CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02929522
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 7, 1953

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECURI NFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1, British Foreign Office analyzes Soviet declaration to Turkey
(page 3).
FAR EAST
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. South Korean official states UN has no authority to negotiate
truce (page 3).
� SOUTHEAST ASIA
� Indonesian National Party willing to form coalition government
vevetth extreme left (page 4).
Chinese Nationalists reportedly prepared to attack Burmese
forces (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
te43ritish Foreign Office wants to delay resumption of Anglo-
Egyptian talks (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. British minister sees East-West talks as cold-war maneuver
page 6).
Commonwealth prime ministers concur on Soviet talks and
Far Eastern issues (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. British Foreign Office analyzes Soviet declaration to Turkey:
The Soviet aide memoire to Turkey on 31
May may be the first application in Europe
of the "new look" in Soviet foreign policy,
according to the British Foreign Office.
points ou a e may be renouncing its unobtainable claims
In an attempt to obtain some kind of nonaggression pact, with a limi-
tation imposed on Turkey with respect to bases and troops for NATO.
The Foreign Office considers it less likely that the USSR hopes to
obtain at this time an alteration in the status of the Dardanelles.
Early Soviet publication of the note would
suggest to the Foreign Office that it was intended only as another
profession of Soviet "peaceful intent."
Comment: There are indications that a
more conciliatory Soviet policy will be: applied also to Greece and
Yugoslavia, the other two signatories of the Balkan pact, in an
attempt to prevent the further development of Western bases on
Orbit frontiers.
FAR EAST
2. South Korean official states UN has no authority to negotiate truce:
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Comment: Since the proposed armistice
agreement is essentially between the opposing military forces, South
Korea apparently would be legally bound by it so long as its forces
remain under the UN Command. Rhee's present public position, how-
ever, is that Korea would not be bound by any cease-fire agreement
allowing Chinese forces to remain in Korea.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Indonesian National Party willing to form coalition government with
extreme left: �
The National Party, the second largest in
Indonesia, has stated that it is prepared to
cooperate with either the extreme right
or the extreme left in forming a new cab-
inet. Most observers believe that a coalition of the Nationalists
and the conservative Masjumi, the largest party, is necessary to
create a government.
3.
3(h)(2)
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The American embassy in Djakarta comments
that the Nationalists have drifted into closer cooperation with the Indo-
nesian Communist Party and other leftist parties. It adds that this
trend constitutes an important victory in the Communist effort to form
a Communist-dominated front for the forthcoming elections.
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Comment: In the past, President Sukarno
has acted to prevent the inclusion of Communists in the Indonesian
cabinet. As a result of increasing Nationalist collaboration with the
Communists, however, any cabinet based on a Nationalist-/Vlasjumi
coalition would probably be subject to extreme leftist influence.
4. Chinese Nationalists reportedly prepared to attack Burmese forces:
Chinese Nationalists in northeast Burma
have reinforced their troops near the city
of Kengtung and plan to capture it, if the
Bangkok negotiations for evacuation break down or if the Burmese
army continues to advance on Mong Hsat, The Nationalists are
alAo reported to have surrounded a Burmese unit west of Kengtung
which they threaten to annihilate if the Burmese make any further
moves against them.
Comment: A Chinese Nationalist attack
on Kentung would probably en7M1 a possibility of evacuation, and
the United States would bear the burden of the blame in Burmese
eyes.
The work of the evacuation committee has
been stalled by the failure of the Nationalists to accept its proposals
for a settlement. The committee is now in recess since the Chinese
and Burmese representatives have returned to their respective capi-
tals for consultation.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. British Foreign Office wants to delay resumption of Anglo-Egyptian
talks:
British Foreign Office opinion currently
favors letting Egypt worry for a while
longer about British intentions in the
Anglo-Egyptian crisis. Working-level
officials believe that Egypt will become amenable to advice "at
the proper time."
The Foreign Office seems aware, how-
ever, that the Egyptians may resort to force if this tactic is pur-
sued too long. Accordingly, these officials feel that if the situation
shows signs of getting out of control, Britain and the United States
should do anything possible to help Nagib.
Comment: Working-level opinion, which
was largely responsible for Foreign Secretary Eden's conciliatory
Sudan policy last winter, accords in this case with Prime Minister
Churchill's generally stiff attitude toward Egypt.
Nagib is
anxious to resume the discussions, although he has not attered his
basic position. Should the domestic situation in Egypt get out of
control, it may be impossible either to save Nagib or to obtain any
agreement granting even minimum Western defense needs in the
Suez area.
WESTERN EUROPE
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6. British minister sees East-West talks as cold-war maneuver:
Selwyn Lloyd, British minister of state for 3.3(h)(2)
foreign affairs, told an American embassy
official on 2 June that he personally thought
that a four-power meeting, which Churchill
wtllgaoawould not explore specific issues, but would
emphasize to the rest of the free world the correctness of Western
policies.
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He stated that the British understand the cold
war better than Americans, and that Washington has overemphasized
the importance of impressing the Kremlin and domestic opinion in
the United States by an attitude of toughness.
Lloyd suggested that if there were a Korean
truce by the time of the Bermuda conference, this conference might
discuss a subsequent five-power meeting including Communist China.
7. Commonwealth prime ministers concur on Soviet talks and Far Eastern
issues:
At the Commonwealth prime ministers' meet3.3(h)(2)
on 3 June, the other seven national leaders
unanimously endorsed Prime Minister
Churchill's stand that efforts to arrange a
four-power meeting should be made in the closest possible harmony
with the United States.
With regard to Korea, the prime ministers on
4 June generally agreed that the political conference which is expected
to follow a prospective armistice should be confined as far as possible
to Korean issues.
The Commonwealth leaders criticized French
moves in Indochina as "most inept" and generally agreed that the
Commonwealth should support any Thai request for a UN peace ob-
servation commission to deter a Viet Minh invasion of Thailand.
Comment: Churchill's primary aim was
evidently to ensure the support Of the Commonwealth leaders for his
effort to bring about East-West talks. Having obtained this support,
he was apparently willing to accept positions on Korea and Southeast
Asia which are not fully in accord with London's policies.
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