CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/05/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02901121
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: May 28, 1953

Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2901121,
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SEC INFORMATION
28 May 1953
Copy No. 61
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Belgrade embassy discounts Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement (page 3).
FAR EAST
2, South Korean army reported planning independent offensive (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. French seen facing two alternatives in Indochina (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Bidault reported strongly critical of Churchill's 11 May proposal
(page 4).
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GENERAL
1. Belgrade embassy discounts Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement:
The American embassy in Belgrade notes
that a Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia
based primarily on Soviet concessions would
cost Moscow heavily in prestige, both in the
Satellites and in the West European Communist Parties. Any concilia-
tory gestures toward Yugoslavia, it believes, will be designed merely
to appeal to such elements as the Cominform sympathizers in the Yugo-
slav Communist Party. Tito could be expected to control these dis-
ruptive forces.
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In the embassy's opinion, Belgrade would assess
the value of any rapprochement with the USSR in realistic terms. In view
of the material support and international standing acquired by Tito since
his break with the Soviet bloc in 1948, it is difficult to see what inducements
renewed membership in the Cominform might offer.
Although a Soviet offer to establish a Balkan Com-
munist federation under Tito's leadership might be such "tempting bait
that Yugoslav leaders could not resist rising to it," the embassy considers
that such a basic change in Soviet policy in the near future is not likely.
FAR EAST
2. South Korean army reported planning independent offensive:
The acting chief of staff of the South Korean
army has ordered plans prepared for an
independent offensive. The operation is to
consist of an amphibious landing on the east
coast in the vicinity of Hamhung and a frontal
a ac owar. nju. The objective is to establish a line across the
narrow neck of the peninsula.
The American army attache comments that it is
questionable whether the chief of staff is seriously considering going
through with the operation, since it was discussed in the presence of an
American, who could have been expected to report it to his superiors.
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Comment: A high-ranking South Korean
army officer earlier informed American officials that President Rhee
on 21 April had urged army officials to prepare plans to carry on the
war alone. While it is probable that Rhee has ordered such planning
to support his opposition to the armistice, it is unlikely that he could
gain the cooperation of the army leaders for an undertaking which they
recognize as unrealistic.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. French seen facing two alternatives in Indochina:
The counselor of the French embassy in Saigo3.3(h)(2)
Raymond Offroy, told an American embassy
officer that he believed France might eventually
have to negotiate a settlement with the Viet Minh
�"t�thdthThbtirden over to the United States." He believed that
French disillusionment with the Indochina war might reach a critical
point in six months.
Offroy added that support in France for the
Indochina war came from elements who were opposed to granting further
political concessions. These elements, he believed, lacked the foresight
to support a policy designed to obtain increased native support by grant-
ing concessions to Indochinese nationalism.
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Bidault reported strongly critical of Churchill's 11 May proposal:
foreign minister.
On his recent trip to Athens, French foreign 3.3(h)(2)
minister Bidault denounced the Churchill pro-
posal for four-power talks without prior agree-
ment on the agenda, according to the Greek
Bidault approved the United States position.
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The Greek foreign minister told the American
ambassador that both Greece and Turkey believe the time is not ripe to
carry out Churchill's proposals.
Comment: While Bidault's dissatisfaction
with the Churchill speech had been expressed earlier, this is the most
forthright statement of his attitude. Most European government spokes-
men expressed private disapproval of the speech, which they regarded
as untimely and impractical.
With the Bermuda talks pending, Bidault's close
connection with French foreign policy over the past eight years suggests
that he will continue as foreign minister in the next French government.
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