CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02887896
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 24, 1953

Fr ed for Release: 20;17,6 CO277897tor/ro,i4
SECU INFORMATION /
3.5(c)
24 June 1953
Copy No. 6 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3.5(c)
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SE INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Italy may seek COCOM exception to export embargoed goods to
USSR (page 3).
2.
3.3(h)(2)
SOVIET UNION
VComment on appointment of new Soviet ambassador to Poland
(page 4).
FAR EAST
4. Comment on Rhee's 23 June "compromise" armistice proposals
(page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
6. Semenov reported ready to agree to all-German elections (page 6).
Vie,, Riots strengthen West bargaining position on Germany (page 6).
1r Dutch opposed to France speaking for all EDC powers at Bermuda
(page 7).
* * * *
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GENERAL
1. Italy may seek COCOM exception to export embargoed goods to USSR:
2.
3.3(h)(2)
According to a high official of the Italian
Foreign Ministry, Italy may soon ask COCOM
and Battle Act exception for the export of ships
and cranes requested by the USSR in the current
negotiations for renewal of the Italo-Soviet trade agreement. The Italians
feel it may be necessary to include some embargoed types of these items
in order to obtain "valuable raw materials" and to ensure Soviet accept-
ance of Italian textiles and citrus fruits.
Comment: As in negotiations with other
Western European countries, the USSR is using its willingness to
purchase consumer goods and to supply wheat, coal, timber, petroleum
and manganese ore as bargaining levers to obtain strategic items and to
weaken Western export controls.
The Italian government is under strong internal
pressure to obtain more of the country's import requirements from the
Soviet bloc in order to reduce the heavy deficits with the European Pay-
ments Union and the dollar area. Italy is having great difficulty in
marketing its textiles and agricultural products in the West.
3.3(h)I(
2)
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3.
SOVIET UNION
Comment on appointment of new Soviet ambassador to Poland:
The appointment of G. M. Popov, a former
leading party figure, as ambassador to Poland probably results
from a realignment of leading personalities following Stalin's death
and suggests a weakening of Malenkov's influence, which would seem
to have been responsible for Popov's relative obscurity during the
past two years.
Popov's background in internal affairs
contrasts sharply with that of his predecessor, a foreign affairs
specialist. His assignment may signify a need to strengthen the
Polish Communist Party and to supervise Poland's internal eco-
nomic program.
FAR EAST
4. Comment on Rhee's 23 June "compromise" armistice proposals:
Having virtually satisfied by unilateral
action his desire for the immediate release of North Korean pris-
oners opposing repatriation, President Rhee has now offered three
"conditions" as the price for his support of an armistice. As re-
ported by the press, these include the immediate withdrawal of
Chinese Communist troops or the simultaneous withdrawal of all
foreign forces, a US-South Korean mutual security pact, and a
90-day time limit on the postarmistice political conference.
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This information confirms Rhee's continued
opposition to any truce except on his terms, and his preference for
continued hostilities. Rhee knows that the Communists will not accept
the first and third conditions, and the second must be regarded as a
further attempt to gain unconditional military guarantees from the
United States.
Rhee's objective is to block a truce dividing
Korea, either by proposing unacceptable conditions or by undertaking
unilateral action. Technically the US has already met his demands
for a military pact, substantial military and economic aid, and reten-
tion of American air and naval forces in Korea pending a South Korean
build-up, after an armistice. He may now believe that his stubborn
reiteration of demands for guarantees will cause the US to meet these
demands prior to an armistice.
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(
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h)(2)
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3.
6. Semenov reported ready to agree to all-German elections:
Soviet ambassador Semenov reportedly wants3.3(h)(2)
an early meeting with the three Western high
commissioners at which he will agree to all-
German elections provided they are on a zonal
rather than a nation-wide basiS. He has allegedly been instructed to
cite the Potsdam agreement as the legal basis for all questions and to
state that the Oder-Neisse frontier cannot be discussed before an all-
German government is formed. 3.3(h)(2)
3(h)(2)
be a fabrication _
Comment: This
may
The Bonn government could be expected to oppose the Potsdam
declaration as the legal basis for any new arrangements, and to adhere
to the Bundestag resolution of September 1951 that all-German elections
must be on the basis of a single electoral district covering the whole
country. In any event, a Soviet approach along the lines of this report
would put Adenauer in an embarrassing position.
7. Riots strengthen West bargaining position on Germany:
American authorities in Berlin believe that 3.3(h)(2)
the East German riots have placed the West,
at least temporarily, in a better bargaining
position with the Soviet Union on the German
unity question. They point out that the newly demonstrated weakness
of the Communist government in East Germany would increase the
risks to the USSR of any unification plan that would lessen Soviet
control there.
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The disturbances have presented the USSR
with a difficult dilemma. Any reversal of the recent concessions
would destroy whatever propaganda advantage was gained by them
and increase popular resentment in the Soviet zone. An extension
of the concessions might be taken as a sign of weakness that would
lead to further East German demands which the Soviet Union would
be unable to grant.
8. Dutch opposed to France speaking for all EDC powers at Bermuda:
n expected proposal from Italian premier 3.3(h)(2)
e Gasperi to empower the French repre-
sentative at the forthcoming Bermuda talks
o act as spokesman for the EDC powers will
be strongly oppose y t e Netherlands, according to a high Dutch
Foreign Ministry official. The six EDC nations differ on many ques-
tions that might be considered at the conference, and the Netherlands
would prefer to convey its views on conference topics through diplo-
matic channels.
Comment: The Netherlands has often
indicated mistrust of French leadership on the Continent.
When the Bermuda conference was first
announced, Dutch officials expressed the hope that NATO countries
concerned with decisions to be taken there would be consulted before-
hand on their views.
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