THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02961907
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• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-00475
• Publication Date: February 5, 1968

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The Pueblo Incident
Briefing Materials
for
Am bassador Ball's Co mmittee
Top. Secrei
Top Secret
5 February 196P,
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NORTH KOREAN SEIZURE OF THE
PUEBLO�PLAN OR OPPORTUNITY?
Summary
The seizure of the USS Pueblo by units of the North
Korean navy was almostmrtanly taken as a result of a decision
at the highest levels of the North Korean government. The
evidence does not permit a conclusive finding on when this
decision was made--while the Pueblo was being investigated off
Wonsan or some time prior to her first actual encounter with
the North Korean ships, it seems likely, however, that the
North Koreans had identified .the ship and her mission at least
a day in advance, if not sooner and had made some plans to
deal with her. It is possible that the original intent was
only to harass and drive off the Pueblo; the final decision
to take the ship into Wonsan may have only been taken when
it eventually appeared that US forces were not coming to
assist the Pueblo.
1
the actions of the North Korean
navai vessels indicate a deliberate course of action.
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Following a short period of initial uncertainty, the North
Koreans acted � boldly and did not hesitate to fire warning shots
or to actually board the vessel. At some later points the
North Koreans appeared somewhat uncertain how to proceed or
exactly how their mission could best be performed, but in
general they seemed sure of themselves and prepared to take
whatever action was necessary to achieve their objective.
2. It is less clear, however, how much--if any--
preplanning Was involved in the seizure.
we do not know how far
in advance of the seizure they were actually aware of her
presence, Further, we cannot determine from the material
available when or at what echelon the decision to seize the
Pueblo was made. It does seem that the North Koreans were
fully ready to take such a decision and it is more likely
than not that they were aware of the Pueblo's presence for
at least 24 hours prior to the seizure.
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3. The North Koreans clearly have the capability to
have detected the Pueblo when she reached her station off
the coast on 12 January. They have five coastal radar
stations on the east coast, backed up by a'string of visual
observation posts. The radar have normal ranges of 30-50 nm,
covering the entire coast, and the North Koreans are very
alert to intrusions They could have easily detected the
Pueblo-
-but we do not know whether in fact they did track
her during her voyage. -
4. We also do not know whether, if detected, the Pueblo
was identified. The North Koreans fly air training missions
off the east coast and maintain naval patrols in the area.
Either an aircraft or a naval vessel could have identified
the Pueblo at any time during her voyage.*
5. The first time, however, that the Pueblo knew she
was under surveillance was on 21 January at 10:25 PM EST,
about 24 hours before the seizure. Two fishing trawlers
sighted the Pueblo and approached to within 30 yards. At
this time the Pueblo was located east of Wonsan and was to
sail southeast and then northwest again before. being seized.
(Early on the 20th a subchaser had passed the Pueblo in the
dark, but had shown no obvious interest in her.) It is likely
that the fishing boats reported the Pueblo's presence, at
least as an unidentified, non-North Korean ship, and that the
North Koreans were aware at this time that there was something
worth investigating.
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6. In the radio conversation among the naval units and
the shore station involved in the seizure, the subchaser
which ordered the Pueblo to heave to was quite concerned to
pass her hull number to the other naval vessels involved and
to identify her as a radar and electronics ship. The subchaser
also asked several times for instructions, a decision and
"countermeasures."
we do not know (W(1)
when or at what echelon a decision was made to seize the PuebloPX3)
When the subchaser first encountered the Pueblo, she had acted
decisively to halt her with threats, probably as a result of
*Of course, the North Koreans could have been tipped off
to the Pueblo's presence and mission by the USSR. Whether the
Soviets--with their greater experience and resources--knew the
Pueblo was off North Korea is unknown, but we have no indication
that the Soviets detected the Pueblo.
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orders. By an hour later, the subchaser was announcing a
plan to take the Pueblo into harbor, indicating that a
definite decision had been made.
7. It is likely that a decision to seize the Pueblo
was taken at a very high level in the North Korean armed
forces or government, although there is no direct evidence
to support this supposition. The naval officers afloat and
the controlling shore authority probably would not make such
a decision on their own, especially since the Pueblo had not
actually violated North Korean territorial waters at the
time and no on-the-spot decision was called for.
8. From all the evidence currently available, it is
possible that the North Koreans were unaware of the Pueblo's
presence until the day before the seizure, when she was
sighted by the fishing trawlers. The report which the
trawlers probably made would.have been enough to justify
making plans to deal with the Pueblo and sending a naval.
vessel out on patrol, although it would not necessarily be
enough to warrant giving precise instructions to the
subchaser beyond, for example, ordering her to halt the
Pueblo while she was identified and a final decision made
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NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA ON
ALLEGED US-ROK NAVAL "INTRUSIONS"
1. North Korean policy toward all vessels in nearby
waters has been uniformly hostile. Ever since the Korean
War Pyongyang's propaganda has used a variety of epithets to
denounce these vessels' activities. In December 1964, for
example, North Korean representatives at the Military
Armistice Commission in Panmunjom accused the "US side" of
engaging in "hostile" and "provocative" acts through the
"dispatch . . . of its naval vessels on a big scale into the
territorial waters of our side along the east coast."
2. The term "spy boats," which has stimulated considerable
press speculation since the Pueblo's capture, is merely the
latest variant and has been in use for over two months. Charges
have recurred again and again in contexts that clearly indicate
Pyongyang equates the "US side" and "US imperialists" with
South Koreans. (For examples during the two weeks before
seizure of the Pueblo see annex.)
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3. Since both US and South Korean government ships
traditionally make it a point to steer 'clear of North Korean
waters, Pyongyang's main target has been privately owned South
Korean fishing vessels which follow the fish northward during
certain seasons and do not observe Pyongyang's unilateral
seaward extension of the Military Demarcation Line. The South
Korean government sometimes dispatches armed patrol-boat escorts
to try to keep these vessels from straying into Pyongyang-claimed
waters; one of these was sunk in January 1967. It is to the
escorts that Pyongyang is clearly referring in its use of the
term "spy boats,"
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4. Pyongyang's actual treatment of captured :fishing-
vessel crews shows clearly that it does not consider them spies,
although a few recent crews--to lend credibility to the "spy
boats" 'charge�have been forced to "confess" to such activities
before returning home Most captured crews are taken on a
"Cook's Tour" of North Korea, wined and dined, shown propaganda
films, given new clothing, and sent back home,
5.
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Annex
On 8 January Pyongyang radio charged that "the US imperialist
aggressor troops, who had lately been engaged in ceaseless
provocations on the east coast, infil-prated many armed boats
mingled with fishing boats, under the escort of armed warships,
into the coastal waters of our side off the east coast on 6 January
and perpetrated provocative acts. . . , The provocations of
the US imperialist aggressors are becoming ever more frequent
and growing in scope as the days go by."
Minju Choson, the second-ranking newspaper, on 9 January
also referred to the 6 January "infiltrating" of "many armed
boats" and commented that "the US imperialist aggressors have
all along been engaged in provocative, hostile acts and lately
have gone so far as to unhesitatingly perpetrate the vicious.
criminal act of infiltrating into the coastal waters of our
side boats carrying espionage and subversive elements, mingled
with fishing boats of South Korea."
On 11 January Pyongyang radio accused "US imperialist
aggressor troops of dispatching hundreds of fishing boats and
spy boats into the coastal Waters of our side."
At a Military Armistice Commission meeting on 20 January, com-
mented on by the Pyongyang's International Service the same day,
it was charged that "In the period from 23 December last year
to 20 January this year, the US imperialist aggressors openly
perpetrated the provocative- act of infiltrating a total of over
5,400 South Korean fishing boats and armed spy boats on 24
occasions into the coastal waters of our side along the eastern.
coast," North Korean Maj. Gen, Pak Chung-kuk demanded that the
"enemy side take immediate measures for stopping the hostile.
acts of infiltrating fishing boats including armed vessels and
spy boats into the coastal waters of our side,"
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North Korea's Military Estalis
General
1. North Korea's military forces total 373,000.
These force levels have been maintained at levels
up to 4 percent of the population despite North
Korea's chronic manpower shortage. They are a ma-
jor limiting factor on contingency mobilization
plans and economic development plans. All North
horenmilitary units are being maintained at full
authorized strength levels, and there is no known
eal,al,ility for immediate, expansion of these forces
except hv audmentation with, personnel of the coun-
tiv's paramilitary forces, and mobilization of its
limited reserves.
2. North Korea is dependent upon Soviet arma-
ment and equipment, although Communist China provides
some limited aid., to maintain and increase its in-
ventory of sophIsticated weapons. North Korea over
the years has developed the capability for production
of Soviet small arms in limited types and quantities,
and can now produce copies of Soviet individual and
crew served weapons up to the 120-mm. mortar, as
well as ammunition for these weapons and motor ve-
hicles including tank parts. There are also indica-
tions that the North Koreans have begun native'dehla
and pioduction or new types Of naval patrol craft.
Communications equipment factories in North Korea
.can fabricate the simpler electronics necessary for
its modern weapons inventory.
The Army
3. The North Korean Army is an effective, mod-
ern, well-1)aianced, rigidly disciplined force of
345,000 men ondanized into 19 active infantry divi-
sions, a tank division, and rive infantry brigades
which are considered division equivalents. They
are al.od vdLii 430 tanks and 450 assault guns, and
some 3,500 aitiflery pieces above 75-mm., includirvj
about 1,400 120-mm. and 160-tim. mortars considered
as artillely by the North Koleans. Its current pri-
mary mission is defense of the Korean peninsula and
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tie coastal areas from the DMZ northward to the bor-
ders of Communist China and the Soviet Far East.
Its combat effectiveness is considered to be good.
4. During 1966.the army underwent a major re-
organization, in which the corps headquarters con-
cept was eliminated, and five army groups were created.
The development of this force structure, which is
similar to the Soviet Army group concept, permits
personnel savings in the elimination of unnecessary
headquarters units. It also gives greater flexibility
of command since each army group is now capable of
executing independent tactical missions.
5. The army has been re-equipping itself with
more modern Soviet arms in recent years. Firepower
has been increased in all army units but particularly
in the infantry corps where antitank battalions have
been added as organic units and separate rocket.com-
panies have been attached to the infantry regiment,
thus improving its artillery capability. The addi-
tion of 85-mm. AA guns has increased the efficiency
and firepower of the AAA batteries. Recent organiza-
tional changes in the howitzer and mortar units have
reduced total strengths but have increased weapons
inventories in individual battalions. Airborne
training has received greater attention and a para-
chute battalion has been organized. The North Ko-
rean Army poses a formidable threat which necessi-
tates continued heavy US support to the South Ko-
rean military forces.
The --Air Force
6. The North Korean Air Force is a self-con-
tained, highly proficient, well-manned, and well-
equipped small tactical jet air force of 18,400
personnel and 650 .aircraft. It is organized into
five fighter divisions, two independent bomber regi-
ments, an air transport battalion, a Civil Air Bu-
reau, and an air school. Its forces are stationed
on 14 of the 15 active airfields in North Korea.
The aircraft inventory comprises 67 to 69 supersonic
fighers in the MIG-21/MIG-19 class, 62 MIG-17 all-
weaLher fighters, 258 MIG-15/17 daytime fighters, 80
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IL-2P, jet light bombers, two IL-18 and two AN-24
turhocrop transports, one IL-14, and 12 IL-2 trans-
ports, 12 MI-4 helicopters, 34 YAK-18 trainers,
26 AN-2s, and six miscellaneous aircraft.
7. The primary mission of the North Korean
Air Force is to provide air defense for the main-
land and for coastal waters, support ground forces,
and conduct bombing missions. It is a modern air
force capable of fulfilling its assigned missions,
of defending against hostile intruders, and having
a limited ability to launch attacks against South
Korea.
8. The North Korean air defense posture has
been improved with the activation of more SAM sites,
bringing current North Korean inventories to 14 SAM.
sites in two clusters around the industrial-military
complexes on the east and west coasts. The acquisi-
tion of Soviet radar for the improvement of its
early warning ground control intercept and height
finding capability enhances North Korean intercep-
tion capabilities.
9. The majority of the equipment used by the
air force is of Soviet origin, and much of the tech-
nical training for this force has been provided in
Soviet technical training centers. Communist China
still provides some limited support in the provision
of less sophisticated equipment; it is believed that
China is presently in the process of transferring up
to 39 AN-2 )ropeller driven transports to North Ko-
rea.
10. The North Korean Air Force began current
modernization training in 1965. It has concentrated
on extensive mobility exercises, the development of
intercept techniques against intruding--notably US
reconnaissance--aircraft off the coasts of North Ko-
rea, and more recently the firing of air-to-air mis-
siles. Air units have thus reached a high degree of
combat effectiveness in their fighter forces. While
the North Korean Air Force is essentially targeted
for defense, with adequate outside logistical sup-
port it would be possible for it to engage in offen-
sive operations with little difficulty.
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The Navy
11. The North Korean Navy is a small defensive
force closely integrated into the over-all defense
structure. It has two major fleets: one assigned to
the defense of the east coast, and one assigned to
the west coast. There are approximately 10,200 per-
sonnel manning 200 vessels including four -"W"-class
submarines, eight Komar guided-missile patrol boats,
two Shershen-class PTFs, two or more modified So-
viet Artillerist-class submarine chasers, 39 units
of the Soviet P-2, P-4, PL-6 class motor-torpedo
boats, two Soviet SO-1 class submarine chasers, 13
YUK-TO and Soviet 1O-1 class.motor-boat submarine
chasers, seven K-48 and Chicom Swatow-class motor
gunboats, three Chicom modified Shanghai-class fast
torpedo boats, and approximately 128 miscellaneous
units including minesweepers, amphibious warfare
craft and service vessels. The North Korean Navy
operates from four main bases and eight subsidiary
stations about equally divided on the two coasts.
12; The navy in the past year has begun a mod-
ernization program of its minor combat patrol units
previously received from the USSR and Communist
China, and it has
begun an ambitious program for the production of
native designed new patrol types. The four "W"-Class
submarines were first noted in 1963 when the first
units were received from the Soviet Union, while the
Kor,ars were first noted in 1965 with an additional
four identified in 1967.
13. Although. the North Korean Navy is essen-
tially a defensive force, some of the boats in the
North Korean inventory have limited antisubmarine
warfare capability. It appears, however, that a
lack of adequate training by the "W"-class submarines
limits these units as an effective force. Finally,
the North Korean Navy is not a deep water navy, and
its operations are limited to coastal operations.
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COMPARATIVE ORDERS OF BATTLE FOR NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
"::ry Forces
Army
Marines
US Forces
Navy
Submarines
3uided-Missi1e Boats
PTF boats
Destroyers
Old flubchasers
Torpedo boats
Patrol boats
Motor Gunboats
Motor Boats, subchaser
Minesweepers
Amphibious
Miscellaneous
Air
Total Jet Fighters
Modern Fighters
Older Fighters
Bombers (Jet Light
Bombers)
North Korea
345,000 men
19 Infantry Divisions
1 Tank Division
5 Infantry Brigades
(Division equiva-
lents)
10,000 men
4 W-class
8 KOMAR-class
2 Shershen-class
(latest Soviet
PTF-class)
2
39
4
13
6
(over) 100
18,500 men
South Korea
534,000 men
(plus 50,000
men in South
Vietnam)
31,000 men
48,000 (2 In-
fantry Divi-
sions)
18,000 men
4
32
11
133
(approx) 9D
25,500 men
(approx) 500
*
246
27
MIG-21
57
F-5 A/P
7
34
MIG-19
u/i supersonic
62
MIG-17
30
F-86D
358
MIG-15/17
105
F-86F
80
IL-28
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Comment: South Korean ground forces are superior
in size and probably are about equal in
training, morale, and equipment to North
Korean force. The South Korean Air Force
is heavily outnumbered and hampered by
inadequate aircraft control and warning
radar system. North Korean Navy is better
equipped, but unlikely to play a major role.
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