CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977787
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 8, 1960

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2977787 3.3(h)(2)
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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w_IUrJELNL I
, 8 OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China rebuts recent Soviet
statement on need to avoid all wars.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Union of South Africa--Narrow margin of
victory in favor of republic likely to
deepen divisions within white population;
Africans appear indifferent.
Nigeria rebuffs Soviet bid for immediate
diplomatic relations.
Laos--King apparently abandons plan to
promote political reconciliation between
Vientiane and Savannakhet.
Congo--Mobutu confronts UAR with evi-
dence of intervention for Lumumba.
III. THE WEST
West Germany's cancellation of trade
agreement with East Germany raises
some misgivings.
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(more than 1,600,000--is likely to deepen the divisions within
South Africa's white population. The 10 million Africans in
the Union, who were excluded from the vote, appear to be in-
different to the republic question, regarding it as a squabble
within the white community. Tension is high among the white
population in Natal Province, stronghold of the country's Eng-
lish-speaking minority, and talk of the province's secession
has been Widespread. Verwoerd is likely to be subject to in-
creased criticism from relatively moderate Afrikaners, many
of whom regard the narrow referendum victory as an insuffi-
cient mandate for the establishment of a republic. However,
traditional Afrikaner solidarity will probably keep defections
to a minimum, and Verwoerd may receive increasing support
from rnnial conservatives in the English-speaking community.
(Page 11,
Nigeria-USSR: Nigeria, which became independent on
1 October, has rebuffed a Soviet bid for the immediate estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations. Nigeria's moderate Prime
Minister Balewa, refused to commit his government to such
ties despite the insistence of Moscow's delegates to the inde-
pendence celebrations that they had been "instructed" by Khru-
shchev to establish an embassy in Lagos. As has been the
practice of Soviet delegations attending independence cere-
monies of other African states, the delegates made wide con-
tacts and reportedly distributed lavish gifts to prominent per-
sonalities.
Although pressures for diplomatic ties with the USSR will
undoubtedly increase in the future,. Balewa will probably resist
the immediate establishment of relations. On the other hand,
because of Nigeria's announced policy of nonalignment, Balewa
is likely, to give serious consideration to establishing such re-
lations at a time of his own choosing, probably within the next
year.
Laos: &ing Savang appears to have abandoned his plan to
promote a political reconciliation between the Souvanna Phouma
government and General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary
Committee, While highly critical of Souvanna's recent actions,..1
8 Oct 60
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the King told Ambassador Brown on 6 October that he would ap-
point a new government only if Souvanna resigned or were
forced out by the National Assembly. Savang claimed he was
powerless to act without the support of either a united army or
a united public opinion, neither of which he has at present�
(Page 2)
Republic of the Congo:
'
Army chief Mobutu, 3
t
confronted
him with documents in which Cairo agreed to place its UN con-'1
)
tingent under Lumumba's command in event of a crisis,
Mobutu spoke of reconvening the
Congo parliament, a course of action which Mobutu may be
inclined to favor since the action of a group of deputies in de-
nouncing Lumumba on 3 October. de-
scribed Mobutu as "close to a nervous breakdown," and re-
ported that Mobutu admitted to having lost 30 pounds.
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
Berlin: LWest Germany's cancellation of its 1961 inter-
zonal trade agreement--which initially received wide approval
in Bonn--is now arousing second thoughts among government
and party leaders there. Members of the Social Democratic c
foreign affairs working group in the Bundestag are reportedly :( �- 1,
highly critical of the move. One leader has voiced a fear that /7)
the new trade negotiations would, for the first time, have to be
conducted on a government-to-government level, thus enhanc-
ing the position of East Germany and undermining the four
power status of Berlin.
West Germany is apparently willing to negotiate a new trade
agreement in exchange for East German access guarantees
�
a right which the West maintains is already guaranteed by the
USSR in the 1949 agreement. It also notes continued British
and French reluctance to impose economic sanctions in retali-
ation for East German travel restrictions:i
(Page 5)
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Prime Minister's Position Strengthened by South African
Republic Referendum
Prime Minister Verwoerd's victory in the recent republic
referendum has confirmed the organizational effectiveness of
the Afrikaner-controlled Nationalist party and has solidified his
own position as leader of the Union of South Africa's politically
dominant Afrikaner community. However, the narrow margin
of victory�less than 80,000 votes in a total of more than 1,600,-
000�is likely to deepen the division between the Afrikaners and
the large English-speaking minority-. (
Tension in the English-speaking community has been espe-
cially high in Natal Province, long a stronghold of anti-republic
sentiment. Some of the province's leaders have hinted that if a
republic were established they would attempt to secede--a move
which almost certainly would be opposed by both English and
Afrikaners in the rest of the country. The province will prob-
ably remain in the Union, but opposition to the Verwoerd gov-
ernment can be expected to become more bitter.
yerwoerd also is likely to be subject' to increased criticism
from relatively moderate Afrikaners, especially in Cape Province.
The Cape Nationalists reportedly believed that to obtain a clear
mandate for the republic, Verwoerd would need at least 60 percent
of the vote in the referendum; they may therefore argue that the
52 percent actually obtained does not justify the establishment of
a republic. While such criticisms may be voiced in private, tra-
ditional Afrikaner solidarity will probably keep public defections
to a minimum. In fact, Verwoerd may even broaden the base of
his authority by obtaining the support of some racial conservatives
in the English-speaking community
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The Situation vItt Laos SLCRET
New
LICing Savang appears to have abandoned any effort to force
a political compromise between the Souvanna Phouma govern-
ment in Vientiane and General Phoumrs Savannakhet Revolu-
tionary Committee. In a 6 October audience with Ambassador
Brown in Luang Prabang, the King indicated that for the pres-
ent, at least, he has resigned himself to permitting events to
take their own course. Savang said that Souvanna, who saw
him on the same day, had asked him to send a cable to Savan-
nakhet ordering Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum to dissolve the
Revolutionary Committee and proclaim their allegiance to the
government. The King refused, telling Souvanna that it was
his responsibility either to seek reconciliation with the com-
mittee or to subdue it by capturing Savannakhet.
CSavang severely criticized Souvanna, not only for permit-
ting Vientiane forces to violate the 28 September cease-fire
agreement with Phoumi, but also for allowing the Pathet Lao
to gain a position of such great strength. He added that Captain
Kong Le was still a force in Vientiane and that the Pathet Lao
were pulling the strings there.
LSouvanna meanwhile has claimed to several sources that
there is not enough time to reach a settlement with Phoumi be-
fore the negotiations with the Pathet Lao which were to begin
on 7 October. One of the chief negotiators for the Pathet Lao
side is reported to have arrived in Vientiane. The First Mili-
tary Region commander, whose headquarters is in Luang Pra-
bang, claims he warned Souvanna of the dangers of negotiating
with the Pathet Lao at the present juncture but that he made
little impression on the premier. This commander is reported
by other sources to be ready to abandon his at best nominal
loyalty to Vientiane at the opportune moment.
Pro-Savannakhet officers are also reported plotting to
take over control of the Second Military Region, with head-
quarters in Xieng Khouang Province. Only ten days ago an
internal turnover in the region's command had swung the region
over to Souvanna. In Vientiane, General Ouane, the armed
forces commander, has indicated qualified willingness to find
some way to cooperate with Phoumi in preventing further Pathet
Lao gains.
8 Oct 60
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41.14
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Situation in the Congo
Army chief Mobutu,
confronted him with documents in
which the UAR charge agreed in late September to place the
UAR contingent in the Congo under Lumumba's command in
the event of a crisis. Although denied this and
other, evidence of Cairo's intervention on Lumumba's behalf, he
reported to Cairo that a search of files revealed that
such a commitment had been made by his predecessor in a let-
ter to the deposed premier.
Mobutu spoke of re-
convening the Congo parliament, an action which may have
gained favor with Mobutu after a group of deputies spoke out
against Lumumba on 3 October.
has characterized as exaggerated the
claim of anti-Lumumba spokesmen that Lumumba now is op-
posed by three quarters of the legislators from his erstwhile
political stronghold, Orientale Province, but adds that the de-
fections are significant, since Lumumba's parliamentary sup-
port has hitherto been based almost entirely on the unity of his
followers from Orientale Province.
Despite the recent trend against Lumumba�highlighted by
the arrest of three of his lieutenants in Stanleyville and the ero-
sion of his parliamentary support--he continues to enjoy a con-
siderable measure of foreign support and to benefit from inde-
cisiveness on the part of the harassed Mobutu. In addition to
the active support he is receiving from Ghana, Guinea, and the
UAR, Lumumba is supported somewhat less enthusiastically
by Morocco,Cyhose secretary general for foreign affairs stated
on 6 October that the only feasible solution to the Congo impasse
would be a working agreement among Kasavubu, Lumumba, and
Mobutu. ) Lumumba may also benefit from
the physical strain undergone by Mobutu, who has spoken of
"quitting" and who was described
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as "close to a nervous breakdown."
LElsewhere, the director of the Congo Central Bank in Brus-
sels has stated that the Congo Government has requested its last
line of credit, and that after this is exhausted�around 15 Octo-
ber--the Congo will have no further funds. He noted, however, that
It might be possible to permit further borrowing by raising the
present debt ceiling.
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West Gemians Having Second Thoughts on Cancellation of
East German Trade Agreement
CWest Germany's cancellation on 30 September of its 1961
interzonal trade agreement with East Germany--which initially
received wide approval in Bonn--now is arousing second thoughts
among government and party leaders there. '
I...Members of the opposing Social Democratic party's for-
eign affairs working group in the Bundestag are reportedly
highly critical of the move. One leader has voiced a fear that
the government might, for the first time, be forced to give in
to East German pressure to conduct new trade negotiations on
a government-to-government level, thus enhancing the posi-
tion of East Germany and undermining the four-power status
of Berlin. Although West Berlin Mayor and SPD chancellor
candidate Willy Brandt and possibly other SPD leaders were
consulted regarding the move, SPD Deputy Chairman Herbert
Wehner complained that it took the party completely by sur-
prise. He also stated that the party was in a quandary be-
cause Brandt had agreed to the cancellation before other SPD
leaders had an opportunity to consider it. j
__Deputy Foreign Minister Carstens, at an off-the-record
briefing for newsmen on 4 October, reportedly conveyed the
impression that Bonn is retreating a little from its trade pact
decision and feels somewhat defensive about it.
Bonn is apparently willing to
negotiate a new trade agreement in exchange for East German
guarantees on access to Berlin--a right which the West main-
tains is guaranteed by the USSR in the 1949 agreements.
continued reluctance on the part of the
French and British to impose effective economic or travel
sanctions�including the denial of travel visas to East German
trade mission personnel--in retaliation for East German travel
restrictions.
Ankara has informed Bonn not to expect Turkish
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NaveSECRETft�pid
support in its economic or travel sanctions. Efforts to line
up Allied support for countermeasures have been complicated
by conflicting public statements of leading German officials
regarding the significance of the trade pact cancellation and
the statement in the North Atlantic Convention on 5 October
by the West German permanent representative that--contrary
to previous indications--interzonal trade could not in practice
continue after 1 January 1961 in the absence of a new agree-
ment with the East Germans.
8 Oct 60
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� WINE' !VEIN 1 UAL 11104
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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