LATIN AMERICA REVIEW 13 JULY 1979[SANITIZED] - 1979/07/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02879502
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: July 13, 1979

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
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Latin America
Review
13 July 1979
ret
PA LAR 79-017
13 July 1979
Copy
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3.5(c)
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
13 July 1979
CONTENTS
Argentina: Disagreements Among Military
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Disagreements among components of Argentina's
ruling military junta are delaying progress
on the formulation of key legislation.
1
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
Argentina: Disagreements Among Military
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Disagreements among components of Argentina's rul-
ing military junta are delaying progress on the formula-
tion of a national political plan, as well as the promul-
gation of key labor and social welfare laws. Some major
differences are likely to remain unresolved for months,
until changes in the Army hierarchy and the issue of
presidential succession are decided. 3.5(c)
Attempts by committees of each of the three
military services to produce a joint program for mili-
tary rule at least through 1984 and for eventual civil-
ian participation in the government now appear hope-
lessly bogged down. The three services reportedly are
unanimous in wanting a permanent, institutionalized
role for the military in government, but beyond that
there is little agreement. 3.5(c)
No consensus has yet emerged among the three-man
military junta on the sharing of power among the three
services following President Videla's term, which ends
in 1981. The Army is seeking greater control of the
government, while the Navy and Air Force prefer to
maintain the status quo, in which power--at least on
paper--is equally shared. 3.5(c)
Also at issue is the role that existing political
parties will play in any future government. The Army
reportedly believes that these political groupings
should play a part. The Air Force wants the old parties
abolished and a new independent national political
movement set up. The Navy is said to be considering
the creation of a new liberal, nationalistic party
representing industrialists, trade unions, and some
remnants of existing political grou s--all united by a
broad social democratic ideology 3.5(c)
It now appears likely that only a general set of
principles for governing may emerge from deliberations
in the individual service committees. Once these
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5,Zerel--1
principles are approved by the junta, probably not before
the end of the year, President Videla may be empowered
to use them as a form of reference for drafting a de-
tailed government proposal and timetable for a return to
constitutional rule. Such a plan, which probably will
be strongly influenced by future changes in the mili-
tary's political leadershi ma not be completed until
the end of Videla's term. 3.5(c)
Although there seems to be broad agreement among
the military that the government must sharply curtail
the political and economic power traditionally held by
the Peronist-dominated trade unions, there are impor-
tant differences over the instrumentalities to be used.
Government officials have labored without success for
many months to produce an acceptable new "professional
associations" law and a social benefits law to achieve
this end. 3.5(c)
The Navy wants to remove all central union authority,
thus putting an end to national-level union control of
social welfare funds. Under the Navy-sponsored plan,
the funds would be administered by the Social Welfare
Ministry, which the Navy itself runs. The Army hopes to
retain some form of central union authority, but backs a
Ministry of Economy proposal that calls for private con-
trol of welfare services. President Videla, not wanting
to offend the Navy by endorsing the Army-backed plan
outright, apparently has asked the junta to reconcile
the two proposals. 3.5(c)
Army commander and junta member General Viola, re-
garded by most insiders as the likely successor to Presi-
dent Videla in 1981, presently is orchestrating changes
in the national trade union leadership that will both
isolate the Peronists and provide a civilian base of
political support for his own future presidency. Viola
reportedly is opposed to both social welfare plans now
under consideration and may seek to obtain less stringent
labor and social benefits laws in exchange for labor's
political support. 3.5(c)
The key to Viola's chances of acceding to the presi-
dency will be his ability to force potential presidential
rivals in the Army hierarchy into retirement and to ma-
neuver loyal supporters into top Army positions during
the 1979 promotion and retirement cycle, which comes at
the end of the year.
2
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3.5(c)
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Up to now Viola has succeeded in neutralizing such
hardline opponents as Army Chief of Staff Suarez Mason
and Third Corps Commander Menendez. Any heating up of
the Beagle Channel issue with Chile, now being mediated
by the Vatican, or serious labor unrest over continued
high inflation before the end of the year could, how-
ever, shift the balance of power in the Army and upset
Viola's political calculations.
3.5(c)
3
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