WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CHINA'S ROLE IN AFRICA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02907888
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• Original Classification: U
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• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2022
• Case Number: F-2022-01588
• Publication Date: February 25, 1972

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Seeder
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
China's Role in Africa
DS13 FILE COPT
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WARNING
The SPECIAL REPORT contains classified information affect-
ing the national defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, sections 793 'Ind 794. of fir US Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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After marking time for nearly five years, Communist China again is expanding its
presence in Africa. Since October 1970, five African governments have established diplo-
matic relations with Peking. When the two others now in the process do so, the Chinese
Communists will be ahead of the rival Chinese Nationalist regime in the contest for
recognition. When the UN General Assembly voted to admit the People's Republic of China
to the world body, Peking received most of the African ballots. Along with these diplomatic
gains, there has been a considerable increase in Chinese economic aid to African nations.
Transforming such short-range political profit into long-term influence will depend en
a number of factors: the effectiveness and continued generosity of Peking's economic aid,
the ability of the Chinese to allay African fears of subversion, conditions and events within
Africa, and Peking's ability to find issues on which China and the African regimes can unite.
China undoubtedly will continue to give priority to its relationships with the US, the USSR,
Japan, and Europe, but in Peking's effort to alter power relationships in the world, Africa
has a definite, if limited, part to play.
The Early Years
Africa first attracted the attention of the
Chinese Communists in the mid-1950s, when the
European powers came under increasing pressure
to grant ipdependence to their colonies. Taking
advantage of the surge in African nationalist senti-
ment, Peking suessed its opposition to imperial-
ism, offering moral and, on occasion, material
support to African national liberation move-
ments. In May 1956, Egypt's President Nasir,
sensing a potential source of support in his devel-
oping dispute with Britain and France over the
status of the Suez Canal, became the first ruler on
the African continent to recognize Mao's regime.
Peking's aid to the nationalist rebels in Algeria
paid off in 1962 when the newly independent
government established diplomatic relations with
China.
Peking's efforts to assert itself as a revolu-
tionary model for African independence move-
ments and to forge diplomatic, economic, and
pllitical ties with the more radical of the newly
independent African states set the stage for
increased competition with the USSR, and, as
Sine-Soviet differences widened during the 1960s,
rivalry for influence in Africa increased. Peking's
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attempt to preserve its ideological purity and out-
bid Moscow in revolutionary appeal, however,
soon adversely affected Chinese diplomacy. Once
in power, most African nationalists, who wel-
comed Chinese political and material aid during
their struggle for independence, gave a chilly
response to the Chinese cries for continued cocial
revolution that Peking felt compelled to sound as
part of its contest with Moscow for ideological
leadership of the Communist movement.
Nevertheless, as an increasing number of
African colonies gained independence during the
early 1960s, China stepped up its efforts to gain
influence, mainly to match Soviet moves. The
Chinese were also trying to counter the rival over-
tures of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan and
reduce US influence on the continent. As Chinese
diplomatic missions on the continent grew in
number, a modest foreign aid program was in-
augurated to woo African governments and
enhal Ice Peking's prestige. High-ranking Chinese
!ea& rs, such as Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign
Minister Chen I, made personal tours in Africa.
African delegations were encouraged to visit Pe-
king, and promising African revolutionaries were
cultivated and occasionally given training in
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China. By 1965, 15 African countries had diplo-
matic relations with Communist China.
Starting in 1965, China's steady, if modest,
progress in Africa began to slow down. African
leaders resented Chinese efforts to use them as
political weapons in the widening quarrel between
Peking and Moscow. A major reason for the can-
cellation of the Afro-Asian conference planned
for Algiers in 1965 was the desire of many Afri-
can leaders to avoid association with any Chinese
effort to turn the meeting against the USSR.
Peking's doctrinaire support of revolutionary
action cast suspicion on its motives. In some
cases, such as their backing of the radical Lu-
mumba and Mulele uprisings in the Congo (now
Zaire), the Chinese appear to have overestimated
the revolutionary ootential of the situation.
Revelations�some ot them concocted�of Chinese
complicity in subversion aimed at overthrowing
independent regimes, as in Burundi, alarmed
many African leaders. Close Chinese ties with
such national leaders as Ghana's Nkrumah meant
that when those leaders were ousted, Chinese
influence suffered.
Peking also discovered that diplomatic ties,
modest Chinese economic aid, and ideological
rhetoric were no match for the iarger amounts of
economic and military as-,istance available to Afri-
can governments from Moscow and the West. In
Algeria, for example, Peking was unable to com-
pete with the large Soviet military and economic
aid commitment. Nor was th( prospect of Chinese
political support on international issues attractive
enough to win over more African regimes. Peking
lacked the superpower status and political punch
of the US or USSR.
African uneasiness over Peking's policies in-
creased with the unfolding of the Cultural Revo-
lution. The Chinese at that time appeared almost
completely ..:ogrossed with domestic concerns and
presented in image of internal instability. All of
China's ainbasadors;, with the exception of the
one in Cairo, were called home. In only one
instance, however, was there a break in
diplomatic relations between an African nation
and Peking during the most tumultuous stage of
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the Cultural Revolution. In 1967, after Tunisian
complaints about Chinese propaganda activities
and Chinese accusations that Tunsia wished to
wreck relations, Kking closed its embassy. Peking
was otherwise generally able to isolate its basic
interests in Africa from the effects of the up-
heaval, although Chinese prestige and influence
undoubtedly suffered. The major effect of the
Cultural Revolution in Africa was to curtail the
extension of new Chinese economic aid and to
put a moratorium on further expansion of Pe-
king's diplomatic relations. After Mauritania
recognized Communist China in July 1965, no
other African government entered into diplomatic
rdations with Peking for over five years.
In 1969, the restoration of order at home
and the adoption of a more pragmatic and flexi-
ble approach to foreign policy laid the ground-
work for a renewal of China's campaign to
increase its presence and influence in Africa.
Chinese ambassadors began returning to their
posts. Peking's economic effort on the continent
was given new impetus; in 1970, China extended
$452.8 million in new economic aid to African
regimes, far excecding its previous aid to Atrica.
The commitment to finance and build the Tan-
zania-Zambia railway accounted for most of this
total ($401.2 million), but Guinea ($10 million)
and Sudan ($41.6 million) were given a slice of
the pie. Continuing its version of dollar diplo-
macy into 1971, China extended new economic
aid to Somalia ($109 million), Ethiopia ($84 mil-
lion), Sudan ($40 million), Algeria ($40 million)
and Mauritania ($20.5 million). In Mali, Peking
indicated its interest in financing and constructing
the $100 million ManantaIN darn project.
A New Approach to Revolution
Since 1969, Peking's answer to the problem
of differences between the demands of its African
policy conducted in a world of nation states and
the demands of its revolutionary ideology has
been to downplay the ideological factor and to
operate on a more pragmatic basis. In effect, the
goal of social revolution has been retained but put
off into the indefinite future. Chinese policy now
emphasizes the cultivation of good state-to-state
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'(b)(3)
African Countries Recognizing People's ReputAc of China
�
SPANISH
SAHARA,'
OAMEIM
PORT CI
MOROCC
ALGERIA
MAURITANIA
GUINEA
31100* 1103!
IJOE114;,
Chinese Economic Aid
Commitments to Africa'
To 1371
1971
Alge-la
52.0
40.0
Chad
A
Congo
25.2
20.0
Egypt
105.7
Ethiopia
84.0
Equatorial Guinea
N/A
Ghana
42.0
Guinea
79.5
Kenya
17.9
lAali
53.0
Mauritania
43
20.5
Somali Republic
2,.3
109.0
Sudan
41.8
40.0
Tanzania
255.0
.7
Uganda
15.0
Zambia
217.4
552586 2-72 CIA
Special Report
'In millions of U.S dollars
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
1E0 GUI4A
.0ARON
ANGOLA
(Port.)
souti4�AresT
AFRICA
,
WALVIS RAY j (intemaL
Tem) '
- 4 -
EGYPT
REPUBLICH
.*r7
SOUTH AFRICA , �
, . , .
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
TANZANIA
MOZAMSIOUE
(Port.)
F.T.A.I.
SOMALI
REPUBLYC
MALAGASY
!RErUSLiC
C= Full recognition Ineuding diplomatic
relations
[Ea Recognizes Peking, but does not
maintain diplomatic relations
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relations with any government willing to recog-
nize Mao's regime as the sole legitimate govern-
ment of China. No ideological strings are
attached, and Peking does not demand that other
governments support its position vis-a-vis the
USSR. Communist China's leadership apparently
accepts the fact that non-Communist, nationalist
regimes are in power throughout Africa and are
likely to remain indefinitely. Naturally, the Chi-
nese are pleased when an African regime adopts a
radical position, as in Guinea or Congo (Brazza-
ville). Nevertheless, while publicly applauding
such measures as the nationalization of various
sectors of the African economy, Peking has
demonstrated considerable private caution. Chi-
nese officials have warned various African regimes
of the dangers of going too far, too fast in
remaking their economies. Chinese spokesmen
also have reminded African leaders hungry for
economic aid that China's capacity to help them
is limited, implying that they should not cut
themselves off from other sources of assistance.
China's adoption of a flexible, nragmatic
policy emphasizing good state relations has pzid
off in wider acceptarce of Mao's regime by Afri-
can states. In turn, diplomatic recognition by
African governments helps buttress the interna-
tional legitimacy of the Peking government and
undermine that ot its rival on Taiwan. African
regimes are encouraged to believe that they can
do business with Peking without fear of Chinese-
sponsored subversion. In the long run, the Chi-
nese obviously hope that increased international
prestige and acceptance will be translated into
support For Peking's moves directed at altering its
power relationships with the US and the Soviet
Union.
Peking loses no opportunity to establish the
image of China as a champion of third-world�
hence, African�interests against those of the two
superpowers. Chinese propaganda hits hard on the
theme that Washington and Moscow are "con-
tending and colluding" in order to divide the
world between them, that Soviet and US eco-
nomic and military aid are given with ulterinr
motives, and that Afro-Asian (and Latin Ameri-
can) countries should "get united" to oppose the
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schemes of the two superpowers to block the
attainment of complete political and economic
independence. Peking, which repeatedly pledges
never to behave as a superpower, looks for con-
crete issues of importance to Africans on which
China can take the lead. For example, China
supports African anti-colonial moves in the UN,
approved the Security Council decision to hold a
session on African problems in Addis Ababa, and
keeps up a drumf ire of criticism against the white
governments in Rhodesia and South Africa. Ii
possible, Peking attempts to select issues that
involvJ the interests of as wide a range of third-
world countries as possible. Thus, Chinese sup-
port of the claim of several African countries to a
200-nautical-mile limit for territorial waters, a
matter of even greater concern to most South
American states, was included in the communique
of July 1971 summarizing the visit of a govern-
ment delegation from Sierra Leone. Later the
same month, the communique marking the end of
the visit of the Algerian foreign minister called for
a "Mediterranean for the Mediterranean states,"
obliquely criticizing the presence of both the US
and Soviet fleets ii the area.
Current Chinese pronouncements stress the
African states' struggle to protect their sover-
eignty and interests in the face of "imperialism,
neo-colonialism, and racism." Peking is fully
aware of the damage done to its position in Africa
by its past association with subversive move-
ments. The C"inese quickly, and probably truth-
fully, denied charges made in the summer of 1971
by Uganda's President Amin that they were aiding
exiled President Obote in his plans to return to
power. They have told the Tanzanian Govern-
ment that if any Chinese personnel there step out
of line, the authorities in Dar es Salaam have only
to say the word and the offender will be sent
home immediately. There is no good current evi-
dence that Peking is offering material or propa-
ganda support to any movements aimed at ove, -
throwing black or Arab regimes in Africa. Indeed,
as demonstrated by Chinese criticism of the
Soviet Union's alleged meddling in the internal
affairs of the Sudan, Peking is attempting to turn
the tables on those who continue to label it
subversive. In a recent Li; z-ntersation, Sudanese
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President Numayri contrasted Chinese "correct-
ness" on the issue of subversion with what he
believed to be the unsavory record of the USSR.
Liberation Movements
China maintains the revolutionary basis of
its African policy by supporting liberation move-
ments directed against white rule in Portuguese
Africa, Rhodesia, and the Republic of South
Africa. Peking furnishes arms and training co the
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) eased
!n Tanzania, and a small amount of arms have
been given to the rebels in Portuguese Guinea.
The FRELIMO leader, Samora Moises Machel,
visited Peking in late summer 1971, and further
Chinese aid probably was discussed. The Chinese
have given limited amounts of aid to two smaller
groups, the Mozambique Revolutionary Com-
mittee and the Partisan Liberation Union of
Mozambique, in an effort to maintain wide con-
tads within the anti-Portuguese liberation move-
ments.
The chairman of the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola made his pilgrimage to
Peking in July 1971, and he may have secured
promises of Chinese support in the form of sup-
plies and training by Chinese instructors in Tan-
zania. The Chinese also have given token amounts
of aid to the National Union for Total Inde-
pendence of Angola. Peking furnishes funds and
military training in Tanzania to the Zimbabwe
African National Union, an organization seeking
the overthrow of the present regime in Rhodesia.
Ideological and organizational splits have
undermimid the political and military impact of
the various liberation movements, particularly
those in Rhodesia, and Peking probably discounts
their ability to overthrow colonial or white rule in
the foreseeable future. After seeing their aid to
various African revolutionaries frittered away in
the early and mid-1960s, the Chinese apparently
have decided to give only relatively modest
amounts of aid to such groups, at least until these
organizations prove to have created effective,
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well-disciplined movements with a chance of
eventual success.
Chinese influence among the African libera-
tion movements faces several limiting factors.
Many of the movements, such as in Portuguese
Guinea, receive aid from the USSR which their
leaders are loath to jeopardize. The thought of
Mao Tse-tung may inspire some African leaders
intellectually and emotionally and interest them
as a general guide to military and political action
in a "people's war," but none of these leaders is
an out-and-out Maoist, and all are ardent national-
ists. None of them appears susceptible to firm
Chinese control, even if Peking should attempt to
exert it. Finally, Chinese efforts to influence the
liberation movements are restricted by the atti-
tudes of the African states that play host to the
rebels. For example, in view of Peking's efforts to
court the Nyerere regime, it is highly unlikely
that the Chinese would go against his wishes in
dealing with FRELIMO.
Given these limitations, which are aggravated
by China's remoteness from the scene of action,
the Chinese are contenting themselves with being
more of an inspirational force to the movements.
Chinese propaganda stresses the necessity for each
movement to be self-reliant, to build a base of
local popular support, and to adopt its tactics to
the local social and political environment.
The Chinese have no qualms about u,ducing
or even abandoning their propaganda or material
support of an African liberation ,novement, if
such an action helps cement good relations with
an African government. Peking ceased propa-
gandizing for the Eritrean Liberation Front sev-
eral months before China began recognition talks
with Ethiopia, and, since the establishment of
diplomatic relations, Peking has severely cut back
and probably ended support for the Eritrean
rebels. Suspension of aid, never very great in
absolute terms, was one of the main conditions
set by Ethiopia as the price of recognition, and
the Chinese apparently paid the price with alac-
rity in order to gain a presence in an important
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African state. During Emperor Haile Selassie's
visit to Peking in October 1971, the Chinese lead-
ership emphatically reassured their guest that
their aid to the Eritrean Liberation Front had
ended.
African Communists
Peking's decision to accept the necessity of
dealing with the existing African nationalist
regimes is paralleled by a decision to write off as a
potential source of support the few existing�and
in almost every case illegal�African Communist
parties. Most of the parties have generary been
ineffectual and have lined up behind Moscow in
the Sino-Soviet ideological split, making it easier
for the Chinese to write them off as revisionists.
Peking's utter indifference to African Communist
parties is illustrated by its reacticn to the fate of
the Sudanese Communists. China did not join the
Soviet and East European chorus protesting Presi-
dent Numayri's violent suppression of the Sudan-
ese party. On the contrary, according to Numayri,
the Chinese sent him a "good luck" message on
the occasion of his countercoup. The Chinese
ambassador was the first foreign representative
received by him after his restoration to power.
Peking has nearly doubled its economic assistance
to his regime and has signed a military protocol
with Khartoum. Chinese national interest in gain-
ing influence at the expense of the USSR in a
major African state clearly overrode ideological
considerations.
If Peking has written off the existing Com-
munist parties, there is still the question of why
the Chinese have made no great effort to en-
courage the formation of pro-Peking Communist
movements in Africa. One deterrent to such a
move is the bias toward "European Communism"
in the African movement. Particularly in French-
speaking Africa, most of the recruits to Com-
munist or other ultraradical views have undergone
ideological conversion under European influence.
During the colonial era, the embryonic African
Communist parties were in a sense an extension
overseas of the Communist movements in the
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metropole. An equally strong factor is Peking's
view of the prospects of African Communism.
The Chinese very likely do not regard the sdua-
tion as ripe for the launching of African Com-
munist parties, which in their view cannot be
organized from outside but must evolve according
to the circumstances in each state. Rather than
engage in futile efforts to encourage chimerical
Communist movements, Peking has chosen to
support selected radical African leaders or nation-
alist movements and to await developments more
favorable to the organization of pro-Chinese par-
ties.
The Economic Sweetener
Since the renewed expansion of Chinese
activity in Africa in 1970, most of China's new
economic aid has gone to regimes that already
have recognized the People's Republic. In part,
this generosity is meant to impress African leaders
who do not recognize China with the tangible
benefits to be gained by good relations. Ethiopia
and Equatorial Guinea concluded economic aid
agreements with China within a year after recog-
nizing Peking. Chinese diplomats in Cameroon
have broadly hinted that their government is will-
ing to entertain a request for assistance, and the
Chinese Communist ambassador in Nigeria has
suggested the conclusion of trade and economic
aid agreements between the two countries. Peking
uses its foreign aid as more than just a lure for
recognition. Provision of aid helps project an
image of a dynamic, expanding, and modern
Chinese economy that will serve both as an in-
spiration and source of help for underdeveloped
nations.
The Chinese are well-suited by experience
and the level of their technology to build basic
projects�roads, railroads, dams, ports, light in-
dustry, and agricultural and medical facilities�so
badly needed by many African nations. The tech-
nologically more sophisticated Western donors
often will not match Peking's financial terms,
which include mainly no interest credits with
repayment over a long term following a
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substantial grace period. Chinese aid has been well
received by most of its African recipients. The
Chinese have a reputation for hard work, fru-
gality, and living within the local economy. The
scarcity of African complaints about Chinese
ideological proselytizing in connection with the
aid programs suggests that Peking is treading with
circumspection. Moreover, the Chinese are willing
to undertake economically dubious projects if
they believe that the political gains will justify the
burden. A case in point is the decision to finance
and build the Tanzania-Zambia railway at a cost
of $400 million. In addition to its direct utility,
the railway is a showcase demonstration of the
Chinese ability to handle a large-scale project
under the difficult conditions of the African
interior.
China's economic competition with the West
or the USSR is limited by its own economic
deficiencies. In Africa, Chinese economic aid has
surpassed that given by the Soviet Union in only
seven countries. The immense cost of the Tanzam
railway has enabled Peking to outdistance Mos-
cow in Tanzania and Zambia. China is the largest
Communist aid donor to Congo (Brazzaville), and
a $109-million aid package negotiated with the
Somali Republic makes the Chinese the major
source of aid there next to Italy. Peking also has
topped the Soviet aid level in Sudan and Mau-
ritania. Half of the small loan given to the Central
African Republic in 1964 remains unused. Bangui
broke diplomatic relations with Peking early in
1965. On the other hand, China's total economic
effort in Africa through 1971 ($1,146 million)
pales in comparison with the USSR's $2,519.5
million in grants or loans during the same period.
Most African states also retain important eco-
nomic ties with their former colonial rulers; there
is still considerable French economic interest in
west and central Africa, and the United Kingdom
is an important trade partner for its former Afri-
can possessions, including Tanzania and Zambia.
Chinese aid activities, particularly in Ethiopia and
Somalia, have succeeled in arousing Soviet
apprehension. Moscow's representatives have
attempted to blacken Peking's new pragmatic
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image by recalling past Chinese association with
subversion and, on occasion, by meeting the
Chinese in head-on competition, as in Somalia,
where the recent Soviet agreement to finance a
large agricultural development project obviously
is meant to offset increased Chinese economic
aid.
Moscow's competition probably will not
deter an increasing number of African regimes
from seeking Chinese economic assistance in the
future. Almost all African regimes profess to fol-
low a nonaligned foreign policy, and acceptance
of Chinese aid helps reinforce this image. Al-
though there probably are few African leaders
who have any illusions about China's ability to
replace the West or the USSR as an economic
patron, Peking's assistance is welcome, not only
in its own right but also as a device to counter-
balance any Western or Soviet presence, and as a
bargaining tool with which to negotiate elsewhere
for more aid on better terms. The Malian regime,
for example, appears to be trying to play off
China, France, and the USSR in an effort to
secure greater economic aid.
Military Aid
Peking's use of military aid as a supplement
to its larger economic effort is more sparing.
Tanzania and possibly Sierra Leone are now the
only African states dependent on China for most
of their new military equipment. President
Nyerere, fearing eventual Portuguese retaliation
for his support of FRELIMO, has agreed to
receive, free of charge, about $12 million worth
of Chinese equipment (tanks, trucks, jet aircraft,
artillery, patrol boats, small arms, and ammuni-
tion), much of which 172s already been delivered.
The Chinese also are building a base for the Tan-
zanian Navy at Dar es Salaam and a major airfield.
Chinese instructors provide military training in
Tanzania, and Tanzanian naval and air force per-
sonnel have received military instruction in China.
In addition, the Chinese have been asked to help
train the new Tanzanian popular militia.
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Apart from Tanzania, no African govern-
ment has received large amounts of military aid
from Peking since 1960. Ihe agreement con-
cluded in July 1971 between China and Guinea
calls for Peking to supply only several small patrol
boats and an undetermined amount of arms and
ammunition. Despite the signing of a military aid
agreement with Congo (Brazzaville) in September
1971�which will bring in Clinese tanks and
"heavy equipment," and send some military
personnel to China for training�the Congolese
receive most of their military equipment from the
USSR. The Chinese have been well received, how-
ever, garnering considerable prestige from a
modest amount of aid. Sierra Leone has received
some small arms and ammunition and reportedly
will receive some helicopters, gunboats, and more
small arms. Zambia recently received its first ship-
ment of small arms from China.
Prospectus
Locked in a competition with the US and
the USSR in the changing world power balance,
Peking is likely to continue to take advantage of
Africa's und,ritaveloped economies and endemic
political instability to expand its influence and
secure African political support. How well the
Chinese do will depend on a number of factors.
Fifteen years of expanding involvement in Africa
have given Peking certain intangible assets�
experience in the area, contacts with several
important African leaders, such as Nyerere and
Kaunda, and a greater understanding of the
region's complex social and political structure.
These assets have not always been well used�
witness the setbacks dealt the Chinese during the
mid-1960s�but Peking's increasing experience in
Africa suggests that its policies and activities there
are likely to become more sophisticated in the
years ahead. The turn toward a pragmatic policy
after 1969 has paid off in an expanding Chinese
presence, yet Peking, by backing selected national
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liberation groups, has managed to retain its revo-
lutionary aura.
Transforming these assets into long-term
political gains is a more uncertain process. The
Chinese must continue to make good on their
promises of economic aid and to show African
!eaders that China's support is valuable in attain-
ing their sometimes com peting national objec-
tives. A major factor shaping the future of China
in Africa is, of course, the unpredictability of
events on the continent itself. The fall of
Nkrumah, which wiped out the political gains
Peking had made in Ghana, and the failure last
year of the attempted coup in the Sudan, which
opened up a new opportunity for e/panding
Chinese influence, are cases in point.
So far, China's ability to influence develop-
ments in Africa has been very limited. No African
regime or liberation movement appears about to
adopt the Maoist model of society in toto, and,
given the intensity of the African desire for
independence, it is unlikely that any African
regime will allow itself to become completely
dependent on Peking. African leaders are more
likely to become increasingly skillful in balancing
the competing pressures from the West, the
USSR, and China.
But as long as Peking supports important
African objectives, avoids a repetition of med-
dling in subversive activities within black and
Arab African nations, and offers cheap economic
and military aid, it probably wiil continue to
make modest gains. In such a context, the view of
a skeptical Soviet diplomat in Ethiopia�that for
years the Ethiopians had milked the US, had
attempted to milk the USSR, but now have found
a new cow and will milk it as dry as possible�may
come to reflect much of the reality of Peking's
African adventure.
(b)(3)
- 9 - 25 February 1972
roved for Release: 2022/09/27 CO2907888