REPORT ON O/NE CONSULTANTS' MEETING AT PRINCETON, N.J., ON 7-8 OCTOBER 1954

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02924300
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: October 26, 1954

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFF= OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 October 1954
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 76-54
SUBJECT: Report on 0/NE Consultants' Meeting at Princeton, N. j.,
on 7-8 October 1954
INTRODLOTION
(b)(3)
1. Participating under the c1iairmnhip of ABBOT LAMM were:
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, CALVIN H. HOOVER. WILLIAM
L, LANGER, COL. 0,A, LINCOLN, PHILIP MOSETY, (b)(3)
JOSEPH R. STROM, AID T. cur= YOUNG. 0/NE staff members JAMS GRAHAM
and DONALD HENDERSON attended the meetings on both days; EDWARD C.
HITCHCOCK and JOHN HEIRES attended on the first day; CHESTER L. COOPER,
COL. JOHN CANNON, and ROBERT L. HEWITT on the second days
20 Both sessions on 7 Octobervare devoted to Western Europe,
Various Far Eastern matters were taken up during the morning of 8 October,
and Iran and Afghaniatan were discussed during the afternoon. Three
briefing memoranda which had been previously forwarded to the consultants
served as discussion guides.
3. Before the substantive discussion began the Chairman briplay
reviewed the work accomplished and problems encountered by 0/NE since
the last consultants' meeting in June noting that most of the estimates
produced since then had been made available to then. LANGER replied
that he had read these estimates and considered them of high standard.
He added that in his broad experience of government analyses and
estimates he has not run into anything superior to the intellectual
quality of the NIE product, HOOVER concurred in these comments,
R.c4JMEPt$Q 49%. 7
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CI
DISCUSSION DEOUkSSCED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: Te, S
NExT REvIEW DATE. MO
WESTERN EUROPE
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4. The Chairmen began with the suggestion that the consultants
discuss the outcome of the London Conference in terms of its implications
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for West German policy's the reactions of the USSR, and especially the
problem of Hendes-France� He pointed out that gossip, rumor, and
reporting all combine to produce an aura of suspicion concerning
Mendes' relations with Molotov and with the French Communists.
A. Hendes-France and the USSR
S. LANGER said that it is almsys impossible to be certain about
an individual, but that the Memorandum to the Director concerning
Vendee' character and intentions looked like a good jcih* He recalled
that when Bismark first took over as Chancellor he was alleged to be
the tool of Napoleon III. Slarly, he thought a lot of the rumors
about Hendee-Frame were on the order of gossip. This was a natural
development following Hendee' "board.clearingo decisions, some of which
are not felt to be in the interest of the US. LANCER suggested that
Hendee' decisions have been favorable to France and may turn out to be
favorable to the US, In this connection, LANGER thought that perhaps
EDC wasn't so good after all, at least at this late date, and if so,
Hendee' action in killing it once and for all was an act of statesmanship,
6. STRAYER stated the test of Hendee' position would come in his
follow.up action on the London agreements* any protracted stalling in
reaching agreements on technical issues would be oause for serious
concern. HOOVER agreed with this judgment and pointed out that if
Hendes.France pushed the London agreements to a conclusion, this would
be the strangest evidence that he is not dealing with Molotov,
7* None of the consultants thought that the Geneva accord
necessarily indicated collaboration between Molotov and Nendes-France.
HOOVER expressed the view that the French did not get a good deal at
Geneva from the Comunists. HOSELY felt that the Communists closed out
the war because it was in their interest to do so quite apart from any
effort to make "arrangements" with Hendee-France. LANCER observed that
in any event it is possible the USSR prefers an "independent" leader
in France,
8. With regard to future French relations with the USSR, LANGER
thought we should certainly not ignore the facts of past Russc*French
alliances. A Frenchman does not have to be &Communist to argue that
a new, operative alliance is better than a rearmed Germany from the
French point of view, particularly since many "good" Frenchmen believe
they can deal safely with the USSR, LANCER thought this situation
should be watched very closely* STRAYER commented that such an alliance
would be very difficult to achieve, He felt that the USSR could not
moo both France and Germany at the same time and he thought the evidence
of the recent past indicated the USSR was playing the German card, He
didn't think France would believe in &neutralized Germany with a email
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army they had seen that tried before and he didn't see how else
the German problem could be handled in a Russo..French agreement.
ARMSTRONG felt, however, that the USSR could play on both French and
German vulnerabilities for some time. It could, for example, offer
France a neutralized Germany and a reinsurance treaty. LANGER observed
that almost any Frenchman would rather stand with the US than the USSR,
but the fact remained that a Russo-French alliance was "terribly
serious" business. Responsibility rests with US policy to give France
such alternatives as to insure that France will continue to stand with
the US,
9. Turning back to Mendes-France and his objectives,
observed that Mendes' present emphasis on the need to strengthen France
in order to support an independent fora po1icy was at least con-
sistent with views he had expressed to LJ back in 1943. LAGER
observed that although it is possible Mendes-France will turn out to
be a "crypto-Communist," it would be disastrous for the US to become
irritated or petulant simply. because Mendes takes actions we do not like.
10. The consultants thought the French people probably do not
like the London agreements much more than EMI but probably find them
less irritating. In general, the consultants thought the agreements
could be ratified in France but that the Saar would pose serious
difficulties*
B. West Germany
11, LANGER observed that he had not seen anything recently on the
current strength of the German urge to unification in relation to other
considerations such as the desire to unite with the West and the fear
of the USSR, and thought the time might be coming soon for &re-
evaluation of how the Germans line up on unification. His personal
opinion was that reunification would only become a burning i88128 after
other things were settled* STATER stated that the West Germans feel
keenly about "middle Germanys" but perhaps are no longer so keen about
the region beyond the Oder-Neisse. =ELY countered with the statement
that when the Germans speak of "unification" they still mean the
Germany of 1937. ARMSTRONG said his observations in Germany indicated
that for the present the West Germans are concerned with other problems,
and that although all Germans must pay lip service to the idea of
unification, there is no strong political urge at this time. LANGER
observed that this postponement of strong feeling is natural in
circumstances when nothing effective can be done.
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C. Soviet Policy in Euro)*
12. LANGER and MOSEL!' agreed with the 0/NE position that Soviet
objectives had not changed and that the USSR would almost certainly
not give up its control of East Germany for a unified, neutralized
Gerseny. NOSELY pointed out that a unified Germany would soon seek
the rectification of its eastern frontiers and would pose more problems
to the USSR than a divided and armed at Germany, STRAYER was not
sure that the USSR would look at it quite that way. He thought the
USSR might feel that an armed West Germany would have only one objective
unification and that the USSR might, therefore, prefer a unified
Germany as less friendly to the West and less hostile toward eastern
Europe and the USSR.
13, LINCOLN felt that that from the point of view of the Soviet
General Staff a neutralized Germany might be preferable since such a
development would probably force the withdrawal of US forces from
Europe, permitting the USSR more freedom of mareuver in Europe. Once
the US had withdrawn its forces, the USSR might feel that the risk
of atomic war would deter the US from returning its forces to Europe
to combat Soviet political...military moves. ARMSTRONG said he remained
convinced that blocking West German armament was the principal immediate
Soviet objective in Eirrope. LANGER stated that it was very unlikely
that the Germans, the UK, or the US would accept neutralization and
that any Starlet moves in this direction would be in the nature of
propaganda,
14, LANGER raised the question of the motivation for the present
Soviet emphasie on "peaceful Coexistence', mid MOULT stated that in his
opinion it was simply an intelligent tactical adjustment not possible
during the lifetime of Stalin. He felt Soviet tactics were to split
the west and that Soviet actions could not be -ascribed to any serious
internal problems.
D. Italiy
154; HOOVER wondered if the present gloomy picture was, in facto
much worse than it has been for the past forty years. He thought it
unlikely that anything in the nature of internal reforms could materially
strengthen the government, nor did he think it possible to build up a
strong, right authoritarian regime. LANGER thought it remarkable that
the Situation was not much worse, given the imbalance of people and
resources, The danger in the present situation, in contrast to years
past, was that the Communist Party now provides a Channel for the
expression of endemic discontent. ABV8TRONG thought that Scelba and
Fanfani certainly would d6 as Well as De Gasperi in maintaining stability,
and Should do latomewhat better, ARMSTRONG felt that the situation in
Italy was probably not quite so black as painted in the briefingi
memorandum prepared for the consultants,
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16. STRAYER questioned any assumption that the long range political
trend in all Europe is to the right. He thought that Europe's economic
recovery may make it possible for Europe to "afford" liberal or left
wing governments.
FAR EAST
A. The Offshore Islands
17, Most of the consultants were impressed with Chinese Communist
opportunities for harassing and embarrassing the US over the issue of
the offshore islands. As a result, in LIDOOLNI; words, they generally
"leaned towards" the view that firm Nationalist and US resistance to
Communist probing actions would not preclude actual attempts to seise
some of the islands and that eveTTUS warning of retaliation against
mainland bases might not deter the Communists, STRAYER thought that
seizure of Quemoy would be a black eye for the Chinese Nationalista
and that all countries but the US would Applaud this, ARKSTRONG felt
most people are surprised that the Nationalists still have possession
of some of the islands. LAMER observed that the Chinese Communists
probably wouldn't expect a big flareback aver Quemoy. MOSEL! said that
the Chinese Communists probably believe that if a fight over Quemoy
did develop, the US mould be isolated� He thought that they would
probably regard this attitude of America's allies as preventing over
of the conflict and that the USSR specifically would feel
protected against undue involvement through support of Peiping so
long as US ground troops were not committed.
18. went on to say that Quemoy could confront the US
with a di mma: if we gave full support to the Nationalists, many
would say we were risking war for no good purpose while if we refrained
we would be demonstrating weakness. ARMSTRONG enlarged on the problem
of US prestige, not only in the Far East: we had intervened with the
Seventh Fleet, had then "unleashed', Chiang, and most recently had told
the Natinnelists, who were obviously our clients, to hold off. He
felt there was a real question with the rest of the world about there
the US was going and, after some further discussion, asked what would
happen if we ordered Chialg to quit Quemoy, whether it would be
accepted as a strategic withdrawal rather than as a defeat. LANGER
observed that in such a case Chiang would probably mobilize hie US
friends, and COOPER noted that some of our military have issued state-
ments that some of the offshore islands are strategically and militarily
important,
B. Sino-Soviet Relations
19. In connection with the offshore islands discussion, LANGER
asked whether US intelligence discounted the USSR's influence in the
determination of Cammie policy In the Far East and Inquired about
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what evidence on this question had been forthcoming at Geneva. COOPER
replied that the US and UK delegations at Geneva both felt that in the
last analysis Molotov called the tune, The Chairman added, however,
that there was general agreement in Washington that China was not a
satellite, that conflicting interests do mist, and that recedr"
apparent efforts of the USSR to get an the record with an opinion of
the Geneva settlement before the Chinese Communists did, was an indication
of Soviet comma that the initiative was passing to the latter.
LANGER remarked with satisfaction on the change from the days 'when it
was assumed that the USSR called all the shots; he had always felt that,
as with Austria and Germaey in 1914, Peiping had told Moscow in late
1950 that Chinese intervention in Korea was necessary. He thought
that Peiping was probably now taking the attitude in SinoeSoviet
discussions that the offshore islands question was also one of primary
Chinese concern.
C. Communist Motives at Geneva
20, HOOVER questioned the briefing memorandum's assertion that
consciousness of the magnitude of Conumniet China's internal tasks
was a major factor in the communist decision to reach an armistice
in Indochina, asking whether infect the Communists had given up
anything significant at Geneva. COOPER noted that the Communists had
made concessions on boundaries in the last 24 hours of the conference,
and ASMSTRONG observed that they had given up the opportunity to keep
the US on the hot spot, LAMER, however, remained convinced that
Geneva
the Communist choice was not between two absolutes, that suggested (b
t;eesigning
neva vas a resoundieg victory for Communist ahina. p)
an armistice still left the COMMUnifite with ample opportunities,
felt that this point served to nail down COOPER's contention (b)(3)
that the Communists at Geneva were manifestly anxious to demonstrate
to the world that it was possible to negotiate successfully with them,
that after the inconclusive termination of the Korea phase of the talks
they were particularly desirous of avoiding a breakdown on Indochina,
and that they therefore 'were willing to make lasteminute concessions.
21, During the course of the discussion, MOSELT advanced the
argument that continuation of the fighting would have created additional
problems and eventual dangers for the Communists, LINCOLN, however,
expressed doubt that this would be the case so long as the US vas
unwilling to commit ground troops ea. that air-sea intervention would
probably not have a significant effect. In the end, there appeared
to be general agreement that the desire to secure propaganda objectives,
particalarly in Europe, had been an important motive in the columnist
decision to reach an armistice and that they had not sacrificed very
much in halting their military offensive in Indochina,
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2% The consultants appeared generally favorable to the view that
the abinese Comm/ate would over the next few years avoid heavy military
comitments, though they might lend oome support to Viet Minh-type
mevements as occasion arose. MOSEL!' commented that the Communists
veuld probell,vneme slowly in Indochina until the need for guerrilla
operations in South Vietnam emerged and that they would probably wish
to place on us the responsibility for any delay in Vietnamese elections,
HOOVER noted that successful subversion usutlly requiees accompanying
military moves on the borders and other forms of pressure.
D. Internal Develotement Problem and Over.-all Chinese Communist Polis
23. !AIM queried the characterization of Chinese Communist
problems as "extremely difficult." LINCOLN obeerved, however, that
collectivization of a rice culture raised new problems, and STRAW
added that whereas the Russians plowed back their net gains to further
the industrialization process, the Chinese must pay the USSR for needed
capital goods, The Chairman noted that the problem was not only one of
economic analysis but one of hov much the Chinese Ccezernists were
preoccupied with economic problems,
24. GRAHAM advanced tkel argument that having secured their borders
in Korea and Indochina the Chinese Communists felt that they could now
turn to internal problems -e that vhile they would like to have Tuition
and 'would certainly use the Taiwan issue both internally and externally,
they would not take undue risks to gain control of it. MOSEL!, however,
felt that this analysis understated the importance of Taiwan. He
considered that collectivization mould be a bigger problem for the
regime than it had been in the USSR, that the existence of any kind of
alternate reeiee yould add to the difficulty of getting adequate peasant
particapation and cooperation, and that the Chimes Communists mutt
therefore be considering haw to clean up the Taiwan situation.
E. The Far East Outlook
25, The consultants eepressed general agreement with the thesis
that the Western position in the Far East had become weaker during the
last six =Malt, and that the leaders of Ja,an and India felt the need
to "adjust" to the new situation� asserted that behind all our
specific quaetions about the Far East was one fundamental fact to which
we -- and the Japanese as well must adjust: namely, that China is
becoming a basis for stabilization in the Far East, not under Nationalist
auspices as we had hoped and initially expected, but under the Communists.
MOSETT added that in Japan the right wing might find it easier to make
such an adjustment than the leftists.
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MIDDLE EAST
A. Iran
26. The first portion of the session was taken up with a pree
ponderantly pessimistic report by YOUNG on his recent trip to Irene
He had been skeptical regarding the optimistic reports of the last
several months and had found his skeptiedmIconfirmed, The shorteterm
situation use improved, but longeterm prospects were no better.
Loreover, improvements with respect to political stability and the
economic situation had only been achieved at a price. The old crowd
was beck in power. He believed there was strong and wide-spread
resentment and disillusionment regarding the imposed character of the
regime. Corruption under Zahedi ee a prime offender himself e- was
geremmilly considered the worst in 15 years, He added that even though
this was an exaggeration, the important point vas that most Iranians
were convinced that it was true. He had found deep despair among most
of his Iranian contacts in part a natural response to the recent
emotional jag e- with little or no hope that a workable substitute
for the Zabedi regime could be found, Many of the former supporters
ofiftossadeq considered there was no alternative but the Tudeh.
27. YOUNG was particularly concerned lest the US relax into the
atmosphere of 1947-50 and depend on nahedigs battalions" He felt
that the US should recognize that it is in a crisis situation and
undertake a comprehensive, coordinated program to eltleleate the con-
ditions and attitudes now undermining popular confidence in the regine
and in 'rants future, In this connection, he pointed out that the US
was generally considered responsible for the existence of the present
regime and that the situation could take an antieAmerican turn if the
US failed to support a movement for reform.
28. In response to questions, MUM conceded that the prevailing
psynhologioal atmosphere was not entirely negative. He believed that
many of the most responsible Iranians realise that it is premature to
judge developments until the oil settlement was working well and that,
despite much regret that nossadeq did not close a deal in early 1953
when terms were more favorable, the present oil settlement was generally
accepted. TOUNG still felt, however, that all too few Iranians had
learned anything from their experience with the oil problem and that
lack of confidence in and resentment of the present government e. and
not only among the intellectuals -- was serious, He was convinced that
something must be done to make the government serve the needs and
avpirations of the people better and to give them a greater sense of
freedom and participation.
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29 The The discussion at this point turned to the question of whether
Iranian aspirations for democracy could be recanciled at this stage
with the maintenance of stability, After YOUNG had characterized the
advent of an honest, democratic government capable of maintaining
stability as unlikely, the Chairman asked whether it was too extreme
to suggest that the situation in Iran was insoluble by ordinary
democratic means and that a benevolent dictatorship was required, YOUNG
replied that however nostalgically the Ireniens looked back to the past
they were determined not to have another Reza Shah-type dictatorship�
He felt that the best hope was for a government which 'would enter
partnership with the Shah and US aid to the best reforming purpose�
300 ARMSTRONG then pointed out that it was Zabedi's very success
that made the Shah dislike him: that such a partnership with the Shah
was difficult to maintain, STRAYER wondered whether direct imperial
rule by the Shah with US support might not be the answer. 'YOUNG
expressed the view that the present Shah was "too Iranian', to male such
a solution work ee he could not hold firmly to a course of action and
loved intrigue for its own sake, ARMSTRONG said that in his recent
interview with the Shah the latter appeared to be preoccupied with
obtaining a good arm. through US aid. He said Anther that while
the Shah's prestige in Teheran is high, nuCh of Iran's problems is
rooted in the coentryeside where the shah's influence is not great.
The consultants seemed to agree that neither the Zahedi regime nor the
Shah alone could effect a substantial alleviation of Iran's problems,
but that something might be done after the oil-settlement if the right
men could be found to work with the Shah. ARMSTRONG emphasised the
breadth of US assets in Iran and suggested that if the US could not
succeed there, it could not hope to do so elsewhere in the world.
310 With regard to Soviet policy toward Iran, MWELI gave his
opinion that the Soviets preferred to wait on the sidelines for a
decline in the Shah's prestige and the growth of a reform, movement
among the intellectuals, He thought the Soviets did not with to
Intervene in Iran now, but might perhaps be interested in terms of
5-10 years, He believed that the Soviets gave a low priority not only
to Ira% but to the whole Iliddle East,
32. STRAI.EX questioned whether some form of TIEDO (not necessarily
along present limes), while not having much military value, might not
attach Iranian loyalties, Noma felt that the creation of a defense
organization might focus discontent on the military link with the
West. YOUNG agreed, making the point that Iranians say the US is
intereated only in granting military or economic aid and not in reforms.
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33. The consultants expressed agreement with the briefing
memoraidumos contention that despite increasing Soviet attention to
Afghanistan, the TBSR had no immediate designs on Afghan territory,
MOSEL' thought that the Soviets considered the Middle East area as
=dm US protection, that their interest In Afghanistan was in relation
to US moves there, and that they knew it would be difficult to
administer the country, YOUNG believed that Afghanistan at this tine
was an exception as far as traditional. Soviet policies of penetration
'Jf border territories were concerned, Be thought the Afghan ruling
family would accept Soviet aid offers up to a dangerous point, but
would then clearly halt, STRA/ER said that the Soviets generally
seemed to have succeeded in making the US spread its resources in
countering their initiatives; he wondered whether or not the US
might have a chance to turn the tables on the Soviet in Afghanistan.
LINCOLN thought it could not be done,
ROBERT HEWITT
JANES GRAHAM
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