CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02942513
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02282
• Publication Date: March 15, 1974

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Central Intelligence Bulletin
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308
March 15, 1974
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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues
of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior
government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and
Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department
of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency and enclosed with brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and
preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information
and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further
dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a
need-to-know basis.
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Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome, They may be directed to
the CIB Panel Secretary,
March 15, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Armed forces Chief of Staff Games and his
deputy, General Spinola,dismissed. (Page 1)
IRAN: Tehran opts for lower peak production in order
to stretch out oil reserves. (Page 2)
ISRAEL: Missile patrol boats sent to Red Sea. (Page 9)
USSR: Soviets uncharacteristically disclose fate of
latest Mars space probes. (Page 13)
SOUTH AMERICA: Chilean President seeks to counter
alleged aggressive designs of Peru. (Page 16)
UGANDA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Prague follows Moscow's lead
and reinstates military deliveries to Uganda. (Page 18)
JAPAN: Overseas borrowing by Japanese firms will ex-
pand rapidly over next several months. (Page 19)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 21)
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4:PORTUGAL: The Portuguese Government yesterday
dismissed armed forces Chief of Staff Costa Gomes
and General Spinola, his deputy. The action is a
victory for right-wing forces who oppose Spinola's
advocacy of greater autonomy for Portugal's overseas
territories.
The dismissals are certain to send further shock
waves through the Portuguese hierarchy, which includes
many Spinola supporters. Probably in anticipation
of this, the government announced that it would par-
tially reimpose the state of alert that confined
troops to barracks for four days this week.
The discharges may also cause rumblings in the
overseas territories. Most civilian and military
leaders will be relieved that Spinola's ideas about
self-determination have been rejected.
Early indications are that Costa Gomes will be
replaced by General Joaquim Luz Cunha, a rightist
who has commanded Por
1972.
NO replacement for Spinola
nas been announced so far.
Over the last week the government quietly posted
Spinola sympathizers in the military as far away from
Lisbon as possible. This dispersal of Spinola sup-
porters is probably continuing. The US Consulate in
the Azores yesterday reported a rumor that 48 more
officers would soon arrive in the islands. Some
junior officers, who presumably supported a change
in overseas policy, were transferred to the
earlier in the week.
Mar 15, 1974
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
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IRAN: Iran apparently is planning to slow the
rate of increase of its petroleum production in
order to stretch out its oil reserves. Tehran plans
to build several refineries and petrochemical plants
and probably wants to ensure that sufficient domestic
oil will be available for the projects.
The National Iranian Oil Company has instructed
the consortium of Western oil companies to prepare
a new production plan. Iranian Oil Company offi-
cials have asked company representatives to calculate
the new program conservatively, on the basis of known
reserves only, and to plan peak production at a level
that can be sustained for at least eight years.
According to a plan published last June, the
consortium had expected to raise production from the
current rate of 5.7 million barrels per day to a
peak of 7.6 million b/d by the end of 1976 and to
sustain that level until 1985, when it would begin
dropping. Recent company estimates of reserves
have been more pessimistic, however, and Iranian
production is now expected to begin declining more
quickly. Although the new plan probably will not
affect production this year, an oil company official
believes the program could lead to a new consortium
peak production goal as low as 6.5 million b/d.
The timing of the Shah's decision presumably
is related to the rapid price increases in recent
months that will yield the government more revenues
in the next three to five years than can be ab-
sorbed effectively by the economy. The decision
probably also reflects the Shah's belief that oil
prices are not likely to decline substantially
over the next five or ten years.
Such a slowdown in the growth of Iranian pro-
duction would further enhance the key role to be
played by Saudi Arabia over the next several years.
The Saudis are capable of increasing production to
offset the Iranian shortfall, if King Faysal so
desires.
Mar 15, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
To30 1--SECIET
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The Shah is currently revamping his economic
development plan, which runs from 1973 to 1978, and
he is apparently concerned that rapidly expanding
oil revenues could have a hyperinflationary impact
on the economy. He may be trying to hold down the
expansion of spending because of the strain on
existing capacity and the consequent upward pressure
on prices.
Mar 15, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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ISRAEL: The Israelis, in a long-planned move,
are sending their two largest operational missile
Patrol boats to the Red Sea.
the boats have now reached South
Africa on their 12,000-mile voyage to Sharm ash
Shaykh, on the southern tip of the Sinai.
The boats are the first units of an Israeli-
designed variant of the French Saar-class missile
patrol boat. The Israeli version is larger, how-
ever, and is capable of extended operations at sea.
It also is more heavily armed, carrying both guns
and six to eight Gabriel anti-ship missiles.
Tel Aviv's plans to send these missile boats
to the Red Sea have been known since at least early
1972. At that time, Israeli naval officials stated
that six boats then under construction were being
specifically equipped for operations in the hot
climate of the Red Sea. The other four boats are
scheduled to be completed by the end of this year.
During the October war, Egypt deployed two
destroyers in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, effectively
deterring the passage of Israeli ships into the Red
Sea. Israel at that time had no naval units or
available aircraft capable of challenging this force,
but the movement of the missile boats to the area
will enable Israel to contest any future attempt
to sever Israeli sea routes.
Mar 15, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
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TOrscLECT
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Mars 6 fails prior to landing
Mars 6
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USSR: The Soviets have been unusually frank
in disclosing the fate of their latest series of
Mars space probes. Mars 6, the last of four probes
to reach Mars, passed the planet on March 12 and
released an instrument capsule in an attempt to ob-
tain data and TV pictures from the planet's surface.
The capsule transmitted data during its descent but,
according to an announcement by Tass yesterday,
radio contact broke off just before it reached the
surface.
Three days earlier, Mars 7 passed by the planet
and also attempted to land an instrument capsule.
The Soviets state that a malfunction occurred, how-
ever, and the capsule did not descend to the surface
but flew by the planet.
Last month, Mars 4 and 5 arrived and were in-
tended to orbit the planet, but Tass admitted that
only Mars 5 went �into orbit. These spacecraft were
to photograph Mars and relay data back to earth from
instrument capsules released to the surface of the
planet by Mars 6 and 7.
The Tass announcements are probably true, but
they are terse and do not provide any details con-
cerning the nature of the failures by the Mars
probes.
In the past, Moscow has rarely admitted fail-
ures of any sort in the Soviet space program. For
example, when the Soviets failed to eject a space
probe from earth orbit on a course for Mars or
Venus, they covered the failure with a short announce-
ment that another Cosmos satellite was in orbit
around the earth performing its assigned tasks.
In recent years, however, Soviet scientists
have become more willing to discuss such failures
at international conferences. The government news
service may now be following suit.
Mar 15, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SOUTH AMERICA: Chilean junta President Pinochet
will seek a stronger Brazilian commitment for assist-
ance in countering the alleged aggressive designs
of Peru when he meets with President Geisel tomorrow.
Pinochet, in Brasilia for Geisel's inauguration, re-
portedly will ask for Brazilian aid in acquiring
weapons from third countries hesitant about selling
to the junta, as well as for more Materiel from Bra-
zil itself.
Peru's purchase of Soviet tanks and acceptance
of Soviet training personnel have heightened Chilean
concern over traditional Peruvian revanchism.
Pinochet reportedly will try to convince Geisel that
Cuba and the USSR plan to use Peru as the new "bridge
for Marxism" in the hemisphere, with the ultimate
goal of isolating Brazil.
Geisel, who probably has a more objective per-
spective on the issue of "Marxist penetration,"
is unlikely to buy all of Pinochet's thesis. Brazil
does, however, want the Chilean junta to succeed and
will continue to provide economic aid
Bolivian President Banzer is also attending the
Geisel inauguration, and Brazilian officials have
helped arrange an informal meeting between the Chil-
ean and Bolivian leaders. This is in line with Bra-
zil's interest in helping the junta patch up Chile's
quarrel with Bolivia. Such a rapprochement would be
important to Chile in the event of a confrontation
with Peru.
Both Pinochet and Banzer have said publicly
that they are willing to discuss issues of common
concern. Bolivian claims to territory conquered
by Chile in the War of the Pacific in the last
century have been a source of friction ever since.
Diplomatic ties have been suspended for over a
decade because of a dispute over Chile's diversion
of a river that flows through both countries.
(continued)
Mar 15, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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The Geisel administration would find an improve-
ment in Bolivian-Chilean relations attractive on
several counts. Brazil basically wants to see both
military regimes strengthened. Even partial recon-
ciliation would earn Brazil prestige as an interna-
tional arbiter, and the fact that the two presidents
are meeting on Brazilian soil will help. Finally, a
possible Chilean concession to Bolivia on access
to the sea might involve internationalization of a
port in northern Chile, a development that Brazil
might view as an opportunity for economic gain and
increased influence in general. Chile is anxious
to attract foreign investment to its northern bor-
der region, and the junta probably believes that a
Brazilian economic stake in the area would helP
discourage Peruvian incursions.
Mar 15, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 17
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UGANDA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA:
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following
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Prague is
military deliveries
Moscow's lead in reinstating
Uganda.
After a hiatus of several
years, Soviet
last November when
artillery, tanks, and
military shipments began again
armored personnel carriers,
fighter aircraft were delivered.
Between 1965 and 1970, Prague and Moscow pro-
vided Uganda with a total of $13 million worth of
military equipment. Following the coup that brought
President Amin to power three years ago, however,
relations became strained, the military aid program
was discontinued, and all Soviet and most Czech mil-
itary technicians were withdrawn. Relations began
to improve in late 1972 when Amin announced his
ho e that Soviet military aid would resume. Some
Soviet and Czech military technicians are now in
Uganda, and Ugandan military personnel are
training in the USSR and Czechoslovakia.
Resumption of military deliveries by Moscow
and Prague reflects a bid for influence with the
Amin regime, whose relations with London, Washing-
ton, and Tel Aviv are deteriorating. Amin has had
to turn to Communist countries for military aid,
because Western countries are reluctant to provide
it.
Kenya and Tanzania do not trust the mercurial
Ugandan leader. Their uneasiness will increase as
Uganda acquires more arms, although Amin apparently
is not planning any military action.
Mar 15, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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