or are readily available.
The use of forged "documents" or of tape recordings of
the sounds of violent confrontations to add to the air of
crisis and confusion during the night do not necessarily
imply foreign guidance. An ostensible bank document pur-
porting to list prominent Iranians sending large sums of
money out of the country merely builds on the general
-7-
Top Ccomt
SC-06303-78
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
--Ter-Becrer
suspicion of corruption in high places. The use of tape
recordings is borrowed from the muzzeins who for some years
have been using the device to avoid the climb up the minaret
to make the call to prayers.
-8-
Top Scorct
SC-06303-78
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Adir Air AF Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516 'Amy
ANIII Amor
0 Top Secret
(Security Classification) 0
0 0
0 0
0 10
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
0 0
0 �T-ep�Secret-- 0
(Security Classification)
,Err A...Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO298551ar AMP' Air All
ROUTING
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
.2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
AW Air IA(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
itY
CONTROL NO
Iwseefet,
(Security Classification)
/
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
0
A
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
OHT-Tgettet--
0
Pr' Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO29855161, lirr Allr"
(Security Classification)
E2 IMPDET
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
(b
(b
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
(
(
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
(
(
(
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516
(b)(
(b)(
(b)(
3)
1)
6)
Approved for Release: 2021/04/19 CO2985516