CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02929517
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 2, 1953

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DATE
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECUR NFORMATION
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RITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Burmese explain rubber shipment to China (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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Mossadeq states he is no longer interested in settling oil dispute
(page 3).
3. Jordan reportedly encouraging terrorist action against Israel
(page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Comment on Czech monetary reform (page 4).
5. Czechoslovakia rejects radio frequencies allocated by international
aviation organization (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. French and German officials speculate on anticipated Soviet proposal
on Germany (page 6).
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Burmese explain rubber shipment to China:
In reply to an American protest against a
planned second shipment of rubber to Com-
munist China, the Burmese foreign minister
H informed the American ambassador that the
shipment had been authorized because it had been contracted for prior
to the institution of a licensing control system. He said that denial of
the licenses would cause undue hardship to the firms involved.
The minister emphasized that henceforth it
would be his government's policy to comply with the UN resolution
concerning the shipment of strategic goods to China and that there
definitely would be no more licenses issued for the export of rubber
to the Chinese Communists.
Comment: Influential Burmese officials with
a financial interest in the trading firms involved may have influenced
the decision to permit the rubber shipments. This factor will be of
continuing importance in Burma's policy on the export licensing of
rubber.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Mossadeq states he is no longer interested in settling oil dispute:
3.3(h)(2)
Prime Minister Mossadeq told Ambassador
Henderson just prior to the latter's departure
on 31 May that he is no longer interested in
settling the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. He said
that in view of the British attitude, it would be impossible to find a solu-
tion acceptable to the Iranian people.
Mossadeq insisted that he must know as soon
as possible whether Iran could expect financial assistance from the
United States in the absence of an oil settlement. He warned that if
aid were refused, his government would fall and be followed by a
Communist-dominated oneo
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Comment: It has become increasingly apparent
in recent months that a settlement of the oil issue should not be expected.
The several small oil sales which have been made may be encouraging
the prime minister to believe that Iran will eventually be able to market
its oil without the necessity of settling with Britain.
In the past year Mossadeq has used the threat
of communism several times in an attempt to get American financial aid.
3. Jordan reportedly encouraging terrorist action against Israel:
3.3(h)(2)
The Jordanian government is supplying arms to
Arab terrorist groups and encouraging raids on
Israeli border settlements in retaliation for
recent attacks, 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: This is the first report that Jordan
is encouraging armed raids into Israel. Terrorist activity, now reported
from both sides, would keep popular emotions inflamed, with the attendant
danger of more serious flare-ups.
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Comment on Czech monetary reform:
The drastic monetary reform announced by the
Czechoslovak government on 30 May reduces personal savings by over
80 percent and, through a preferential currency exchange rate, will be
used as a weapon against "kulaks," private employers and speculators.
The same decree abolishes rationing and establishes a new uniform price
index in some cases several times higher than previous prices for
rationed goods.
Although wages in the new currency are also
increased, the reform will have the net effect of considerably reducing
the workers' real income. The elimination of excess purchasing power
is aimed at increasing labor productivity by forcing the worker to rely
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solely on his current income. The reform will have no effect on
foreign trade, however, since the Czech crown is not used as an
international currency.
The fact that the government felt secure
enough to undertake such a measure despite the disquieting effect
it will have on the population is an indication of the effectiveness of
Communist control.
5. Czechoslovakia rejects radio frequencies allocated by international
aviation organization:
Comment: Orbit countries have been
reluctant to adopt new radio frequencies allocated by organs of the
International Telecommunications Union to eliminate confusion in
international radiocommunications. The Czech refusal on the grounds
that the new allocations are discriminatory may foreshadow general
Orbit rejection of new maritime, aviation and broadcast frequency
assignments as they are effected.
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WESTERN EUROPE
6. French and German officials speculate on anticipated Soviet proposal
on Germany:
oth French and German Foreign Ministry
fficials believe that in any new quadripartite
egotiations the Soviet Union would be likely
o propose four-power control over a reunified
ermany. While such a proposal would be un-
cceptable to the Western governments, French
fficials fear that the French populace might
iew the offer favorably.
West German officials declare that the Allied
position is sufficiently strong to permit standing on the terms of the
Allied note on Germany of 23 September. Meanwhile, Chancellor
Adenauer is sending ilerbert Blankenhorn to Washington as his personal
representative to assure President Eisenhower that his government backs
American views on future East-West discussions.
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