DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02892560
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01546
• Publication Date: July 16, 1973

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Intelligence f I emora ndum
Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations
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66
16 July 1973
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This document contains classified information zilfecting the national security
of the United States width' die meaning (If dio Imvs. IS Co(h.
Title IS, Scctimis 7q3. 791 and 798,
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations
Since the announcement of the Brezhnev-Nixon
summit in early May, Sino-Soviet rivalry has fo-
cused on competition for Washington's favor, long
a controlling factor in the policies of both Peking
and Moscow. Within days after the dates of the
summit were announced, Peking, clearly worried that
the summit would advance detente in Europe, com-
pleted plans for a diplomatic tour of its own.
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei was sent to Europe,
where he reiterated the pro-US, pro-NATO, and anti-
Soviet positions of China. Moscow, always sensitive
about Chinese "meddling" in Europe, missed no op-
portunity to disparage Chi's trip.
The Soviets presented the summit as an event
of extraordinary significance, but have let the
agreements speak for themselves and have not im-
plied that they are aimed at any third party. Pe-
king gave the event almost no media coverage. In
private, the Chinese dismissed the agreements as
"meaningless," but they are probably concerned
that the over-all impact of the summit will be to
relax US and Western vigilance and make it more
difficult for China to play upon European fears
of Soviet expansionism.
While the Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle
has captured most of the attention in recent weeks,
Peking and Moscow have continued to jockey for po-
sition in Japan and North Korea. Improvement in
Soviet-Japanese relations slowed to a crawl, and
Premier Kim 11-song expressed discontent with both
his powerful allies.
Note: This memorandum is one of a series of reports
on Sino-Soviet relations. Comments and queries may
be directed to
both of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
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A Diplomatic Tour
Just 12 days aftet the dates for the Nixon-
Brezhnev summit were announced, the Chinese
firmed up plans for a diplomatic tour by Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fei. The tour had been in the
works for some time, but the timing and itinerary
were clearly influenced by Peking's desire to
counter the expected impact of the summit talks.
Chi traveled to London, Paris, Teheran, and Karachi;
the messages he carried were in large measure re-
lated to events in Washington.
The itinerary itself conveyed a message. By
stopping first in London, Chi appeared to signal
that Peking now finds Britain's pro-US, pro-NATO,
and pro-European posture more congenial than the
more "independent" policies of France, Communist
China's oldest friend in Europe. His stop-over in
Iran--a rather startling move--suggested a new in-
terest in Persian Gulf politics with a declining
concern over purely Arab matters.
Chi also conveyed Peking's message by direct
remarks during his visits. While there was nothing
startling or even new in Chi's talks with European
officials, one theme was stressed over and over:
Europeans must place renewed emphasis on their
defense ties with Washington and must be wary of
Soviet efforts to "dislodge" the US from Europe.
Undoubtedly to add weight to this argument, Chi
warned that of the two superpowers, the US was
on the defensive. He asked Europe to be more
"understanding" of present US economic difficul-
ties. Chi seemed primarily concerned that the
Soviet "peace offensive" would lead to a change
of the military balance in Europe; he argued that
MBFR negotiations in Vienna were even more "dan-
gerous" than the Conference on European Coopera-
tion and Security He again encouraged the Euro-
peans not to forsake their reliance on the US nu-
clear umbrella. Unsaid, but clearly on Chi's mind,
was concern that the present trend toward detente
in Europe could allow the Soivets to shift more of
their military weight to the Sino-Soviet border.
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In Iran, Chi publicly endorsed the Shah's
buildup of US supplied arms. In addition, he
concurred with the Shah's claim that Iran was
facing dangers from both the "east and west"--
an obvious reference to India and Iraq, each of
which has a treaty of friendship with Moscow.
Chi thereby implied that Peking would like to see
greater cooperation between Iran and Pakistan,
perhaps as a counterweight to the USSR's clients.
Chi's public espousal of the Iranian view of power
relationships in the Gulf clearly throws down the
gauntlet to Iraq. Both Pakistan and Iran have
reasonably cordial relations with Washington. Chi
also explicitly stated his worries about European
detente and its effect on the situation along the
Sino-Soviet borders.
"Enemies of Detente"
The Soviets carefully followed the course
of Chi's visits. Several days before his arrival
in Britain, Izvestia printed a wide-ranging critique
of Chinese foreign policy. The article stressed
that the Chinese were enemies of detente, trying
to destroy the current system of international re-
lations and to frustrate Moscow's dealings with
major Western powers. The Soviet media were par-
ticularly critical of China's "negative attitude"
toward the European security conference and Mos-
cow's treaties with West Germany. During the
visits, Soviet news media insisted that Chi had
failed to "negate the positive role" played by
the USSR in "achieving peace in Europe."
the Soviets have
been pressing their East European allies to sup-
port the Soviet line in the dispute with Peking.
Increased anti-Chinese propaganda began to appear
in the Polish press earlier this year, reversing
an improvement in Polish-Chinese relations briefly
evident last summer. The output of most East Euro-
pean media reveals a similar pattern. A Romanian
official remarked privately last month, however,
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that Bucharest has no interest in participating
in the current Soviet-directed ideological strug-
gle.
The Soviets are telling their allies that
relations between the USSR and China are worse
than ever and that Moscow will not be conciliatory
in the face of Peking's intransigence. Ti A rnn-
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Taking Center Stage
. One reason that Moscow has recently de-
emphasized its relations with Japan was its pre-
occupation with preparations for the Washington
summit, which, it felt, would curb the rise in
Peking's international prestige and bring the
global responsibilities of the US and the USSR
into full view. Nevertheless, following the pat-
tern of last year's Brezhnev-Nixon meeting, the
SJviets have been generally restrained in their
exploitation of the summit vis-a-vis China.
Pravda has referred to "certain powers" (presum-
ably China) that are trying to cast the Soviet-
American detente as collusion among the super-
powers, but there have been no direct attempts
to relate the summit to Sino-Soviet problems.
Peking's Reaction
To avoid any implication that the summit was
a success, the Chinese reaction has been decidedly
low-key. During the summit, Chinese media were
silent, and when it finally was mentioned, NCNA
played down the US angle by billing Brezhnev's
journey as a visit to "the United States and
France." The account enumerated the agreements
signed by the US and the USSR, including that on
the prevention of nuclear war, but did not com-
ment on the issues.
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Officials of Chinese-owned newspapers in Hong
Kong, who base their views on guidance from Peking,
played down the summit as making no real contribu-
tion to world peace, noting that no accord had been
reached on either the Middle East or Cambodia. The
agreement on preventing nuclear war was dismissed
as a "meaningless document," despite its obvious
implications for Peking's relations with both Mos-
cow and Washington. Asked if Chou En-lai would
visit Washington, one official said that Sino-US
relations have reached a stage where it is "no longer
necessary" to convene such high-level sessions.
This last line is a not very convincing effort
to make a virtue of necessity. The Chinese ob-
viously would like to balance the Brezhnev-Nixon
summit with a Chou-Nixon summit, but are con-
strained by their lack of full diplomatic relations
with Washington and by Chou's often-repeated af-
firmation that he would never travel to Washington
as long as the Nationalists maintain an embassy
there.
The summit almost certainly has disturbed
Peking far more than it would like to admit.
The Chinese ambassador (W(1)
told that Peking viewed the Soviet-US (b)(3)
agreements as an effort by the two superpowers
to protect their nuclear monopoly. Another Chi-
nese official said privately that the summit
could eventually lead to a Soviet-US agreement
on force levels in Europe that would increase the
Soviet military threat to China.
There have thus far been no really authoritive
indications of the Chinese assessment of the agree-
ment on prevention of nuclear war, The Chinese may
welcome an agreement that, if respected, would pre-
clude a first-strike nuclear attack against China
from either superpower. Even though Peking is
convinced that Moscow cannot be trusted, it may
take some comfort in at least the moral weight of
US participation in an agreement that would fore-
close Soviet nuclear attack on China.
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Balanced against this, however, is Peking's
concern that the lessening of Soviet-US tensions
will lead to a significant reduction of US con-
ventional forces in Europe and a decreased US
commitment to the nuclear defense of both Europe
and Japan. The Chinese nightmare is a world
where the US moves away from its global role,
leaving first Europe and then Asia open to Moscow.
In their view, both the US and the Europeans are
being captured by a false sense of detente, which
in the end will serve Moscow's purposes only too
well. The nuclear agreement, in particular, al-
lows Moscow to project itself as a peaceifll
world power, deflecting Peking's efforts to
portray it as aggressive and. expansionist.
Triangular Sensitivity
Clearly the Soviets view the agreement on the
prevention of nuclear war as the crowning achievement
of the summit and also as a possible tool in the
triangular relationship between Moscow, Peking, and
Washington. Article Four of the agreement commits
the US and the USSR to "make every effort to avert"
the risk of nuclear war "between either party and
other countries," begging the question of US re-
sponse in the event of threatened Sino-Soviet hos-
tilities.
In the past, the Soviets have been particularly
touchy about reports that US intervention had averted
a Sino-Soviet conflict and that the Soviets had tried
to obtain a promise of US support should a conflict
develop. On 1 June, for instance, the Soviet Em-
bassy in Washington issued a strong statement denying
reports that US diplomatic intervention had "averted
an inevitable nuclear attack" by the Soviets on
China. (Embassy statements of this type are not
unprecedented, but have been rare; usually they
have dealt with Jewish activities directed against
the Soviets in the US.)
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The Embassy statement was followed by press
comment rejecting the proposition that the Soviets
posed a threat: to China. Pravda emphatically denied
a report that the Soviet troop build-up on the Chi-
nese border was linked with the Soviet diplomatic
offensiv in the West. The article observed darkly
that "no few leaders" in the West would like to put
the USSR and China on a collision course and "warm
their hands on this."
The Korean Angle
Moscow has reason to be pleased with recent
events on the Korean peninsula. Until recent months,
the North Koreans have probably regarded the Chinese
a bit more favorably than the Soviets, but now the
balance has shifted slightly toward Moscow. Peking
has been unwilling to give strong backing to North
Korean demands for a pull-out of US forces from
South Korea. Thus, in April when Pyongyang issued
a propaganda blast claiming the presence of US forcos
in South Korea was the primary obstacle to progress
in the North-South talks, Peking gave only lukewarm
support, while Moscow wholeheartedly endorsed the
North Korean position. I
The South Korean diplomatic initiative of 23
June may further complicate Pyongyang's relations
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with both its major allies. Pyongyang chose to
stand pat and oppose dual membership of the Koreas
in the UN on the grounds that it would perpetuate
the division of Eorea. Peking gave rapid and spe-
cific support to the North's position and Moscow
provided a somewhat less hearty endorsement. Never-
theless, both Moscow and Peking have accepted in
principle the eventual entry of both Germanies into
the UN, and it is probable that they see eventual
dual Korean membership in the international organi-
zation as a contribution to stability on the Korean
peninsula. In this sense, Pyongyang may be painfully
aware that it can no longer play Moscow off against
Peking as effectively as in the past, because the
priorities of both its major allies have changed.
Border Incidents
With the thawing of the rivers along the north-
eastern Sino-Soviet border, Moscow and Peking have
been performing their annual ritual of exchanging
protests over frontier violations. Apparently there
have been no major clashes, but arguments over the
location of main navigation channels and ownership
of river islands have reached a high pitch. There
have been several collisions and near collisions
followed by warnings and implied threats. Many of
the incidents have involved the placement of naviga-
tion markers on disputed islands, with each side
accusing the other of improper conduct.
For the past several years the focal point of
the border struggle has been the dispute over owner-
ship of Hei-hsia-tzu island (called "Big Ussuri" by
the Soviets) that lies direct2y opposite Khabarovsk
at the confluence of the Amur a.nd Ussuri rivers. This
dispute has caused the last three annual sessions of
the Sino-Soviet Navigation Committee to fail, and has
hindered broars at the border talks in Peking.
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Incidents Along
Sino-Soviet Border
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On Border
Guards Day (28 May), the Soviets ran a newspaper
article reporting a shooting incident on the "south-
ern border" that involved several Soviet and "in-
truder" casualties. This is only the second time
since the open fighting in 1969 that Moscow has
given official publicity to a border incident_
American correspondents who returned from a govern-
ment-sponsored tour in May in the Tadzhik Republic
got the impression from talking with local residents
that minor incidents, occasionally involving gunfire,
occurred there every seven to ten days.
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The increased tension along the border does not
mean that either side wants or expects a repeat per-
formance of the fighting that broke out along the
rivers in 1969. There is an increase in incidents
every year around this time, and neither sile seems
inclined to capitalize on them for propag,a la pur-
poses.
Nevertheless, the potential for scrious frictions
remains. The Chinese appeared to be particularly
assertive in testing the limits of Soviet endurance
on the waters near Khabarovsk, and the Soviets have
displayed great sensitivity to Chinese probes in this
area. Most likely, the USSR was particularly con-
cerned that Peking was trying to stir up trouble
that would embarrass the Soviets on the eve of
Brezhnev's trip to the US.
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