CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977792
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 15, 1960

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15 October 1960
Copy No. C 77
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
TOP SECRET
DOGUMENT
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Arid Nod
15 .00TOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping extends $105,000,000 loan to North
Korea in another move to strengthen Chi-
na's political position among Asian satel-
lites.
Albanian political crisis apparently re-
lated to Sino-Soviet dispute.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos--Another military regional com-
mander may throw his support to Phoumi;
this would leave Souvanna Phouma de-
pendent on Kong Le's forces and might
cause him to reverse decision to move
government to Luang Prabang.
Japan--Leftists trying to exploit impact
of Asanuma assassination by demanding
prime minister's resignation.
South Korea--Factionalism intensifying
within ruling party but Prime Minister
Chang believes he will achieve majority
support.
Mali Republic intends to establish early
diplomatic relations with Communist
China, North Vietnam, USSR, and Czech-0
oslovakia.
�Situation in Congo.
III. THE WEST
�West German foreign minister says trade
with East Germany will not end com-
pletely despite cancellation of interzonal
agreement.
�Situation in Argentina.
LATE ITEM
0 Soviet launch attempt.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - North Korea: Peiping% intention to
strengthen its political position among the Asian satellites
with firmer economic ties is demonstrated by the 13 October --A--e-z-g
agreement extending a new $105,000,000 loan to North Korea.
A sizable loan from Moscow to North Korea can be expected.
Peiping's $50,000,000 loan to Mongolia last May was followed
by a Soviet offer of more than $150,000,000. Both Mongolia
and North Korea are beginning new long-term economic devel-
opment plans and -probably have approached Moscow and Pei-
ping for assistance. Pyongyang has given general support to
Moscow's foreign policy line in the current Sino-Soviet dispute,
but North Korean commentary shows reluctance to criticize Pei-
ping. (Page 1)
Albania: The Albanian political crisis, which led to the
ouster of .a politburo member in early. September, has appar-
ently affected a number of party personnel at the regional
level. In addition, a sizable number ofGaval personnel andi
residents in the southern area of the country have reportedly
been arrested. Reports persist that an abortive coup took
place in late July or early August which may have led to a
general crackdown. The Albanian regime has taken a more
markedly pro-Chinese position following the conclusion of
the September party plenum, and current evidence now sug-
gests Belishova, the politburo me her ousted in September,
may have favored the Soviet line. (Page 2)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: In Luang Prabang the commander of the 1st
Military egion is
planning to come out in support of the Savannakhet reb-
els, possibly on 15 October. In this event, four of the
five military regional commanders would be lined up
with Phoumi. The Souvanna Phouma regime would be
isolated and dependent on the troops in Vientiane dom-
inated by Kong Le. It would almost certainly cause
Souvanna to reverse his recent decision to move his gov-
ernment from Vientiane to Luang Prabang3
(Page 3)
Japan: Leftists in nationwide demonstrations are extiloit-
ing the emotional impact of the assassination of Socialist
leader Asa,numa by demanding Prime Minister Ikeda's
resignation on the ground that his government is respon-
sible. Press play of the incident, however, stresses the
need to eliminate violence from Japanese politics and
tends to moderate public reaction to the assassination
in spite of widespread shock and sympathy for Asanuma.
The government, in an effort to minimize adverse reac-
tion in the forthcoming election campaign, has accepted
the resignation of the cabinet minister in charge of public
safety. (Page 4)
South Korea:LAlthough public agitation over the light
punishment given to former officials of the Fthee regime
is subsiding, Democratic opponents of Prime Minister
Chang Myon apparently believe this provides them with
an issue to justify splitting the gov ernment party. Both
Chang's faction and his opponents within the party are in
the process of forming separate organizations. Although
the split may result in the resignation of some members of
Chang's cabinet, Chang is not disturbed at the prospect as
he believes his faction will profit by the split to the extent
' 1 soon have a clear working majority:
(Page 5)
15 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF
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Mali-Bloc: The left-wing, neutralist government of
the Mali Republic intends to establish early diplomatic
relations with Communist China and North Vietnam as
well as with the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The govern-
ment announced on 13 October that it had recognized the
Peiping regime. Of the 16 African states which have be-
come independent this year, Mali is the first to take such
action. (Page 6)
Republic of the Congo: The reported disappearance of
Mobutu's troops from around the residence of deposed
Premier Lumumba and the withdrawal of a Congo Army
contingent from Leopoldville against Mobutu's orders sug-
gest that Mobutu is encountering serious difficulties in
maintaining discipline among his army supporters. Ten-
sion continues high in Leopoldville, and pro-Lumumba
demonstrators�who assaulted one of Mobutu's commis-
��ioners on 14 October�have stepped up their activities.
LIIN representative Dayal favors reconvening the parlia-
ment2 in which event Lumumba would probably resume
political activity. (Page 7)
III. THE WEST
West Germany: Foreign Minister von Brentano has
told Christian Democratic foreign affairs experts of the
Bundestag that trade with East Germany will not end com-
pletely despite suspension of the interzonal trade agree-
ment. Trade would continue on the basis of individual or-
ders, but licenses would depend on East German actions re-
garding Berlin. While West German industrialists are re-
luctant to cut off trade with East Germany, Brentano empha-
sized his dissatisfaction over the unwillingness of the NATO
allies to support economic sanctions against East Germany.
He noted reports from Bonn's ambassador in Paris that
French determination to stand by the status quo in Berlin
was weakening. Although conceding that new international
talks on Berlin could not be avoided, Brentano would try to
delathem until after the German elections in the fall of
1961. Page 8)
15 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Argentina: While the crisis over army demands for
changes in President Frondizi's advisers and policies
has been eased, the situation is still troubled by army
unrest. At least 17 of the some 50 generals have presented
their resignations. Frondizi is reported to have given
in to one of their demands by accepting the resignation of
War Secretary Larcher, who is trying to reduce the pow-
er of army commander Toranzo Montero. A special meet-
ing of all army generals has been called for 17 October.
(Page 9)
LATE ITEM
*USSR: On 14 October the USSR launched a vehicle
from Tyura Tam which, like that of 10 October, failed in
flight shortly after launch. The vehicle was launched at
approximately 1350Z 0950 EDT), was airborne at least five
and one-half minutes.
the apparent failure of attempts by Soviet facilities in
the Far East to track the vehicle, indicate an in-flight failure.
The Tyura Tam and Klyuchi facilities and the four
SIBIR ships participated in the operation which closely re-
sembled the event of 10 October. The characteristics of
the vehicle and the objectives of the operation are cur-
rently unripterminpd
15 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I 11-1L. 'Nee
Communist China Extends New Economic Assistance
To North Korea
Peiping on 13 October demonstrated its intention to
strengthen its political position among the Asian satellites
by granting North Korea a loan of $105,000,000. This loan
covers equipment and technical aid to build industrial plants
for the manufacture of rubber tires, radios, and telecommu-
nications equipment. China will also assist enterprises pro-
ducing consumer goods and will provide cotton-textile equip-
ment.
A sizable loan from Moscow to North Korea also will
probably be forthcoming. Peiping's $50,000,000 loan to Mon-
golia last May was followed by a Soviet offer of more than
$150,000,000. Mongolia has embarked on a Five-Year Plan,
and North Korea is beginning an ambitious seven-year program
of economic development. Both countries have probably ap-
proached Moscow and Peiping for assistance.
North Korea has received large-scale economic assistance
from the Sino-Soviet bloc during the past ten years, initially in
support of the war effort but since 1953 to sustain rehabilita-
tion efforts and to expand inaustrial capacity. Excluding mil-
itary deliveries during the Korean war, the total amount of bloc
economic aid is estimated at about $1.2 billion--most of which
was in the form of outright grants prior to 1957. The USSR
has provided about $500,000,000, while Peiping's contribution
has risen with the new loan to some $400,000,000. The terms
of the new Chinese credit indicate that Peiping intends to play
a more active role in North Korean industrialization, including
supplying complete plants, which heretofore have been installed
chiefly under the Soviet aid program.
At a party plenum last August Pyongyang pledged "full sup-
port" for Moscow's foreign policy line in the current Sino-Soviet
dispute on Communist strategy. Since that time, however, North
Korean commentary on the subject has indicated reluctance to
criticize Peiping. Pyongyang has attacked both "revisionism"
and "dogmatism" as "un-Marxist tendencies." In a speech on
10 October, Pak Kum-chol, a leading party spokesman, was es-
pecially critical of "revisionism?' A si1inp the "Tito clique and
other international revisionists?'
TONFIBENTIAL__
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*awlU1 JULAtt,/ Nov'
Albanian Internal Situation
The ouster of politburo member Belishova and party
audit commission head Tashko appears to have been a part
of a series of widespread political changes in Albania since
midsummer.
A political crisis apparently has been stimulated by
Albania's support of Peiping in the Sino-Soviet controversy.
Recent evidence suggests that Belishova favored a pro-
Soviet position and that since her ouster the regime has
consolidated its positions around the pro-Chinese line. The
Albanian regime has taken a more markedly pro-Chinese po-
sition since the September plenum, as manifested by party
boss Hoxha's speech on the eve of the 1 October Chinese libera-
tion anniversary and the conduct during the past two weeks of
Albanian Vice Premier Kellezi in China.
Alternate politburo member Dervishi was removed from
his post as party first secretary of the Tirana city organiza-
tion and replaced by Fiqerete Shehu, the premier's wife, short-
ly before the September plenum.
a sizable number of regional
party and government officials of middle rank were also ousted
in various areas in Albania.
a coup was attempted in late July or early August.
also report an abortive coup.
the "nervousness" of
the Albanian leaders was "noted by everyone" in August and was
perhaps related to rumors of imminent changes in the party.
(Vice Admiral Teme Sejko, commander in chief of the Albanian
Navy reportedly, was arrested by Serritv authorities alonq with
a number of other naval personnef:-I
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Not, %we
Situation in Laos
[the commander of the 1st Military Region, Colonel
Houmpanh, is going
to come out ii. support of the Savannakhet rebels, possibly
in the next day or so. Houmpanh, whose headquarters is
In Luang Prabang, previously has maintained a cautiously
neutral position between the rival camps, although during
the past few days he has leaned toward Phoumi. According
to Houmpanh, the top military figure in the Vientiane regime--
General Ouane--is associated with the planii
Houmpanh acts, four of Laos' five military, regional
commanders will be lined up behind Phoumi. Premier Souvanna
Phouma, who recently decided to move his government to Luang
Prabang, where it would be less subject to direct influence by
Kong Le, would almost certainly reverse his decision. With
the great bulk of the army arrayed against him, Souvanna would
probably be forced into closer dependence on Kong Le, who to-
day called for a shake-up in the top command of the Laotian
Army, demonstrating once again that he does not see his role
limited to that of a battalion commander]
Souvanna Phouma told the press on 14 October that he is
determined to stick to his neutralist policy and added, "If the
Americans are willing to understand this, it is fine; if they do
not, it is too bad." Souvanna continues to hint broadly that he
will be forced to turn to the Communist bloc unless American
aid is resumed. Soviet Ambassador Abramov parried report-
ers' questions on possible Soviet aid on his arrival on 13 Octo-
ber but indicated he would make a statement on the subject after
he presented his credentials to the King.
an the first substantive talks between the Vientiane govern-
ment and the Pathet Lao on 13 October, the Pathets reportedly
called for a "Cambodian-type neutrality" and for action against
the Savannakhet regime. Vientiane is, in effect, being asked to
sign a "separate peace" with the Pathets. The Pathet negotiator
said that he reserved the right to attack any troops which in his
opinion do not support the policy of neutrality
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Nei �04�01
Demonstrations in Japan
Leftists are staging nationwide demonstrations to exploit
the emotional impact of the assassination on 12 October of
left-wing Socialist leader Inejiro Asanuma by supporting de-
mands of labor, Socialist party (JSP), and Communist leaders
for Prime Minister Ikeda's resignation on the grounds that the
government is responsible for the incident. Rallies called by
the Socialists in connection with the assassination are to coin-
cide with a half-hour strike and mass labor demonstrations
against the government which have been planned since early
September by Sohyo, the large leftist labor federation. Sohyo,
which supports the JSP, was chiefly responsible for organiz-
ing and financing the demonstrations in May and June preceding
the fall of the Kishi government.
The press, however, which encouraged the demonstrations
last spring, is stressing the need to eliminate both leftist and
rightist violence from Japanese politics. This view is moderat-
ing public reaction to the assassination in spite of widespread
shock--perhaps the sharpest in Japan since the war--and sym-
pathy for Asanuma. By recalling the recent stabbing of former
Prime Minister Kishi, the press has attempted to counter left-
ist allegations of government responsibility in the Asanuma case.
The JSP, which hopes orderly demonstrations will arouse
support for party opposition to the government in the special
Diet session scheduled for 17 October, has joined the govern-
ment in appealing against violence. The demonstrations so far
have been relatively calm, but there have been clashes between
students and the police.
In an effort to minimize adverse public reaction in the No-
vember election campaign, Ikeda has accepted the resignation
of Iwao Yamazaki, who as chairman of the Public Safety Com-
mission is the cabinet minister in charge of police. The Sot
cialists, to preserve their unity in the campaign, have appar-
ently decided to defer the intraparty contest over choosing
Asanuma's successor until after the parliamentary election.
-SECRET-
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South Korean Majority Party-mbyut-3
6actional opponents of Prime Minister Chang Myon
within his Democratic party have launched an attack on him
over the light punishment given to former officials of the
Rhee regime. Although public agitation over the sentences
handed down by the Seoul District Court on 8 October appears
�to be subsiding, Democratic dissidents apparently believe
this issue provides them with an opportunity to split the party.
The public, which has resented the continuing factional strife,
may accept the break.:
1�1'he split may result in the resignation of some members
_o_t_C_hang2scabinet-1 s not disturbed at the prospect.
he be-
lieved the split would give him a good working majority in the
National Assembly and free his administration to turn its oftention to pressing national problems.
rom 20 to 30 of the 85 declared anti-
Chang factionists in the dominant 233-seat lower house will
join the 95 Democrats now committed to the prime minister.
The local press has stated that of the five anti-Chang faction-
ists in Chang's 14-man coalition cabinet, three will remain in
the government, one will join the opposition, and the intentions
of the other are unknown:
Chang's opponents have faxen an active
part in organizing the recent disturbances.
To appease popular indignation over the sentences, the govern-
ment has appealed the cases, Chang has called for ex post facto
legislation to assure stiffer penalties, and the assembly has
passed a measure suspending the trials until the special laws
can be enacted. As a further gesture to the public, Chang has
accepted the resignation of Home Minister Yi Sang-chol�who
assumed moral responsibility for the outcome of the trials--
and a plinted onetime Defense Minister Hyon Sok-ho in his
place
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LLJ1EIL)L4IV 1 IHL
Mali Movinq Toward Early Diplomatic Ties With
Sino-Soviet Bloc
The leftist-oriented government of the Mali Republic
apparently intends to establish early diplomatic ties with a
number of Sino-Soviet bloc countries, inducing Communist
China and North Vietnam. The government announced on 13
October that it had recognized the Peiping regime, becom-
ing thereby the first of the 16 African states which have be-
� come independent so far this year to take such action.
� This step will probably be followed shortly by a request
for the departure of a Chinese Nationalist mission which had
been seeking recognition for Taipei. The Mali announcement
of 13 October revealed that a South Vietnamese envoy who had
been in Bamako on a mission similar to that of Taipei's rep-
resentative has already been directed to leave Mali. This ac-
tion followed a recent visit to Bamako by the North Vietnamese
ambassador accredited to Guinea.
The Mali announcement also stated that a Soviet delega-
tion would arrive in Mali later this month. Earlier Mali
authorities had announced receipt of a cable from Khrushchev
proclaiming the USSR's readiness to proceed with an exchange
of diplomatic representatives. Czechoslovakia is apparently
already in the process of establishing both diplomatic and eco-
nomic ties with Mali.
Since Mali was admitted to the UN on 28 September, its
delegation in New York has consistently voted with the bloc on
all East-West issues. In one instance--the inscription on the
General Assembly's agenda of the Hungarian question--Mali
alone among African states cast a negative vote. This pattern
may change to some extent, however, after the arrival of Mali's
new permanent representative to the UN and ambassador to the
US--a man believed to be somewhat less ill-disposed to the West
than are his country's present spokesmen at the UN. Top offi-
cials at Bamako, apparently desirous of preserving a neutral
posture, balanced their gestures toward the bloc in their 13 Oc-
tober announcement with statements implying an intention to
encourage friendly relations with Western countries.
-eONFwENTIA
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Situation in the Congo
The reported disappearance of Mobutu's troops from around
the residence of deposed Premier Lumumba, together with the
withdrawal of a Congolese Army contingent from Leopoldville
in defiance of Mobutu's orders, indicates that Mobutu may be
having difficulty in maintaining discipline among his army fol-
lowers,
when he had last passed by Lu-
_
mumba's residence, "I found the Congolese troops in a state
of general laxity." He added that on one occasion an army unit
had insulted Mobutu.
In view of Mobutu's inability to maintain a secure guard on
his rival and UN representative Dayal's hope that a reconvening
of parliament will bring a political reconciliation favorable to
Lumumba, Lumumba may resume political activity in the near
future. One Congolese politician has speculated that parlia-
ment might reconvene about 21 October. Any speechmaking by
Lumumba--in defiance of Mobutu's "neutralization" of Congolese
politicians�might compel Mobutu to attempt to arrest him.
President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko have
declared personae non gratae three Ghanaian diplomats, in-
cluding Ambassador Djin and Charge Welbeck, for interfer-
ence in internal Congolese affairs. The whereabouts of Wel-
beck�who is believed to have left Accra for Leopoldville on
12 October on a mission to "rescue!' Lumumba--remains un-
clear.
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JIjQj
Noe
Bonn Clarifies Stand on East German Trade
doreign Minister von Brentano has reportedly told mem-
bers of the Christian Democratic Union's foreign affairs work-
ing group in the Bundesta,g that despite Bonn's 30 September
suspension of its interzonal trade agreement, trade with East
Germany will continue after 1 January on the basis of individual
orders, but licenses will be dependent on East German moves
in Berlin. Although key West German industrialists are still
reluctant to cut off their trade with East Germany, Brentano
emphasized his dissatisfaction over the unwillingness of Bonn's
NATO allies to support economic sanctions against East Ger-
many. He cited in particular a complaint of the Belgian am-
bassador about "damage" done by the Allied suspension of
temporary travel documents for East German trade mission
personne1.7
French determination to stand by the status quo in
Berlin was weakening, there are no other indications that
Paris' support for the Allied occupation of Berlin has lessened.
Brentano also noted
the French were interested in renewing talks on Berlin at the
earliest opportunity, probably around late February or early
March of 1961. Although conceding that new talks on Berlin
could not be avoided, he stated that he would try to delay them
until after the German elections in the fall of 1960
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Noe
Argentine Crisis Eased, but Military Unrest Continues
While the crisis over the army's demands for changes in
Argentine President Frondizi's advisers and policies has been
eased, the situation is still troubled by army unrest. Horacio
Rodriguez Larreta, a Foreign Ministry official who has been
in contact with the US Embassy in Buenos Aires as an emis-
sary for Frondizi, commented on 13 October that the crisis
"has been transferred from the national sphere, in which the
government itself was threatened, to (another) sphere, in the
form of a contest for power between War Secretary Larcher
and Army Commander in Chief General Carlos Toranzo Mon-
tero." He added that concessions made by Frondizi had satis=
fied all but a minority element within the army which favors a
coup. Similar information was given to the US army attache
by Toranzo Montero's aide.
Frondizi's "concessions" thus far seem mainly to be as-
surances that his administration will curb any political activ-
ity designed to restore Peronista political power or favor the
objectives of international Communism. He also said other
problems in the administrative, labor union, and other fields
would be corrected, Rodriguez Larreta expected some shifts
among lower officials, particularly those suspected of graft
or involvement with Frondizi's unofficial adviser, Rogelio
Frigerio, whom the army considers too conciliatory toward
the Peronistas. The mediation of former President Pedro
Aramburu is generally believed to have played an important
role in easing the negotiations concerning the army demands.
At least 17 of some 50 generals, apparently excluding
Toranzo Montero, submitted their resignations to Larcher,
whom they consider too partial to Frondizi. Frondizi, how-
ever, is reported to have given in to one of their demands on
14 October by accepting Larcher's resignation. A special
meeting of all army generals has been called for 17 October.
SECRET
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L,L11 ftesd
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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