CAMBODIA AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS - 1968/01/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02962544
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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Noe Its,/ TonSecrir
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
�
Intelligence Memorandum
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CAMBODIA AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
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29 January 1968
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 January 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists
A Monthly Report
Contents
I. Military Developments: Communist battal-
ion and regimental size units continue to operate in
Cambodian territory (Paras. 1-5). It is clear that
North Vietnamese forces have had bases in the Cam-
bodian salient since mid-1965 (Paras. 6-8). The
salient, however, has never been one of the major
Communist base areas in Cambodia (Paras. 9-12). A
Cambodian reports Communist units in
South Vietnam are receiving Chinese arms and ammuni-
tion from Cambodian stocks (Paras. 13-16). More
reports have been received on Cambodian rice sales
to the Communists (Paras. 17-20). Cambodian smug-
glers are supplying explosive chemicals to the Viet
Cong (Para. 21).
II. Political Developments: Sihanouk, con-
cerned over possible allied action against Communists
in Cambodia for sanctuary, has reverted to diplomacy
to settle the crisis (Paras. 22-27). Sihanouk has
again attempted to get a satisfactory border declara-
tion from the US (Para. 28). Cambodia, still believ-
ing the Communists will prevail in South Vietnam,
sees short-term advantages to an opening to the West
(Para. 29).
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research,
the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine
Services.
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CAMBODIA
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I. Military Developments
1. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong battalion
and regimental size units continue to operate in Cam-
bodian territory, although the absence of protracted
heavy fighting in border areas since the Dak To battle
in late November has taken some of the heat out of
the sanctuary problem.
2. In recent weeks, however, the Communists
have made frequent use of Cambodian territory along
the southern portion of the border, where they gen-
erally act with more restraint than in the isolated
and sparsely populated areas of the northeast. In
early January, for example, at least one element of
the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), the
Viet Cong's highest command headquarters, was located
in Cambodia's Kompong Chan Province. The element
probably moved across the border in reaction to Op-
eration YELLOWSTONE, a US ground sweep in adjacent
Tay Ninh Province. COSVN made a similar evasive
move into Camobida early last year during the course
of Operation JUNCTION CITY.
3. Furthermore, elements of the headquarters
and elements of all three regiments of the Viet Cong
9th Infantry Division were located in Cambodia at
various times during January. One regiment, the
271st, moved out of Tay Ninh during Operation YELLOW-
STONE, and some of its elements found sanctuary in
Cambodia. A Viet Cong rallier has told interrogators
that one battalion of the Viet Cong's 271st Regiment
as well as the regiment's headquarters withdrew into
Cambodia following an attack on 1 January on a nearby
US position. The rallier stated that the 271st's
other two battalions remained in South Vietnam, al-
though close to the border. By 23 January, the 271st
Regiment had moved back across the border into Phuoc
Long Province, but headquarters elements of the divi-
siorIs other two regiments moved just over the border
into Cambodia from positions along the border in Binh
Long Province. The movement of regular battalion-
sized Communist units into this area of Cambodia,where
the enemy has never demonstrated the kind of open
disregard for the border it has shown farther north,
is by no means unprecedented but is far from
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ordinary. At any rate, the 271st's stay in Cam-
bodia appears to have been temporary.
4. There is no evidence, moreover, that the
activities of these regiments foreshadow an in-
creased reliance on Cambodian territory, or that
the enemy is becoming insensitive to the necessity
for keeping their activites in this populated area
of Cambodia as discreet as possible. On the con-
trary, a number of captured documents reveal that
Viet Cong units in this area were only recently
warned about "difficulties" at the Cambodian bor-
der and were instructed to comply strictly with
"regulations" if they were forced to evacuate
across the border.
5. Farther north, major North Vietnamese
regiments continue to be located in the tri-border
area. By late January, headquarters elements of
the B-3 Front and the 32nd North Vietnam Army.
(HVA) Regiment were located in the Cambodian salient
east of the US base at Dak To. The 66th NVA Regi-
ment, which along with the 32nd Regiment moved
through Cambodian territory on its way to Dak To,
was located well to the north in Laotian territory.
North Vietnamese Activity in the Salient
6. It is clear that North Vietnamese forces
began to move into the tri-border area in force as
early as mid-1965. Aerial photography began to pick
up signs that the North Vietnamese were establishing
bases throughout the tri-border area and in the Cam-
bodian salient. Although the evidence was something
less than dramatic--North Vietnamese "bases" and
"bivouac areas" usually consisting of grass huts dis-
persed under the trees--it was evident that the bases
were linked by improved trails to the Laotian infil-
tration complex, that tribal villages in the area
were being abandoned, that Vietnamese-type "row-crop"
agriculture was appearing, and that there was no
evidence of a Cambodian presence in the area. The
picture, in sum, provided an incomplete, but nonethe-
less persuasive, account of the North Vietnamese
presence.
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7. The photographic evidence was verified by
statements of North Vietnamese prisoners who were
captured in South Vietnam in 1966. They described
a system of trails and way stations used by infil-
trating North Vietnamese units which hopscotched
down South Vietnam's border with Laos and Cambodia.
They told interrogators that a few of the way sta-
tions where they rested and received rice and other
foodstuffs were located in the Cambodian salient.
8. It also became clear that, during late
1965, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong began
to make provisions for feeding the infiltrating
combat troops and the substantial number of workers,
engineers, and coolies who were engaged in expanding
and improving the road net in the Laotian panhandle.
In late 1965, they apparently concluded a semioffi-
cial rice agreement with Phnom Penh, and in early
1966 they built Route 110 in southern Laos to con-
nect the Cambodian transport system with the tri-bor-
der area. The road linked up with the southernmost
extension of the Laotian infiltration net, enabling
the Communists to move rice by truck up the system
to their bases in Laos and eventually onward into
South Vietnam. In November 1967 they extended the
route a short distance into the Cambodian salient.
The Role of the Salient in the Dak To Battle
9. Although the North Vietnamese have used the
Cambodian salient for at least two years, it has never
been one of the major Communist base areas in Cam-
bodia. Prior to October 1967, when the deployment
of regimental units in conjunction with the impend-
ing attack against Dak To was under way, we were not
able to establish the continuing presence of any
regimental-size North Vietnamese units in the salient.
Small reconnaissance teams began running operations
into the area in June For the most part, they found
nothing surprising, although they were able to verify
that there was Communist activity and presence in the
area. In establishing that most of the base camps
and bivouac areas identified in photography had not
been in use for extended periods of time, however,
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the reconnaissance teams did substantiate our assump-
tion that the salient was hardly a hotbed of North
Vietnamese activity.
10. In October 1967,
the north-
ern movement into the salient of elements of the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) B-3 Front Headquarters: of the
1st NVA Division Headquarters and of headquarters
elements of two subordinate 1st Division regiments,
the 32nd and the 66th. The regiments and the 1st Div-
ision headquarters soon moved into the Dak To area
of South Vietnam, about 20 miles east of the salient.
During the Dak To battle, two elements of the B-3
Front Headquarters remained within Cambodia, appar-
ently directing the fight, while other entities de-
ployed to the vicinity of Dak To. As the fighting
tapered off, Communist units began to move back to-
ward the border, but of the five North Vietnamese
regiments which participated in the Dak To action,
only the 32nd took sanctuary in Cambodia. The others
evaded contact by moving north in South Vietnamese
territory or went directly into Laos.
11. Although it is clear that the sanctuary
provided by the Cambodian salient played an impor-
tant part in Communist planning prior to and during
the battle of Dak To, the importance of the salient
to the Communist effort should not be overemphasized.
Except that the Communists have so far been free from
air attack in the salient, there is no great differ-
ence for them, at least in this area, between sanc-
tuary in Cambodia or in Laos, or even in South Viet-
nam. The Communists did not, for example, seek to
withdraw their forces entirely from South Vietnam
after the attack, suggesting that sanctuary from
bombing is not critical for them.
12. The over-all picture that emerges from our
ground reconnaissance teams, and from the unfolding
of the Dak To battle is that the entire tri-border
area is a Communist base area, and that Communists
can still find sanctuary on the South Vietnamese and
Laotian sides of the border. The Communists prob-
ably believe that the Cambodian sanctuary will not
become critical to their war effort until sufficient
US ground forces are put in the highlands to drive
them out of South Vietnam.
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Supply Activities
13. A Cambodian has reported that
Vietnamese Communist units in South Vietnam's Pleiku
Province are receiving Chinese arms and ammunition
from Cambodian stocks.
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14. He was told
that a Phnom Penh truck-
ing firm picks up the arms either at Sihanoukville or
at a Cambodian military base near Phnom Penh. The
trucks travel Route 19 through Ratanakiri Province
to the border where the Viet Cong take over and drive
them to an unloading point inside South Vietnam.
the trucks carry foodstuffs and medicines
in addition to arms.
15. \
/ The Cambodian Government has admitted selling
food to the Communists and the border area described
is known to have been used for delivery. The ship-
ments may have consisted
mostly of foodstuffs. In addition, Cambodian military
officials have long been suspected of selling small
quantities of arms to the Communists and it may have
been this illegal activity
16. Moreover, there are a number of inconsis-
tencies
, for example, that the trucks carried up
to 15 tons, but Cambodia is not known to have any
trucks canable of carrying such a load. In addition,
I the trucks moved across the border
on Route 19 is not
I the road becomes unmotorable sev-
eral miles before the border.
Rice Traffic
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18.
Cambodia was
shipping
Viet Cong.
cooperative,
trucking
border.
smugglers.
20,000 metric
tons of rice annually to the
the government's agricultural
OROC,
companies
buys the rice and hires private
to ship it to the South Vietnamese
OROC's involvement
dates from 1965
when it took over from local
SONEXIM, the
government's
in 1967
Viet Cong.
National
Phnom Penh
import-
for the sale
export agency, had contracted
of 16,000 tons of rice to the
a representative of the
Liberation
Front signed the contract in
rice was paid for in Hong Kong.
the
19.
OROC has the
primary authority for purchasing rice from Cambodian
growers while SONEXIM is responsible for deliveries
to foreign recipients. Thus, both agencies may be
involved in the same sales.
20. Although the Cambodian Government admits
that it sells rice to the Communists for economic
reasons, it has never released figures on the trade.
Communists Smuggled Chemicals Via New Route
21.
the Viet Cong are receiving at least six
tons of explosive chemicals a month through Cambodia.
potassium chlorate, of
either Japanese or Chinese Communist origin, was being
smuggled from Singapore in fishing junks, which un-
loaded their cargo at several points along the Cam-
bodian coast. From there, local Cambodian smugglers
delivered the contraband by truck to Vietnamese Com-
munist units at the South Vietnamese border. The
Communists now reportedly rely on this source for potas-
sium chlorate because shipments from Thailand, one of
their previous sources, were adulterated beyond use.
If true, the report suggests a way in which the Com-
munists could move arms and ammunition clandestinely
through Cambodia avoiding Sihanoukville and other
ports on the Gulf of Siam. (See map)
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II. Political Developments
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22. In the face of what he considered mount-
ing indications that allied forces might soon con-
duct operations against Communist units using Cam-
bodia for sanctuary, Chief of State Sihanouk has
reverted to his diplomatic skills to take some of
the heat out of the crisis.
23. Sihanouk viewed with growing alarm the
crescendo of US press reports last November concern-
ing Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodian territory.
His concern over the gravity of the situation was
probably heightened in early December when the US
sent a firm note to Phnom Penh with an accompanying
dossier documenting Communist violations of Cam-
bodia's neutrality. Cambodia's erratic response
to the US note--a flat rejection in an official note
on 20 December, followed by a conciliatory state-
ment to the Washington Post a few days later--does
not conceal the fact he was orchestrating his steps
carefully, taking pains to keep Phnom Penh's offi-
cial line intact while conceding just enough to
forestall any imminent move across Cambodia's bor-
ders. At any rate, the fact that almost three
weeks passed between Washington's note and Siha-
nouk's first reaction to it, should help lay to
rest assertions that Sihanouk's policies are de-
termined by his impetuosity.
24. Sihanouk was clearly pleased with both
the cordial atmosphere and the outcome of his dis-
cussions in Phnom Penh with Ambassador Bowles, Presi-
dent Johnson's special envoy. The Prince's public
statements portraying the talks as an important
victory for Cambodia backstop his boat that his
diplomatic skills would keep the war from spreading
to Cambodia and are, therefore, in part designed
for his domestic audience. But Sihanouk apparently
also believes that the talks not only served their
primary purpose of forestalling any immediate move
by allied forces across the Cambodian border, but
also provided some important political advantages for
Phnom Penh.
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25. Sihanouk moved with alacrity, for example,
to tie the US publicly to a renunciation of the "hot
pursuit" concept, and he quickly condemned Washing-
ton's effort to set the record straight as double-
dealing. Sihanouk also indicated that he would not
hesitate to exploit statements in the joint commu-
nique following the talks that the US has no "inten-
tion to violate Cambodian territory" and will do
"everything possible" to avoid "acts of aggression,"
if the US takes action against Communist troops in
Cambodia. He has, therefore, without specifically
disavowing them, now largely blunted the impact of
his earlier public statements that Cambodia would
not oppose US military activities in certain "iso-
lated" border areas.
26. Sihanouk's concessions to the US, at least
as far as the public record goes, do not appear to
depart significantly from his previously established
positions. Cambodia has sent a new formal request
to the International Control Commission (ICC) that
its supervisory function in Cambodia be strengthened,
but Phnom Penh has made similar requests in the past,
and Sihanouk is under no illusion about the prospects
for an effective 'ICC in the face of Polish and
Soviet opposition. Sihanouk did go somewhat farther
than he has in the past in admitting that the Com-
munists use Cambodian territory, but he did so only
by implication, and, at any rate, he undoubtedly
viewed this as a small price to pay for the "assur-
ances" he received from Ambassador Bowles.
27. Sihanouk's public statement that Cambodia
would be willing, on the basis of information pro-
vided by the US, to send its troops or the ICC to
areas of suspected Communist activity, does mark a
significant departure from his past refusal to co-
operate directly with the US in any way on the
sanctuary problem. It is not clear whether Sihanouk
will carry through, however, and the joint communi-
que did not include this provision.
28. It seems reasonably clear that Sihanouk
views the Phnom Penh talks as more than a short-
term answer to a pressing problem. His gentle, if
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not subtle, efforts to get a satisfactory border
declaration from the US in return for the re-estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations may not only re-
flect a desire to sign up the only important power
which has not yet declared on the border, but also
a genuine effort to explore the possibility of im-
proving relations with the US.
29. Although Sihanouk apparently has not
changed his estimate that the Communists will ul-
timately prevail in South Vietnam, this does not
obscure the short-term advantages to him of an
opening to the West. His disparaging references
to Hanoi and Peking over the past week indicate
once again that he draws little comfort from their
"support" in meeting Cambodia's principal objec-
tive of keeping the war from its territory.
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