NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02931643
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01647
• Publication Date: October 12, 1974

Approved for Release: 2018/08/22 CO2931643
The
National Intelligence
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only
/2(4
1-151er-SECTFET
Copy No. 169
(b)(3)
SATURDAY OCTOBER 12, 1974
VOLUME I, NUMBER 233
TCS 668/74
NR Record
-TOP-SEC.FLEI (b)(3)
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TOP-S-Ee-RS-T�_
2 SATURDAY OCTOBER 12, 1974
TCS 668/74 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
NR
Record
An Assessment of the Prospects for Guerrilla Warfare on Cyprus
Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders con-
tinue to talk of beginning a guerrilla cam-
paign if a reasonable settlement is not
reached with the Turks. The prospects for
such a campaign are examined in the
folio wing article. The Greek Cypriots, out
of frustration, may undertake guerrilla
warfare, but we believe several obstacles
make it unlikely that they could manage a
sustained campaign.
by
There are three major political-military
groups on Cyprus capable of conducting
guerrilla or terrorist operations against
the Turks.
The EOKA-B is a right-wing terrorist
organization dedicated to enosis. This
group can count on the support of rightist
Greek Cypriots, but would not have the
backing of the Clerides government or
of leftists on the island. Moreover,
EOKA-B has been weakened by the
Karamanlis government's formal
repudiation of enosis.
Leftist forces consist of the non-com-
munist EDEK and the communist AKEL
organizations. Both groups probably
would be inclined to go it alone in mount-
ing insurgency operations, in hopes of
stealing a march on their rivals. Although
their participation in a united front
against the Turks cannot be ruled out,
neither of these groups would be likely to
receive support from the EOKA-B or
from mainland Greek officials.
The group best prepared to mount a
prolonged guerrilla campaign against the
Turks is the Greek Cypriot national
guard. The guard sustained heavy losses
in last summer's fighting and its mo-
rale is poor, but it is relatively well
equipped and well disciplined. With sup-
port from Athens, it could serve as the
nucleus of a broad-based guerrilla effort.
Some EOKA-B militia men reportedly
have been already integrated into the
guard.
Cyprus' relatively long distance from
Greece would hinder Greek support for a
guerrilla campaign involving large units.
The 350-mile supply route from Greece is
vulnerable to Turkish interdiction by air
and sea. The island's small size, its prox-
imity to the Turkish mainland, and ab-
solute Turkish superiority in the air would
make it easy for the Turks to blockade
Cyprus.
The division of Cyprus along either the
first or second Attila lines would hamper
Greek abilities to infiltrate guerrillas or
terrorists into Turkish territory. Except
for a wooded area on the northwest coast,
both lines extend through a wide belt of
open, cultivated fields, thus facilitating
Turkish monitoring of personnel
movements.
Resources
The supply of arms, ammunition, and
demolition equipment from many years of
fighting on Cyprus is sufficient to support
sporadic Greek raids and terror cam-
paigns. Although the Greek Cypriot
national guard lost most of its tanks and
much of its artillery in the fighting last
July and August, a few antitank and an-
tiaircraft weapons have been acquired
from Greece.
Ankara is concerned about the
possibility of guerrilla warfare on Cyprus.
Turkey's already overwhelming military
strength on Cyprus has been augmented
by the addition of several battalions of
troops specifically trained for population
control and antiguerrilla operations.
Another advantage for the Turks is the
fact that the population of Turkish-oc-
cupied areas consists mainly of Turkish
Cypriots, who would resist bitterly any
Greek guerrilla activity. Turkish
authorities are maintaining tight controls
over the movement of people throughout
the occupied area. Greek refugees who
have been allowed to return to their
homes have been rigorously screened.
Few male Greek Cypriots of military age
have been permitted to return to their
villages in the north.
Political
The Greek Cypriot factions are badly
divided. An appeal by either rightist or
leftist groups for a united guerrilla cam-
paign is unlikely to win general Greek
Cypriot support. Only the Athens govern-
ment, working through the Greek Cypriot
government and the Greek Cypriot guard,
offers any real hope of uniting the Greek
community behind a course of action.
A guerrilla campaign directed from
Athens would present several dangers for
Greeks and Greek Cypriots:
� A Greek-sponsored insurgency ef-
fort might goad the Turks into seizing
the entire island. Militarily, the Greek
Cypriots could not expect to expel the
Turkish forces or even to prevent
another Turkish advance.
� The Greek islands in the Aegean,
already in a precarious position, would
face increased danger of Turkish at-
tack. A Greek-sponsored guerrilla war
on Cyprus might provide Ankara with
a rationale for seizing such coastal
islands as Limnos and Lesbos, both of
which are in the area of the disputed
Aegean oil concessions.
� Prompted by Ankara, the Turkish
population in Greek Thrace could start
its own sabotage activities.
Outside Support
The Greek Cypriots could expect little
outside support for a guerrilla struggle,
even though international public opinion
would probably be sympathetic .to their
cause. There is limited contact between
EDEK and a few Arab governments, but
the Arab states and the various Palestin-
ian organizations probably would be
reluctant to support the Greeks because of
the risk of offending their fellow Muslims,
the Turks.
Were Greek Cypriots to begin a
guerrilla war, the prospects for a
successful campaign would be poor. It is
unlikely that any of the various groups
capable of conducting such operations
would adequately support one another.
The dangers of Turkish retaliation on
Cyprus or in the Aegean Sea are so great
as to deter unrestrained Greek support.
The geopolitical and demographic situa-
tion on the island, the limited military
resources available to Greek Cypriot
forces, and the overriding threat of
massive Turkish retaliation weigh heavily
against anything other than small-scale
harassment forts against Turkish forces.
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
-rop-ssenat
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Approved for Release: 2018/08/22 CO2931643