REACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA TO ALLENDE'S VICTORY IN CHILE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02909582
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02282
• Publication Date: September 17, 1970

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
et
No Forag i mem
Intelligence Memorandum
Reactions in Latin America to Allende's Victory in Chile
Ilterkt
87
17 September 1970
No. 1463/70
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by . an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CROUP
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 September 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Reactions in Latin America to Allende's Victory in Chile
Summary
There seems to be a widespread conviction in
Latin America that Salvador Allende's 36-percent
plurality in the Chilean presidential election is
a political watershed that is likely to have impor-
tant repercussions throughout the hemisphere. Most
governments have refrained from public comment, ap-
parently choosing to await the outcome of the vote
of the Chilean Congress on Allende and runner-up
Jorge Alessandri that is scheduled for 24 October.
They no doubt also want to appraise opinion at home
and to study the reactions of other Latin American
countries and of the US. Cuba is apparently the
only country that has formally congratulated Allende,
but the text of the message has not yet been made
public and Fidel Castro has withheld comment. In
general, political reactions have fallen into three
categories. Orthodox Marxists and radical national-
ists are jubilant over Allende's victory. They be-
lieve that their chances for a larger political role
have been enhanced in many countries. Christian
Democratic and other left-of-center parties are dis-
appointed over the defeat of Radomiro Tomic, Chile's
Christian Democratic candidate, and are worried about
their own political fortunes. Political groups in
the center and on the right are concerned and appre-
hensive; many are hostile. In some countries these
groups probably will counsel harsher treatment of
left-wing opposition. On the extreme right, there
is unmitigated opposition to Allende.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates
and the Deputy Directorate for Plans.
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Initially, the Soviet press has greeted Allende's
victory with enthusiasm, calling the results a "big
success for left-wing forces." The election results
are seen as having "profound significance" as regards
bolstering the independence from the US not only of
Chile but all Latin America. The Director of Moscow's
Latin American Institute told a US Embassy official
on 1 September that the USSR would aid an Allende
administration if the US were to pursue a policy of
"economic isolation" like that toward Cuba. He added
that if the US and Chile continue to have "normal re-
lations," he saw "little prospect of sizable Soviet
aid."
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Reactions From Chile's Neighbors
1. It is likely that the first and some of
the most important effects of Allende's dlection
will be felt by Chile's immediate neighbors--Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, and Peru. Since the 1830s rela-
tions between Chile and both Peru and Bolivia have
been marred by rivalry and hostility. Chile's min-
eral rich northernmost provinces were won from Bo-
livia and Peru as a result of the War of the Pacific
(1879-1883), and the paramount issue still dividing
Chile and Bolivia grows out of La Paz' unyielding
desire to regain access to the Pacific. Argentine-
Chilean relations, likewiSe, have been troubled for
decades by smoldering boundary disputes and military
rivalry and competition. All three of Chile's
neighbors, for different reasons, will be sedulous
observers of Allende and his Popular Unity coali-
tion, though to date the attitude of each has been
cautious.
Peru
2. A high-level US observer in Lima has re-
ported that Allende 's victory "has been generally
well received" and should "give the Peruvian Gov-
ernment renewed determination to pursue its revolu-
tionary program." Moderate generals, however, are
worried about the existence of a Communist state on
Peru's southern border, especially in the light of
the long-standing military rivalries with Chile.
3. Members of the Velasco government thus far
have refrained from public comments on the Chilean
election, but Rear Admiral Vargas Caballero, Peruvian
Minister of Housing, reportedly believes that Allende 's
victory will be "auspicious" for Peru. Those govern-
ment: officials who are strongly committed to the
"revolutionary" programs of the Velasco administration
and to even more rapid reforms probably think that
an Allende government will reinforce Peru's revolution.
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4. More moderate members of the Velasco govern-
ment, however, are probably disturbed by Allende's
success. Prime Minister and Minister of War Montagne
was reported on 4 September to be "concerned about
the possibility of an Allende victory." A high-level
police official is worried that under an Allende admin-
istration, "the Chileans *ith the did of the Cubans,
Chinese, and other leftist groups, would export their
revolution to Peru." Moderate military leaders prob-
ably believe that a Marxist government in Chile would
make it more difficult for them to oppose the rapid
pace of reform currently espoused by their own radi-
cals, and many of the generals may fear that Chile
will become a center for subversion in Latin America.
There is probably also apprehension that the Soviets
will buildup their military strength in Chile if
Allende takes office in November.
5. Despite these mixed views toward Allende,
the Peruvian Government's relations with the Popular
Unity coalition would probably be friendly, and the
two governments would be likely to find areas of com-
mon interest. For instance, although Peru has felt
that it could not take the initiative in restoring
relations with Cuba, it might be quick to follow a
Chilean exchange of ambassadors with Havana.
Bolivia
6. So far, President Ovando is one of only four
Latin American heads of state who have commented
publicly on Allende's victory. Although he told US
Ambassador Siracusa on election eve that he favored
Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of Chile's Christian
Democratic Party, he said on 7 September in a press
conference that "it is possible for Bolivia to live
in friendship with a Marxist regime that doesn't use
violence to impose its goals" and expressed the belief
that the Chilean Congress should declare Allende
winner. Asked if he thought Bolivian-Chilean relations
might improve under an Allende administration, Ovando
replied that "if Allende really wants justice not only
in his country, but in the whole world, logically he
must recognize Bolivia's right to the sea."
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7. Bolivian military leaders, however, view an.
Allende government with considerable alarm. Some re-
portedly believe that the "US should use its influence
to ensure the selection of Alessandri by the Chilean
Congress." Regimental-level officers reportedly con-
sider an Allende government "extremely dangerous for
democracy in Bolivia." They cite the assistance given
by Allende and his followers to the five survivors
of Che Guevara's 1967 guerrilla effort and to ten
political prisoners released by Bolivia in July 1970
who stopped off in Chile on their way to Cuba. The
military apparently fear that with Allende in power,
Bolivian guerrillas and urban terrorists could expect
considerable support from Chilean sources.
8. High military circles reportedly believe that
the only specific step the Bolivian Government can
take is to launch "harsh repression of the subversive
left," and such a course would be widely supported by
the armed forces. But if the President is reluctant
to take a harder line against the Bolivian left, a
further strain would be placed on relations between
Ovando and the military.
9. Reaction among other sectors in Bolivia has
been mixed. Moderate businessmen reportedly fear
that radicals will be reinforced and more audacious
and that Bolivia will lean more toward the left un-
der the influence of an Allende adndnistration, es-
pecially because the Bolivian Government is "without
definition." They reportedly are afraid that a
"strong anti-US front composed of Chile, Peru, and
Bolivia could become a reality."
10. Leaders of the important Bolivian Mine Work-
ers Federation .and the Bolivian Workers .Cehtral report-
edly consider the Allende victory "a triumph of the
working class and oppressed masses." They believe
that Allende will develop "intense" relations with
Cuba but that he will move calmly and gradually in
implementing domestic reforms. They do not discount
the possibility of a "right-wing" coup attempt. La
Paz university students reportedly have been too pre-
occupied with a hunger strike against the government
to take account of the election.
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Argentina
11. Although the government thus far has not
reacted publicly, it is deeply concerned over the
election outcome.
12. Foreign Ministry officials are taking a
cautious approach and believe that it is premature
to comment publicly on the Allende victory.
13. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires reports that
the Argentine military are "quite concerned--even
alarmed--by prospects of an Allende presidency, but
they are not in a state of panic." Army commander
General Lanusse said that the situation "is very
serious for Argentina," but did not imply an impend-
ing Argentine military move. The Embassy reports
that the government "apparently propose to take no
initiatives in the matter at this time." Foreign
Ministry officials reportedly believe that reaction
in Chile against any Argentine intervention would be
swift and united. ID addition, an Argentine colonel
reportedly commented on 6 September that Argentina
could not risk any future intervention in Chile as
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"this might give the Soviets ar excuse to send troops
to maintain the Allende government."
14. Reaction by Argentine politicians has thus
far been low-key. Most leaders have refrained from
public comment, but there is widespread opinion that
an Allende government would be a major and tragic
hemispheric development. Peron's representative in
Argentina, however, extolled the victory of the
Chilean "popular movement" and identified Peron with
Allende. Argentine Communist Party leaflets have
lauded Allende and have called for unity against the
Argentine dictatorship. Although a variety of labor
leaders have expressed disappointment over the elec-
ticn, even foreseeing an eventual Communist take-over
in Chile, they are "in no sense alarmed." There has
been almost no discernible student reaction.
Reaction from Other South American Countries
Brazil
15. President Medici reportedly is "most con-
cerned over the prospect of a Marxist government in
Chile" and has referred to lame-duck President Frei
as "the Kerensky of Chile." Medici, in a cabinet
meeting following the election, reportedly said that
if PAlende's victory is ratified in Congress, "Chile
in dne time could become a second Cuba despite Al-
lende's promises to maintain free elections and in-
diviavkal liberties." He indicated that Brazil would
have relations with an Allende administration, but
hinted that if Chile takes a "drastic turn to the
left as Cuba did in 1959-1960," he would sever rela-
tions. Medici reportedly lamented that democratic
forces in the Western Hemisphere had supported Frei's
candidacy in 1964, but in the recent campaign, "when
anti-Marxist forces needed help even more, little or
none was forthcoming."
16. In private, Brazilian officials have re-
acted similarly, although they have refrained from
public comment. They are resigned to Allende's con-
firmation by Congress and believe there is nothing
they can do to influence events. They tend to blame
the outcome principally on weaknesses within the
Christian Democratic Party rather than on Lllende's
appeal. Foreign Ministry and high-level military
circles have adopted a righteous "we-told-you-so"
attitude, charging that a "socialist" government like
Frei's will "inevitably lead to a Communist regime."
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17. There are no indications that either the
Brazilian Government or the military are consider-
ing taking any action against Chile, but the military
apparently views increased informal cooperation with
Argentina as an inevitable outgrowth of the Chilean
situation. Both Argentine and Brazilian officials
reportedly are concerned that Allende may permit
the USSR to "establish a port" in Chile.
18. Reaction from Brazil's generally conserva-
tively oriented press has been hostile and apprehen-
sive. The independent Jornal do Brasil called the
outcome a "political earthquake, more terrible than
past earthquakes in Chile." The conservative 0
Estado de Sao Paulo warned that "it is not the first
time in contemporary history that dictatorship comes
to power taking advantage of democratic constitu-
tional rights....Adolf Hitler was an example in
1933." 0 Jornal blames the election result on Chile's
democratic forces, particularly the Christian Demo-
crats, who had "allowed" themselves to be seduced
by the lullaby of cooperation "with the Marxists."
0 Estado de Sao Paulo saw an Allende government
following the path of Cuba, including the "solicita-
tion of Soviet alms," and 0 Jornal foresaw a menace
of subversion from Chile "with its red frontiers
bordering on the Latin democracies."
Venezuela
19. President Caldera, in a press conference
on 10 September, said that much can be learned from
the Chilean elections both by those who "celebrate"
the results aid by those who "lament," He added,
however, that he believes President Frei is still
the most populax political figure in Chile. His
remarks were probably intended to blunt charges in
Venezuela that Christian Democracy in Latin America
is declining. (Caldera's Christian Democratic Party
(COPEI) is the only major Christian Democratic 72arty
outside of Chile.)
20. A COPEI leader told the US Embassy in Ca-
racas that he and his associates were badly shaken
by Allende's victory and that the party would have
to study the implications. According to press re-
ports, he believes that the first lesson to be
learned from the Chilean election is that a united
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front of progressive parties is necessary in Vene-
zuela. Thus, in the short run, Allende's victory
may tend to increase cooperation in Congress between
COPEI and the progressive Accion Democratica party.
It may also enhance the possibility of broader coop-
eration among Venezuela's weak leftist forces, even
though Caldera and at least one other prominent COPEI
leader have criticized Tomic for moving too far left
in his camp4gn in Chile.
21. Former President Romulo Betancourt stated
in public that the election results in Chile must be
respected and that Allende's victory proves the
bankruptcy of the radical Marxist view that violence
is the preferred means of attaining power. He went
on to reiterate his "Betancourt Doctrine" that only
those governments acquiring power legally and through
elections should be afforded diplomatic recognition
and participation in the Inter-American system.
Colombia
22. Reaction in Colombia is moderate and largely
uncritical, probably because of the widespread lack of
informed opinion about Chile and the conviction that
Chilean political developments affect Colombia only
peripherally. President Misael Pastrana answered a
question about the Chilean election in a press confer-
ence on 7 September. Although he stressed his inten-
tion to refrain from commenting on internal Chilean
poljtics, Pastrana nevertheless again advocated con-
stitutional reforms in Colombia to provide for run-off
elections when a candidate fails to win a majority
vote.
23. Much of the discussion in Colombia about
Allende's victory seems to center on the prospects
for the continuance of the Andean Pact, a sub-regional
association of five South American countries that has
been a favorite Colombian project for several years.
In his press conference Pastrana was optimistic that
Allende would uphold Chile's commitments to the pact.
Former President Lleras, who with Chilean President
Frei was the principal architect of the pact, also
publicly stated his belief that the association would
not be significantly affected by Allende's victory.
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24. Colombian press comments have been gener-
ally moderate and restrained. A columnist for El
Espectador, a,.. prestigious Bogota daily, said that
Allende is a serious person and not a "tropical"
like Castro.
Uruguay
25. Reaction in Uruguay has been limited so far
to press and media commentaries reflecting a favorable
reception of Allende's victory. It is unlikely that
the Pacheco government will criticize the results in
view of Uruguay's firm committent. since the first
decades of the 20th century to an advanced welfare
system and socialism. Newspapers representing various
factions of the ruling Colorado Party state optimis-
tically that Allende will bring liberal socialism to
Chile within a democratic system. The Colorado paper
El Diario compared Allende's brand of socialism to
Dubcek's. Another Colorado paper, La Manama, notes
that Allende's election strengthens Moscow's position
against radical Marxists and terrorists who espouse
violent paths to power. The Catholic paper favorably
compares Allende's politics to Scandinavian socialism.
The orthodox Con,nunist Party daily, El Popular, of
course, was jubilant.
Ecuador
26. On 10 September President Velasco Ibarra
became the fourth Latin American head of state to
comment publicly on Allende's victory. Quito radio
quoted his comment that "the Chilean people expressed
their sovereign will and it must be respected by all
states, whether they like it or not." There has been
no other official or private reaction from Ecuador.
Reaction From Middle America
Mexico
27. :Mexican officials have made no public state-
ments, but all of the press has expressed satisfaction
with the peaceful course of the election. Excelsior,
a prominent Mexicc City daily, editorialized that, "the
democratic maturity of the Chilean people exercised the
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r
right of self-determination, and they deserve the
highest respect from all the nations of the world."
It Ilso cautiously pointed out that "Allende, a
democratically and freely elected president, has
assumed, above any other considerations, a commit-
ment to freedom."
28. Another Excelsior editorial commented that
"Chilean socialism has come from the ballot box, not
from an explosion of violence, assault on palaces, or
military coups." El Dia of Mexico City said that
Allende's victory apresses the desire of the Chilean
people for deep changes in the country's basic struc-
ture."
29. Such comments probably accurately reflect
the mood and opinions of many Mexican officials and
the informed public. Mexico's firm espousal of non-
intervention, its tradition of popular and national.
istic reforms growing out of its own experiences, and
its independent foreign policy impel it toward an
uncritical judgement on Allende.
30. The private views of some Mexican officials,
however, may differ in varying degrees from the official
stance.
Central America and the Caribbean
31. Reaction from most Central American and
Caribbean states has been limited and brief.
El Salvador
32. In El Salvador, where the Christian Demo-
cratic Party (PDC) is a major political force, the
Allende victory has attracted intensive media and
public attention, however. Salvadoran Chtistian
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Democrats have not yet publicly reacted but reportedly
agree that the election will further wilaken their
party and that the government is behind the recent
attacks against them that have appeared in the Sal-
vadoran press. Editorials and signed columns warn
that the PDC is a "bridgehead to communism" and
that any PDC election victory will result in the
country being "sold out to the Communists." A colum-
nist who is often spokesman for the Salvadoran oli-
garchy is running �L series that seeks to show that
Chilean Christian Democracy was responsible for
Allende's victory.
Costa Rica
33. The Costa Rican press has also devoted de-
tailed attention to the Chilean elections. Although
it is almost uniformly critical, it probably has
not reflected the depth of antipathy that President
Figueres feels for Allende. News accounts have em-
phasized that the Chilean Congress is expected to con-
firm Allende's plurality and that the Chilean mili-
tary is expected to respect the decision. Editorial
opinion, however, reflects dismay over Allende's
victory. La Nacion, an influential conservative
daily, termed it a "serious threat to all other Latin
American people" and criticized Chilean democratic
elements for being "lost in indecision." The more
progressive La Republica said that Allende's victory
could be blamed on the "suicidal efforts of Chilean
democratic elements." The only approving reaction
came from the Communist Youth of Costa Rica.
Honduras, Panama
34. Statements by Radio Honduras are probably
typical of the reactions of official and ruling circles
in the remaining Central American countries. A sta-
tion editorial emphasized that it was premature for
"Communists throughout the world" to show enthusiasm
for Allende's victory, because "we are sure that the
last word is yet to be heard." Editorials in Panama's
progovernment newspapers indicate unease over the out-
come of the Chilean election. The blame for the
"victory of Communism" is placed, however, on the
US for "lack of sensitivity" to Latin American needs.
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Dominican Republic
35. Although President Balaguer of the Dominican
Republic has declined to com-nt, other officials have
thus far reacted with cauti�ts acceptance. Some lead-
ers have commented on the likelihood of Allende's elec-
tion to the presidency by Congress and say that they
expect cordial relations with his government. Former
President Juan Bosch emphasized that Allende's victory
presented problems for US policy in Latin America and
claimed that the US could do little to avert a "Chilean
Revolution" without.risking.grave consequences.
36. Informed opinion in the Dominican Republic
takes a number of different lines. Comment concen-
trates on the belief that hit can't happen here"
because the military would not permit it. Moderate
leftists are somewhat concerned that the Balaguer
government could adopt a more repressive attitude
toward the left and opposition in general. At the
same time, however, the Chilean election reinforces
the views of some of the left that change is inevitable
and highly desirable. The Dominican Republic is some-
what isolated from the Latin American political main-
stream, and Allende's victory is not likely to have
an immediate or profound impact on the country's
political life.
Cuba
37. So far Cuban public comment has been con-
fined to a few Radio Havana broadcasts and probably
to daily newspaper coverage. The tone of these
statements is enthusiastic without being overly
boastful or confident. It appears that Castro prefers
to continue the policy he followed during the Chilean
electoral campaign of avoiding comment on Chilean
affairs as much as possible. It is too early to pre-
dict whether Castro will accept the invitation he
reportedly has received to attend Allende's inaugura-
tion.
38. Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende have been
friends since 1959, when the Chilean senator began
his frequent and regular visits to Cuba. Castro has
praised Allende many times during the past 11 years
and will be delighted to have a friend and sympathizer
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governing an important Latin American country. The
Cuban leader went to some lengths to aid the Allende
campaign: from reportedly providing funds through
an intermediary in Spain to playing to perfection
a careful public role designed to deny Allende's op-
ponents any issue. In..anticipation of Allende's
victory, the Cuban Communist Party recently re-es-
tablished relations with the Chilean Communist Party
in order to be on good terms with the key element of
Allende's coalition. Havana's relations with Allende's
Socialist Party are already good. Havana probably
expects to gain an increase in trade, a resumption
of diplomatic ties, and a full restoration of normal
intercourse between the two countries.
Conclusion
39. Preliminary reaction in Latin America to
Allende's victory has generaly been cautious. There
is widespread acceptance of or resignation to the
possibility that Allende will be inaugurated in No-
vember, and there seems to be no inclination in any
country to infPrfere openly in Chilean affairs. Most
governments have withheld official comment, in view
of the fluidi.ty of the Chilean situation.
40. These initial responses will probably pre-
vail at least until after the Chilean Congress votes
on the candidates. If Allende confirmed, he will
probably receive the public endorsement' of additional
governments, and, once he is inaugurated, most coun-
tries of the hemisphere will pi...obably attempt to es-
tablish cordial relations with his government.
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