CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02929531
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 19, 1953

pproved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929531,
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19 June 1953
Copy No. 57
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.lif
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S la)
ricx-c REVIEW DATP.
AUTH: HR 7O
DATE /2_1i.F.LIREVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Further progress made in Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish defense
planning (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
Comment on Lithuanian party criticism of internal Soviet policy
(page 3).
FAR EAST
Comment on release of North Korean prisoners of war (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
'Chiang reportedly to remove "minimum" number of Nationalist
troops from Burma (rage 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Inflationary trend becoming more acute in Iran (page 5).
6. King's interference in politics causes new crisis in Libya (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. New Soviet gestures predicted in Austria (page 6).
8. Comment on Berlin rintino� (na rya rn
9.
new NATO base
'cum:Ines cpage 8).
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1.
GENERAL
Further progress made in Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish defense planning:
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Greek Foreign Office and military officials
state that the Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish military
talks concluded last week provide a basis for
further progress toward joint defense planning.
Yugoslav representatives were frank and unreserved in revealing spe-
cific weaknesses and strengths of their southern forces, in agreeing to
hold general maneuvers in the south with Greek and Turkish observers
present, and in approving an exchange of visits between commanders.
The Greeks plan to propose shortly that a
permanent joint staff be established.
Comment: These are the first practical
steps toward integrating the defense planning of the three countries.
The results of the meeting also suggest that
the three governments have not yet been diverted by Soviet conciliatory
gestures.
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Lithuanian party criticism of internal Soviet policy:
The recent announcement that the Central
Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party had convened to con-
demn and correct distortions in the application of Soviet nationality
policy supports previous indications that the new regime is repudiating
Stalin's harsh Russification of the many national minorities in the USSR.
The first evidence of such a reversal appeared
in the dramatic Georgian shake-up in April with its charges that officials
had provoked feelings of national enmity and interfered with native
Georgian leaders. More recently the ouster of L. G. Melnikov as first
party secretary in the Ukraine was officially attributed, in part, to his
not using local officials to administer those oblasts acquired from
Poland and Czechoslovakia after World War IL
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Much of the local dissatisfaction in both the
Lithuanian and Ukrainian republics appears to be with the sycophantic
attitude which the centrally appointed collective farm chairmen dis-
played toward everything Great Russian. Furthermore, their over-
zealousness in consolidating the collective farms has caused consider-
able disapproval in Moscow because of ensuing production losses. This
latter point was particularly stressed by Malenkov at the 19th Party
Congress.
FAR EAST
3. Comment on release of North Korean prisoners of war:
The Communists will almost certainly assert
that President Rhee's release of 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist
POW's was taken in collusion with the United Nations Command, under-
mines the basis of the truce talks, and "proves" a lack of good faith.
While they may recess the talks pending assurances against future
releases and will fully exploit the propaganda value in the incident,
it is doubtful that they will break off the talks on this issue.
Rhee has several other possible weapons at
his command, short of independent military operations, to hamper or
block a truce, embarrass the United States, and emphasize South
Korean opposition to an armistice. Measures which he may still adopt
include refusal to sign an armistice, refusal to remove South Korean
troops from the demilitarized zone, withdrawal from the UN Command,
and employment of force against Indian troops.
While there is a real danger of South Korean
unilateral military action, Rhee will find it more difficult to gain the
army's cooperation for such a move than was the case with the rear
area troops which are under the command of a "political" general
completely loyal to the president.
Whether Rhee will make any further unilateral
moves probably depends on the reactions which follow the prisoner
release. In addition to his efforts to undermine the truce, Rhee ap-
parently hopes to secure major concessions from the United States
without making commitments. Any success he might have could change
the widespread indecision in South Korea to support.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Chiang reportedly to remove "minimum" number of Nationalist 3.3(h)(2)
troops from Burma:
Chiang
tcai-stiek several days ago instructed the
Nationalist premier and General Li Mi to go
ahead with negotiations to evacuate some of
Li's forces from Burma but to keep the number of evacuees to an
"absolute minimum."
Chiang's order in
effect overruled the premier's decision to follow the advice of the
Nationalist delegate to the United Nations, who had warned of the
grave consequences of noncooperation.
Comment: It has been uncertain whether
Taipei's recent hints at cooperation in the evacuation effort have
represented a genuine intent. Chiang's reported decision is con-
sistent with frequent statements by Nationalist spokesmen that
Taipei cannot be blamed for failing to effect the withdrawal of more
than one or two thousand of Li's 12,000 followers.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Inflationary trend becoming more acute in Iran:
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Iran's economic difficulties are now beginning
to appear in price rises and increasing demands
for higher wages, the US embassy reported on
16 June. Business is no longer counting on an
oil settlement and is now mainly concerned
over the instability of the foreign exchange
rates.
Inventories of foreign goods formerly acquired
a relatively favorable exchange rates have been largely exhausted and
must be replaced at two and one half times the former cost. The Iranian
government appears to be unable to stop the inflationary trend.
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Comment: This report suggests that the
Iranian economy may now be entering a new inflationary phase and
that the government may be unable to carry out its intention of
stabilizing the currency without the aid of oil revenues.
6. King's interference in politics causes new crisis in Libya:
King Idriss' summary dismissal of the
governor of Tripolitania and two members of the provincial council,
during Prime Minister Muntasser's absence in London, has precipi-
tated a new crisis in the growing conflict between the king and his
pro-Western premier.
Muntasser has returned to Tripoli reportedly
determined to resign as a result of Idriss' latest interference in Libyan
politics. Even if Muntasser agrees to remain in office, his efforts to
cooperate with the West will be complicated by the continuing cleavage
between himself and the anti-Western Cyrenaican clique which surrounds
the king.
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. New Soviet gestures predicted in Austria:
Soviet officials wilt
abolish post ana teLegra,ph censorship there
before 1 July and will also grant amnesty to
political prisoners detained in Austria on Soviet authority. These
moves are planned to coincide with the official installation of the new
Soviet ambassador.
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Comment: The release of locally held
prisoners would be in addition to the recently promised release
under the Soviet amnesty law of some of the Austrian prisoners
now in the USSR.
8. Comment on Berlin rioting:
The situation in East Berlin has apparently
been brought under control. Soviet troops continue to back up East
German police, and numerous arrests have reportedly been made.
Public transportation in East Berlin was still disrupted on 18 June,
however, and Soviet zone traffic into the city irregular. Strict
controls over intersector travel have been imposed.
There are numerous unconfirmed reports
of strikes and disturbances in other areas of East Germany, and
martial law has reportedly been extended to some of them.
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The government has obviously been fright-
ened by these events and continues to alternate promises of generous
concessions with threats of severe punishment. It is probable that at
various levels the government has been compelled to relinquish authority
to the Soviet military establishment.
attribute the riots to popu ar suspicion
moves of the East German government
and that demonstrations would be dealt
past.
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tentatively
that the recent conciliatory
were a confession of weakness
with less ruthlessly than in the
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new NATO base facilities:
2)
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Comment: Negotiations for the early deploy-
ment of US forces to these bases began last October. Despite some ob-
jections, the Italian government agreed in principle to NATO use of the
bases after the early June national elections. In view of the present
unsettled political conditions in Italy, however, major policy decision
on NATO bases now appears unlikely before fall.
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