CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02929526
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 12, 1953

Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
/ .i, IPA TOP S RET 7
SECU INFORMATION
4
_e#0.,:;i
040,0 12 June 1953 +...�)
of 3.5(c)
Copy No. 6 7
ro/;)
ey
0 � ' �"#4
ef '
r/ rj
7 2 /
11"
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 4
DECLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT NO.
/
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4.'4
/4 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS $73,01
NEXT 1. IE VW D, FL
� 7
/I AUTH: HA 70-Ahr
D ATE �1�41P _!1.. REVIEWER 1 3.(
5c)
14:�� ,
#� � */; 5
41/
� /'7#�
4
0 Office of Current Intelligence
/ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY /
0
.0
$ 3.5.(c),
I,
4/
7
SEC
TOP S RET
INFORMATION 1 1 "074/0.014
7
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
,-Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
'Jr or. L. I
SEQRITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Vietnamese representative in Paris details demands for new
French-Vietnamese agreement (page 3).
2. French decisions in Indochina linked to security of Thailand
and Malaya (page 3).
3, Philippine Chinese population altering anti-Communist position
(page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on closure by India of its legation in Portugal (page 4).
NEAR EAST AFRICA
5. Britain feels Egyptians should make first move to resume defense
talks (page 5).
6. Libya's need for financial assistance becoming acute (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on "de-socialization" measures in East Germany
(page 6).
An(4 Afa1c..6,
* * * *
2
T e t
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
Nu,
SECRITY INFORMATION
rApproved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
I__,.1 L;i.
3.5(c)
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Vietnamese representative in Paris details demands for new French-
Vietnamese agreement:
The Vietnamese high commissioner in Paris
has commented to an American embassy
official that the French-Vietnamese accords
must be renegotiated. He stated that the
judiciary agreements and those regulating economic relations between
France and the three Associated States are not acceptable to any of
the states and must be changed. The high commissioner pointed out,
however, that his government would not unilaterally denounce the
agreements.
Comment: The 3 July meeting of the High
Council of the French Union, which will be attended by the three
Indochinese prime ministers, will present an opportunity for a joint
presentation of demands by the Associated States. Vietnam will
probably concentrate on ending French controls over state banking
and foreign exchange.
2. French decisions in Indochina linked to security of Thailand and
Malaya:
3.3(h)(2)
Commissioner General Malcolm MacDonald) 3.3(h)(2)
speaking before the British Defense Coordi-
nating Committee in Singapore, stated that the
fate of Indochina depends largely on the French
government's willingness to reinforce its
garrison in Laos and to issue a political declaration granting greater
autonomy to the Associated States. He believes that the United States
and Britain should try jointly to persuade the French to take these
steps.
- 3 -
TOP ET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
T 1pproyed for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
LAVE.
CURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
If positive action is not taken in Indochina,
MacDonald anticipates increased Communist pressure on Thailand,
possibly resulting in a new government there which would seek an
understanding with the Viet Minh. This would jeopardize Malaya's
security, as Thailand could be used as a base for fifth column
penetration.
3. Philippine Chinese population altering anti-Communist position:
The Philippine Chinese community's support 3.3(h)(2)
for the Formosa regime has been substantially
reduced during recent weeks,
Anti-Communist
leaders in the community have adopted a middle-of-the-road policy;
they fear that after a Korean truce the Philippines and the United
States may recognize Peiping, which would then find means to re-
taliate for their past anti-Communist efforts.
Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party
apparatus in the Philippines is exploiting a belief, already fairly
widespread among the Chinese, that Peiping can offer them more
protection from venal Philippine officials than the ineffective Nation-
alist embassy has afforded.
Comment: Such a trend among the Chinese
in the Philippines can also be expected among the large and influential
Overseas Chinese communities in the other Southeast Asian countries.
Any development that can be construed as a victory for Communist
China weakens anti-Communist sentiment.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on closure by India of its legation in Portugal:
India's decision to close its legation in Lisbon
on 11 June apparently acknowledges its failure to obtain control by
diplomatic means of Goa, Damao, and Diu, three small Portuguese
enclaves in South Asia.
- 4 -
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
,Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
.������"" SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
India is now lait with the choice of attempt-
ing to eliminate Portuguese possessions on the subcontinent by
military conquest, economic pressure, or subversion. Since the
first alternative is unlikely, and the latter two have not been markedly
successful in the past, India probably will fail to achieve its aims
in the near future. Nationalistic pride will demand, however, that
it continue to apply pressure on Portugal.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Britain feels Egyptians should make first move to resume defense
talks:
Prime Minister Churchill feels strongly that
the next move in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute
should be made by the Egyptians. According
to the American embassy, London thinks
that further improvement in the Egyptian
attitude is necessary before the prospects
for successful negotiations can be considered
good.
The Foreign Office has twice answered
requests of the Egyptian ambassador in London for new British
proposals by telling him that Cairo would do well to give thought to
the proposals already advanced. London considers that there has
been too little constructive thinking in Cairo on this subject.
Ambassador Caffrey on 10 June described
as "wishful thinking again" the hope of the British embassy in Cairo
that Egyptian officials will suggest a resumption of talks when General
Robertson returns to Cairo on 17 June,
5
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
�Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
*�.., I Ur tkr,
UR1TY INFORMA liON
3.5(c)
6. Libya's need for financial assistance becoming acute:
American minister Villard in Tripoli be-
lieves Libya's need for financial assistance
will become acute before there is any
possibility of its ratifying the American
base agreement.
Villard also reports that Libyans "deeply
resent� the US air force's use of Wheelus Field without payment
pending ratification of the agreement.
Comment: The Libyan government has
requested an immediate advante of $1,000,000 for the American use
of Wheelus Field. It has also progressively raised the annual pay-
ment from the originally propcised $500,000 to $1,000,000 and now
indicates that $2,000,000 yearly is the minimum that is acceptable.
In addition, Libya has stated that the draft agreement must be re-
negotiated before it can be ratified.
The United States has made no payment for
the use of Wheelus Field since Libyan independence in December
1951, but is currently considering advancing Libya $500,000.
The reported offer by Egypt to supply all
of Libya's financial requirements would make American negotiations
with Libya more difficult.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on "de-socialization" measures in East Germany:
The decisions taken by the Socialist Unity
Party's politburo on 9 June represent an important and possibly
basic modification of the rapid socialization program in East Germany.
6
TOP ET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
_Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526
wo 1 Ul"
RITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
The promises to shift productive capacity
to consumer goods, to support private entrepreneurs, and to at-
tenuate the internal security program are in obvious conflict with
other recent measuresfuch as the increase in workers' norms
decreed only last week.
In any case, the regime and its Soviet
supervisors are engaged in an effort to soften aspects of the pre-
vious program responsible for popular unrest within East Germany
and for West German suspicion of Soviet intentions. In the latter
respect, the Soviet Union may hope that moderation in East Germany
will preclude the necessity of major concessions, such as agreeing
to free all-German elections, to persuade the West to participate
in four-power talks on Germany.
The sudden modification of previous policies
is certain to increase speculation as to the present status of Deputy
Premier Walter Ulbricht and other East German Communists who
have been associated with the "tough" policy. Ulbricht has long
been regarded as one of Moscow's most trusted lieutenants, how-
ever, and his position in the party hierarchy still appears strong.
7
CRET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929526