CONSULTANTS' MEETING AT PRINCETON, 5 FEBRUARY 1953, ON DRAFT OF NIE-654

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02903570
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: February 12, 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION
75909
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
12 February 1953
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 323
SUBJECT: Consultants' Meeting at Princeton, 5 February 1953, on
Draft of /41E4165*
Dr. SONTAG began by okcing for comments on the significance of
the recent purges. Byway of ever-all comment, Mr. FAHS noted that
they were acts of consolidation, and thus offensive rather than
defensive in character. He wondered, however, whether there might
not be considerable Soviet concern over the dependability of the
Satellites in the event of war and pointed out that the present estimate
doesn't differentiate between peacetime and wartime conditions. With
respect to the stability of the Soviet control structure, he felt that
decision..making by the "hatchet technique" was a source of weakness
but that he would hesitate to say that the present situation would
critically weaken the Soviets. He pointed out, however, that the
recent purges, which he felt implied a possible Soviet shift With
respect to Germany and the Middle East, would hurt the Soviet
psychological warfare position in other parts of the world.
Dr. LUSEUY expressed the view that the arrests end denunciations
in Moscow represented the consolidation of a victory by Malenkov
rather than the beginning of a fight as some have suggested. He felt
that in the Soviet system open attacks on the secret police such as
those recently made would normally follow rather than precede a major
Ohange and would in part be designed to indicate to all concerned
what the new setup was. In his view, Stalin-..still in control but
* Present: -Dr. Raymond J. Sontag, Board of National Estimates, Chairman;
Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Dr. Samuel Flagg Bernie, Dr. Burton Fahai
Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner,
Dr. William L. Langer, Or. Max Villikaa, or. Philip Uosely, and Dr.
Joseph Strayer, Consultants; Dr. Ludwell Montague, Board of National
Estimates; Messrs. Byrnes, Graham, Hewitt, and !Comer, ONE Staff.
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-manifestly getting older and probably anxious to avoid a struggle
for power after his death-..had given Malenkov the green light some
time before the party Congress. %aria had apparently accepted a
subordinate position, Melotov's power is fading away, and all that
remained was the mopping up. He out:meted that some regrouping
of the military might still take place-..that the military nvictime
of. the doctors' plot might be Malenkov men.
Dr. SONTAG commented that this interpretation was 180 degrees
may from Kennan's view of Stalin as an old man refusing to admit his
mortality� tending to repeat himself, and depending on the divisions
among his associates to protect his own position. Dr. MOSEL! stated
in reply that Stalin has made use of Malerktarfor a long time now
end that the problem of eliminating old Bolsheviks underlying the
purges of the 1930's did not exist now. He added that even if the
Malenkov succession is called off by Stalin or otherwise doesn't
come off, the repercussions mould be confined to the small group
at the top and that any change mould be rapid and efficient. Dr.
SONTAG cited Kennan's view that an orderly transition would require
delivery of the secret police intact. Dr. MOS= thought that
Malenkev's man, was already in control of ;he secret police. He
added, as an afterthought, that one possible explanation of the
denunciation of. the doctors WAS to lay Zdhanov's ghost to stifle
possible rumors that Malenkov had procured Zdhanov's death and to
provide a test of loyalty for Zdhanov's mourners.
Dr. LANGER commented that he really didn't know but that the
Soviets were as aware or the problems of succession as we and that
it was quite reasonable that Malenkov would be given more responsibility
as Stalin got older. In any event, be felt that it would be rash to
expect a serious weakening of Soviet power, pointing out that even
after the purges of the 1930's the USSR demonstrated far more
military power than Hitler had expected.
Dr. SONTAG stated in summary that the only generalization which
could be made was that opinion is divided but that Stalin is growing older
and a possibility for a struggle for power exists. Dr. MILLIKAN
pointed out that the subject was one of little evidence and much judgment
and suggested that it was a case in which alternative hypotheses might
well be presented.
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Wreply to the suggestion that the recent commotion in Moscow
might be designed to distract outside attention and might in fact be
a screen for internal changes within the Bloc..Russification or
agricultural reorganizntion.-Dr. MELT stated that what might be
called a Soviet.centered group, identified with Malergew and con.
vinoed of a need for internal strengthening of the USSR and the
Satellites, had been in the ascendency since the 1946.1948 period.
He felt that this group would wish to finish up the sengtening
of the agricultural system within the next five years and would not
wish to undertake along war until the agricultural situation was in
better shape. With regard to internal difficulties attendant on
planned changes, however, he felt that the worst was already over.
Following Dr. MWELT's comment that the Western reaction on
Korea was a surprise to the Soviets and tended to jar them out of
their Soviet.centered philosophy during most of the first year of
the fighting, General DtzNER pointed out that Korea may have been
a shock to the Soviets but was proving to be a great asset in that
it provided a testing ground for them, forced the diversion of US
air defense forces from the northern frontier sector, kept our allies
nervous, and sapped our reserves of materiel and anzmunition, Dr.
MILLIKAN felt, however, that this argument could he overstated and
that any net advantage which might accrue to the Soviets would not
be overwhelming. He recognized that the psychological impact on the
US was heavy but believed that the industrial cost to the US was more
than offset by the stimulus to indnatrial expansion which the Korean
mar had provided. As for our shortages, he felt that reserves will
be built up again, making the net drain a small one, but that in the
Soviet case the drain of materiel relative to total output might be
substantial. General HUEBNER commented that in any event we can't now
lead from strength.
All of the consultants expressed agreement with the statement
that Communist China was more of an ally than a Satellite. Dr.
LANGER pointed out that the Chinese rather than the 'USSR might have
made the decision for intervention in Korea and warned against assuming
that Communist Far cast policy was necessarily Soviet*inspired. There
was some discussion, led by Mr. ARMSTRONG, of whether the Indians might
not be right about Chinese independence of the USSR. Dr. LANGER supported
Dr. SONTAG's view that the Indians were probably being wishful in their
piteentation of Korean peace proposals. Dr. M/LLIKAN noted that in any
event the Chinese would not be industrially independent of the USSR
for along time.
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With respect to Soviet control over the European Satellites,
Dr. PITMAN wondered about the statement that groups loyal to the
USSR would grow in size. Ambassador GREW disagreed with the state.
ment that the isolation of the Soviet and Satellite populations
would be complete by 1957, pointing out that Radio Pree Europe,
though experiencing increasing trouble with jamming, was doing
more to get around it. Dr. MOS= indicated that there were sub-
stantial opportunities for developing resistance in the Satellites
but did not make clear how significant that resistance might be.
General HUEBNER, citing the fate of those who rose prematurely
against the Germans in Prague and Warsaw, emphasised that it would
be wasteful and suicidal to do anything which would stir up open
resistance before Western ground forces eere prepared to move in to
its suppOrt. Ambassador GREW strongly agreed.
Dr. SONTAG, then questioned the consultants about the over.all
validity and impact of the economic section of the estimate, asking
whether we knew enough to make firm predictions, whether the economists'
forecasts of a steady growth in Soviet strength were valid in view of
the problems of managing so large an empire, and whether the estimate's
unqualified statements were meaningful and convincing to the lay reader.
In general, the consultants failed to respond to this invitation, although
a. number of specific questions were raised. Dr. UT-MIKAN said he agreed
with the general lines of the economic section., though he felt that
the confidence of the economists in certain data on the Soviet Union
itself had spilled over into their assessments of the Satellite
economies, where data is much less reliable, and that there were
probably other places where there was a different margin of error
for different conclusions. Ur. PAHS pointed out that the varying
use of the US and of the entire NATO bloc as a basis of statistical
comparison was confusing and noted that the estimate's initial pre.
diction of a steady percentage rise in Gross National Product did not
jibe with a later implication that this percentage would fall off as
the Soviet bloc moved into the mature development stage in which the
West finds itself. (Dr. MILLIKAN stated that the economists would
tend to assume such a levelling off but that specific instances
don't emerge from the data.) Dr. STRAYER wondered whether the
immorality of the system wouldn't eventually have an effect in terms
of graft, etc. After some comments on the emphasis on results in the
Soviet system, Dr. LULLIKAN cautioned that rate of increase in GNP was
not an indication of efficiency--that forced savings and an investment
program directed toward obtaining maximum yields would produce a high
rate of growth despite operating inefficiency.
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A number of additional points on the economic 'sett= arose
during the afternoon session. The principal ones arose over the
discussion in paragraph 20 of factors which might have serious adverse
effects on Bloc economic growth. A general question was raised as
to whether these factors had been taken into consideration in the
growth rates previously given. Dr. NILWAH challenged the statement
that the entire economic program might be undermined by an agricultural
shortfall, There was general agreement with Dr. SONTAG's criticism
of the statement in paragraph 26 that Soviet quantitative military
superiority would be steadily reduoed and even reversed. Questions
were raised about various dates used as a basis of comparison with
present or prospective levels of economic activity and about ether
points of presentation. Dr. STRAIN asked whether the reference to)
transportation weaknesses in pargaraph 33 didn't imply a check
on economic expansions and the Staff is to check, Dr. MOSFLY
pointed outs, however, that the Five Year Plan calls for sub.
otantial investment in transportation: echoing the reported
views of the economist contributors that if more transportation'
facilities were needed the Soviets would build thee.
There was some inconclusive discussion on Soviet ability to
produce top-flight scientists. Dr. NOSE= suggested that the
compulsions of living in 4 police state mieht not heve much effect
an the output of the physical sciences after all; he noted that
many men appeared to go into the sciences as a-kind of asylum and that
the institute system, with a politico as deputy director to handle
relations with the powers that be, tended to shield the Individual
scientist from distraction and harassment. He added that at lutist
one institute solved the problem of showing the necessary results
in its experimentation by drawing up its annual production plan
on the basis of successfully completed but unpublished work in its
files and then going Ahead on new but unlisted experiments, It was
agreed that a survey of the Soviet scientists now working in various
fields might be useful.
There was general dissatisfaction with the political warfare
section, some consultants expressing the view that it was scattered
and hard to follow, some stating that Western vulnerabilities should
be omitted, and others recommending a new approach or the approach
of BIE-64.6
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