CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/01/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977764
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: January 29, 1960

Approved fElkiiii_224./eiffb4
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DOCUMENT NO. 24
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DATIA JUN 7,9804Eviiwil:
29 January 1960
Copy No, C 67
CEYTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETI\
EE -TOP-SCRT-
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29 JANUARY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR puts pressure on Kishi over US-
Japan security treaty by further qualify-
ing pledge to return islands_off Hokkaido;
this may boomerang by improving pros-
pects for treaty ratification.
Sino-Burmese boundary and friendship
treaties announced but not yet published;
if Burmese objectives are met, Chinese
Communist reputation in Southeast Asia
may be somewhat refurbished.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Strong attack on army post near Saigon
may herald increased aggressiveness by
Vietnamese Communists in South Viet-
nam.
Afghans agree to Soviet construction of
large military airfield near Afghan-
Iranian border.
Jordan planning to propose Palestine so-
lution providing for Arab recognition of
Israel, new boundaries, and Israeli de-
mobilization.
0 "Violent differences" reported among
leaders of Sudan's military regime; re-
ligious sect may threaten civil disobedi-
ence in pressing for return of civil gov-
ernment.
III. THE WEST
0 Bolivian President sees financial diffi-
culties and possibility of civil war aris-
ing from last week's Communist-led
seizure of mining town.
LATE ITEM
�De Gaulle trying to convince insurgents
and army in Algeria that he has France
solidly behind him.
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CENWAL INTELLIGE LETIN
29 January 1980
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMM1JNIST BLOC
USSR-Japan: The Soviet Union has responded to the
signing of the US-Japanese security treaty by a note for-
mally withdrawing its pledge to return the Habomai and
Shikotan islands off northern Hokkaido to Japan after the
conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. Moscow now
will return the islands after such a treaty only if all foreign
troops are withdrawn from Japan. Although the Soviet lead-
ers probably do not expect this maneuver to prevent ratifica-
tion of the treaty by the Japanese Diet, they probably felt
impelled to follow up their prolonged propaganda warnings
about the dangerous consequences of the treaty with some re-
taliatory action. Withdrawal of the pledge to return the is-
lands is designed to emphasize Moscow's displeasure with
the Kishi government and to warn that there is no prospect
for_any improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as long as
Kishi retains power.
top Japanese Foreign Ministry official has asserted
that the ministry believes the Soviet note may in fact be a
blunder that would strengthen Prime Minister Kishi person-
ally n d imnrove prospects for ratification of the treatyj
Communist China - Burma: A border agreement and a
treaty of friendship were announced in a Sino-Burmese joint
communique of 28 January. If the border agreement substan-
tially fulfills Burmese objectives, it will help Communist
China refurbish its reputation in South and Southeast Asia.
The details of the agreement will not be released until 30
January. (CONFIDENTIAL) trt,is not clear from the an-
nouncement whether it is an agreement covering only "mat-
ters of principle," such as the Chinese desired, or the more
definitive settlement desired by the Burmese,
some unre
solved differences still remained and would be referred to a
joint commissionl
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
South Vietnam: he Diem regime, which has had a per-
sistent internal security problem, now may be facing in-
creased aggressiveness by Vietnamese Communist elements
lin South Vietnam. A force of several hundred Communists
recently attacked a South Vietnamese Army regimental head-
3 quarters about 50 miles northwest of Saigon, inflicting nu-
rneyous casualties and seizing large quantities of arms. In
ditions there is an as yet unconfirmed report that large
umbers of North Vietnamese have recently infiltrated South
Vietnam through CambodiC (Page 1)
v
Afghanistan: Igabul has apparently approved an agreement
for Soviet construction of a military airfield at Shindand, in
western Afghanistan 40 miles from the Iranian border. The
new field, like the one just being completed at Bagram, is to
be capable of handling most types of jet aircraft, and Iran is
likely to show concern over this new "Soviet threat" to its
northeastern region. The work probably is to be done under
the technical and economic assistance agreement signed on
U 28 May 1959, which also provided for Soviet improvement of
the Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Kandahar road: 11
(Page 2) (Map)
Jordan-Palestine: je Jordanian Governments in reac-
tion to other Arab proposals for a separate Palestine state
and government, intends to submit a comprehensive plan for
settlement of the Palestine question at the meeting of the Arab
League foreign ministers in Cairo on 8 February. King Husayn
has said that details of the plan have not yet been worked out
A U but that it would abandon the "Arab legend" that Israel should
N be pushed into the sea and would propose a frontier somewhere
between the 1947 Nnartlt nniinm1 the present armistice
lines, the plan also advocates
Arab r wgmuono srae as a religious state," demobiliza-
tion of Israeli armed forces, and establishment of Arab-Israeli
trade relations. These terms are unlikely to be acceptable3
41
� 29 Jan 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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vi
[Other to other Arab states or to Israel, and the plan almost
certainly will
rt111CIA hnofila ririfiniam ni� +he. A T ?ague
meeting,!3 (Page 3)
Sudan: The political situation in the Sudan has been un-
stable for some time. Most rPePntiv nn 2 Ianuary,
there are "vio-
lent differences" in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces--
�r)the top governing body--and predicted cabinet changes and "a
great purge of police and investigations" personnel.
the head of the large and influential
Ansar religious sect intends to threaten a campaign of civil
disobedience in order to press Prime Minister Abboud to carry
out measures for a gradual transition from military to civilian
government. (Page 4)
III. THE WEST
Bolivia: ClItesident Siles has expressed to the US ambas-
sador grave concern over the situation resulting from the
Communist-led seizure last week of Huanuni, a key tin-min-
ing town in central Bolivia. Siles said the way is now open
for Communists to seize the major city of Oruro, 40 miles
away on the railroad to La Paz, and stressed the possibility
of civil war. He also emphasized that disruption of an impor-
tant segment of the tin-mining industry would result in even
greater Bolivian financial difficulties. The American Army
attache characterizes the Huanuni episode as the most daring
exploit of the Bolivian Communist party to date. Siles, who
may be reluctant to cause further bloodshed, is said to ques-
tion whether the army could dislodge the Communist-led
miners' militia controlling the town:
(Page 5) (Map)
29 Jan 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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LATE ITEM
*France-Algeria: Reinforced by assurances of support
from most political parties in France, De Gaulle seems to
be mounting a campaign to isolate the insurgents in Algiers
and to convince the army that he has France solidly behind
him. His transfer of Delegate General Delouvrier and Gen-
eral Challe to a new command post 30 miles from Algiers
has been officially explained as a move to put them "out of
reach of any pressure from the insurgents or any quarter."
riThe move was accompanied by renewed appeals by Delouvrier
and Challe for unity of all elements in Algeria behind De Gaulle.
Meanwhile, the settler insurgents have seized the radio
station in Algiers--a move which may offset in part their fail-
ure to rally significant Moslem support for their cause. Ex-
tremist spokesmen in Algiers have raised the threat of seces-
sion should De Gaulle fail to pledge himself to a "French Al-
geria." (Page 7)
29 Jan 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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nri VIVIN1 U IN1 1 IAA;
yaw' Nuol
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Vietnamese Communist Guerrilla Raid in South Vietnam
ET.he persistent security problem faced by the Diem gov-
ernment in South Vietnam is underscored by a Communist
guerrilla attack this week against a regimental headquarters
near Tay Ninh, about 50 miles northwest of Saigon. The at-
tackers, numbering several hundred, fled toward the nearby
Cambodian frontier after killing more than 30 government
soldiers and seizing considerable amounts of arms and equip-
menfg
Poor security at the command post undoubtedly contrib-
uted c argely to the success of the surprise attack, but its
nature and unprecedented scope suggest growing Communist
aggressiveness in South Vietnam. Communist armed strength
there has long been estimated at about 2,5002 but there are
unconfirmed reports that an additional 12500 men recently in-
filtrated from North Vietnam via Cambodia. While not posing
a direct threat to the Diem regime, an increase in Commu-
nist guerrilla activity would divert the government's attention
from important economic development projects now begin-
ning to take shap!3
ECin learning of the attack, President Diem reportedly sent
an urgent appeal to the Cambodian Government for help in head-
ing off the fleeing dissidents. The implications of this attack
for both countries could have a beneficial effect on the informal
discussions of joint border security measures. Deep distrust
of each other's motives still poses a serious obstacles but there
is already common concern over the Communist insurrection
in neighboring Laos. A temporary arrangement may be reached
aimed at curbing Communist and other dissident bands which
have long acted with relative impunity along the frontiefl
29 Jan 60
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AFGHANISTAN"
Nushka
�1Herat
Shindand
USSR
1.7....USSR ROAD PROJECT
Farah
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USSR to Build Military Airfield for Western Afghanistan
fthe Afghan Government has approved an agreement for
Soviet construction of a military airfield at Shindand, 40
miles from the Iranian border,
The new airfield, like the one just being completed
with Soviet assistance at Bagram, is to be capable of han-
dling most types of jet aircraft. It may be used as an alternate
landing field for civil aircraft using the international airport
being constructed at Kandahar with US assistance. Iran,
which has previously voiced anxiety about Soviet military aid
programs in Afghanistan, is likely to show concern over this
new "Soviet threat" to its northeastern regio_Lnj
he work is probably to be done on a grant basis under
the terms of the technical and economic assistance agreement
signed on 28 May 1959, which also provided for Soviet improve-
ment of the Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Kandahar road. Moscow
announced on 15 December that Soviet technicians were about
to begin the survey for the road project. Improvement of the
Kushka-Shindand section of this road would facilitate construc-
tion of the airfield.')
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Jordan to Propose Plan for Palestine
atecent proposals by Iraqi Premier Qasim and the former
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem for the establishment of a separate
Palestine state have aroused critical comment in Jordan and
have inspired a Jordanian counterproposal. The Jordanian
Government intends to submit a plan for an over-all settle-
ment of the Palestine question to the meeting of the Arab League
foreign ministers in Cairo on 8 February. Although King
Husayn has said details of the plan have yet to be worked out,
he indicated it would involve abandonment of the "Arab legend"
that Israel should be pushed into the sea and would propose a
frontier somewhere between the 1947 UN partition lines and
the present armistice lineD
EIlhe plan reportedly also advocates Arab recognition of
Israel as a "religious state," establishment of Arab-Israeli
trade relations, demobilization of Israel's armed forces,
and suspension of Israeli immigration pending a settlement.
These terms as a whole are unlikely to be acceptable either
to the other Arab states or to Israel, and since the plan would
reverse Arab attitudes toward Israel, it is bound to evoke hos-
tile criticism at the Arab League meeting. Husayn neverthe-
less hopes the plan can be framed in a manner which will fore-
stall charges that Jordan is a traitor to the Arab cause. Jor-
dan's position will be kept secret until the conference,]
The Jordanians probably feel compelled to take some
counteraction in view of the direct threat to Jordanian sover-
eignty posed by proposals for a separate Palestine state and
army. Jordan's West Bank (of the Jordan River), formerly
part of Palestine, was annexed by King Abdullah in 1950, and
roughly two thirds of Jordan's population of over 1,500,000 are
Palestinians, of whom about half are refugees. Jordan's annex-
ation of Palestinian territory has not been recognized by the
Arab League and has even been criticized as a traitorous act.
King Abdullah was assassinated in 1951, apparently because of
his moderate attitude toward Israel and his secret contacts with
the Israelis in an effort to achieve a settlement.
29 Jan 60
OU aeurec Ivo furoner vaaseributt&t,lun.i.
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Growing Political Instability in the Sudan'
serious dissension persists in the Sudan's seven-man
Supre e Council of the Armed Forces�the top governing
body. Maj. Gen. Hasan Bashir Nasir, acting deputy com-
mander in chief, is at odds with Maj. Gen. Talaat Farid,
who is minister of information and labor, and Brig. Ahmad
Mahjub Bahari, who is minister of interior and local govern-
ment. Bashir Nasir's pressure for a further purge of the
officer corps has, moreover, provoked opposition from sev-
eral of the army's regional commanderCt
-J
There have been several reports of impending cabinet
changes; Interior Minister Bahari is one of those who may
be displaced. The prediction in the UAR report of a "great
purge of police and investigations" personnel is not, how-
ever, supported by other sources.
For months, several political leaders including Siddiq
al-Mandi, head of the large and influential Ansar religious
sect, have been urging Prime Minister Abboud to begin a
gradual transition from military to civilian government.
Abboud appointed a committee headed by the Sudanese chief
justice to study this problem and is considering its recom-
mendations.
The Mandi, who has long aspired to become president,
has clearly become impatient with this delay. Implementa-
tion of his reported threat to launch a campaign of civil dis-
obedience could create a serious situation; even if only a
small part of the Ansar sect's 1,5002000 members partici-
pated, they might well be joined by other disaffected polit-
ical elements, including adherents of ooth the National
Unionist and the Communist parties.
29 Jan 60
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411114
28 JANUARY 1960
UNCLASSIFIED
mn es 200
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III. THE WEST
The Bolivian Situation
tpommunist-led miners have taken control of the key
mining town of Huanuni, which prior to the armed clash of
23 January served as a progovernrnent barrier separating
8,000 Communist-led miners in Catavi from the cities of
Oruro and La Paz. President Siles has expressed to the US
ambassador his grave concern over the situation, stressing
the possibility of civil war. He noted that control of Oruro,
a junction of railroads serving the tin mines, would permit
the Communists virtual control of the nation's economy.
Minerals make up 90 percent of Bolivian exports.]
4iles emphasized the effect this would have on the coun-
try's already difficult financial situation, and requested US
good offices with the International Monetary Fund, where a
Bolivian request for aid is pending
Eklles is seeking to convince former President Paz Estens-
soro, right-wing leader Walter Guevara, and left-wing leader Juan
Lechin that they are playing into the Communists' hands by
their bitter rivalry over the government party's impending
presidential and congressional nominations. Paz and Guevara
have gone to the Cochabamba valley in central Bolivia to
pacify the opposing right- and left-wing units of rural militia
which were recently mobilized in response to the Huanuni ep-
isode. Fighting began near Cochabamba on 25 January, and
initial reports claim ten to thirteen dead-.7
Liles, who flew to Huanuni on 23 January to stop the fight-
ing there, said he was surprised to encounter "500 disciplined
militia, superbly led by Communists." The workers militia
was the main force in 1952 in the MNR's defeat of the ruling
military junta and the armed forces. Since then, government
control has often depended on a precarious balance betweea)
29 Jan 60
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Ehe right and left wings of the party, each backed by workers'
militia units which are still armed. In the present situation
Siles is reported to have questioned whether the army would
be able to dislodge the Catavi miners from Huanuni without
exposing La Paz itself to attack�I
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LATE ITEM
The French-Algerian Situation
De Gaulle appears to be mounting a campaign to isolate the
settler insurgents in Algiers and to impress the army there
that France is solidly behind him. Police action on the night
of 27 January against rightist extremist leaders in France was
probably the first step in this campaign. De Gaulle, in his state-
ment before the Council of State on 28 January, said he was re-
solved to "shoulder his responsibilities" and, "whatever happens,"
to maintain the "legitimate institutions and the functioning of the
state."
Reports of the special cabinet meeting on 27 January sug-
gest at De Gaulle has abandoned any intention to order the
army to use force against the insurgents and may move to mix
some conciliation with firmness in his major sneech scheduled
for 29 January.
De Gaulle told tne cabinet that perhaps he should have been more
explicit in his 16 September speech announcing his self-determi-
nation policy for Algeria, and perhaps should have stated at the
time that he expected a "French" solution`q
Most political parties in France have indicated their support
for De Gaulle in his contest with rightist extremists. Liocialist
party leaders and non-Communist labor union leaders, however,
have expressed fears that if the threat of antigovernment violence
grows, they may be forced into joint action with the Communist
party :1 The Communists, anxious to break out of their long-stand-
ing political isolation, have already called for rigorous action by
the government against the insurgents, and for all "Socialists,
Communists, and Democrats" to unite in the "defense of democ-
racy."
Paris' transfer of Delegate General Delouvrier and General
Challe to a new command post about 30 miles from Algiers has
been explained by a government spokesman as a move to put them
"out of reach of any pressure from the insurgents or any quarter
whatsoever." � There is also speculation this move may be intended
to lay the groundwork for a possible future withholding of supplies
from an insurgent-dominated Algiers without penalizing the army
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at the same time. The command post shift was accompanied by
renewed appeals by Delouvrier and Challe to the insurgents, the
army, and the Moslems to unite behind De Gaulle.
The Algiers insurgents' seizure of the local radio station
provides them with a means of coordinating extremist activity out-
side Algiers, and is a tactical success which may offset somewhat
the failure of their attempts to rally significant Moslem support
for a "French Algeria." Efforts throughout 28 January to stimu-
late demonstrations of Moslem support for the extremists were
conspicuously unsuccessful, and there are indications that most
Algerian Moslems support De Gaulle's self-determination pro-
gram.
The number of extremists barricaded in downtown Algiers
reached about 6,000 on 28 January� and the American consulate
general characterized the atmosphere as one of "fanaticism and
despair." Both extremist and French Army attitudes will prob-
ably be influenced!, recent manifestations of support for De
Gaulle in France. Extremist spokesmen, however, have raised
the threat of secession should De Gaulle fail to pledge himself to
a "French AlgeriD
29 Jan 60
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�11- 1.,CLUT ,IAL
Nero "tiW
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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