PRINCETON CONSULTANTS' DISCUSSION ON 30 SEPTEMBER AND 1 OCTOBER 1953 OF NIE-90, NIE-95, AND NIE-99 (IN DRAFT)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02904978
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: October 7, 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7 Ootober 1953
STAFF MINORANDTDI NO. 395
&MOTs Princeton Consultants Discussion on 30 September
and 1 October 1953 of NIE-900 NIE-95, and
NIE-99 (in draft).
MajzogLaSsgga.Wle_mtjag
Abbot Smith
George F. Unman
Philip Mosel,'
Richard Bissell
Gordon Gray
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Homan Armour
Charles B. Paha
Col. G. A. Lincoln
Calvin Hoover
T. Cuyler Young
Levis V. Thomas
Board of N4tiona1 Estimates
Sherman Kent
Joseph Strayer
Ogige of Intelligence R
Boris Klosson
(b)(3)
sear
Staff MeMbergt Bpard of Netimpol Es Imam
Willi= O. Webb
(b)(3)
DOCUMENT NO.
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. tn
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
DATE:
(b)(3)
Robert Korner
Charles Cremeans
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PRISM= CONSULTANTS' DISCUSSION ON 30 SEPTETBER AND
1 OCTOBER 1953 OF:
NIE.J90: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID.1955
NIE-95: PROBABLE SOVIET BLOC COURSES OF ACTION
THROU(1111AD.1955
N1E-99: THEUaRLD SITUATION THROUGH 1955 (in draft)
Discussion of NIE0s 900 95 and 99 at Princeton on
30 September and 1 October revealed general agreement amorg
the consultants on the fundamental ideas in the three papers.
Talk, ranged over the whole area of Soviet policy since the
death of Stalin and its probable future consequences. There
was no consistent alignment of the consultants and majority
and minority groupings did not appear. The report that
follows does not give an account of the �mime of the die.
cunsion as it actually teak place, but attempts to present
the mein positions taken on the principal toplos diecussea.
I. SOVIET DOMESTIC POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
1. Reason* for the Itelmat_pr new emata.g. d_copeetil
mUsgt ja_Valuastaatm
The consultants agreed that the new Soviet agricultural
policy and the new emphasis upon consumer goods reflects the
ohange in Soviet loaderehip after:St.nlinls death. T....e7-.agreed
that low agricultural production aid lee living standards
probably required correction, but did not feel that the regime
was acting in desperation. The (museums was that the regime
has decided that conditions are favorable for measures to
correct deficiencies and raise popular morale.
Neely expressed the opinion that the regime in Soviet
Russia feels the need to consolidate its influence with the
people in order to facilitate its control over them and that
this need is not a reflection of vaekbess. The regime does
not depend upon popular support:, but it nesds to stimulate
the will to work, Stalin's authoritarian methods workedv. but
at great cost, The system does not actually requite a Stalin,
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Slum suggested that the death of Stalin probably had a
good deal to do with the appearance of new domestic policies
in the Soviet orbit. Stoll', demended a certain apportioneent
of priorities, which the new regime has changed. He collecti-
vised agriculture in crier to establish control over the peasantry,
even at the cost of reduced agricultural production. The new
rulers of Russia have apparently decided to angrier the basic
questions about Soviet agriculture Ina different ways and
eventual4 this decision will have an important effect upon
the regime. At a later point in the discussion Kenn= said
that the Soviets were extremely sensitive to the population
problem and suggested that this concern about the ratio of
popalation to food supply might be &factor in the USW course
in agricultural policy.
Ema proposed the hypothesis that the shift in Soviet agri-
cultural policy might not be so =hen indication of weakness*
in the agricultural sector as of the fact that heavy capital
investment in industry in the post-war years has now begun
to pay off, so that the regime is now able to divert resources
to agricultural demelopeent. He suggested that the diversion
of resources required for the implementation of the new policy
might not be very great.
Hoover expressed unwillingness to accept Paha hypothesis.
He said that apparently the production of food and consumer
goods was so deficient that the situation had -bobs remedied.
The new Soviet agricultural policy is the result of the fact
that the regime le worried about the peasantry.
2. Operation and reettel)le outeme_gf_mirmiliging.
VOW,' was considerably more optimistic: about the ability
of the Soviet Union to raise agricultural productivity and
increase the production of eonsamer goods than Es= Cr amt.
*sely said that there is probably a slack in Soviet consumer
goods industries of about 20% that could be taken up at
relatively low cost and with little capital expenditure through
allocations of additional raw materials, labor, spare parts for
machinery, etc. It is possible that in absolute figures heavy
industrial activity will continue at its present level without
increasing, leaving a surplus of resources for consumer goods.
industries. The government's control over the peasantry will
probably not be adversely affected by the new agricultural
pellay because emphaais will be placed upon the development
or the collective sector of agriculture,
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Ism placed great emphasis upon the difficulties which
the regime is likely to face in its endeavor to carry out its
new domestic policies, The government will face a real ploy-
chologioal problem in persuading the peasantry to put their
hopes and confidence lathe collective seam of agriculture.
It is the good fortune of the West that the Soviets are coup.
mitted to collective agriculture. The promise of increased
quantities of consumer goods will not persuade the peasants
to work harder in the collective sector until the goods
actually rem* the shops in vhich, the peasants trade. The
new agricultural program will pay off very slowly.
Hoover pointed out that increases in the production of
consumer goods are not easily obtained in the Soviet Union.
They have been promised Worth+ but the goverenent hasn't
'Amiable to come through. It Is also apparent that the
authorities are afraid that the new agricultural policy may
endanger their control or the peasantry. An important in-
dication is that they are planning to seed 100,000 agrarian
experts out into the couatry.
Wade expressed some doubt as to the ability of the
Soviet Union to develop its agricultural production fast
enough to keep pace with the growth of population, soil
depletion and lack of eletil in mechanized agriculture being
important factors.
3. Scelet economy.
It was generally agreed that the new domestic policies
would not produce a diversion of resourcei of such magnitude
as to have a serious effect upon other sectors of the aconoey.
It was thought that the rate of ininetrial expansion might be
reduced, but that industzvialexpansion would continue at a
high level,
Kennan said that the government will have to pay in goods
and labor for its new policy. The Soviet econoey, however, can
supply these additional resources, though their diversion
will mean that heavy industry will not develop as rapidly
as it otherwise would have. Physically, there will not be a
great diversion of resources. Lemsee agreed with Strayer that
the diversion you'd beivprimarily9 a diversion of attention.
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Romer argued that it is possible that the WeiR may achieve
greater overall production by paying increased attention to
consumer goods because in the past they have tried to divert
more resources than was economically feasible into industry
and the armed forces. Improved living conditions may restore
balance to the economy and raise productivity., What goes into
agriculture and consumer goods production mot come from
someuherey but if the absolute increase in economic produo-
tion is gr4at enough there may be no absolute diminution of
resources in any part of the ecomosor.
Aluals in response to a question as to what the new
Soviet policies on agriculture and consumer goods do to the
old estimate of an increasing Soviet GNP, said: The evidence
is that the Soviet regime has made public recognition of, and
has announced its intention of coping with, certain previously
unreoognized economic praises. Those measures are taken to
correct deficiencies as well as to stimulate production. A
ease could be made that in the long range these nay policies
will make as great a contribution to the GNP as the policies
upon which development of the GNP has previously been calculated,
4, Effep fj domestie Doltage_upor_ckes&h.
The consultants were of the opinion that Soviet military
strength would not be affected by nee domestic policies.
Bissell expressed the belief that such diversion of re.
sources as is likely to occur as the result of new domestic
policies is very unlikely to reduce Soviet military strength.
The Soviets may currently be in a phase of their military
development in which there is less need for massive additions
of resources than before, There will also be some gain to
military strength from the end of hostilities in Urea.
Stockpiles and supplies have probably been developed to
adequate levels. The Soviets will have to meet the cost of
replacing obsolete equipment, but this is less costly than
the initial build=up. They have an advantage over the West
in having completed their build-up of conventional weapons.
Lincoln expressed the opinion that the Russians are well
supplied with conventional weapons and that their present
bottleneck is not weapons but logistics -- e.g., railroads
through Poland. The problem of figuring the rate of obsolescence
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