CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977797
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 21, 1960

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Approved for Mut /9/
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
21 October 1960
Copy No. C 1:)
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
DOCUMENT NO. �Pig
NO �NAME D CLASS. X
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AUTHI liti 70.2
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1 0 JUN 1980
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21 OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese are delaying
decisions on 1961 trade with other bloc
countries; this probably is due in part to
agricultural difficulties, but Sino- Soviet
ii spite may also be factor.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR Commander in Chief Amir apparent-
ly to visit USSR shortly; probably will
try to get USSR to accelerate delivery of
militar equipment.
0
0
British, determined to keep Uganda in-
tact, will reject formal Buganda request
for separate independence by early 1961. 0
Situation in the Congo.
III. THE WEST
Castro regime may be preparing to stage
another "incident" to back up charges of
US aggression against Cuba.
0
0
LATE ITEM
OKhrushchev's 20 October speech seen as
strong effort to buttress Soviet position
at November meeting of world Commu-
nist leaders in Moscow.
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.43
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China:
Peiping is postponing decisions
on the extent and nature of its 1961 trade with the rest of 3 1.4
the Communist bloc. The level of trade this year has also
been affected by Chinese delays in signing some new con=
tracts and cancellation of some import orders. These de-
velopments probably are attributable in part to Communist
China's internal economic difficulties, notably in agricul-
ture over the past two years, although the basic dispute
between the USSR and China may have contributed to China's
uncertainty over its future trade prospects. Drought and
flood have cast a shadow over China's foreign trade poten-
tial, since up to two thirds of China's exports to other bloc
countries co sist of agricultura], products and goods processed
from them. (Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-USSR:
arrangements for a visit to
the Soviet Union by UAR Commander in Chief Amir. No date
for the trip is mentioned, but the tone sug-
gests the very near future. Although the reason for the visit
is not disclosed, Amir probably will try to get the USSR to
accelerate delivery of military equipment from the bloc, and
possibly discuss arrangements for additional new equipment.
13age 2)
Britain-Uganda6,,ondon will refuse Buganda's formal re-
qdest for separate independence from the Uganda protectorate
by early 1961. The request for independence, made on 4 Octo-
ber, followed the Buganda legislature's passage of a resolution-
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month decla_
in Uganda protecter.,,
mined to keep the ae
preeexed to alter the
even replace the -7
able popular support
-.protectorate call for ncI
-,'1.1;e7,nd7. would not participete
The British are deter
faei. intact, however, and are
nda government and, if neces-
.sent ruler, .who has consider-
:en British British plans for the
enr4,nee by about 1963.
(Page 3)
ap)
. The Wo_rning, of Governor
Province on 20 October that
his province will "seee... from the Congo unless Mobutu
ends his "reirm of terree'' f_n.Leopoldville was designed
primarily to provide asuort for leurnumba.
spokesnn
,eelville have periodic
p.:13t, the threat had nuL
Zrican Solidarity
Hepublic of the Ce...
n.itatsu of Leopolciee
tion of any simitificane--
sa.;I:balm party in Leo-
threatened secession in the
eeviciisly been used by Kamitatsuis
he oilier pill lOrnl nrcraniry2 -
We eirov;nr.p
Congo were "anvestheti
their protestations cf
Cairo come forward v:
vening of parliament e_ee
ence in the country.
Western diplomats in the
TIN representative Dayal with
ort for Congo unity. He urged that
a Congo program based on a recon-
he neutralization of Western influ-
(Page 4)
ririE WEST
Cuba: The Castro reeime, which on 18 October re-
quested the UN General Assembly to consider its charges
of US aggression, may now be preparing to stage another
"Incident" to back up such accusations. The American Em-
bassy, which has received several reports that five or six
Cuban planes at the major air base south of Havana have been
21 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF 11
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o:ntod wLT.iet US insi.7,
112:2d in such a move.
tactics before, noi...e-
icariE.; to stage a
"prove" US cornplicii,7 �
UN General Assernble'e
take up the Cuban rec
may return to the UN to
in plenary session,
*An official of the Ce
ican Embassy officer
Castro regime will res,-,
these aircraft might be
regime has used such
7.7.-reli when R. hire-et two Amer-
then used the flight .to
"war criminals." The
er Committee will probably
_ ::aril next week; Castro himself
ss his charges, either there or
Embassy in Ottawa told .an Amer-
or; 19 October that he believes the
- the imposition of new US re-
breaking diplomatic relations.
TE, ITEM �
*USSR: Khrushcheve, -...eeech in Moscow on 20 October,
ostensibly a report oe :ectities at the United Nations,
was in reality a vigorce.e7 .'efense of his estimate of the in-
ternational situation ani s general foreign policy line in
recent years. Khrushe:iewcs principal purpose probably was
to reiterate his views in ',he strongest possible terms in
preparation for the meet.e7 of -world Communist leaders in
f,doscow next month. T. ..eech contained no evidence that
any progress has been a{..:-,te.vca in reducing the areas of dis-
agreement with the Chie,. Communists; on the contrary,
Ithrushchev pointedly rejected the policy of "adventureie3"
who think the "social order" can be changed by war. The
Soviet premier repeated his New York proposals for reor-
ganizing the United Nations structure, and implied that the
Security Council should be enlarged by adding such neutral-
ist powers as India and Indonesia as permanent members
He also repeated the warnino
De solved in 1961.
21 Oct 60
that thp Rerlin question "must
(Page 5)
DAILY BRIEF Ill
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kimpe Nrato
Uncertainty in Communist China Over Trade Prospects
Peiping is postponing decisions on the extent and nature
of its future trade with the rest of the bloc,
Peiping, in the process of conducting a
survey of its economy, feels it is not in a position to estimate
its 1961 export capabilities. The Chinese have delayed sign-
ing new contracts and have canceled some import orders,
which will affect the level of trade this year. The cancella-
tion of imports applies only to orders which have not been
formalized in contracts; formal contracts signed earlier by
the Chinese are still in effect, and deliveries to China are
continuing as usual. Export contracts are apparently still
being honored, but Peiping is delayingany new commitments.
Peiping's indecisiveness about trade plans for next year
is probably attributable in part to the regime's recognition
of its internal economic difficulties. The Chinese have been
uncommonly vague about economic accomplishments this year
and have been especially worried about agriculture. Difficul-
ties of maintaining agricultural production because of drought
and flood this year throw China's trade potential into doubt.
Agricultural products, both raw and processed, make up ap-
proximately two thirds of China's exports to the bloc.
China's dispute with the USSR probably has also contrib-
uted to its uncertainty over future trade. In addition to the
existing debt to the Soviet Union, Peiping has been running a
deficit in its balance of payments with the bloc.
SECRET
21 Oct 60
CFNTRAI INTFI IC;FNCF BULLETIN Page 1
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NiarS
UAR Commander in Chief Amir Scheduling Visit to Moscow
Arrangements re being nt,de for UAR Vice President
and Commander in Chief Abd al-Hakim Amir to visit Moscow.
The initiative for the visit was not disclosed and no date has
been set, but Amir will probably try to get the USSR to accel-
erate the delivery of milli. ry equipment from the bloc and
possibly discuss rrangements for dditional new equipment.
Amir had ordered" the UAR Embassy to con-
tact Soviet authorities to determine "what they have to offer
for armaments." The embassy was instructed to report to
Cairo "the types, numbers, and prices offered, and particu-
larly the new offers." the matter of a
new arms "contr ct or commitment' with the USSR already
had been discussed in Cairo.
Moscow apparently has been reluctant since 1958 to honor
Cairo's requests for more large-sc le arms aid, although it
continues to supply the UAR with some military equipment and
earlier this year agreed to provide MIG-19 jet fighters. The
MIG-19s, however, have not yet been delivered.
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21 Oct 60
CENTRAL INTFI I inFtqcF FUJI I FTIN
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S U D N
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
GANDA 4
ETHIOPIA
� mnhar
KENYA
Nairobi*
Meru.
TANGANYIKA
Inganyika
FEDSRATION OF
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SOMALI
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MBIQUE
UGAND
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UNCLASSIIIID
31380
ENYA
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Impending Political Crisis in Uganda
\-London will refuse Buganda's formal request for inde-
pendence separate from the Uganda protectorate by early
1961 and is prepared to take firm action to handle the po-
litical crisis this decision will precipitate. The 4 October
independence request followed the Buganda legislature's pas-
sage of a resolution last month declaring that Buganda, the
protectorate's largest and richest province, would not par-
ticipate in Uganda affairs. The British are determined to keep
the protectorate intact, and are prepared to alter the Buganda
government and, if necessary, even replace the present ruler--
or Kabaka--who has considerable popular support:3
(_Fearful of losing their influence, the traditional rulers of
Buganda have long opposed British efforts to introduce more
responsible government on a protectorate-wide basis. Discus-
sions in London between the Kabaka and Colonial Secretary
Macleod were suspended in mid-September after London re-
fused to promise that Uganda's new constitution to be drafted
in mid-1961 wofild guarantee Buganda special rights in a weak
Uganda federation:\
(While not opposed to some degree of federalism, London
is determined to push constitutional reform to prepare Uganda
for independence as a single state. British officials in Uganda
have set some time between 1963 or 1964 as a target date for
independence, with the proviso that "outside pressure" could
advance this by about six months. These officials are recom-
mending that Britain try to undercut Buganda's opposition by
lobbying at the UN, with the argument that Buganda's desires
are undemocratic and not in keeping with the "wind of change."
Although only one percent of the Buganda electorate has so far
registered, London is determined to proceed with protectorate-
wide elections in February or March for members of the legis-
latureot,
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The Situatioi the Congo
The warning on 20 October by Cleophas Kamitatsu, gov-
ernor of Leopoldville Province, that his province will "secede"
from the Congo unless Mobutu ends his "reign of terror" in
Leopoldville is designed primarily to provide propaganda for
deposed premier Lumumba. Although spokesmen for Kasavu-
bu's Abako party have periodically threatened secession in the
past, the threat had not been invoked by Kamitatsu's African
Solidarity party (PSA), the Abako's main rival. Kamitatsu's
statement may reflect the desire of PSA chief Antoine Gizenga
to undermine Mobutu by portraying him as an obstacle to Congo
unity.
Western diplomats in the Congo
were "anesthetizing" UN representative Dayal with their prot-
estations of support for Congo unity. He urged that Cairo come
forward with a Congo program based on a reconvening of par-
liament, the removal of the Congo Army from politics, and the
expulsion of all Belgians. He added that all "foreign activity"
should be ended except that devoted to "consolidating the na-
tional economy under the supervision of the central government."
Lulua villages in Kasai Province appeared to have suf-
fered heavy damage in the sporadic tribal fighting between the
Balubas and Luluas. Defeated Lulua tribesmen have reported-
ly fallen back on the city of Luluabourg, as fighting has shifted
to Katanga. There Baluba attacks pose a serious threat to the
government of Moise Tshombe, and recent statements by the
Katanga leader have reflected dissatisfaction with the measures
taken by UN forces to maintain security.-,
Elsewhere, five Soviet IL-18s in Accra, which have been
used by Ghana while it awaited delivery on five IL-18s pur-
chased from the USSR, have scheduled return flights to Mos-
cow on about 21 October. Two other IL-18s--presumably the
first of those ordered by Ghana�were scheduled to arrive in
Accra on 20 October.
the returning Soviet aircraft would carry Soviet
diplomatic personnel who were evacuated from Leopoldville in
September.
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*aro
Khrushchev Reports on UN Activities
Khrushchev's speech in Moscow on 20 October, osten-
sibly a report on his UN venture,was in reality a vigorous
defense and justification of his estimate of the international
situation and his general foreign policy course in recent
years. Using the disarmament issue as the basis for his
remarks, Khrushchev presented a strong indictment of the
positions taken by the Chinese Communists, specifically re-
jecting the views of "adventurers" who believe that the social
order should be changed by "unleashing wars." In contrast,
Khrushchev endeavored to draw a picture of the international
situation as sharply divided into three power groupings, with
future international alignment of the neutralist states at stake.
In effect, he claimed that only by a combination of propaganda,
agitation, and diplomatic activities, as typified in his UN per-
formance, would the bloc isolate and defeat the West by win-
ning over these uncommitted states.
The detailed manner in which Khrushchev developed his
position on the points at issue with the Chinese Communists
provides further evidence that no progress has been achieved
in reducing the areas of disagreement. The speech was, there-
fore, probably intended to present the strongest and most con-
vincing case for Soviet views and serve as a preview for the
Communist world of the position the Kremlin will take in the
forthcoming meeting of Communist parties in Moscow. Khru-
shchev's determination to undercut Chinese criticism of his
policies in dealing with the "national liberation struggle" was
also reflected in the pains he took to reiterate his de facto
recognition of and support for the Algerian rebels. He de-
scribed the Algerian situation as a "just war"--the type which
"we support"--and warned that if the French "colonialists" do
not leave Algeria they will be forced out in a "military debacle."
On the issues which Khrushchev raised at the UN, he ad-
vanced claims of maximum success. Elaborating on the ques-
tion of reorganizing the UN, he asserted that his attendance at the
meeting was not only worthwhile but necessary in order to pre-
sent the "fundamental proposition" that the present structure of
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the UN is obsolete and must be modified to reflect the ac-
tual balance of power in the world. He added that the UN
could not expect future Soviet respect for its decisions un-
til a reorganization had been effected in the Security Coun-
cil, the executive organs, and the office of the Secretary
General.
On East-West questions Khrushchev is apparently set-
ting the stage for a possible bloc walkout for the UN Polit-
ical Committee's discussion of disarmament to be followed
by a campaign for a special UN session attended by the heads
of government next March or April. He also repeated his
warning,Eg_iven to Macmillan that the Berlin ques-
t-
tion "must be 60.1.VeLl 111 1961." However, he reaffirmed his
pledge to stand by his post-summit commitment to seek a new
summit meeting before taking unilateral action, provided Bonn
did not engage in further "provocations." In the USSR's first
authoritative response to Bonn's denunciation of the interzonal
trade agreement, he warned that East Germany would be forced
to reply to further provocations with economic measures.
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-CIVTITFTLIEINI I IA L
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense�
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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