CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/04/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02893556
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: April 23, 1953

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23 April 1953
Copy No. b
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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CLASS. cHANGF:ri TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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ECURITY INFO
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
/New pattern in top leadership emerging in USSR (page 3).
Diplomats in Moscow differ on nature of Soviet reply to
Eisenhower (page 4).
3.
5.
6.
FAR EAST
Peiping slogans for May Day ignore Malenkov and honor Mao
(page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.3(h)(2)
Burmese Army chief orders slowdown on attacks against Chinese
Nationalists (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Tudeh strength in Iranian armed forces estimated at 1,600
(page 6).
Iranian note issue increased over 40 percent (page 7).
Comment on rumored Iraqi expansionism (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. East Germans act to meet "very serious" food situation (page 8).
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SOVIET UNION
1. New pattern in top leadership emerging in USSRz
The new pattern of government and
party shifts in at least two Soviet Republics suggests that the top
position is no longer the First Party Secretaryship as it was under
Stalin. The Georgian and Azerbaijan Party Buros, which corre-
spond to the All-Union Party Presidium, now list as the first or
most important member the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
This pattern is particularly clear in
Azerbaijan where M. D. Bagirov, appointed Chairman of the
Republic's Council of Ministers, was released at his own request
as the Republic's First Party Secretary, but retained his top list-
ing--out of alphabetical order--on the Buro. Bagirov, who had
been First Secretary in Azerbaijan since 1933, is unquestionably
the top figure in the Azerbaijan hierarchy and following Stalin's
death was elected an alternate on the All-Union Presidium, the
new name for the old Politburo,
He was the only addition to that body in
March, when it was cut from 25 members and 11 alternates to 10
members and 4 alternates. The appointment of a regional Party
Secretary at that time was contrary to the pattern of the reduction,
in which five of the six members who were local Secretaries were
dropped.
His present shift out of the Secretariat to
head the government while retaining the number one position on the
Republic's Party Buro exactly parallels Malenkov's shift on the All-
Union level, and suggests that IVIalenkov's request for release from
the Secretaryship may not have reflected a loss in power.
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2. Diplomats in Moscow differ on nature of Soviet reply to Eisenhower:
Ambassador Bohlen reports a difference
of opinion among diplomats in Moscow on
the possible Soviet reaction to President
Eisenhower's foreign policy speech on 16
April.
Some diplomats consider that the Kremlin
may prefer to remain silent to avoid taking a definite position at this
time; that to attack the speech and reject the implied challenge would
be in direct contradiction to the recent relatively temperate official
statements. On the other hand, to welcome it might commit the USSR
to courses of action on which it has not yet made up its mind.
Others argue that silence would strike a
serious blow at the Soviet peace campaign, and would in effect be
tantamount to a rejection.
Bohlen suggests that some form of official
reaction will be forthcoming, possibly not immediately, either through
a communication to the United States or an inspired editorial.
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Comment: Distribution of the address at
the diplomatic level almost demands an official reply from the Kremlin.
An early reply would in all probability be motivated primarily by propa-
ganda considerations.
Factors favoring a delayed response might
include: the need for time to develop a well-coordinated line, and to
consider effective countermeasures; a desire to avoid giving advance
warning of Moscow's stand before the trend of the NATO conference
becomes apparent; and an intention to use the Korean negotiations as
a means of dissipating the effectiveness of the American initiative.
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3.
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h)(2)
FAR EAST
4. Peiping slogans for May Day ignore Malenkov and honor Mao:
The 55 slogans issued by Peiping for use
on May Day 1953 in China do not mention
Soviet Premier Malenkov. The place of
honor on the list last year went to Stalin,
described as "great leader of the working people of the world." This
year it goes to Mao Tse-tung, "great leader of the Chinese people."
Comment: Peiping has followed the Soviet
line since Stalin's death in emphasizing the leadership of the Soviet
Communist Party rather than that of any individual. It has also demon-
strated its belief that Mao's personal prestige is greater than that of
any living Soviet leader.
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5.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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3.
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6. Burmese Army chief orders slowdown on attacks against Chinese
Nationalists:
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The Burmese Army commander, General
Ne Win, on 21 April ordered commanders
in north Burma to proceed with caution in
further attacks against the Chinese National-
ists, Ne Win
was said to believe that an earl ase- ire and evacuation of the
ce
Nationalists was possible.
Comment: This is the first indication that
the Burmese Government may have curtailed its operations against the
Chinese Nationalists.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Tudeh strength in Iranian armed forces estimated at 11600
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A commission of high-ranking Iranian Army
officers appointed to examine Tudeh strength
in the armed forces estimated a total Tudeh
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membership of 900 in the army, 300 in the air force, and 200 each
in the Military College and Military High School.
The commission concluded that the Tudeh
hopes to become well entrenched in the armed forces within five years,
and recommended that known Tudeh members be court-martialed and
publicly stripped of their military insignia.
Comment: While the percentage of Tudeh
membership in the services is less than one percent, the fact that
approximately 20 percent of the two military schools are members
Indicates Tudeh's emphasis on long-range planning to influence the
army.
A successful purge of Tudeh members in
the armed forces would depend on government support.
8. Iranian note issue increased over 40 percent:
Iranian Minister of Court Ala recently told
that the note issue has been increased by
about $98,000,000, more than 40 percent
above the authorized level.
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Last September Prime Minister
Mossadeq secretly authorized a 20-percent increase in the note issue.
The subsequent expansion indicates the magnitude of Iran's present
financial crisis and suggests that this may continue to be the only way
in which Mossadeq can meet essential government obligations.
9. Comment on rumored Iraqi expansionism:
With the approach of the coronations on
2 May of two members of the Hashemite family, King Feisal of Iraq
and King Husein of Sorclan, reports indicate a growing Middle East
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belief that Iraq is planning some move toward realization of the
traditional ambition of the Hashemites--union of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
jordan and the former Palestine.
Syrian dictator Shishakli has reported an
Iraqi conspiracy with former Syrian army officers to turn Syria into
an Iraqi-ruled state. Press reports from Syria and Jordan speak of
a federation between Iraq and Jordan to be consummated shortly after
the coronations.
3.3(h)(2)
None of these reports has been established
as valid. They reflect Iraqi enthusiasm for Arab unity, however, as
well as non-Iraqi suspicion of the Hashemites. The Hashemites and
Iraqi elder statesman Nun i Said have worked since 1920 for union of
these states; they may consider the forthcoming celebrations an
auspicious occasion to attempt it.
3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
10. East Germans act to meet "very serious" food situation:
In view of the "very serious" food situation
in East Germany, the Central Committee of
the Socialist Unity Party reportedly decided
on 14 April to reduce the number of ration
cards by 1,200,000 and to ask the USSR for a respite in food reparations
deliveries, direct assistance, and permission to draw on strategic food
reserves.
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Comment Meat, fats, sugar and potatoes
have been in short supply throughout the winter and food reserves were
drawn on in January to meet critical shortages. The tight food situation
is expected to continue through the spring.
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