KING HUSAYN'S DILEMMA GROWING SHARPER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02909533
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-02009
• Publication Date: May 25, 1970

.
=Approved for
(Release: i(b)(3
2018/06/27
CO2909533
pproved for
Release:
2018/06/27
CO2909533
tlit De/
//11 Approvedifor Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
AtirelL
(b)(3)
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
KING HUSAYN'S DILEMMA GROWING SHARPER
.re&
90
25 May 1970
No. 0508/70
pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533mmili
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
(b)(3)
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prthibited by law.
xxcLuryL GROUP I
nO 1.110M AUTCIMATIC
DOWMCIIIAU1110 AND
OCCI.AIIIIIEICATION
Lommaiummommimimmomminpproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
(b)(3)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 May 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
King Husayn's Dilemma Growing Sharper
Summary
For the past several years, King Husayn's au-
thority has come under increasingly severe challenge
from the country's proliferating groups of fedayeen.
His repeated but hesitant attempts to impose the
writ of the central government on the commandos have
provoked ever-more serious crises, but have had little
effect in restraining the fedayeen; the latest set
of government decrees is being openly ignored.
jominously, the unquestioning
loyalty of the army--once considered the bedrock of
the Hashemite monarchy--can no longer be taken for
granted.
Husayn has in the past manifested remarkable
staying power. Presiding over a country that is an
artificial creation whose elements have never co-
alesced, he remains a somewhat tarnished symbol of
unity. Although pro-fedayeen sentiment is strong
and growing, Husayn can still draw on considerable
support from much of the army, from conservatives,
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intel-
ligence and coordinated with the Office of National
Estimates, and the Clandestine Service.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
lApproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
lri
and from traditional--primarily Bedouin--elements.
Perhaps the most telling factor in his favor is the
division among the fedayeen, who are devoting much
of their energies to maneuvering against one another
in an effort to control the movement. Leaders of
Fatah, the largest group, are even said to have
agreed to help the King whip the others into line
if they are given the freedom to do so.
The fedayeen cause
is a popular one among Palestinians and non-Palestin-
ians alike; it provides an outlet for Arab feelings
of inferiority and frustration growing out of the
humiliation of 1967. Nevertheless, pro-fedayeen
sentiment has been somewhat tempered by the high-
handed activities of the more radical groups and by
the commandos' less-than-dazzling record against the
Israelis--for example, during the Israeli reprisal
raid into Lebanon in May. There probably remains
in Jordan a large body of opinion that favors law
and order and would support Husayn in a genuine effort
to curb the fedayeen; firm action may well be Husayn's
only hope of regainina the initiative in a deteri-
oratina situation.
-2-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Fedayeen Bases and Refugee Camp in JORDAN's East Bank
Haifa
1/
1; '� GOLAN HEIGHTS, I
Tlber,leA�\,7 (ls-aelhocapiedl
.
, N
) .
I-!.
� f;Nazareth
ISRAEL
(6)
,..!!',..... i:v, . . , 1.41-�-.1�rb...1..ri ...
/ ..�,�7"...."� s )1:4,4 Gip,'
.
.
� JenIn iLk
i 1 'i % /
..... 00 0 /
.., i
.1 0 0 .4:0 /
�Achun,i'��@
/ �-�
� Nablus..'
JO
WEST,)RANK
(Israeli =�occupiod)
\ � a �1.1arash
..nOR DAN
0\
, a �
SYRIA
Al IA' afraa',
I
1/
/ lit� eiclan , 6 -',-1
,,Ramlaa-T V�,, Ram i)
.. \ �..... V, Zir -- �'' \ Ak.../Vman
/ - �
_:, �
...,,..�..., \ N., Jericho;----t)i -�"� � ' -�- / �
, Allah,p. 42
ve...f.-:::�.
,
rusalem
1 Ma'daba. A
Armistice Line i� �Bethlehem
(199)---
.0
/
/
yl-lebron �
/
/
\,�,4ersheba
ISRAEL
.DImona
10
MILES
98591 5-70 CIA
20
;Yew(
� 1,
� ,
� �, I
I �
,/ Al Karafir7,
(.1)
�, '4,As Safi
� �,,s,
I I
(L. Pa!astinien refugee camp
��/ I .
/
Az Zarqa
.4�--) IISA;It�
Fedayeen bases
� FATAH (Palestine Liberation Movemeni)
o PLF (Popular Liberation Force)
(.)PFLP (Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine)
SAIQA (Vanguard of the People's
Liberation War)
0000 )
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
The Growth of the Fedayeen "State"
1. Fedayeen popularity in Jordan received a major
boost in March 1968 when the commandos and the army
exacted heavy casualties during an Israeli raid on
fedayeen camps near Karamah. By the following No-
vember, uniformed and armed fedayeen had the run
of downtown Amman, where they set up roadblocks,
detained civilians, and extracted taxes from the
population. A shooting incident in Amman that month
touched off the first serious government-fedayeen
confrontation. It was resolved by an agreement
ostensibly subordinating the commandos to some degree
of government control but implicitly allowing them a
measure of autonomy. The pattern was repeated in
April 1969, when the King managed to de-fuse the
situation after e, series of emergency meetings
between government and fedayeen leaders.
2. Husayn's first tentative effort to impose
meaningful restraints on the fedayeen was the result
of Israeli-generated pressures. Amman's reaction to
Israeli breaches of the East Ghor Canal during the
summer of 1969 gave Israel opportunities to insist
that Jordan impose quiet along the ceasefire lines
before repairs would be permitted; Husayn apparently
did his best to comply. In June, King Husayn gave
the defense portfolio to his former director of
public security, Rasul Kaylani, a move that the
commandos interpreted as aimed directly at them.
Kaylani proved to be relatively ineffective, however.
During anti-American demonstrations that August,
fedayeen military police assumed full responsibility
for keeping the crowds under control, while the
Jordanian police stood on the sidelines. The fedayeen
began again to assess monthly "contributions" from
Amman storekeepers and took to killing local citizens
they found undesirable, without interference from
the civilian police.
-3-
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
40.
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
-
3. Throughout the year, Husayn was also forced to
ponder the example of Lebanon, where government at-
tempts to restrict fedayeen activity had brought on
a full-scale crisis, toppled the cabinet, invited
the intervention of other Arab states, and ended in
November by leaving the fedayeen with a freer hand
than before.
His is-
suance of law-and-order decrees on 10 February was
clumsily handled, however; no advance notice was
given to fedayeen leaders or to the army--whether
through Husayn's own fault or that of his ministers
is unclear. The commandos quickly served notice
that they would resist the new measures and formed
a Unified Command to coordinate action; a series of
clashes between fedayeen forces and Jordanian police
left 60 dead. The King hastily backed away from a
showdown. He agreed to freeze his original decrees--
thus enabling the fedayeen to trumpet total victory--
pending negotiations between the two sides.
4. On 18 February, the fedayeen issued their own
set of law-and-order decrees. They were very similar
to those of the King, with one vital exception--en-
forcement was to remain in fedayeen, not government,
harms. The "settlement," announced on 22 February,
skillfully fuzzed over this issue. Although the key
points of the original decrees were preserved or even
extended--largely through the inclusion of "concessions"
offered by the fedayeen to burnish their public image--
failure to deal with the question of enforcement enabled
the fedayeen to put their own gloss on the text. The
King's earlier measures "were never issued," they
claimed; the fedayeen had merely agreed to observe
their own code of discipline. Additional meetings
were supposed to be held to clarify the problem of
implementation, but months passed, leaving the question
in limbo. Meanwhile, the fedayeen proceeded to ignore
the agreement without provoking a reaction from the
King.
Husayn's
-4-
-SECRET--
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
,f1�rgv�kw7...r.TgrAymm.;(17.1.,!rrtn'TPTiTlri-IRMArltwill.r
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
orit-Ex
(b)(3)
prompt freezing of the law-and-order decrees and the
virtually unchecked activity of the commandos after
the crisis were inevitably interpreted as a defeat
for the King. Succeeding events have seemed to con-
firm this interpretation. Anti-American demonstra-
tions in Amman against US Assistant Secretary Sisco's
projected visit in mid-April were controlled--where
they were controlled at all--primarily through the
efforts of some of the more moderate fedayeen groups;
the Jordanian authorities stood aside, creating the
impression of a regime unwilling or unable to maintain
order.
Fedayeen Strength
6. After the creation of Israel in 1948, Jordan
absorbed some 500,000 refugees, and inherited the
inhabitants of the West Bank--which used to be a
portion of Palestine--more than doubling the country's
population. More bitterly anti-Israeli than most
Arabs, politically subordinated to the less skilled
and educated Jordanians of the East Bank, and fre-
quently unemployed, these people gravitated toward
the embryonic fedayeen groups. The Palestinians
were always a headache for Husayn, but the fedayeen
movement itself was negligible until the 1967 war
deprived Jordan of the West Bank. New and old
refugees poured across the river�including a large
number dislodged from the Gaza Strip--bringing the
number of Jordan's refugees up to nearly 700,000
out of a total population of 2.2 million. At the same
time, the commando movement, almost a laughingstock
before the war, began to emerge as the most dynamic
element in Middle East politics--the Arabs' only
hope, however far-fetched, of regaining their lost
lands.
-5-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
(b)(3)
7. Commandos in Jordan--including those armed in
refugee camps--are now thought to number 8-10,000.
About half of them belong to Fatah, the largest,
best-funded, and most moderate group. Two or three
thousand are members of Saiqa, founded and directed
by Syria's left-wing Baathist regime. The radical
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led
by George Habbash, numbers about 1,000. Smaller
organizations count their membership in the hundreds
or less; there are somewhere around 30 groups all
told.
8. The fedayeen have always been a disorganized
lot, inherently undisciplined and given to breaking
into splinter gioups. An attempt a year ago to
coordinate the military activity of five of the
major groups led to the formation of a largely paper
entity, the Palestine Armed Struggle Command. The
King's move last February to clamp down frightened
the fedayeen into a temporary tightening of ranks,
but the 11-member Unified Command they established
never managed any concerted activity other than the
issuing of proclamations. Although both Fatah and
Saiqa reportedly opposed the anti-Sisco demonstrations
in April, the more radical groups nevertheless incited
damaging riots. It seems unlikely that the recent
creation by these same 11 groups of a new central
committee within the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion will prove any more meaningful,
9. In the course of Jordan's developing polar-
ization between the regime and the fedayeen, Fatah's
role has grown increasingly ambivalent.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Fatah was presumably
motivated in part by fear that in any kind of mili-
tary confrontation, it would be eradicated along
with the other commando organizations. But Yasir
Arafat and the present Fatah leadership almost cer-
tainly realize that as the King's position deteri-
orates, their own leading role--such as it is--will
come under increasing fire from more radical fedayeen
groups. Diminished as Husayn's actual power may be,
-6-
(b)(3)
Approved for for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
(b)(3)
the monarchy is still a stabilizing factor--one of
the few left to Jordan. If Husayn goes, the result--
whatever it might be--would almost certainly be
unpalatable for Fatah. In an army takeover, fedayeen
activity might well be drastically curtailed, if not
eliminated altogether. Even if the fedayeen ended
up running the country, Fatah would at best be one
of many groups�all of the others more radical, all
doing their best to push Fatah into line. At worst,
Fatah could find itself edged out of the country's
power structure.
10. Such a view of the future may explain the ,
"pact" said to have been struck between Yasir Arafat
of Fatah and the King early in May--virtually an
agreement to collaborate in reining in the mare radi-
cal fedayeen.
Such an alliance may help prop up
Husayn for a time, although it will not solve his
long-term problems. Fatah cannot impose its line
on the other groups by force, and overt collaboration
with the King would be viewed by fedayeen sympathizers
as treachery to their cause. There have already been
signs that Yasir Arafat's leadership is being chal-
lenged by more radical elements within Fatah itself;
such pressures will presumably, in time, push Arafat
further to the left--or else Fatah will move left
without him.
Husayn's Crumbling Support
11. It used to be an article of faith that both
Jordan's Army and the country's Bedouin element would
stand behind the King, come what may. This is no
longer axiomatic. The fedayeen have been working for
some time to buy off, penetrate, or otherwise neutral-
ize the Bedouin.
Even
the King has at last become concerned; the appoint-
ment in May of Mashur Haditha al-Jazi--a leader of
-7-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
SECRET.. -
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533.
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
the influential Huwaytat tribe--as chief of staff
of the Jordanian Army was probably an attempt to
shore up the King's popularity among the Bedouin.
12. Nor is it clear that Husayn can rely on the
Jordan Arab Army in a showdown with the feaayeen.
Jordanians in general are emotionally attached to
the fedayeen crusade to recover their occupied West
BailkR and these feelings are presumably shared by
Jordanians in the army. A face-off against the
fedayeen could well find substantial numbers of the
rank and file reluctant to fire on their Palestinian
brethren. Husayn claims to have no doubt of the
army's support.
13. A major factor inhibiting Husayn's use of the
army in a crisis is his nervousness over the presence
of Iraqi troops in Jordan. Before July, according
to some reports, these troops are slated to number
50,000, equal to the size of the entire Jordanian
Army (Iraq, however, would face serious problems in
supplying so many troops.) The Iraqi forces carefully
stood aside during the February crisis, but they
rnutinely furnish logistical and operational support
to the fedayeen. King Husayn, aware that Baghdad has
no particular love for the Hashem!te monarchy, clearly
fears Iraqi intervention on the r de of the fedayeen,
yet feels powerless to deny entry to the troops. In
consequence, he will avoid committing his army against
the commandos except as a last resort.
Outlook
-8-
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Pr,,,7o71
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
15. If Husayn has in fact decided against en-
forcing bounds tc fedayeen activity, he will pre-
sumably adopt a number of measures in an effort to
buy More time. The pact with Fatah seems to have
been one step in this direction. Should this prove
insufficient, Husayn may well try to form a national
coalition government in which the fedayeen--at least
Fatah and its supporte.:s--would be represented; but
as the fedayeen movement as a whole moves to the
left, Fatah, too, must shift, or face a loss of in-
fluence. The King may eventually feel forced to
deal with mounting criticism of his reliance on
aid from the US--now virtually identified with
Israel in Arab eyes--by combining strong denuncia-
tions of the US with the acceptance of Soviet arms.
This may give Husayn's popularity a momentary lift,
but at best it is a stop-gap. The fedayeen's
political power in Jordan will continue to grow
with the passage of time, while Husayn's image as
a leader will wear steadily thinner and the regime's
isolation from the population will deepen. Never-
theless, if Husayn does not initiate and then fumb]e
a new clamp-down, and if the fedayeen do not flout
the King's authority too obviously or provoke in-
tolerable retaliation from the Israelis, Husayn can
probably keep afloat in a gradually deteriorating
situation for some time.
16. In Jordan's charged atmosphere, however,
even a small spark has explosive potential. The
factor most likely to bring events to a head would
be a step-up in the present low level of fedayeen
-9-
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
(b)(3)
cross-border incursions or shellings. Early in May,
attempts by Fatah to shell Israeli units near an
area of the East Ghor Canal that was under repair
provoked the intervention of the Jordanian Army,
which cleaned out three fedayeen camps, destroying
their arms and provisions. This clash followed on
the heels of an announcement by one of the commando
groups that it had uncovered a plot by Sharif Nasir,
the head of the Jordanian Army, to assassinate
several fedayeen leaders. The two incidents con-
firmed growing suspicions among the fedayeen and
their supporters that the regime has been collab-
orating with the Israelis to keep the cease-fire
lines quiet and to exterminate the commandos.
17. Husayn, in consequence, cannot afford much
more in the way of overt activity against the fedayeen.
If groups other than Fatah suspect that the King
will not act against them and attempt to exploit
his reluctance by increased anti-Israeli operations,
RusavnIS dilemma will be painfully sharpened.
The fedayeen
appreciate their freedom from the responsibilities
of day-to-day statecraft and depend more than they
-10-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533_
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 CO2909533
19. The prospect of a fedayeen state
(
could
compel army commanders, said to be champing at the
bit to deal with the fedayeon, to take matters into
their own hands and try to run the country themselves.
Such a move could well meet with a large degree of
support throughout the country at large. Even some
of the Palestinians--primarily the more successful
ones who have been absorbed into Jordanian society
and risk the loss of their business interests--as
well as some Bedouin chieftains, are said to be
growing increasingly disenchanted with the fedayeen,
particularly the antics of the more radical groups.
An army regime determined to bridle the fedayeen
could probably count on the support of the conserva-
tive elements within the county that are being
progressively alienated
Such an army-dominated Arab
republic would probably be more moderate than most
military regimes. Jordanian Army leaders are better
trained--for the most part, Western-trained than are
those of most Arab armies; some of the traditions
of the old Arab Legion still linger. Nevertheless,
a moderate army regime would be vulnerable; pressure
from more radical elements among the rank and file
could push it toward the left, or a group of radical
younger officers could seize power directly possibly
with a subversive push from Syria or Iraq.
20. Perhaps the only alternative holding out a
real prospect of extricating Husayn from his narrow-
ing position is the use of the army against the
fedayeen in the early future.
-11-
SET
pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 CO29095331k
fl ' IT1Y7717'7,ii7
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
IT,F:r;r!trjr
'10.�
-12-
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
AmisimimmApproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
SEeREal
(b)(3)
APPENDIX
King Husayn's Dilemma Growing Sharper
Chronology
March 1968
November 1968
April 1969
June 1969
August 1969
10 February
1970
12 February
1970
18 February
1970
21 February
1970
22 February
1970
15 April 1970
Israeli raid on fedayeen
camps at Karamah
First government- fedayeen
confrontation, resolved by
agreement.
Government-fedayeen crisis,
resolved by emergency meet-
ings between the two sides
Husayn appoints Rasul Kaylani
as Minister of Defense
Anti-American demonstrations
in Amman controlled by feda-
yeen police
King issues law-and-order
decrees
King agrees to "freeze"
decrees
Fedayeen issue their own set
of decrees
Talks begin between govern-
ment and fedayeen leaders
Government- fedayeen "agree-
ment" announced
Riots in Amman protesting
Assistant Secretary Sisco's
planned visit to Jordan
(continued)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 CO2909533a
Approved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533
(b)(3)
19 April 1970
30 April 1970
May 1970
2 May 1970
Cabinet reshuffle
Announcement of plot by
Sharif Nasir to assassinate
fedayeen leaders
Reported pact between re-
gime and Fatah
Jordanian Army cleans out
three fedayeen camps
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2018/06/27 002909533