CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/05/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02901115
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: May 21, 1953

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21 May1953
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
V..."Britain seen preferring Communist proposals in Korea to collapse
I talks (page 3).
Molotov asks India to serve on Korean commission (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
3. USSR timber surplus reportedly at prewar levels (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA.
Mi believes one third of his force can be evacuated (page 5).
5. Friction within Burmese cabinet reported (page 5).
6. French overstate successes in Laos (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3.3(h)(2)
7.
NK Popularity of Egyptian military regime reportedly at low ebb (page 8.
WESTERN EUROPE
tie." East German Communists reportedly plan compulsory military
training for party members (page 8).
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GENERAL
1. Britain seen preferring Communist proposals in Korea to collapse
of talks:
The British government would prefer UN
acceptance without substantial change of
the latest Communist proposals to a break-
down in the negotiations at Panmunjom,
an embassy in London. The British believe
that prolongation of the current stalemate will make more difficult
any eventual compromise, and consider that the present situation
ties up funds and troops needed in areas of much greater strategic
importance.
The embassy believes that British public
opinion will make it increasingly difficult for the government to give
full support to the UN Command if the truce talks collapse.
2. Molotov asks India to serve on Korean commission:
Foreign Minister Molotov called in the
Indian ambassador on 16 May to inquire
whether India was prepared to serve on
the neutral commission which would have
ustoay oi prisoners unwilling to accept immediate repatriation.
He stressed the importance the Soviet government attached to India's
membership but gave no indication of the Soviet attitude on any par-
ticular points.
The ambassador replied that India would
accept membership and added that, in India's view, the Communist
proposal of 7 May, although subject to modification, appeared to be
in general harmony with the Indian resolution adopted by the United
Nations last December.
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Comment This is the second recent
approach indicating Moscow's willingness to use its influence
officially to promote the armistice negotiations. It suggests that
the Communists believe a five-nation commission with India in
the key spot would assure the return of the bulk of the prisoners
either during the "explanation" period or later through disposition
by the commission.
The recent Indian, British and Burmese
contention that current Communist proposals approximate the
Indian plan endorsed by the United Nations on 3 December is
erroneous. The Indian plan of 17 November proposed, as the
Communists now propose, that the fate of prisoners who remained
unwilling to return be decided by a political conference, where the
Communists could indefinitely block their release. The amended
version of 3 December, bitterly denounced by both Moscow and
Peiping, provided for the United Nations to decide the prisoners'
fate if the political conference could not reach an agreement on
the issue in 30 days.
SOVIET UNION
3. USSR timber surplus reportedly at prewar levels
An official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Trade told Harold Wilson, former president
of the British Board of Trade, who is now
in Moscow, that the USSR has an exportable
timber surplus roughly comparable to that exported before the war.
Wilson believes the estimate to be greatly
exaggerated, but warns that Soviet exports even remotely approach-
ing prewar levels would have a very serious effect on the world timber
market.
Comment Soviet exports of wood and its
products in 1953 will probably remain at about 3,500,000 cubic meters
of round wood, the approximate annual level over the past few years.
This is roughly one fourth of the prewar level.
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If the resources of the Satellites were
included, considerably more than this amount could be exported,
but only at the expense of domestic requirements. Such shipments
could depress world prices to the extent that exports from Finland,
Yugoslavia and Scandinavia would be unprofitable, thus giving the
USSR a strengthened position in bargaining for desired Western
commodities.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Li Mi believes one third of his force can be evacuated:
General Li Mi told Ambassador Rankin
in Taipei that Chinese Nationalist units
in Burma were now concentrating in the
Mong Hsat area. He said that 6,000 to
7,000 men had now assembled there and that one third could be
evacuated if properly handled. Li emphasized, however, that he
would not assist in any withdrawal before a cease-fire.
The Nationalist foreign minister has told
Rankin that Chiang Kai-shek might not permit Li to leave Formosa
for fear of losing control of him.
Comment: On 21 April the Burmese army
commander issued orders to his field commanders to slacken pressure
on the Nationalists and indicated that an early cease-fire order was
possible. No further information that the Burmese may curtail opera-
tions against the Nationalists has been received.
5. Friction within Burmese cabinet reported:
A serious split is developing in the Burmese 3.3(h)(2)
cabinet between the Socialists, led by Minister
of Industries Kyaw Nyein, and membfrq of th
moderate faction led by Premier
3.3(h)(2)
The American consulate general in Singapore
also reports that the British have received
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evidence that Kyaw Nyein is attempting to force the removal of
three cabinet officers, all of whom are supporters of the premier.
Comment: Although these reports differ
regarding personalities, the cleavage between the moderates and
Socialists is clear in both.
The Socialist group has been less friendly
to the West than Premier Nu and his followers. In any showdown the
Socialists, through their political organizations and organized armed
supporters, could easily win out.
6. French overstate successes in Laos:
French military sources in Vientiane state
that the reoccupation of Xieng Khouang is
only the beginning of a sizable operation
which will be played up as a "major counter-
offensive." The American army attache in
Saigon states that General Salan is obviously
trying through wide publicity to dispel the idea
that he is not offensive-minded, but that
ctually the French action thus far has been
no mo e an a reconnaissance in force. The attache expects the French
will next attempt contact with Viet Minh units operating south of Xieng
Khouang.
Meanwhile, the long-besieged French post of
Muong Khoua, 90 miles north of Luang Prabang, has fallen and guerrilla
activity in the Tonkin delta is seriously increasing. The army attache
states that the lack of reserves has reduced French policing activities
in the delta to a small scale.
Comment: The limited French contacts with
the Viet Minh in Laos have not confirmed the rumored withdrawal of
the Viet Minh 304th Division, last reported in the Xieng Khouang area.
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Tonkin delta security may be expected to
deteriorate still further in the near future as infiltrated enemy
forces, taking advantage of the dispersal of French mobile reserves,
increase their "rice offensive."
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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8. Popularity of Egyptian military regime reportedly at low ebb:
3.3(h)(2)
The popularity of the EffvDtian military ripaimp
is at a low ebb
This
situation is largely due to the economic distress
of the Egyptian peasants, whose living conditions have not been improved
despite the promises of land reforms.
There is also wide dissatisfaction among the
middle classes with the leadership of the young, inexperienced officers
of the Revolutionary Command Council.
Comment: 3.3(h)(2)
other indications of growing dissatisfaction. The increasingly national-
istic line adopted by the Revolutionary Command Council, as evidenced
by recent speeches, probably reflects an effort to rally waning popular
support.
There is no indication that dissident groups
could overthrow the military regime at this time. Elements in the army,
however, have for some time been opposed to the policies of the Nagib
government.
WESTERN EUROPE
9. East German Communists reportedly plan compulsory military training
for party members:
District headquarters of the East German
Socialist Unity Party reportedly held country-
wide conferences on 13 May on plans for com-
pulsory three-month physical-military training
for all male party members and candidates be-
tween the ages of 18 and 30.
American army observers in West Germany
sugge-st that the reported program may be designed to provide the
nucleus for a party militia, or that it is a preliminary to introduction
of compulsory military service.
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Comment: At a minimum, the enforced train-
ing would appear intended to achieve a maximum of discipline among
participants while forcing out of the party those persons whose member-
ship is only nominal. The current strength of the party is estimated at
1,300,000, mostly male.
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