AUSTRALIA: THE NEW TEAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02892548
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2021
• Case Number: F-2021-02245
• Publication Date: January 11, 1973

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CiAl0c11144A- i611)73 Secret
-
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Australia: The New Team
CIA
Secret
11 January 1973
No. 1618/73
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 January 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Australia: The New Team
The new Labor government has been in office
barely a month, and Prime Minister Whitlam has
moved rapidly to establish a new style and direc-
tion. Much of what has been done could have been
anticipated. The succession of announcements changing
the policies of the c'itgoing Liberal-Country govurn-
ment grew directly out of the Labor Party's long-
standing policies and election platform. The speed
and firmness with which Whitlam has acted are obvi-
ously designed to serve notice on all concerned--the
population, the bureaucracy, and Australia's allies--
that a new team with different ideas is now in charge.
Most of the government's initial moves, such as
its quick recognition of Peking, have touched on
foreign policy, The government also acted immediately
to end military conscription, The resulting reduc-
tion in the size of the Australian military force
is in line with the government's intention to avoid
future overseas military commitments and to withdraw
Australian ground forces from Singapore and Malaysia.
Australia's basic alliance with the US does not
appear in jeopardy. Whitlam has consistently affirmed
the importance to Australia of the ANZUS treaty re-
lationship and since coming to office has given as-
surances that the continuation of US defense and
scientific activities in Australia will present no
fundamrntal problem. Nevertheless, his intention to
chart a more independent and assertive foreign policy
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence and coordinatgd with the Office
of NationaZ Estimates.
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course will inevitably introduce complications and
uncertainties previously unknown in the Australian-
US relationship. This fact was brought home with
considerable force by the government's performance
during the 12-day dock strike against US shipping
that ended on 9 January.
Politically motivated strikes have been common
in Australia, and no previous government has had
great success in dealing with them. The strike by
the seamen's union, however, was extremely unwelcome
to the new government since it threatened to ignite
a controversy between the Labor Party's left and
moderate wings. A public dissociation from or con-
demnation of the strike, which would have been quickly
issued by the previous government, was not a polit-
ically feasible option for Whitlam.
Despite repeated US efforts to discuss the sub-
ject, he declined to see the US ambassador during
the course of the strike or to address himself to
the problem in public. Behind the scenes, Whitlam
did work toward an early settlement. He consulted
closely with Australian Council of Trade Unions pres-
ident Robert Hawke, a member of the Labor Party's
left wing. Hawke was nevertheless ready to cooperate
with the government
The dockworkers' strike did not attract
wide support from other unions and began to collapse.
The resumption of the Paris talks on 8 January pro-
vided an excuse for the suspension of the strike the
next day.
The strike does point to the problems Whitlam
will face in presiding over his quarrelsome colleagues
and raises questions about the Prime Minister's
ability to control intemperate leftist elements in
his party and government. Three cabinet ministers,
one with a long history of Communist associations
and the other two known for a tendency to make ill-
considered remarks, publicly reviled the US for the
bombing of North Vietnam, thus implicitly backing
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the strike at a time when Whitlam was trying to
head it off.
Whitlam seems to have overcome the first chal-
lenge to his authority handily. In working behind
the scenes to end the strike, the Prime Minister
demonstratc.d that he could count on the support and
cooperation of the national trade union machinery.
Being in power will obviously place further strains
on the ties between the party's left and the moderate
wing led by Whitlam. Under Whitlam the two wings
have compromised on most of their many policy dif-
ferences, but the government's lack of a common front
during the strike indicates that the maintenance of
party discipline will be a major problem. In regard
to discipline within the government, it should be
kept in mind that the new cabinet had not yet been
formally convened when the strike was on. It was
dispersed for the almost sacrosanct Australian sum-
mer holidays. At a press conference on 9 January,
Whitlam declared that he intended to put a lid on
future foreign policy statements by anyone except
himself acting in his capacity as foreign minister.
These signs of a firm, moderate approach are
encouraging and augur well for future US-Australian
relations. The events surrounding the dockworkers'
strike, however, have made clear that Vietnam could
become a major disruptive issue between Washington
and Canberra. In a lengthy and frank discussion with
the US ambassador on 8 January, Whitlam stressed that
his government's position on the strike had been
seriously complicated by its own stand on Vietnam.
In very candid fashion, he said that the new Labor
government had a mandate not only to end participation
in the war, but also to take all possible action to
ensure a speedy sectlement. Whitlam warned that if
the Paris negotiations were to break down and if the
war were to be intensified, he would find it diffi-
cult not to speak out and would consider making a
diplomatic initiative in the United Nations.
Anti-war sentiment is widespread within the
Labor Party, and the Prime Minister's remarks no
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doubt are a bow to political realities as well as
a reflection of his personal convictions. In any
case, Whitlam's blunt forewarning says much about
the Australian Government the US must deal with in
the future--a government that accepts the alliance
with the US as basic, but is determined to move
toward what it sees as more equality in that al-
liance.
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