THE STATUS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS IN COASTA L II CORPS - 1967/11/25

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• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02902656
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Status of the North Vietnamese Divisions
in Coastal II Corps
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2 3
25 November 1967
No. 1398/67
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defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 November 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Status of the North Vietnamese Divisions in Coastal
II Corps
Summary
During the past two years, allied military forces
have inflicted extremely heavy casualties on the three
North Vietnamese divisions located in the central
coastal provinces of South Vietnam. As a result, the
combat effectiveness of these units has been drasti-
cally cut and their ability to mount concentrated, regi-
mental-size attacks virtually eliminated.
The direct control which the Communist units ex-
erted over most of the rural populace along the coast
in mid-1965, when the South Vietnamese Army was faced
with near total disaster in the area, has been broken.
Roads are now generally open to the movement of allied
military units and the enemy's major forces have been
pushed into a posture of near constant maneuver opera-
tions in order to avoid allied offensives.
There has been some progress in the reassertion of
government control and influence among the rural popu-
lace lost to the enemy, but it has been slow, very
limited in scope, and vulnerable to quick erosion as a
result of continuing enemy operations in the populous
coastal lowlands. The North Vietnamese regiments in
the area are still capable, either independently or in
conjunction with local Viet Cong units, of small-scale
operations within and on the fringes of the populated
sectors. Partly as a result of their operations, se-
curity has deteriorated in most of the coastal provinces
during the last few months, with some pacification areas
overrun by enemy forces.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was
prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and co-
ordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Of-
fice of National Estimates, and the Director's Special
Adviser for Vietnamese Affairs.
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By dint of continuing replacements, Hanoi has
managed to keep the numerical strength of the NVA
coastal divisions to within about 70 percent of the
strength at which they infiltrated South Vietnam. Al-
though the individual quality of the replacements is
now far below past standards, the divisions are still
formidable units and, given a respite from military
pressure, would probably quickly recover their of-
fensive punch.
There seems little reason to believe that the
divisions will lose their ability to conduct and sup-
port small-scale operations until the allies are able
to shift enough military forces into the coastal prov-
inces to destroy the regimental and main force ap-
paratus. Present levels of Communist military opera-
tions, moreover, will probably be sufficient to block
any really extensive and sustained advance of pacifica-
tion in the area.
The outlook is thus for continuing, indecisive
warfare in the central coastal area during the fore-
seeable future.
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Entry of North Vietnamese Units Into II Corps
1. Hanoi began to bolster the Communist mili-
tary position in the central coastal provinces of
South Vietnam late in 1964 when it started the in-
filtration of some six North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
infantry regiments into the area from Da Nang south
to Nha Trang. The movement spanned a 15-month pe-
riod and was not completed until about March 1966.
At the outset, Hanoi's strategy called for the use
of these and other NVA units infiltrated during the
same period in a determined push for a quick mili-
tary victory, hopefully before the end of 1966.
The objective was to overwhelm the South Vietnamese
Army which was seriously weakened from battlefield
reverses during 1964.
2. The North Vietnamese deployments into the
central provinces followed a strategically sound
plan. The highland sector of this region formed
the terminus of the Laotian infiltration and supply
routes. Domination of the highlands eastward into
the coastal provinces would provide a secure base
from which to launch attacks on the rice-rich
population centers along the seacoast. Binh Dinh
Province with nearly 800,000 people and Quang Ngai
Province with at least 650,000 were particularly
attractive targets. Domination of these provinces,
along with control of the highlands, would have
provided large reservoirs of food and manpower to
the Communists and would have virtually cut South
Vietnam in half, isolating the northern portion
of the country.
3. The first of the incoming North Vietnamese
units scored a number of important victories. The
NVA 95th Regiment, for example. participated in sev-
eral devastating attacks on government regular army
units near Route 19 in Pleiku Province in early 1965
before moving on into Binh Dinh. Its actions and
presence, moreover, emboldened local Viet Cong main
force units into a round of offensive activity
against government paramilitary positions. By the
end of March 1965, the Communists had effectively
interdicted all the major transportation routes in
the II Corps area; they firmly controlled Route 19
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which provides the main east-west access through
valley approaches to the populous coastal districts
of Tuy Phuoc, Phu My, and Phu Cat, in Binh Dinh.
4. In April, the 18th NVA Regiment, coordinat-
ing its actions with local Viet Cong troops, severely
mauled several South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) bat-
talions in Binh Dinh and even threatened the provin-
cial capital of Qui Nhon. Increasingly effective
terrorism and Communist control measures were re-
ported throughout the central coastal provinces by
May. To the north, in Quang Ngai Province, a battle
took place in June outside the provincial capital
during which 13 Communist battalions were reported
in the combat area. Total ARVN losses in this en-
gagement were over 600, while enemy casualties were
under 100. Three government battalions were knocked
out.
5. To all intents and purposes, the ARVN was
forced into an almost totally defensive posture
throughout the central coastal provinces; large-scale
security operations were nearly abandoned and the
populace was left open to Communist domination. By
July, the government military situation in the area was
exceedingly grave. In Quang Ngai, for example, gov-
ernment control--even by day--extended only to the
provincial capital, the district towns, and a few
isolated outposts. Pacification activities had all
but ceased, with 62 hamlets previously considered
secure lost to the enemy during June along. Commu-
nist strength in Quang Ngai totaled over 12,000 and,
numerically, was nearly equal to that of the govern-
ment. Some 100,000 refugees from the Communist-
controlled areas were clustered around the district
towns and provincial capital. Even there, however,
they had little security.
The Introduction of US Combat Forces
6. To meet the Communist threat in this and
other sectors, American combat troops were sent
into South Vietnam. A substantial part of the ini-
tial American commitment was deployed into the
central provinces where their first tactical objec-
tive was to reopen Route 19 and punch some badly
needed supplies through to besieged government posts
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in the highlands. After a series of clearing op-
erations along Route 19, US and ARVN convoys,
backed by a division-size escort, managed to move
through from Qui Nhon to Pleiku on 23 July 1965.
7. In retrospect, July 1965 can be seen as
the high-water mark of Communist success in the
central coastal provinces. From this point onward,
the combat effectiveness of the enemy main forces
began to decline and their ability to mount sus-
tained offensives in regimental echelon, or even
in battalion strength, steadily eroded. As noted
below, there is a vast difference between the situa-
tion today and the near-hopeless government mili-
tary position in the area in mid-1965. Roads are
now generally open to allied military movements and
the enemy's major units have been forced into
nearly continuous maneuver operations in order to
avoid allied actions. There has also been some
progress in the reassertion of government control
and influence among the rural populace although,
as indicated below, the continued viability of
the NVA units, among other factors, has made the
expansion and maintenance of security in the cen-
tral coastal area tenuous at best.
8. The Communists clearly recognized from
the start that the introduction of US combat units
into the central coastal area posed a substantial
new challenge to their strategy, and were not
long in reacting. They decided to move in close
to the American installations where possible, hop-
ing by harassment and guerrilla-type defenses in
depth to impede and stall US offensives against
Communist main force units. By August 1965, a
considerable increase in sightings of VC units
around US installations at such places as Da Nang,
Phu Bal, and Chu Lai was reported.
9. Late in August 1965, the first big engage-
ment occurred between US and Communist main forces
in the central coastal area. As part of the "anti-
American belt" the enemy had attempted to draw
around US facilities, the Viet Cong's 1st Regi-
ment (eventually to become part of the NVA 2nd
Division) had deployed into the lowlands south
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of the Chu Lai Air Base. A joint sea and ground op-
eration by American units caught the VC 1st on the
Van Tuong Peninsula south of the base, and drastic
casualties--US claims ran to over 900--were in-
flicted on the regiment before it could withdraw.
10. The battle rather conclusively demon-
strated the real vulnerability of Communist units
based in the lowlands in concentrated elements.
In reaction the enemy attempted to adopt more flexi-
ble, maneuver-type tactics that would permit quick
sallies from isolated mountain base areas into the
coastal region with a view to blocking any firm ex-
tension of government control over the populace.
These actions were also designed to show that al-
lied security for the populace was inadequate and
permitted continued Communist intimidation and ex-
ploitation of the people. In general, this has con-
tinued to be the over-all Communist strategy in the
central coastal region, even though the enemy's mil-
itary position in the area has declined substantially
since the Van Tuong battle. In essence, he is
seeking to outlast the allies in the struggle and,
even with forces of reduced effectiveness, to block
friendly units from achieving a decisive and
lasting success in any important sector.
11. Although the Communist offensive was
stalled in the early fall of 1965 by the entry
of American units, the Communist units remained
largely intact throughout the rest of the year.
There was, in fact, a substantial growth in the
strength and organizational apparatus of the enemy
regular units in the area during the period. The
21st and 22nd NVA regiments followed the 18th and
95th into the coastal plains late in 1965. The
last two units to infiltrate were the 18B and 3rd
regiments which arrived in February and March of
1966. The 21st and 3rd regiments deployed to the
Quang Tin - Quang Ngai region south of Da Nang
where they combined with the existing Viet Cong
1st Regiment to form the 2nd NVA Division. The
18th and 22nd regiments combined with the Viet
Cong 2nd Regiment in the southern Quang Ngai -
Binh Dinh Province area forming the 3rd NVA Divi-
sion. The 5th NVA Division was formed in the Phu
Yen - Khanh Hoa Province region from the 95th
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and 18B regiments. The 5th Division has no third
regiment, but it has operated in close coordina-
tion with the very active Viet Cong 30th Main
Force Battalion.
12. There is no conclusive proof that the in-
filtration of all six regiments was programed prior
to the commitment of American combat forces along
the central coast. It is probable, however, that
it was preplanned in connection with Hanoi's hopes
of forcing an early military decision in the con-
flict. Hanoi probably estimated that NVA forces,
in a strength of at least six regiments, could live
off the terrain and could maintain sufficiently
secure bases in the coastal area, if they were
backed up with supplies of ammunition and weapons
they needed from external sources. It seems likely
that this estimate would have proved correct had
not the addition of major US increments of manpower,
mobility, and firepower altered the situation, leav-
ing no base area in the coastal provinces, nor
any supply route, with really adequate security
for the Communists.
13. Assuming that the over-all NVA infiltra-
tion into the area was preplanned there was cer-
tainly good reason in late 1965 for the Communists
to complete it in an effort to checkmate the intro-
duction of American forces. Although the divi-
sional-type organizations formed in the area by
the Communists during this period could hardly be
called divisions in the conventional Western sense
of the term--their heaviest weapons, for example,
were mortars and recoilless rifles--they were self-
contained organizations capable of coordinating
and sustaining operations over a wide area.
Throughout the remaining months of 1965, elements
of the enemy divisions, in cooperation with local
forces, mounted sporadic battalion and multibat-
talion attacks on ARVN units and installations
and kept the government on the defensive.
Sustained Allied Offensives
14. The significant era in the decline of
Communist military power in the central coastal
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provinces did not begin until early 1966. The first
major allied offensive operations to trap and de-
stroy the NVA coastal divisions were launched in
January in northern Binh Dinh Province. The tar-
get was the NVA 3rd Division with a strength of at least
5,000 men and probably more. In a series of oper-
ations--codenamed'MASHER/WHITE WING, THAYER, and
IRVING--very heavy casualties were inflicted on
the 3rd Division and it was forced into a largely
defensive posture. The result of the operations in
Binh Dinh was to break, rather definitively, the
direct hold which the Communists had on the local
population. The war was far from won in the prov-
ince, however, since the allied clearing operations
against the main forces outpaced their ability to
follow up with a firmly maintained expansion of gov-
ernment control and influence throughout the populous
area.
15. Government forces could now move with
relative ease through the area, but little solid
progress was made toward establishing permanent
village and hamlet security against the VC or in
commiting the people to the government in an ac-
tive sense. Officially, the pacification goal was
actually reached in Binh Dinh for 1966. However,
because of the low base from which the allies
were building, the lack of personnel, and other
inhibiting factors, the goal involved the secur-
ing of only 63 hamlets and the "consolidation"
of another 12 in just three of the seven districts
of the province. Most allied officials, neverthe-
less, regarded Binh Dinh and neighboring Phu Yen
Province as the scene of the greatest allied suc-
cesses during 1966. This view was clearly justi-
fied in view of the even smaller pacification gains
made in most other areas of the country.
16. From a wholly military standpoint, moreover,
the situation in the war against the enemy main
forces in the central coastal area was not entirely
favorable to the allies. The North Vietnamese were
able to replace a substantial portion of their 1966
manpower losses and maintain the threat of their
division in Binh Dinh, even though its effective-
ness was cut drastically by the poor quality of the
replacements and by the loss of supplies and weapons
to the allied sweep forces. Also, the better part
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of all the available maneuver battalions of the US
1st Cavalry Division was tied up during the year
in the various sweep operations against the 3rd
Division. They were backed up at times by US Ma-
rine forces, Korean Army elements, and other al-
lied units.
17. The mission of the American maneuver bat-
talions was primarily that of engaging the enemy
main forces, but there could be no thought that
the task was ending in this area and that US units,
in the foreseeable future, could be permanently
deployed elseVihere to assist in operations against
other enemy regular units. Nor was it thought
that they could be used in any strength in this
area to assist the largely ineffective ARVN in es-
tablishing and maintaining tight and reassuring
security in the populated lowlands. The rate of
attrition of American forces--a key factor in Com-
munist hopes to sway US opinion against the war--
was also not wholly satisfactory from the allied
point of view. Over 700 Americans were killed in
the six major search-and-destroy operations con-
ducted in Binh Dinh against the NVA 3rd Division
during 1966. This was approximately 14 percent
of the total American deaths suffered in South
Vietnam during the year. The losses were taken
in fighting about 9 percent of the enemy's main
force strength.
18. As 1966 ended it was clear to the al-
lies that the NVA 3rd, while hurt seriously, had
managed to stay in the field. If the pressure
were lifted and substantial numbers of allied
forces diverted elsewhere, the Communists would
soon dominate the area again provided they had
only to oppose the South Vietnamese Government
forces normally assigned to the province. Ef-
forts continued during 1967, primarily in the
form of Operation PERSHING, to keep the 3rd Divi-
sion on the defensive and perhaps to destroy it
along with other VC forces in the province. In
the course of this offensive, additional, large
casualties have been inflicted on the division
and it has been forced to deploy over a wide area,
thus drastically reducing the possibility that it
can be concentrated for a successful large-scale
attack.
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19., At the present time, the 22nd Regiment
of the division is believed to be scattered in
small groups in the Bong Son plains of northern
Binh Dinh, attempting to secure rice. The 18th
and 2nd regiments--the latter a Viet Cong unit
which has been heavily reinforced with North Viet-
namese replacements--remain deployed in Phu My
and Phu Cat districts along the southern coast
of the province. The ability of these units to
support and conduct small-scale operations, often
in connection with Viet Cong local forces, has
probably also been reduced somewhat, but they
would appear to remain a substantial threat. About
500 US troops have been killed and 2,400 wounded
in the PERSHING operation, a rate which will prob-
ably equal the casualties suffered by US forces
in operations against the 3rd Division during 1966.
20. Pacification in the province, meanwhile,
continues to advance at a slow pace and appears
subject to quick reversal. About 78 hamlets
were targeted for pacification team operations
during 1967. A special effort was directed at
Phu Cat and Phu My districts where it was hoped
that allied military advances had left an open-
ing for a solid pacification operation. By
September, 35 of the 42 Revolutionary Develop-
ment teams in the province, including those in
Phu My and Phu Cat, had moved on to their second
targeted hamlet of the year--having completed
the bulk of their initial pacification procedures.
Reports indicate, however, that the enemy is
making a special effort to disrupt the program
in Phu My and Phu Cat. According to captured
enemy documents, the Communists hope to make an
all-out attempt there to shake any renewed popu-
lar confidence in the government's ability to
provide adequate security. The very presence of
two enemy regiments operating in and on the edges
of the districts will almost certainly tend to
undercut the pacification program.
Operations Against the NVA 2nd and 5th Divisions
21. Sustained allied offensives have also
seriously cut into the ability of the NVA 2nd
Division in the Quang Nam - Quang Tin area, and
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of the NVA 5th Division in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa,
to mount concentrated attacks. By reinforcing
the units with new replacements, however, the
Communists have managed to maintain them as at
least a partially viable military threat against
the allies. About 35 US, ARVN, and ROK battalions
are generally tied down in offensive or defensive
operations largely conducted to keep the 2nd and
5th together with local Viet Cong units, off
balance. The continuing threat posed by the 2nd
Division is reflected in the over 300 US troops
killed and 2,000 wounded in operations against
it since September of this year.
22. Although there has been great improve-
ment in the flow of allied military and civil
traffic in coastal Quang Nam and Quang Tin since
the low point of mid-1965, gains in terms of adequate
security over the populace have been much more
tenuous. There have, in fact, been some recent
setbacks. On the night of 2 November, for ex-
ample, Communist units in Quang Nam attacked a
number of allied outposts and a refugee resettle-
ment area in Dai Loc district. The enemy managed
to burn some 300 houses in the resettlement area.
On 8 November, the Communists returned and launched
a diversionary attack against a government district
headquarters before again directing their main
effort at five nearby refugee camps. Refugee
facilities were also hit at the same time in ad-
jacent Hien Duc District. The coordination and
intensity of the assaults is indicative of a con-
tinuing, strong enemy capability in these areas.
The enemy actions almost certainly had a serious
psychological impact on the populace and they are
hardly likely to put much faith in government
pacification efforts until security is improved
and such attacks prevented.
23. The situation is somewhat similar in
the operating area of the 5th NVA Division. The
5th has been under very heavy pressure from the
South Korean 9th Infantry Division and has, for
more than a year, absorrbed very severe casualties.
Nevertheless, it has maintained at least a low
level of operations and, with replacements to its two
regiments, recently stepped up activities, in the
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populated coastal districts. In combating these
forays and other operations by Viet Cong forces
in Khanh Hoa and Phu Yen, the ROKs have been over-
extended and it has been necessary to reinforce
them with US units drawn from other areas.
24. The situation took a turn for the
worse in August when there were several coordinated
attacks on small government outposts in Phu Yen
and an element of the NVA 95th Regiment attacked
a revolutionary development complex less than six
miles south of provincial capital Tuy Hoa. In
fierce fighting in the populous Tuy Hoa area be-
fore and after the 3 September national elections,
21 hamlets were temporarily overrun--including 12
with pacification teams working in them. Some
2,700 homes were destroyed in the coastal districts
of Phu Yen as a result of recent enemy attacks or
allied counteraction. US officials estimate that
the RD program has been set back at least three
months in Phu Yen. This is probably a conserva-
tive view, since the psychological impact on
the populace of a situation wherein the government
moves in to;establish security and then loses it is
extremely deleterious. The people are usually
doubly suspicious and uncooperative in any renewed
government attempt to assert control and influence.
Personnel Attrition in the NVA Divisions
25. Apart from reported body counts follow-
ing engagements, there is substantial corollary
evidence that the NVA coastal divisions have suf-
fered heavy losses both from combat and personal
hardships during the past two years. Documents
and interrogation reports, for example, describe
extensive casualties and also report extensive
incoming replacements. The latter activity is
of particular importance since it appears that,
despite heavy losses, the three divisions have
been able to maintain their over-all personnel
strength at around 70 percent of that at which
they infiltrated South Vietnam.
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26. The estimated total strength of the
six regiments when they infiltrated was about
11,500. At the present time, their strength is
estimated at approximately 8,500. An exact ac-
counting of all the replacements sent by North
Vietnam is impossible to reconstruct. However,
reports pinpoint the dispatch to specific regi-
ments of nearly 5,000 replacements, while an ad-
ditional 3,300 have been reported going to operat-
ing areas of the divisions. The exact units
to which they were assigned, however, is not
clear. This would suggest that the over-all
casualties of the three coastal divisions during
the last two years have been in the neighborhood
of about 50 percent of their total strength. This
loss rate was partially confirmed for at least
the 2nd Division by a recent knowledgeable de-
fector from that organization.
27. It is possible only to speculate on
why the Communists have not continued to add new
NVA regiments in the central coastal area in an
effort to build up their over-all power. It is
probable, however, that the infiltration rate
into this region is based mainly on Communist
calculations as to what level of forces the re-
gion can support and protect. Since the Commu-
nists are clearly having considerable difficulty
in maintaining the effectiveness of the units
already in the central coastal provinces--in view
of the allied ability to attack their supply
lines and bases--the enemy is unlikely to make
any major effort to bolster his unit strength
there at the present time. That North Vietnam
has the manpower to do so, however, is implied
by the deployment of several new NVA regiments
to other parts of South Vietnam this year. In
each case, however, they have moved into operat-
ing areas more favorable from a supply and pro-
tection standpoint.
28. There is very substantial evidence that
the replacements sent to the central coastal
divisions have been far below the quality of the
men in the original NVA regiments. Both in train-
ing and combat experience, most of the reinforce-
ments are now raw recruits. This has resulted
in a substantial lowering of the combat effective-
ness of the Communist regimental units below their
peak in the latter half of 1965. They are, none-
theless, still formidable units numerically and,
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given some respite from allied pressure, would
quickly recover the capability for significant
and large-scale offensive actions. Meanwhile,
they are still capable of conducting small-scale
operations and of supporting other Viet Cong
units in such actions in and around the populated
areas.
29. As experience this year indicates, sub-
stantial and sustained pacification gains in the
central coastal provinces are unlikely as long
as the Communists possess this capability. There
seems little reason to conclude that the enemy
will be blocked from such actions as long as he
can continue to infiltrate replacements to his
units on a level roughly equal to that of the
past two years, or until the allies are able to
shift enough military forces into the central
coastal provinces to firmly crush and destroy the
NVA regimental and local main force apparatus in
the area.
30. In view of the enemy's present capability
to continue offensive operations throughout the
country on a scale strong enough to tie up most
friendly maneuver battalions now available, it ap-
pears unlikely that, in the foreseeable future,
the allies will be able to move sufficiently pre-
ponderant forces into the coastal provinces to ex-
tinguish the Communist regular force threat there.
The outlook is rather for continuing, indecisive
warfare in the area with pacification gains ex-
tremely slow and subject to quick reversal.
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14-1110U01
68742 11-67 CIA
Chu Lai
CONFIDENTIAL
uang Ngai
� Duc Pho
�
Bong Son
.Phu My
NH
Phu Cat
..Tuy Phuoc
Qui Nhon
CAMBODIA
PHNOM
PENH
�
Tuy Hoa
Ninh Hoa
.Nha Trang
Cam Ranh
'Phan Rang
� Can Tho
OR PS
SOUTH VIETNAM
100
MILES
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Secret
Secret
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NrS
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Memo Control Form
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0
04* .s.ai LLAJJII-ILA I IUN Ur MMU kULI) ,es_
0 NOTICE NO e 119-67 COVER SHEET 9 DI SO AUTHORIZATION
MEMO NO 25 Nov 1967 DATE Due D/OCI Review
1398/67
Dates: Dissem 27 Nov 1967
SUBJECT: Status of North Vietnamese Divisions in the
REQUESTED OR M tD
CentraICLoastal Provinces of South Vietnam
UKILAN bY:
PURPOSE:
ASSIGNED TO:
3.5(c)
Iundo-
china
GRAPHICS
DISSEMINATION
0 Preliminary (DDI, D/OCI, and their staffs)
0 Category Recommended to D/OC
Category Finally Authorized By:
0 Specified Other
Cat. E (Routine internal and external)
Cat. D (Routine internal CIA only)
Cat. B (Subcabinet and internal CIA)
Cat. A (Elite�External top officials only and internal CIA)
Map
COORDINATE
OUTSIDE OCI
3.5(c)
3 5(c)
2024 P
S-66 EDITION
R EVIOUS
EDITION
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 CO2902656
DISTRIBUTION LIST
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DDI REPRESENTATIVES OVERSEAS
OCI Special Paper Notice No. 119-67
Subject:Statis NVN Divs in Central SVN
Category
3-67
Control No. 1398/67
Date: 27 Nov 67
3.3(h)(2)
Authorized by:
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3.3(h)(2)
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onoi
SECRET
DISTRIBUTION LIST
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CATEGORY E ROUTINE
OC1 Sj A iPApel Notice No. 119-67 Control No. 1396/67
SUIRJECI: StatmA 401_Korth Vietnamese Divisions patc 25 November
in the, Central Coastal Provinces of-Sbuth vietnam
IN1LnNAL
7
1-6 DDT
DCI
DDCI
67,68
69
70
71
72-74
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EXEC. DIR.
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EXEC. REG. 51-53 PDB
D/NIPE
Go COUNS.
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0/DCI
DD/SL-1
OSP, DO/S&T
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(COL.) -1
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90,91
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97-101
102,103
104
105-108
109
ONE
ONE Reading Room
D/OER (CSS)
D/OSI
D/OCR (SR/OCR)
CSB/OCR (SR/OCR)
DIR/NPTC
D/OSR
EXTERNAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
Smith -5
The Vice President -1
Gen. Maxwell Taylor -1
BUDGET
7771-7-1
TREASURY USIA
Towler-1 TATFRs -1
USIB (Distribution Points)
NSA/C3/CDB
State (COLLATERAL)-15
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1967
18-22 OD/OCI STAFF 23,24
54 PTO 65,66
55-63 OPSCEN
64 OPSCEN FOR CSDO
110
111
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113
114,115
116,117
118,119
120,121
122
123-126
127
128
129,130
131,132
STATE
DDI/IRS
NMCC (OPSCEN)
DDI/RS
SA/R
CA/EUR
CA/MEA
CA/WH
CA/FE
CD/West
CS/PRES
3.5(c)
AID
Gaud -1
3.5(c)
DEFENSE
lIand
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INDICO
-1
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-1
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-2
-2
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-4
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ACDA
Kireer
NASA
-1 Halpern -1
DIA (COLLATERAL)-55 Sullivan (FBI)-1
AMAXAMRKAUXX#X
Brown (AEC)
NON-USIB (Intelligence Distribution Points)
/04WANKAUMMOR1IR5ix fOrAxARRMW2Mtlixr&
Special Instructions: Distribution
NIC -1
Agcleigaff xxxkx
authorized by
To
be
SECRET
released
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Ly 27 IsInven her
No. Copies
3.5(c)
CorTP7T
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'ROW Nise
22 November 1967
MEMORANDUM TALKING PAPER
The Status of the North Vietnamese Divisions In The
Central Coastal Provinces of South Vietnam
1. This memo was a projedt initiated by. the Indo-
china Division of OCI to assess the present enemy threat
in the heavily populated, .strategically important coastal
provinces of central South Vietnam. It has been coordinated
with SAVA, ONE, and OER.
2. The memo traces the initial infiltration of North
Vietnamese forces into the area beginning in late 1964, out-
lines the heavy losses which these units have suffered and
the substantial replacements they have received. In assess-
ing the situation it notes that the momentum which these
forces achieved in 1965 has been broken but also points out
that these enemy units retain considerable vitality and have
been able to sustain a damaging guerrilla type campaign.
Consequently, the reassertion of government control and in-
fluence among the rural population has been very slow and
subject to quick reversal. The outlook is for continuing,
indecisive warfare in this strategic region.
3. The memo probably should be given both elite and
routine dissemination.
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 CO2902656
MEMORANDUM F
9141 eto�-*
ttr,ohcd 2.r.a.�taiTia cony of revised summary
ich --Jent into some 21 co ies of Lo. 1398/67
or I. G oUr ey -Ho other copies had the
revised summary, ..nd no instructions Ilere receive
to iris ert 'them in the coldes uhich had already
1De r dist.; eil-1 ted_.
ACI).
(DATE)
REPLACES FORM 10-101
FORM NO. 101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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(471
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 CO2902656
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
28 Nov
Please inform that I invaded his
extra copy safe last night and took out 21 copies of
The Status of North Vietnamese Divisions in Coastal
II Cores (#1398/67) pursuant to in-
structions (attached). Also attached are extra copies
of the summary pages which were printed.
ook the following copies: 2,1,6,10 1
17 33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42(
3.5(c)
These copies with their new summaries
to 0/D/OCI at 0013.
were delivered
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3.5(c)