CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/04/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02893552
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: April 18, 1953

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SEW INFORMATION
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18 April 1953
Copy No. r)LI
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DEC1AS51FIED
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70-ya
Italta4
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOPS ET
SECURI FORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
L Probable Communist reaction to UN truce proposals (page 3).
2. Foreign correspondents invited to World Peace Council meeting
in Budapest (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3, Three Viet Minh divisions identified in drive for Laos (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on removal of Pakistani Prime Minister and cabinet
(page 4),
WESTERN EUROPE
5. British propose generous gesture to the USSR on Austrian
treaty (page 5).
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GENERAL
1. Probable Communist reaction to UN truce proposals:
The Communists will probably object to at
least three of the proposals in the UN Command's note of 17 April
which calls for a resumption of the Korean truce talks suspended
last October. They are likely to nominate as the neutral country
a state more friendly to them than Switzerland, such as India.
Two sources in contact with the Communist command have reported
that Switzerland is unacceptable.
The Communists are also expected to press
for a much longer period than 60 days in which to make "explanations"
to the prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated. Chou En-lai has at
least twice expressed a belief that the great majority of prisoners
could be induced to return if the Communists are given sufficient time
to persuade them.
Finally, there will almost certainly be an
attempt to prevent any neutral state from exercising complete control
over the prisoners in its custody and from determining their final dis-
position. In the past, the Communists have insisted on veto power in
the body which decides the prisoners' fate.
2. Foreign correspondents invited to World Peace Council meeting in
Budapest
The date for the World Peace Council meeting3.3(h)(2)
has reportedly been set for 22 May in Budapest.
About 80 foreign correspondents have been
invited.
Comment: Several leading American newsmen
are known to have been invited. Soviet willingness to allow this penetra-
tion of the Orbit may reflect satisfaction with the propaganda benefits
resulting from the recent Moscow visit of ten American editors.
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These developments, along with a recent
hint that restrictions on Western diplomats' contacts with the Polish
people would be eased in the future, may foreshadow a concerted
Orbit campaign to give the impression that the Iron Curtain is a myth.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Three Viet Minh divisions identified in drive for Laos:
Prisoners taken by the French in north-
eastern Laos come from three Viet Minh
divisions, according to General Salan, the
French commander in Indochina. He stated
that while some observers had believed the Viet Minh threat to Laos
was only a feint, he had realized from the beginning that it "portended
serious action."
Comment French headquarters in Saigon
stated on 15 April that, according to reports from local inhabitants,
a fourth enemy division was moving into Laos from the east. SaIan's
reference to prisoners is the first official indication that the opposing
forces are in contact.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on removal of Pakistani Prime Minister and cabinet:
The resignation of Prime Minister Nazimuddin
and his cabinet at the request of Governor General Ghulam Mohammad
demonstrates that strong elements in Pakistan have decided finally to
end the weakness which has characterized Nazimuddin's government
during the past year.
It also represents a clear-cut effort to estab-
lish Pakistan as a secular state and to curtail the power of religious
groups, whose recent agitation against the proposed Pakistani consti-
tution and Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan has resulted in riots and
political confusion. In taking his action, Ghulam Mohammad is sup-
ported by the army, and probably by the civil service.
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Pakistan's foreign policy will continue to
be Western-oriented, since the individuals who apparently motivated
the change of government are all pro-Western. Mohammad Ali, the
new Prime Minister, has been Ambassador to the United States since
early 1952. He is pro-Western, fairly competent, but not an outstand-
ing statesman.
In the immediate future the new cabinet can
do little to improve Pakistan's internal economic situation beyond
streamlining the ministries which must combat the prospective food
shortage and ominous financial situation.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. British propose generous gesture to the USSR on Austrian treaty.;
Britain has recommended that the Western
powers make as "grand a gesture" as pos-
sible toward meeting the Soviet position on
an Austrian treaty, even to the extent of
unconditional withdrawal of the abbreviated treaty draft. The British
do not believe that the USSR desires a treaty, and consider that the
Western initiative should be designed to debunk Soviet "peace" moves
and convince those Western elements which are impressed by them.
Comment The United States has con-
sistently opposed dropping the abbreviated treaty as a condition for
the resumption of negotiations.
The British share the French and Austrian
view that the short treaty is of limited effectiveness in obtaining
concessions from the Russians and that the extraterritorial rights
which would be granted the Russians under the long treaty could be
counteracted once Soviet troops were withdrawn.
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