CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/17
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02929529
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 17, 1953
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Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15671790].pdf | 198.3 KB |
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SECU INFORMATION
17 June 1953
Copy No. 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
fi DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTH: HR 701,
DATI24t REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SE
FORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
ZBritain prepared to discuss Formosa and Chinese UN representation
in Korean conference (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Soviet plans to expand consumer goods production
(page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
\dEr."French views on settlement of Indochina war reported (page 4).
4. Letourneau may recommend withdrawal of French troops from
Cambodia (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
IX/American officials in Berlin expect no major Soviet concessions
(page 5).
6. Imminent retirement of Portuguese premier Salazar reported
(page 6).
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GENERAL
1. Britain prepared to discuss Formosa and Chinese UN representation
in Korean conference:
United Nations negotiators in any Korean
postarmistice political conference should
consider discussing Chinese Communist UN
representation and the disposition of Formosa,
according to a British Foreign Office draft paper. These issues would
be discussed, however, only after substantial progress toward a politi-
cal settlement in Korea.
The Foreign Office would be unwilling to dis-
cuss Indochina and Southeast Asia generally until the foregoing issues
had been disposed of. It expects protracted negotiations on the Korean
settlement, and believes that other problems will receive little serious
consideration for many months.
Comment: The Foreign Office apparently
now considers that the situation in the Far East will permit greater
latitude for negotiations. Previously it held that a general area
settlement could be achieved only through step-by-step negotiations
on individual problems.
Australian minister of external affairs Casey
has told the American ambassador in Canberra that Australia would,
at this stage, not vote for Communist China's admission to the United
Nations if the subject were to come up.
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Soviet plans to expand consumer goods production:
Pravda's announcement on 11 June that the
Soviet Union had adopted "special measures" to exceed the original
1953 plan for production of consumer goods was preceded by specific
orders implementing this policy.
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3.3(h
Such increases, which can be accomplished
without significant cutbacks in production of armaments and major
industrial commodities, should provide an incentive for labor to raise
Its productivity.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. French views on settlement of Indochina war reported:
(2)
3.3(h)(2
Comment: France has long hoped for some
general Far Eastern settlement to solve the Indochina problem. The
French have also hoped to defeat the Viet Minh by inducing the Chinese
Communists to cut off aid to Indochina, and to this end may press the
United States to accept Communist China as a UN member.
The Peiping regime can be expected to main-
tain a common front with the Viet Minh in any negotiations with the
French. It would almost certainly not cut off aid to the Viet Minh in
exchange for French support for its admittance to the United Nations.
TOPS
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4. Letourneau may recommend withdrawal of French troops from Cambodia:
Minister for the Associated States Letourneau3.3(h)(2)
told Ambassador Dillon that he would advise
his successor to withdraw all French forces
from Cambodia if it were impossible to con-
tinue negotiations with any duly authorized representative of the Cam-
bodian people.
The French were taken completely by surprise
at the king's flight in view of their belief that he in general accepted the
terms of the agreement Letourneau had discussed with him on 23 May.
Comment: France will probably continue
efforts to discredit the king until a new French government permits
formulation of a more definite policy.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. American officials in Berlin expect no major Soviet concessions:
3
The tentative conclusion of American officialL3(h)(2) �
in Berlin is that the present changes in East
Germany are not indicative of Soviet willing-
ness at this time to make serious concessions
to the West on German unity.
The new tactics emphasize Soviet realization
of the need for slowing the tempo and aggressiveness of socialization
in order to stem the exodus of refugees and to counter the popular feel-
ing of insecurity and discontent which was undermining Soviet objectives.
The officials point out that the East German government says nothing
about cutting down the armed forces and does not reverse the basic
socialization program, but only criticizes the methods and speed of
carrying it out.
The changes, it is believed, were timed for
the greatest possible external propaganda effect, particularly in influ-
encing West German elections and in appearing to meet some basic
Western conditions for four-power talks.
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Comment: West German Social Democratic
leaders reportedly now bWaTtr-Cat the Soviet Union is prepared to
sacrifice its position in East Germany and will agree to unification in
the hope of extending its influence through all of Germany. Chancellor
Adenauer, on the other hand, takes a more realistic view and has
voiced strong suspicion of Soviet intentions.
6. Imminent retirement of Portuguese premier Salazar reported:
3.3(
The most likely candidate for prime minister
is said to be Luis Esteves Fernandes, present Portuguese ambassador
to Washington.
)(2)
Comment: Reliable reports have indicated
previously that Salazar, is seriously concerned 3.3(h)(2)
with the problem of his successor. Esteves Fernandes is not usually
mentioned as a possible candidate.
Salazar's voluntary retirement would probably
not affect Portugal's internal stability or relations with NATO and the
United States.
The interim role of Santos Costa would seem
unlikely except in the event of serious intra-governmental disagreement
on the choice of Salazar's successor.
T E.eT
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